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ABSTRACT 
 
The Viking and Laval cases have reignited persistent concern within the literature, first 
remarked upon following the Schmidberger ruling, that fundamental rights are structurally 
subjugated to free movement, within the European Union legal order, by the Court of Justice’s 
adjudicative methodology. Specifically, criticism has focused on the procedural disadvantage 
faced by fundamental rights as a result of the Court’s two-stage breach/justification approach. 
At stage one, a restriction of the applicable market freedom is established. At stage two, the 
relevant fundamental right is required to ‘defend’ itself against this prima facie unlawful 
conduct and therefore overcome the evidential hurdles operating at the justification phase, 
namely, legitimacy of aim, necessity, appropriateness, and general proportionality. It has been 
frequently argued that this places fundamental rights on the ‘back-foot’. Nevertheless, a two-
stage breach/justification model still dominates, even after the extensive criticism that Viking 
and Laval provoked. Moreover, to date, a large-scale examination of why the Court approaches 
conflicts between the market freedoms and fundamental rights in this way, precisely why it is 
problematic, and how it might be overcome, in conformity with the Union’s constitutional 
requirements, is generally absent from the literature.  
 
This thesis seeks to plug this gap. It conducts an essential diagnostic analysis in order to 
identify the causes of the procedural prioritisation of free movement and the impact of the 
imbalanced architecture of the Court’s decision-making on fundamental rights. Significantly, it 
demonstrates that the use of a two-stage breach/justification framework is the product of an 
historical hangover rooted in the economic foundations of the EU’s predecessor, the EEC. 
Since the central purpose of the Rome Treaty was economic integration through the creation of 
a common market, and a key tool in achieving this was the free movement of goods, workers, 
services/establishment, and capital, it was logical for the Court to employ a method of 
adjudication that presented conflicting Member State law and policy as a prima facie ‘wrong’ 
in need of justification. Critically, since the market freedoms were not initially directly 
effective and could only be triggered by protectionist and/or directly discriminatory Member 
State conduct, they were generally unlikely to interact with fundamental rights.  
 
However, crucially, the thesis identifies a trinity of significant and overlapping constitutional 
developments, all of which have contributed to an escalation of conflict between free 
movement and fundamental rights but which have also, ironically, reinforced the 
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breach/justification framework, and therefore the procedural prioritisation of free movement. 
Specifically, this constitutional trinity is comprised of: the expansion of the material and 
personal scope of the free movement provisions; the recognition of the direct effect of the 
market freedoms; and the introduction of Union citizenship.  
 
The thesis also offers an important assessment of the effects of this exacerbation of structural 
bias from practical, theoretical and Union constitutional perspectives. In particular, a trio of 
negative consequences emerges from the fact that, under the two-stage model, only 
fundamental rights, and not free movement, face questions of proportionality. Crucially, this 
issue is normally assessed by reference to whether there are means of safeguarding 
fundamental rights that are less restrictive of free movement. This can limit the legal space for 
the consideration of crucial factors including, first, the need for idiosyncratic rights protection 
within particular Member States; second, the fact that, in some situations, certain fundamental 
rights, such as the right to strike, are inherently restrictive of free movement; and, third, that 
measures less restrictive of free movement will not always be feasible when budgetary or 
administrative considerations are taken into account. This is especially true of fundamental 
rights of a programmatic nature.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the structural subjugation of fundamental rights presents a 
challenge to their status as universal inviolable absolutes that represent the basic needs central 
to our human dignity. Alternatively, a procedural preference for free movement over 
fundamental rights undermines the ‘social fact’ of fundamental rights within the EU legal 
order, which the Treaties explicitly commit the Union to respecting. Indeed, an interrogation of 
the constitutional implications of the breach/justification framework demonstrates that it is out 
of line with the EU’s contemporary constitutional framework. In particular, the thesis charts the 
evolution of the Union’s goals beyond economic integration and notes that, in relation to some 
of its new objectives, the Treaties confer only shared or complementary legislative competence 
upon the Union. This necessitates a model that permits the Member States sufficient space to 
pursue these aims, many of which overlap with fundamental rights concerns, away from the 
shadow of a breach of free movement. A procedural preference for free movement is also 
particularly unsuitable in the post-Lisbon era in which the Union is formally obliged to accede 
to the European Convention on Human Rights and in which the Union’s own Charter of 
Fundamental Rights enjoys primary law status.  
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Ultimately, the thesis advances a balancing model as an alternative method of adjudication 
more suited to the Union’s contemporary constitutional requirements. Study of this model is 
pertinent due to its increasing relevance both in the academic commentary and in the case-law 
of the Court of Justice concerning rights clashes occurring at the level of secondary Union 
legislation, and in the approach of the European Court of Human Rights in the context of 
conflict between Convention rights. A balancing methodology recognises the equal legal status 
of conflicting norms and seeks to reconcile and find compromise between opposing rules in 
order to locate an outcome that is least restrictive of both norms. Nevertheless, the commentary 
to date has not yet dealt fully with the potential practical and conceptual obstacles to adopting a 
balancing methodology. Specifically, equal legal status does not provide a concrete means of 
resolving tensions between free movement and fundamental rights when they collide. 
Moreover, balancing introduces the conceptual question of whether free movement should be 
treated as (equal to) a fundamental right. The thesis argues that these challenges can be 
overcome. Specifically, balancing can offer concrete outcomes through a process of reciprocal 
proportionality assessment whereby the relative impacts of free movement and fundamental 
rights on each other are analysed. Finally, drawing on the undeniable constitutional 
significance of free movement within the Union legal order, and its importance to the EU 
citizen, the thesis argues that free movement should be recognised as a fundamental right 
within the Union’s own legal framework or, at the very least, as a norm of equal rank.    
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PREFACE 
 
 
The law is stated as it stood on 22
nd
 September 2014. 
 
However, owing to some relevant developments in the case-law occurring after this date, 
reference is made to more recent judgments where this is particularly pertinent in order to 
ensure the currency of this work.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION: ANALYSING THE ADJUDICATION OF INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN FREE MOVEMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Introducing the thesis 
 
In 2007 the European Union’s Court of Justice (CJEU/the Court/the Luxembourg Court) 
delivered its now (in)famous decisions in Viking and Laval.
1
 The cases saw the exercise of the 
fundamental right to strike by trade unions
2
 constitute a restriction on Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU,
3
 concerning the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services, 
respectively. The judgments provoked, and continue to elicit, what is arguably an 
unprecedented response from the literature both in terms of volume and the overall level of 
disquiet surrounding the decisions.
4
 Indeed, Viking and Laval have commanded the attention 
of those working from both theoretical and doctrinal perspectives within a range of legal 
disciplines (and beyond),
5
 including, but not restricted to: competition law,
6
 maritime law,
7
 
labour law,
8
 human rights law,
9
 internal market law,
10
 and national
11
 and EU constitutional 
                                                          
1
 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP 
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] EU:C:2007:772; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
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law.
12
 Although some commentators have welcomed the judgments as an opportunity to re-
think the relationship between the European Union’s (EU/the Union) market freedoms and 
social rights,
13
 one overwhelming message emanating from the literature has been the concern 
that these decisions demonstrate the subjugation of the fundamental right to strike to the 
freedom of establishment and the free provision of services. This, itself, has invited diverse 
research covering the overlapping areas of, inter alia: the substantive issues arising from 
presenting the right to strike as a breach of free movement,
14
 and the wider consequences this 
has for national social models;
15
 the relative positions of market freedoms and social rights 
within the Union’s constitution;16 and the architecture of the Court’s decision-making in 
resolving clashes between free movement and collective action.
17
  
 
Regarding the last of these areas of concern – i.e. how the CJEU structures its approach to 
tensions between the market freedoms and exercise of the right to strike – commentators have 
argued that the latter was procedurally disadvantaged by the Court’s adjudicative architecture. 
Specifically, the CJEU employed a two-stage breach/justification model to resolve the 
disputes in both Viking and Laval. At stage one, a restriction of the relevant free movement 
provision was established. At stage two, the right to strike was required to ‘defend’ itself 
against this prima facie unlawful conduct and therefore overcome the justificatory hurdles 
operating at this stage, namely questions of legitimacy of aim, necessity, appropriateness, and 
general proportionality. Accordingly, this two-stage methodology places the right to strike on 
the ‘back-foot’, structurally subjugating it to free movement.18 
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However, the structure of the Court’s decision-making in Viking and Laval is consistent with 
its standard approach to clashes between free movement and competing law and policy, 
including fundamental rights.
19
 Indeed, the potential threat such a model poses to fundamental 
rights was first identified by Brown, following the earlier case of Schmidberger,
20
 who argued 
that ‘as a matter of principle, it should not be for those who are invoking protection of their 
human rights…to have to justify themselves’.21 And yet, the two-stage model remains the 
Court’s predominant methodology today, even after the large-scale criticism that the Viking 
and Laval cases engendered.
22
 Nevertheless, there is incipient acknowledgement, explicit 
amongst some of the Advocates General, and implied in one judgment of the Court, that this 
model is ill-suited to the Union’s contemporary constitutional framework.23     
 
Thus, the issue remains a pertinent one, and is of wider application than the relationship 
between free movement and the fundamental right to strike. This poses the question of why 
the Court approaches conflicts between free movement and fundamental rights in this way 
and, if it is problematic, how it might be overcome. Although a significant proportion of the 
literature acknowledges that the prioritisation of free movement is intrinsic to the structure of 
the Court’s decision-making,24 while others have sought to offer alternatives to its imbalanced 
architectural design,
25
 a large-scale examination of both the origins of this procedural bias and 
of the feasibility of proposed reforms, from practical and Union constitutional perspectives, is 
generally absent.
26
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Accordingly, this thesis has two critical functions. First, it will run an essential diagnostic 
analysis of the causes of this procedural prioritisation and its impact on the protection or 
exercise of fundamental rights, demonstrating that it is indeed problematic. The thesis will 
postulate that the use of a two-stage breach/justification model for interactions between free 
movement and fundamental rights is the result of an historic hangover rooted in the economic 
foundations of the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Specifically, in light of the centrality of free movement to the EEC’s fundamental purpose, 
economic integration through the creation of a common market, it is unsurprising to see the 
Court utilise a two-stage approach in its early case-law, presenting Member State activity that 
conflicted with free movement as a prima facie ‘breach’ in need of ‘justification’.27 Since the 
free movement provisions could only be triggered by protectionist or directly discriminatory 
policy, the procedural prioritisation of free movement would arguably tackle exactly the sort 
of conduct that the Member States sought to eradicate when they created the EEC. Further, as 
the apparatus of economic integration, the Treaty free movement provisions seemingly did not 
anticipate their being invoked by or against individuals.  
 
Consequently and crucially, from a fundamental rights perspective the two-stage approach did 
not initially appear problematic. It seemed unlikely that free movement, or the internal market 
more broadly, would interact with fundamental rights. Indeed, the EEC Treaty made no 
provision for this eventuality. Nevertheless, if maintained, it contained the latent risk of 
becoming, at best, inappropriate, and at worst, potentially damaging, should free movement 
evolve in a way that brought it into more frequent contact with fundamental rights. However, 
the expansion of free movement into new policy areas, for instance by means of the extension 
of the scope of the market freedoms beyond directly discriminatory conduct, has resulted in a 
‘steep increase’28 in contact between free movement and fundamental rights. In this regard, 
Viking and Laval are just two high-profile examples of a larger scale phenomenon.
29
 
Critically, this development has not inspired alteration in the Court’s adjudicative processes. 
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Instead, the two-stage approach has been maintained, even reinforced, for these new free 
movement dynamics.  
 
A central task for this thesis, then, is to unpack the key historical, constitutional developments 
that have contributed to increased contact between free movement and fundamental rights but 
that have also, ironically, cemented the procedural favouring of the former over the latter. 
Thus, across three chapters, the thesis will demonstrate the impact of the broadening of the 
scope of the free movement provisions, the doctrine of direct effect, and the introduction of 
Union citizenship on both the frequency of conflict between the market freedoms and 
fundamental rights and the reinforcement of the breach/justification methodology. These 
pivotal developments can be termed a ‘constitutional trinity’ since their contributions to a 
structural preference for free movement cannot be cleanly delineated from one another; rather, 
their respective reinforcements of procedural imbalance are overlapping and interlocking.  
 
Thus, chapter two will assess the impact of the expansion of both the material and personal 
scope of the free movement provisions on their relationship with fundamental rights. It will 
demonstrate that the evolution of what constitutes a breach of free movement, from 
protectionist or directly discriminatory measures to restrictions on market access, has resulted 
in a significant increase in the volume of interactions between free movement and 
fundamental rights. Similarly, the broadening of the personal scope of the free movement 
provisions has made a direct contribution to the classification of a greater quantity of 
fundamental rights endeavours as restrictions on free movement. The chapter will underline 
that, while the Court has recognised, in a substantive sense,
30
 that these expansions cause free 
movement to engage with qualitatively different Member State activity, this has, crucially, not 
been matched by an alteration to the structure of the Court’s decision-making. Indeed, the 
architectural imbalance inherent in the two-stage approach was not only maintained but 
exacerbated by this constitutional development since it resulted in a (general) lowering of the 
evidentiary burden imposed at the breach stage, widening the evidentiary gap between breach 
and justification. The chapter will then argue that this can result in lower standards of 
fundamental rights protection in real terms. In particular, it will identify an ‘impact trio’: three 
concrete consequences for the safeguarding of fundamental rights of adjudicating free 
movement/fundamental rights tensions through a two-stage approach. First, since it is tilted in 
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favour of free movement, the breach/justification framework seeks outcomes that are least 
restrictive of it. This can reduce the legal space for consideration of the idiosyncratic 
fundamental rights needs of certain Member States. For instance, a Member State might need 
to protect the fundamental right to freedom of expression in a specific way due to a paucity of 
press diversity, particular to that Member State. Second, the breach/justification structure 
limits capacity for acknowledging that certain fundamental rights, such as the right to strike, 
can be inherently restrictive of free movement. Third, alternatives to Member State 
programmes for the protection of fundamental social rights might be less restrictive of free 
movement but are not always feasible when logistical and budgetary considerations are taken 
into account. Although the analysis will be developed for the first time in chapter two, since 
the effects of the two-stage model are a central exploration of the thesis, this impact trio will 
be revisited in subsequent chapters.     
 
Chapter three analyses the consequence of the conferral of direct effect on the free movement 
provisions from a fundamental rights perspective. While there is an appreciable body of 
literature on the effects of extending the horizontal effect of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU onto 
trade unions or private parties, including its impact on fundamental rights,
31
 this avenue of 
post-Viking/Laval research generally exists independently from research dedicated to 
investigating the structural subjugation of fundamental rights to the free movement 
provisions.
32
 This chapter posits that these two important features of Viking and Laval are 
mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. It will demonstrate the significance of the 
doctrine as both an indirect and direct contributor to structural bias. First, in order to meet the 
Van Gend criteria for direct effect,
33
 the free movement provisions have been presented as 
‘unconditional’ and ‘precise’, while derogations from them must be interpreted ‘strictly’. This 
both reinforces and legitimises an adjudicative architecture that prioritises free movement 
over conflicting activity. Further, the direct effect of the free movement provisions allows 
individuals to invoke them directly before their national courts. This introduces and/or 
strengthens the use of rights language in relation to the market freedoms, which, of itself, 
encourages the prioritisation of free movement since it becomes akin to a fundamental right. 
The impact of direct effect is particularly potent as a result of the twin forces of primacy and 
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the principle of effective judicial protection. Where individuals invoke directly effective free 
movement provisions, national courts are required to apply them over conflicting domestic 
measures, with immediacy.
34
 Clearly, these constitutional developments make a significant 
contribution to economic integration and were not introduced with the specific intention of 
undermining fundamental rights. Nevertheless, by solidifying, and providing outputs for, 
architectural bias in the adjudication of clashes between free movement and other interests, 
these doctrines increase the latent risk that free movement will be prioritised over 
fundamental rights should they interact. In this way, direct effect indirectly intensifies the 
structural subjugation of fundamental rights. Second, the principle also makes a more direct 
contribution to this phenomenon in two ways. The evolution of the doctrine from vertical 
through to horizontal direct effect greatly increases the frequency of interaction between free 
movement and fundamental rights. It also alters the nature of the interface, requiring private 
parties, in certain circumstances, to rely on justifications, designed primarily for Member 
State actors, to defend their exercise of fundamental rights. 
 
The final constitutional development explored in this thesis is the genesis and evolution of 
Union citizenship. Chapter four will examine both the indirect and direct contributions that 
Union citizenship makes to the exposure of fundamental rights to free movement bias. 
Specifically, the chapter will argue that by adopting free movement as the core right of the 
Union citizen, citizenship has elevated free movement to a fundamental right. This lends 
legitimacy to, and intensifies the need for, an adjudicative model that favours free movement 
over conflicting activity. Within the specific confines of citizenship, where free movement 
largely runs congruent to fundamental rights, this is generally viewed as enhancing the 
fundamental rights of Union citizens.
35
 However, a deeper analysis demonstrates that this 
enriched fundamental rights protection is only possible as a corollary of the structural boost 
that Union citizenship offers to free movement. Thus, citizenship’s reinforcement of the two-
stage approach contains the potential indirectly to subject fundamental rights to a 
strengthened free movement bias where the former clashes with the latter. Indeed, since the 
free movement operating under Union citizenship is built upon economic free movement, 
such indirect support for the two-stage model can cross-pollinate across shared legal 
structures into the internal market, where instances of conflict are more likely. Union 
                                                          
34
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citizenship also directly impacts on interactions between free movement and fundamental 
rights. First, it creates new situations in which the protection of fundamental rights can be 
viewed as restrictive of free movement and consequently processed through the 
breach/justification model. For instance, complex programmes designed by the Member 
States for the protection of fundamental social rights have been challenged as barriers to the 
exercise of free movement rights by individual Union citizens. Second, the fundamentality of 
free movement to the Union citizen has raised the evidentiary burden at the justification stage, 
arguably making it harder for conflicting fundamental rights to overcome the procedural 
disadvantage they face as part of the Court’s two-stage methodology. In particular, the focus 
on finding alternatives less restrictive of free movement can inhibit consideration of the 
effectiveness of fundamental rights measures or the practical aspects of implementing 
fundamental social rights.   
 
If chapters one to four are concerned with detailing why free movement has come into more 
frequent contact with fundamental rights and why the two-stage model was nevertheless 
retained, chapter five performs the second essential function of this thesis: it considers how to 
overcome the structural subjugation of fundamental rights to the free movement provisions 
and addresses potential practical and conceptual issues arising from proposed alternatives. In 
particular, the chapter assesses the feasibility of adopting a rights-balancing approach for the 
adjudication of clashes between free movement and fundamental rights. Such a model would 
present them as hierarchically equal, as opposed to putting fundamental rights at a procedural 
disadvantage. The assessment of a balancing model is particularly pertinent for a number of 
reasons. Following the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
36
 balancing is increasingly 
used by the CJEU in the context of clashes between two fundamental rights operating under 
the Union’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter/CFR).37 It is also utilised by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR/the Strasbourg Court) when two rights protected 
by the European Convention on Human Rights
38
 (ECHR/the Convention) come into 
conflict.
39
 Significantly, it is has also been suggested as a viable alternative to the two-stage 
approach in the specific context of free movement by an Advocate General and impliedly 
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adopted by the Court in one case.
40
 Additionally, this proposed alternative has been welcomed 
in the academic commentary.
41
 For instance, Trstenjak and Beysen have argued that it is 
imperative that the principle of equal ranking between free movement and fundamental rights 
is recognised during the resolution of tensions between them.
42
 They advance balancing as 
‘best suited to achiev[ing] an outcome which ensures the optimum effectiveness of 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in the case of collision’.43  
 
Nevertheless, one writer argues that, in terms of offering concrete solutions, ‘equal legal 
status does not signal an obvious way forward when values collide’.44 Accordingly, chapter 
five addresses the practical aspects of introducing a balancing model. In particular, it argues 
that a system of reciprocal proportionality, through mutual impact assessment, should be 
introduced. Whereas the two-stage model principally pursues methods of fundamental rights 
protection that are least restrictive of free movement, this approach would analyse the effects 
of free movement and fundamental rights on each other, seeking an outcome that is least 
restrictive of both free movement and fundamental rights. This creates more legal space for 
the consideration of the effects of free movement on the fundamental rights ‘impact trio’ 
outlined above. The chapter appreciates that such a model will require the Court to accept the 
operation of a qualitative de minimis threshold in relation to free movement and will argue 
that it is for the Court to lay down general guidance in this regard. For instance, direct 
discrimination might be viewed as having automatically serious effects on free movement, 
whereas restrictions to market access might require the demonstration of interference. 
Regardless, any level of restriction would still have to be weighed against its relative impact 
on fundamental rights. It will be argued that this task should be left to the national courts.  
 
The chapter also acknowledges that there are potential conceptual obstacles to the 
introduction of a balancing model, specifically because it treats free movement as the same as, 
or at least equal to, a fundamental right. Grounded in legal positivism, and drawing on the 
broad constitutional significance of free movement, including to the Union citizen, the chapter 
will posit that free movement should be recognised as a fundamental right within the EU legal 
order, or, at the very least, as a norm of equal constitutional rank.  
                                                          
40
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1.1.1. Analysing the architecture of the Court’s decision-making: a doctrinal, case-focused 
methodology 
 
Since this thesis interrogates the structure of the Court’s adjudication of tensions between free 
movement and fundamental rights and assesses the impact of key constitutional developments 
on the formulation of the CJEU’s current adjudicative framework, a doctrinal, black-letter 
approach has been the principal research methodology. Specifically, a comprehensive review 
of the free movement case-law was conducted not only to identify the use of a two-stage 
breach/justification model for resolving conflict between free movement and fundamental 
rights, but also to site this within the broader use of this architecture for free movement 
conflicts generally. Such an approach, alongside examination of the EU Treaties, was also 
imperative in order to ensure an accurate historical appraisal of the constitutional significance 
of free movement, as an explanation for the breach/justification framework, and to chart the 
evolution of free movement from a ‘fundamental principle of the common market’ to a 
‘fundamental freedom’ of the Union. In addition, a black-letter approach was vital to 
demonstrating that key constitutional developments - such as direct effect, or the extension of 
the scope of the market freedoms to cover restrictions to market access - had a direct impact 
on the volume of interactions between free movement and fundamental rights. Case-law also 
provided clear evidence that the ‘constitutional trinity’ discussed in chapters two, three and 
four had a demonstrable effect on fundamental rights standards in respect of the ‘impact trio’. 
Since the thesis covers such significant constitutional developments, however, it will 
frequently recall seminal and much-discussed judgments of the CJEU. The originality of the 
thesis lies in its analysis of these decisions in terms of their consequent impact on the 
structural prioritisation of free movement over fundamental rights. Thus, although the 
discussion will understandably and inevitably focus on case-law upon which much ink has 
already been spilled, reference will consistently be made in the footnotes to a wider range of 
case-law confirming the central arguments posited. 
 
The case-law review was accompanied by a black-letter analysis of the Union’s constitutional 
remit as contained within the Treaties as well as engagement with theoretical justifications for 
the existence and safeguarding of fundamental rights. This was essential for establishing that 
the two-stage breach/justification model is, in fact, problematic when pitched against the 
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contemporary constitutional framework. In other words, while it explores the reality of the 
structural subjugation of fundamental rights to the free movement provisions, the thesis does 
not seek, globally, to make a normative statement in this regard. Rather, the emphasis is on 
pausing to take stock of whether historically-entrenched and well-established judicial 
approaches remain suited to the needs of the present-day European Union. Although, overall, 
the thesis argues, firmly, that the breach/justification framework no longer serves the EU’s 
contemporary constitutional requirements, the decision to conduct an historical diagnostic 
analysis has proved significant in demonstrating that the structural subjugation of fundamental 
rights is not necessarily the work of a biased Court determined to prioritise economic 
integration over other endeavours. Rather, it is the product of history; of intertwined and 
intersecting constitutional developments that, when viewed in isolation are largely logical, 
and not directly connected to fundamental rights, but which nevertheless come together to put 
fundamental rights at a procedural disadvantage.         
 
 
1.2. Introducing the introduction: siting the discussion, setting the parameters, and 
identifying overarching themes 
 
A thesis that approaches such major constitutional developments in the Union’s history is 
inevitably going to be broad in nature. The Viking and Laval cases, the expansion of the 
material and personal scope of the free movement provisions, the doctrine of direct effect, and 
the introduction of Union citizenship all merit, and have indeed stimulated, significant 
examination in their own right. Moreover, while each component of our constitutional trinity, 
explored in chapters two, three, and four has individually contributed to free movement bias, 
they have not done so in a linear or chronological fashion. Rarely has each constitutional 
expansion been solely responsible for, or deliberately designed to produce, the fundamental 
rights consequences discussed in those chapters. Rather, as noted above, they form integral 
parts of the organic evolution of the wider Union legal order and create an interconnected web 
of indirect and direct contributors to the procedural prioritisation of free movement over 
fundamental rights. This presents a significant structural challenge to the thesis.  
 
Consequently, the rest of this chapter serves two core functions: to set the parameters of the 
analysis within what is potentially a very wide field of investigation; and to provide an 
overview of cross-cutting themes, in order to minimise the risk of over-emphasising the 
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responsibility of particular constitutional developments for the genesis and maintenance of the 
two-stage approach. Thus, chapter one will prove to be an unusually substantial introductory 
chapter that is, nevertheless, justified as a result of its role as a reference for the central issues 
unpacked in the rest of the thesis. Specifically, section two will provide the factual backdrop 
to the analysis. It will outline the broad history of the Union’s relationship with fundamental 
rights and detail the key cases that have reignited the debate about the Union’s capacity for 
fundamental rights protection.  
 
Section three will reiterate that, while there may also be substantive reasons for the 
subjugation of the fundamental right to strike in the Viking and Laval cases, this thesis will 
focus on the wider issue of the structure of the Court’s approach to addressing conflict 
between free movement and fundamental rights generally. It will demonstrate the existence of 
a two-stage model for the adjudication of clashes between free movement and competing 
interests, which by offering procedural priority to free movement, structurally presents it as a 
fundamental right. The section will acknowledge the utility of such a framework in the 
historical context of the central, economic, aims of the EEC. Nevertheless, a review of well-
established case-law will confirm that this structure has been maintained in instances of clash 
between free movement and fundamental rights. In this context, the two-stage approach does 
not ‘merely’ treat free movement as equivalent to a fundamental right but as more 
fundamental. 
 
Section four will explore the consequences of an imbalanced adjudicative model from 
practical, theoretical, and constitutional perspectives. In short, the section is concerned with 
whether, and why, the two-stage approach is problematic. Examining the various fundamental 
rights outcomes that the structural prioritisation of free movement can produce, the section 
will acknowledge, first, that the two-stage model, in some situations, allows fundamental 
rights and free movement to benefit each other. Moreover, the exercise of free movement can 
also create fundamental rights clashes that only exist as a result of the operation of an internal 
market. Nevertheless, the section will highlight that the thesis is principally concerned with 
situations of clash between free movement and fundamental rights. Consequently, the section 
will provide an overview, developed in subsequent chapters, of the practical implications of 
placing a heavier burden of proof, by means of the principle of proportionality, on those who, 
through the protection or exercise of fundamental rights, find themselves accused of a prima 
facie unlawful restriction of free movement.  
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The section also uses theoretical perspectives to examine why the subjugation of fundamental 
rights to free movement is particularly problematic, as compared with the general 
prioritisation of free movement over competing public interests. In short, it recognises that the 
thesis rests on a (contested) presumption that fundamental rights warrant special protection. 
However, since engaging with these debates is not the central objective of the analysis, it will, 
instead, acknowledge them and identify established justifications for safeguarding 
fundamental rights. In particular, it will draw on the existence of fundamental rights as a 
social fact and the Union’s own explicit commitment to respecting them in its primary law. 
Thus, this thesis plays an important role in testing whether the Union meets the obligations 
that, through the agreement of its Member States, it has imposed upon itself. This analysis 
will also lay the definitional framework for detailing what constitutes a ‘fundamental right’ 
for the purposes of the thesis and for the issue, explored in chapter five, of whether free 
movement can itself constitute a fundamental right.  
 
The notion that fundamental rights merit special protection, because the Union has committed 
itself to respecting them, introduces questions as to the constitutional implications of the two-
stage approach. Consequently, with particular, though not exclusive, focus on the 
amendments brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, the final part of section four will unpack the 
evolution of the Union’s goals in order to argue that the Court’s current adjudicative model is 
out of line with the contemporary constitutional framework. The Union’s future accession to 
the ECHR and the primary law status of the Union’s own Charter will be presented as 
particularly significant drivers of change.    
 
    
2. (Re)igniting the debate: Viking and Laval as indicators of a preference for free 
movement over conflicting fundamental rights 
 
In a thesis focused on the historical, constitutional developments behind the apparent 
prioritisation of the free movement provisions over fundamental rights, it is worth pausing to 
outline the wider history of the relationship between the Union and fundamental rights. Since 
Viking and Laval have reinvigorated the debate, in this regard, it is also useful to provide the 
material facts of these cases, and to position them within existing critiques as to the capacity 
 14 
 
of the Union’s legal order to respect fundamental rights in the context of economic 
integration.   
 
 
2.1. The historical relationship between the Union and fundamental rights 
 
Students of EU law are well-versed in the incremental and, at least initially, reactive 
introduction of fundamental rights considerations within the EU legal order. While a glance at 
the most recent incarnation of the Union’s Treaties, particularly after the amendments 
introduced at Lisbon, might suggest that fundamental rights occupy a central position within 
the Union’s constitutional framework,45 this lies in stark contrast to the (absence of) 
fundamental rights provision in the Rome Treaty, the foundational text of the EEC.
46
 That 
document set, as the EEC’s central task, economic integration through the creation of a 
common market.
47
 Reference to fundamental rights was seemingly not relevant within a 
Treaty charged with constituting such a polity and was not included in its text.
48
       
 
And yet, litigants soon began to argue that the pursuit of economic integration was affecting 
their fundamental rights. Although the CJEU was initially reluctant to introduce fundamental 
rights considerations into the EU’s legal order,49 in Stauder it accepted that the interpretation 
of internal market rules could incorporate ‘the fundamental rights enshrined in the general 
principles of Community law and protected by the Court’.50 Soon after, in its seminal 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft decision, the Court held that, while domestic fundamental 
rights norms could not pose a challenge to the validity of EU law, Union legislation could be 
                                                          
45
 Inter alia, the preamble to the TEU (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/13) confirms the attachment of the EU Member States to ‘respect for human rights’; Art.2(2) states that 
‘[t]he Union is founded on [inter alia] respect for human rights’; Art.6(1) TEU bestows primary law status on 
the Charter; Art.6(2) TEU commits the Union to acceding to the ECHR. 
46
 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [1957]    
47
 Art.2 EEC 
48
 A richer analysis of the background to the creation of the EEC does demonstrate fundamental rights 
considerations. For instance, the draft European Political Community Treaty would have integrated the ECHR 
within the law of that polity. While this arguably increases the potential significance of the absence of a 
reference to fundamental rights in the Rome Treaty, that document itself can be said to acknowledge goals 
beyond economic integration. Its preamble seeks to ‘lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’ and to ‘ensure…the social progress’ of the Member States. However, crucially, Art.2 EEC 
presents this as achievable through the medium of the common market. For discussion of this history, see M, 
Dauses, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order’ (1985) 10 ELRev 398, 399 
49
 Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] EU:C:1959:4; Joined cases 36-38, 40/59 Geitling v High Authority 
[1960] EU:C:1960:36; Case 40/64 Sgarlata a.o. v Commission [1965] EU:C:1965:36 
50
 Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] EU:C:1969:57 
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assessed by reference to analogous guarantees existing at EU-level. Fundamental rights 
formed an integral part of the general principles of Union law, were inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, but operated within the structure and 
objectives of the Union.
51
 This was later confirmed in Nold, in which the Court also 
highlighted the significance of international human rights instruments, to which the Member 
States were signatories, to the EU fundamental rights framework.
52
 The ECHR became a 
‘special source of inspiration’ in this regard.53 In time, the Court accepted jurisdiction not 
only for examining the compatibility of the activity of the EU’s legislative organs with 
fundamental rights, but also the actions of the Member States when they were implementing
54
 
and, later acting in the scope of, EU law.
55
 
 
 
Acknowledgement, by the EU’s legislative organs, of the need to recognise fundamental 
rights has been similarly incremental. It was not until 1977 that the Union’s legislative 
institutions released a joint declaration stressing the prime importance they attached to the 
protection of fundamental rights, particularly those derived from the constitutions of the 
Member States and the ECHR.
56
 This commitment was endorsed by the Member States in the 
preamble to the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. It was only with the Maastricht Treaty, 
entering into force in 1993, that respect for the fundamental rights contained in the ECHR and 
resulting from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States entered the main 
Treaty text, via Article 6 TEU.
57
 Suspension of the voting rights, within the European 
Council, of those Member States that seriously and persistently breached fundamental rights, 
was not possible until the Amsterdam Treaty became effective in 1999.
58
 With this Treaty, 
Article 6 TEU was changed to declare that that the Union was founded on, inter alia, respect 
for human rights. Accession to the Union also became conditional upon respect for 
fundamental rights.
59
 The EU’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights, solemnly proclaimed in 
2000,
60
 did not enjoy primary law status until the most recent Treaty amendments at Lisbon in 
                                                          
51
 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] EU:C:1970:114, paras.3-4 
52
 Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] EU:C:1974:51, para.13 
53
 Case C-260/89 ERT v DEP [1991] EU:C:1991:254; Case C-299/95 Kremzow v Austria [1997] EU:C:1997:254 
54
 Case 5/88 Wachauf v Germany [1988] EU:C:1989:321 
55
 Case C-260/89 ERT, n.53  
56
 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, Council, and the Commission concerning the protection of 
fundamental rights and the ECHR, 05/04/77 OJ C103 
57
 Art.F(2), Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C325/5 (TM)  
58
 Art.7 TEU 
59
 Art.O TA/Art.49 TEU 
60
 [2000] OJ C364/1 
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2009. Similarly, after the CJEU had ruled that the EU lacked the competence to accede to the 
ECHR,
61
 the process for formal accession to the Convention could not commence until the 
insertion of Article 6(2) TEU by the Lisbon Treaty.
62
 Even post-Lisbon, the Union has no 
general fundamental rights competence. 
 
Thus, while economic integration through the formation of a common market has always been 
a central objective of the Union, the relationship between the EU and fundamental rights has 
been more piecemeal. The historical and constitutional asymmetry between the development 
of the internal market, on the one hand, and the Union’s commitment to fundamental rights, 
on the other, has invited abundant comment within the academic literature, particularly where 
the two interact. For instance, some have argued that the reception of fundamental rights into 
the EU legal order was a direct attempt to avoid the derailing of the doctrine of primacy.
63
 
Even after Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, in its 
Solange I judgment,
64
 famously rejected the primacy of EU law in light, inter alia, of the lack 
of a catalogue of fundamental rights operating at Union-level. Only after the EU had further 
demonstrated its commitment to fundamental rights did that court declare, in Solange II,
65
 that 
it would no longer exercise jurisdiction in assessing the validity of EU legislation on 
fundamental rights grounds, so long as the EU offered an equivalent standard of protection to 
that found in the German Constitution. In a similar vein, others argue that fundamental rights 
protection provides a useful means of improving the legitimacy of Union activity, or that it 
exists (deliberately) to allow for further EU encroachment into Member State law and 
policy.
66
 These claims are themselves hotly contested.
67
 Others still have voiced concern that 
                                                          
61
 Opinion 2/94 [1996] EU:C:1996:140. For criticism, see J. Weiler and S. Fries, ‘A Human Rights Policy for 
the European Community and Union: The Question of Competences’ in P. Alston et al (eds), The EU and 
Human Rights, (OUP, 1999), ch.5   
62
 Moreover, this process has been somewhat stalled by the CJEU’s recent decision in Opinion 2/13 [2014] 
EU:C:2014:2454 that the draft agreement for accession to the ECHR is not compatible with Art.6(2) TEU or 
with Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to 
the Convention. 
63
 Following the introduction of the doctrine in Case 6/64 Costa n.34, a parliamentary report explicitly voiced 
concern that primacy could undermine domestic fundamental rights protection. F. Dehousse (MEP), ‘Report on 
the Supremacy of EC Law over National Law of the Member States’. Eur Parl Doc 43 (1965-1966_ JO (2923) 
14; J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’, (1992) 29 CMLRev 
669 
64
 International Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr – und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] 2 
CMLR 540 
65
 Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225 
66
 S. Greer, A. Williams, ‘Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the EU: Towards ‘Individual’, 
‘Constitutional’ or ‘Institutional’ Justice?’, (2009) 15(4) ELJ 462; A. Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A 
Study in Irony, (OUP, 2004) 159-160; Coppel, O’Neill, n.63  
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EU fundamental rights might reflect the existence, but not the substance, of the fundamental 
rights contained in international instruments and the constitutions of the Member States.
68
 
Commentators have questioned the extent of fundamental rights protection at EU-level when 
the scope of EU fundamental rights is frequently defined by reference to Union objectives.
69
 
Finally, as noted above, following the emergence of clashes between fundamental rights and 
the free movement provisions, Brown has argued that slotting fundamental rights 
considerations into the Court’s existing two-stage approach, originally designed for 
adjudicating conflict between free movement and public interests, is ill-suited to this 
dynamic.
70
 
 
Although Brown highlighted the two-stage approach as a cause for concern in the wake of the 
Schmidberger decision,
71
 its use was not problematic in terms of the substantive outcome of 
that judgment. The fundamental rights arising in that case – the freedoms of expression and 
association – prevailed over the free movement of goods. The cases of Viking and Laval, on 
the other hand, arguably demonstrate the realisation of Brown’s concerns about the structural 
prioritisation of free movement over fundamental rights. In this way, those cases are just one 
(significant) manifestation of a larger, enduring discussion surrounding the relative positions 
of market values and fundamental rights (and/or social goals) in the Union legal order. 
Nevertheless, they do reignite the debate, provoking commentators to decry apparent 
constitutional asymmetry with renewed vigour. As a result, the cases merit examination of 
their material facts.  
 
 
2.2. The material facts of Viking and Laval 
 
2.2.1. Viking 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
67
 G. de Búrca, ‘Fundamental Rights and the Reach of EC Law’, (1993) 13(3) OJLS 283 ; see also the response 
to Coppel and O’Neill of J. Weiler and N. Lockhart, ‘”Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: The European Court 
and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – Part I’ (1995) 32(1) CMLRev 51; and ‘”Taking Rights Seriously” 
Seriously: The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence - Part II’ (1995) 32(2) CMLRev 579 
68
 A. Williams, n.66; E. Drywood, ‘Giving with One Hand, Taking with the Other: Fundamental Rights, 
Children and the Family Reunification Directive’ (2007) 32(3) ELRev 396, 397; A. Davies, n.14, 139   
69
 Veldman, n.9, 116-117; Coppel, O’Neill, n.63, 683, citing Case 5/88 Wachauf n.51. C.f. M. Koskenniemi who 
welcomes the CJEU’s honesty in expressly acknowledging that fundamental rights are defined by political 
values, ‘The Effects of Rights on Political Culture’, in Alston et al, n.61, ch.3, 111 
70
 Brown, n.21  
71
 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, n.19  
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Viking concerned a ship, the Rosella, that sailed between Estonia and Finland. Operating 
under the Finnish flag, the vessel’s operator, Viking, was obliged, pursuant to Finnish law and 
the terms of collective bargaining agreements with Finnish trade unions, to pay the crew 
Finnish wages. The Rosella was running at a loss as a result of the competition presented by 
Estonian ships, plying the same route, who were able to pay their crews lower wages. 
Accordingly, Viking decided to re-flag the Rosella to Estonia and enter into new collective 
agreements with trade unions operating there. The ITF, an international federation of transport 
workers’ unions, pursuant to its ‘flags of convenience policy’ which required vessels to be 
flagged to the State of beneficial ownership, issued a circular requesting its affiliate trade 
unions not to enter into negotiations with Viking. The Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) also 
gave notice of strike action against Viking. In previous discussions, FSU had said it would not 
enter into a collective agreement with Viking without guarantees that, regardless of the re-
flagging, the ship would continue to be covered by Finnish law and Finnish collective 
agreements; that a change of flag would not result in job losses for Viking employees, or 
change terms and conditions of employment. FSU was aware that its demands rendered re-
flagging the Rosella pointless. Viking had stated that a change of flag would not result in 
redundancies. It brought an action for a court declaration that the activities of ITF and FSU 
were contrary to Article 49 TFEU, on the freedom of establishment. The ITF and FSU argued 
that they were exercising the fundamental right to take collective action. Consequently, a 
reference was made to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The referring court asked: first, 
whether collective action to induce an undertaking to enter into a collective agreement, the 
terms of which are liable to deter it from exercising freedom of establishment, falls within the 
scope of Article 49 TFEU; second, whether that provision could be relied on against trade 
unions, in other words, whether Article 49 had horizontal direct effect; and third, whether the 
collective action of the kind threatened by the ITF and FSU could constitute a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment and, if so, whether it could be justified. 
 
In relation to the first question, the CJEU stated that the collective action concerned fell 
within the scope of Article 49. It recalled that Articles 45, 49, and 56 TFEU (on free 
movement of workers, establishment, and services, respectively) apply not only to public 
authorities but also to private parties regulating in a collective manner gainful employment, 
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self-employment, or service provision.
72
 Since working conditions were governed differently 
across the Member States, sometimes by law and regulation and sometimes by collective 
agreements adopted by private persons, restricting the application of those Treaty provisions 
to public bodies risked inequality of application.
73
 As the collective action was inextricably 
linked with regulating the work of Viking’s employees through collective agreement, it fell 
within the scope of Article 49.
74
 Although Article 153(5) TFEU expressly excludes collective 
action from the Union’s legislative competence, Member States, when acting in their area of 
competence, were still required to comply with Union law.
75
 Similarly, the Court held that, 
although the right to strike was a fundamental right within the Union legal order, it did not fall 
outwith the scope of Article 49. Exercise of that right was subject to certain restrictions, 
namely that it must be employed in accordance with Union law, as well as national law and 
practices.
76
 The Court noted that it had already held that other fundamental rights, including 
the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, and human dignity, could constitute barriers 
to free movement. Nevertheless, they could also represent legitimate interests that justified 
restrictions ‘even’ on the Treaty free movement provisions.77 Finally, distinguishing the 
competition law case of Albany,
78
 the Court rejected the argument that the right to take 
collective action should fall outside the scope of free movement because it was inherent in the 
very nature of trade union activity that free movement would be prejudiced to some extent.
79
 
 
On the second question, the Court, relying on its collective-regulator case-law, held that 
Article 49 could be invoked against trade unions. As it had outlined in its response to the first 
question, the CJEU stated that the abolition of obstacles to free movement would be 
compromised if associations, not governed by public law, were able to impose restrictions as 
part of the exercise of their legal autonomy. Even if certain provisions were formally 
addressed to the Member States, the prohibition on prejudicing free movement applied to all 
                                                          
72
 Para.33, citing Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] EU:C:1974:140, para.17; Case 13/76 Donà [1976] 
EU:C:1976:115, para.17; Case 415/93 Bosman [1995] EU:C:1995:463, para.82; Joined Cases C-51/96 and 
C-191/97 Deliège [2000] EU:C:2000:199, para.47; Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] EU:C:2000:296, para.31; 
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 Paras.35-37 
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 Paras.39-49, citing, by analogy, Case C-120/95 Decker [1998] EU:C:1998:167, paras.22-23; Case C-158/96 
Kohll [1998] EU:C:1998:171, paras.18-19; Case C-334/02 Commission v France [2004] EU:C:2004:129, 
para,21; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] EU:C:2005:763, para.29 
76
 Paras.42-44, citing, inter alia, Art.28 CFR 
77
 Paras.45-47, citing Case C-112/00 Schmidberger; Case C-36/02 Omega, n.19  
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79
 Para.52 
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agreements intended to regulate paid labour collectively.
80
 However, the Court went further, 
relying also on Spanish Strawberries and Schmidberger,
81
 to demonstrate that restrictions on 
free movement can be caused by the actions of private individuals and that there was ‘no 
indication’ that its previous case-law applied only to associations or organisations exercising a 
regulatory task or having quasi-legislative powers.
82
  
 
The CJEU commenced its response to the third question by reiterating that Article 49 TFEU 
was triggered not only by discriminatory activity but by action that hindered the movement of 
establishments between Member States. For the Court, it was indisputable that, the FSU’s 
collective action made Viking’s exercise of free movement less attractive or even pointless: if 
Viking agreed to FSU’s demands it would not enjoy the same treatment as other undertakings 
operating in Estonia. ITF’s collective action was also ‘at least liable to restrict Viking’s 
exercise of its right to freedom of establishment’. A restriction on Article 49 was 
established.
83
 The Court emphasised that a restriction on free movement could only be 
justified if it pursued a legitimate aim, justified by overriding reasons of the public interest, 
and was suitable and necessary for attaining that goal.
84
 It accepted that exercise of the 
fundamental right to take collective action was a legitimate aim and that the protection of 
workers could constitute an overriding reason in the public interest.
85
 The CJEU also 
acknowledged that the EU had not only an economic but also a social purpose.
86
 
Consequently, the Court recognised that the Treaty’s free movement provisions must be 
balanced against the objectives of social policy, which included improved living and working 
conditions and the maintenance of dialogue between labour and management. The Court left 
the final decision as to whether the actions of FSU and ITF were justified to the national 
court, but nevertheless gave relatively clear guidance. While the actions of those organisations 
aimed at protecting the jobs and employment conditions of the FSU’s members fell, in 
principle, within the objective of protecting workers, this would no longer be tenable if it were 
established that the jobs or conditions of employment at issue were not ‘jeopardised or under 
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serious threat’.87 Even then, the national court was still required to determine whether the 
collective action taken was suitable for, and did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve, 
the aim pursued. The CJEU accepted that collective action may be one of the main ways for 
trade unions to protect the interests of their members, however, it was still for the national 
court to consider whether the FSU ‘did not have other means at its disposal which were less 
restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring to a successful conclusion the 
collective negotiations…’ and whether those alternative means had been exhausted.88  
 
 
2.2.2. Laval 
In Laval, a company, Laval, incorporated under Latvian law, posted some of its workers to 
Vaxholm, Sweden, to work on a building site operated by the Swedish undertaking, Baltic. 
The Posted Workers Directive (PWD)
89
 requires host States to ensure that undertakings 
posting workers to their territory guarantee the terms and conditions of employment, referred 
to in Article 3(1)(a)-(g), operating in that State. Article 3(7) stipulates that Article 3(1) shall 
not prevent the application of terms and conditions more favourable to workers, while Article 
3(10) provides that the PWD does not preclude the application by Member States, in 
accordance with the Treaty, of terms and conditions of employment on matters other than 
those referred to in the ‘core nucleus’ of Article 3(1)(a)-(g) for reasons of public policy. Laval 
had already entered into collective agreements with Latvian trade unions in relation to its 
workers. Contact was established between Laval and Byggettan, the relevant local branch of 
the Swedish trade union, with a view to negotiating the signing of a collective agreement by 
Laval. Negotiations were, however, unsuccessful and Laval refused to sign the collective 
agreement. With support of the national union, Byggnads, Bygettan commenced collective 
action, lawful under Swedish law. During mediation, Laval refused to sign a collective 
agreement before the issue of wages was dealt with, since the collective agreement left wage 
rates to be determined later. If it had done so, the collective action would have ceased 
immediately and wage negotiations would have proceeded under a social truce. The collective 
action was extended to cover sympathy action by the Swedish Electricians’ Union, 
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 Para.80-83 
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Elektrikerna, and other trade unions, with the result that Laval could no longer carry out its 
activities in Sweden. Eventually, Vaxholm public authorities requested that the contract 
between Laval and Baltic be terminated. Baltic was later declared bankrupt.  
Laval brought an action for a declaration that ongoing collective action should cease and for 
compensation from Byggettan, Byggnads, and Elektrikerna. In particular, it argued that 
Article 56 TFEU, on the free provision of services, precluded trade unions from using 
collective action to attempt to force a foreign undertaking to sign a Swedish collective 
agreement. Accordingly, a reference was made to the CJEU asking, first, whether Article 56 
and the PWD precluded a trade union from using collective action in such a way, particularly 
when the terms of the relevant collective agreements exceeded both the level and content of 
guarantees contained in the ‘core nucleus’ of the PWD. The referring court’s second question 
concerned the compatibility with Article 56 of a Swedish law, which permitted trade unions to 
view undertakings, bound by collective agreements operating in another Member State, as 
though there were not legally tied to a collective agreement at all. 
 
Responding to the first question, the CJEU stated that the PWD was not directly applicable to 
the case at hand. The collective agreements contained terms and conditions going beyond the 
‘core nucleus’ of the PWD, both in standard and content. Although Article 3(7) PWD stated 
that Article 3(1) did not prevent the application of terms and conditions more favourable to 
the worker, this could not be interpreted so as to allow host Member States to apply a higher 
level of protection without undermining the effectiveness of the PWD. Instead, Article 3(7) 
allowed the application of home State rules where these were more favourable than those 
operating in the host State, or for undertakings voluntarily to conclude collective agreements 
in the host State that offered a higher level of protection to their employees.
90
 Similarly, 
Article 3(10) PWD could not be relied upon, in the present case, to justify the enforcement of 
terms and conditions going beyond the core nucleus against undertakings coming from other 
Member States. The obligations, contained in the collective agreements, had been established 
by the social partners, without the Swedish authorities’ having recourse to that provision. 
Since trade unions were not governed by public law, they could not use public policy grounds 
to justify imposing restrictions on Union law.
91
 Minimum rates of pay were the only issue 
contained in the PWD’s ‘core nucleus’ that Sweden had not addressed through legislation. 
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However, the relevant collective agreements, which sought to ascertain pays rates on a case-
by-case basis according to the qualifications and tasks of the employees concerned, were not 
of ‘universal’ or ‘general’ application, as required by the PWD.92  
 
The Court proceeded to assess the trade union’s activity against Article 56 TFEU. As it had in 
Viking, the CJEU reiterated that although strike action was excluded from Union competence, 
the Member States were required to comply with EU law when acting in their own areas of 
legislative competence.
93
 Adopting the same reasoning as it had in Viking, the Court accepted 
the fundamental rights status of strike action but rejected the argument that this precluded the 
application of Article 56.
94
 Similarly, it relied on its collective-regulator case-law to hold that 
Article 56 was directly effective against the trade unions concerned.
95
 The Court then 
concluded that collective action, whereby undertakings established in other Member States 
might be forced to sign a collective agreement containing terms going above but also beyond 
the core nucleus of the PWD, is liable to make it less attractive or more difficult for such 
undertakings to provide services in the host State. Consequently, a restriction on Article 56 
TFEU was established. This was particularly the case where, in order to ascertain applicable 
rates of pay, undertakings might be forced into negotiations with the trade unions of 
unspecified duration.
96
 Since the freedom to provide service was one of the fundamental 
principles of the Union, a restriction upon it was only warranted where it pursued a legitimate 
objective, justified by overriding reasons of the public interest, in a manner that was suitable 
and necessary in relation to the aim pursued. It was argued that the collective action was 
justified by reference to the fundamental right to strike and because it had as its objective the 
protection of workers. The CJEU recognised that the protection of workers could justify, in 
principle, a restriction on Article 56. As it had in Viking, it acknowledged, in addition, that the 
Union had a social, as well as economic, purpose. However, the Court concluded that the 
specific obligations that the trade union sought to impose on Laval could not be justified by 
the aim of worker protection since they went beyond the core nucleus of protection contained 
in the PWD. On the specific issue of pay, collective action to impose minimum rates could 
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not be justified, in practice, because the national system of case-by-case determination made it 
impossible or excessively difficult for undertakings to determine their obligations.
97
 
 
On the second question, the Court held that Swedish rules discriminated against service 
providers coming from other Member States where they failed to take into account, 
irrespective of their content, collective agreements negotiated in other Member States, to 
which those undertakings are already bound. Such measures treated those companies as akin 
to national employers who had concluded no collective agreements at all. Since the restriction 
on Article 56 was discriminatory in nature, the Swedish measures could only be justified by 
reference to the grounds of public policy, public security and public health contained in 
Article 52 TFEU. The justifications presented by the Swedish government – creating a 
climate of fair competition and ensuring that all conditions imposed on employers active on 
the Swedish market were in line – did not fall within that provision.98   
 
The Laval decision was confirmed and expanded in the subsequent cases of Rüffert and 
Commission v Luxembourg.
99
 In Rüffert, the Court held that Article 56 TFEU and the PWD 
precluded German legislation from requiring public authorities to oblige contractors, coming 
from other Member States, to pay employees at least the remuneration prescribed by 
collective agreements in force at the place where the contracted services were performed. 
Those collective agreements could not be viewed as setting the minimum rate of pay for the 
purposes of the ‘core nucleus’ of the PWD, since they had not been declared universally 
applicable, as required by that instrument. Moreover, relying on Laval, Article 3(7) PWD 
could not be relied upon by the host State to impose terms and conditions going beyond that 
core nucleus. This interpretation was confirmed by the fact that the legal basis for the PWD 
was Article 56 TFEU. Accordingly, the purpose of the Directive was to facilitate the cross-
border provision of services. By requiring service providers from other Member States to pay 
their workers rates laid down in local collective agreements, the law potentially imposed 
additional economic burdens that might prohibit, impede or render less attractive the 
provision of services in the host State. This restriction on Article 56 could not be justified by 
the objective of worker protection since the requirement only applied to employees working 
under a public, rather than private, contract of service. It was not clear why this was necessary 
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only in relation to the public sector. The same reasoning applied to the argument that the 
measure was justified for the protection of the organisation of working life by trade unions.  
 
Commission v Luxembourg concerned a Luxembourg rule that required, inter alia, that a cost 
of living index be applied to all rates of pay. Although the Court held that this was 
permissible in relation to minimum rates of pay, on the basis of Article 3(1)(c) PWD, its 
application to other levels of remuneration did not fall within the ‘core nucleus’ of that 
instrument. Luxembourg had argued that its rule was necessary to ensure good labour 
relations and by the public policy imperative of protecting workers from the effects of 
inflation, relying on Article 3(10) PWD. The CJEU held that, as a derogation from the 
fundamental freedom to provide services, Article 3(10) had to be interpreted strictly and could 
not be determined unilaterally by the Member States. In particular, a public policy derogation 
needed to reflect ‘a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of 
society’.100 Earlier, it had recalled that for national provisions to be classified as ‘public-order 
legislation’ they had to be deemed ‘so crucial for the protection of the political, social or 
economic order in the Member States concerned as to require compliance therewith by all 
persons present on the national territory’.101 The Court underlined that Member States had to 
support their reasons for derogation with ‘appropriate evidence or by analysis of the 
expediency and proportionality of the restrictive measure…and precise evidence enabling its 
arguments to be substantiated’.102 Rather than provide such evidence, Luxembourg had 
merely cited, in a general manner, the objectives of its rules, without demonstrating why they 
were necessary and suitable for achieving their goal. Accordingly, it could not rely on the 
public policy derogation in this regard.
103
 
 
 
2.2.3. A brief overview of debates surrounding the Laval quartet 
 
As section one recognised, the Viking, Laval, Rüffert, and Commission v Luxembourg 
judgments provoked a plethora of debate in the academic commentary in diverse fields of 
legal study. It would be beyond the scope of this work to cover the varied and in-depth 
avenues of investigation conducted in the wake of these decisions. In short, however, the 
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decisions elicited surprise, in general, that the ‘core nucleus’ contained in Article 3(1)(a)-(g) 
imposes a ceiling on host State safeguarding of posted workers, rather than offering a 
minimum floor of protection.
104
 Caused, in part, by the fact the PWD finds its legal basis in 
Article 56 TFEU, chapter three will consider the indirect contributions that the bestowal of 
direct effect made to this outcome, specifically in its presentation of Article 56 as ‘precise’. 
The fundamental rights implications of the decision, in Viking and Laval, to confer horizontal 
direct effect of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU will also be analysed there.
105
 The cases have also 
sparked discussion about their substantive effects on Member State industrial relations and 
social models,
106
 and revived existing debates about the CJEU’s examination of issues falling 
principally within Member State competence, where they ‘fall within the scope of’ Union 
law.
107
 Notwithstanding the Court’s explicit acknowledgement of the Union’s ‘social purpose’ 
in Viking and Laval, the outcome of those cases has also suggested to some that market 
integration continues to be favoured over social progression in the contemporary Union.
108
  
 
Finally, the cases have reintroduced questions about the Union’s relationship with 
fundamental rights, specifically the issue of whether the pursuit of free movement is 
prioritised over fundamental rights. Since this thesis seeks to explore the relationship between 
free movement and fundamental rights, and in light of the breadth of research that this subject 
could itself stimulate, it is important to acknowledge these debates but also to frame the 
parameters of our own investigation. The next section performs this essential function. 
 
 
3. Defining the scope of the analysis: assessing adjudicative structures as a cause of 
free movement bias 
 
 
The post-Viking/Laval literature on the interaction between free movement and fundamental 
rights can be roughly divided into two groups. The first category focuses on substantive 
questions such as whether Viking and Laval have lowered standards of fundamental rights 
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protection, in particular regarding the rights of workers,
109
 or whether those judgments 
suggest that the Court distinguishes, in a substantive sense, between different types of 
fundamental rights in its adjudication of clashes between those norms and free movement. In 
particular, it has been argued that the CJEU is more receptive to Member State rules seeking 
to protect civil and political fundamental rights than it is to those of an economic and social 
nature.
110
 The second body of the literature, not necessarily mutually exclusive of the first, 
focuses on the procedural disadvantage that fundamental rights face as a result of the CJEU’s 
breach/justification methodology.
111
  
 
While this section will acknowledge the arguments forwarded in the literature regarding a 
substantive distinction between different types of fundamental rights, it will, however, 
emphasise that the subject of our examination is on the adjudicative process for resolving 
tensions between free movement and all categories of fundamental rights, since this is where 
a broader, systemic problem becomes visible. Specifically, the focus will be on the Court’s 
use of the two-stage breach/justification framework to address conflict between free 
movement and fundamental rights. Since this process structurally subjugates the latter to the 
former, requiring all fundamental rights to overcome questions of legitimacy, appropriateness, 
and necessity, the two-stage approach remains problematic. This burden of proof places the 
exercise or protection of fundamental rights at a visible disadvantage procedurally. Even in 
those cases where fundamental rights prevail, this is despite not because of the Court’s 
processing of rules aimed at their protection. Providing a broad overview, to be developed in 
chapters two, three, and four, the section will not only demonstrate the existence of the two-
stage model but also outline the historical reasons for its use. It will argue that, viewed against 
the background of the EU’s economic origins, an adjudicative architecture that gives 
precedence to free movement over competing interests is understandable. However, when 
retained for clashes between free movement and fundamental rights, this imbalanced 
framework treats free movement as more fundamental, even than fundamental rights. This 
lays the groundwork for section four to establish why this model is ill-suited to resolving this 
type of conflict.    
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3.1. Substantive differentiation: the impact of types of fundamental rights on the 
outcome of free movement/fundamental rights conflict 
 
Those investigating the substantive fundamental rights impact of the Laval quartet have 
examined whether those cases have led to a lowering in fundamental rights protection, 
especially in relation to the posting of workers.
112
 Nevertheless, while the judgments have 
provoked criticism that the free movement provisions are favoured over fundamental rights, 
there are case-law examples of the latter prevailing over the former. There is also, therefore, 
an argument in the literature that this demonstrates a substantive distinction, from the Court, 
between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the 
other, where these different types of rights clash with free movement. Accordingly, it is worth 
examining the cases of Schmidberger, Omega,
113
 and Dynamic Medien
114
 and the 
comparisons drawn between them and Viking and Laval.  
 
First, in Schmidberger, the Court was tasked with reconciling the free movement of goods 
with the freedoms of expression and association, protected by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. A 
group of environmental protestors conducted, with the permission of the Austrian authorities, 
a demonstration on the Brenner motorway. This resulted in the closure of a main route 
between Austria and Italy for almost 30 hours. Schmidberger, an international transport 
undertaking that used the motorway to transport goods between Member States, brought an 
action for damages against the Austrian state on the basis that the latter’s failure to ban the 
protest constituted a restriction of Article 34 TFEU, on the free movement of goods. Austria 
contended that assessment of competing interests should lean in favour of the freedoms of 
expression and assembly (in this case of the protesters), since they were fundamental rights, 
inviolable in a democratic society.  
 
The Court held that, as a ‘fundamental principle of the Union’,115 Article 34 not only prohibits 
measures emanating from the Member State itself, but also situations in which the Member 
State fails to take adequate measures in respect of obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
caused by private individuals.
116
 Consequently, the decision not to ban a protest, which 
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resulted in the temporary closure of a major transit route for the cross-border movement of 
goods, constituted a restriction on Article 34 that was, in principle, incompatible with Union 
law.
117
   
 
As to whether this restriction could be justified, the Court acknowledged that the Austrian 
decision to permit the ban related to the protection of the fundamental rights to freedom of 
expression and assembly, pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. It accepted that fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general principles of Union law and indeed stated that 
measures incompatible with the observance of human rights were not acceptable in the 
Union.
118
 Accordingly, the protection of fundamental rights was a ‘legitimate interest which, 
in principle, justifies a restriction…even [of] a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty’.119 However, it also noted that the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and 
assembly were not absolute. The second paragraphs of Articles 10 and 11 ECHR permit 
derogations from those rights where they operate in the public interest, are in accordance with 
the law, are motivated by a legitimate aim, and are necessary in a democratic society. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded, the free movement of goods and the freedoms of 
expression and assembly had to be weighed, having regard to all of the circumstances of the 
case, in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck between those interests.
120
 
Although the national authorities had a wide margin of discretion in this regard, it was 
nevertheless, necessary to examine whether the restrictions placed on intra-Union trade were 
proportionate in light of the need to protect fundamental rights.
121
 The Court noted that the 
protest, the purpose of which was to highlight environmental concerns rather than to restrict 
cross-border movement, had taken place on a single route on one occasion, and that various 
administrative measures had been taken to minimise disruption. Within their wide margin of 
discretion, the national authorities were entitled to conclude that an outright prohibition of, or 
stricter conditions on, the demonstration would have constituted an unacceptable or excessive 
interference with the Article 10 and 11 ECHR rights of the protestors. The inconvenience, as 
regards free movement, could be tolerated provided that it related to the lawful demonstration 
of opinion.
122
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Omega concerned a decision, by German authorities, to ban a laser game in which 
participants fired at human targets. Omega, the company behind the game, argued that the ban 
contravened Article 56 TFEU on the free provision of services, since Omega operated as a 
franchisee of a British undertaking. However, the German courts concluded that, since the 
game involved ‘playing at killing’, it constituted an affront to human dignity, protected by the 
German constitution, by awakening or strengthening an attitude of denying the fundamental 
rights of a person. Accordingly, a reference was made to the CJEU, in the course of which, 
the referring court also posited that if human dignity constituted a fundamental right within 
the Union legal order, there would be no need to assess the proportionality of the ban against 
the restrictions it placed on the free provision of services.  
 
Having established that the prohibition was a prima facie breach of Article 56,
123
 the CJEU 
accepted that the restriction could be justified, in principle, since the protection of human 
dignity fell within the public policy derogation contained in Article 52(1) TFEU. However, as 
‘a derogation from the fundamental principle of the freedom to provide services, [public 
policy had to be] interpreted strictly [and] its scope [could not] be determined unilaterally by 
each Member State’.124 Nevertheless, in specific circumstances, public policy may vary from 
one country to another and from one era to another. Accordingly, the Member States enjoyed 
a margin of discretion in this regard, within the limits imposed by the Treaty.
125
 The Court 
recalled that fundamental rights formed an integral part of the general principles of Union 
law, which were drawn, inter alia, from the constitutional traditions of the Member States. It 
underlined that the Union legal order ‘undeniably strives to ensure respect for human dignity 
as a general principle of law’, irrespective of its ‘particular’ status as a fundamental right in 
Germany.
126
 The CJEU reiterated that fundamental rights constituted a legitimate interest that, 
in principle, justifies a restriction even on the fundamental freedom to provide services.
127
 In 
order to be justifiable, in practice, however, national measures were required to demonstrate 
that they were necessary for the protection of human dignity, and could not be attained by 
measures less restrictive of free movement.
128
 This was, however, not to be determined by the 
fact that one Member State had chosen a system of protection different from that adopted in 
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another.
129
 The Court noted that the German ban corresponded to a level of protection of 
human dignity sought by the German constitution. Moreover, since laser games were only 
prohibited where they involved firing at human targets, the ban did not go beyond what was 
necessary to achieve its aim. The restriction on the free provision of services was justified.
130
 
 
In Dynamic Medien, an undertaking, Dynamic Medien, brought an action before the German 
courts with a view to prohibiting its competitor, Avides, from selling in Germany, via mail 
order, videos and DVDs, contrary to the Jugendschutzgesetz. That law required assessment of 
the media in Germany and the labelling of the videos/DVDs with an age-label corresponding 
to the decision of the competent German authorities. Avides argued that, since it imported its 
videos/DVDs from the UK, where their content had already been assessed by the British 
Board of Film Classification, application of the German rule would violate Article 34 TFEU 
on the free movement of goods. The Court held that the German rules constituted a restriction 
of Article 34. Imported media was subjected to checks regardless of whether a similar 
procedure had been conducted in the Member State of production, and to a change in product 
labelling. This was liable to make the importation of DVDs into Germany more difficult and 
more expensive and could dissuade undertakings from marketing their goods there.
131
  
 
On the question of justification, the CJEU accepted that the German measures sought to 
protect the rights of the child,
132
 in particular to safeguard children from material injurious to 
her/his well-being,
133
 which, in principle, justified restrictions on the free movement of goods. 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to consider if Germany pursued its goal in a proportionate 
manner. Echoing Omega, the Court stated that domestic provisions did not have to correspond 
to a conception of child protection shared across the Member States. This could vary between 
Member States on the basis of moral and cultural views. Although the Member States enjoyed 
a broad margin of discretion in this respect, this still had to be exercised in compliance with 
Union law. This required consideration of the suitability and necessity of the German 
measures. For the Court, there was ‘no doubt’ as to the suitability of the German rule. Further, 
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the prohibition on sales of media that had not been subject to examination, classification, and 
labelling by the competent German authorities, only applied in respect of children and not to 
the import of DVDs for adults. Accordingly, the rules did not go beyond what was necessary 
to secure the Member State’s desired goal. The proportionality of a measure had to be 
assessed solely by reference to the objective pursued and the level of protection intended by 
the Member State, and not through comparisons with the systems of protection implemented 
elsewhere. The only requirement was that the national examination was readily accessible, 
could be completed in a reasonable time, and that the decisions of the competent authorities 
could be appealed. This was left to be determined by the national court.
134
       
 
Consequently, in contrast to Viking and Laval, Schmidberger, Omega, and Dynamic Medien 
all serve as examples of conflict between free movement and fundamental rights in which the 
latter has prevailed. This has led some commentators to argue that the Court is more likely to 
decide that the restrictions fundamental rights impose on free movement are justified where 
they are civil and political in nature, as opposed to economic and social. For instance, 
focusing on the pre-Lisbon era, O’Gorman argues that the absence of fundamental rights 
provision within the Union’s formative texts, and the Court’s subsequent reliance on the 
ECHR, which is civil and political in nature, as a ‘special source of inspiration’ led to the 
neglect of social rights within the EU legal order. This was cemented, he argued, within the 
EU Treaty when Article 6 TEU made reference to the ECHR after Maastricht.
135
 He claims 
that, although a significant number of Member States protect social rights within their 
constitutions, the CJEU has never attempted to use these as a basis for the discovery of a 
common constitutional tradition for the purposes of the general principles of EU law. He 
remarks that international sources have fared little better, with the exception of the use of the 
European Social Charter in Defrenne II to enshrine the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sex.
136
 Applying this to Laval, O’Gorman argues that, although the Court 
recognised the right to strike as fundamental earlier in its judgment, at the crucial stage of its 
reasoning, in which it assessed the proportionality of the trade unions’ activities, it looked 
solely to the provisions of the Treaty, namely ex-Articles 2 and 3 TEC, which gave the EU a 
social purpose. In contrast with Schmidberger and Omega, it did not reference the need to 
respect fundamental rights, required by Article 6 TEU, at this point, since that provision 
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focuses on the ECHR and, implicitly, rights of a civil and political nature. He concludes that it 
is this that leaves fundamental social rights inadequately protected.
137
  
 
This argument is also perhaps implicit in the analysis of Trstenjak and Beysen, who note that 
in Schmidberger, the protection of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly was sufficient, on its own, to constitute a justification, in principle, for 
restrictions placed on the free movement of goods. By contrast, in Viking and Laval, exercise 
of the fundamental right to strike was not sufficient in itself to justify, in principle, restrictions 
on the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services. It was necessary, also, that 
the purpose of the strike served an overriding reason in the public interest, namely the 
protection of workers.
138
 For Trstenjak and Beysen, the latter approach ‘sits uncomfortably 
alongside the principle of equal ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms’.139 
 
Commentators have also compared the wide margin of discretion afforded to the Member 
States in the Omega and Dynamic Medien judgments, with the Court’s prescriptive guidance 
in Viking and its application of the law in Laval. As Barnard highlights, in the latter cases, 
‘the Court…made it extremely difficult to defend the social interests due to its strict approach 
to justification and proportionality… despite recognition of the right to strike.’140 Meanwhile, 
Chu remarks, that in Omega, ‘[i]t suffices merely that the German authorities felt that a ban 
was necessary to achieve the level of protection of ‘human dignity’ that its [own] constitution 
seeks to guarantee…by this reasoning, the [CJEU] renders the whole attempt at applying the 
‘proportionality’ principle…somewhat meaningless’.141 Moreover, as Malmberg and Sigeman 
point out, the Court was prepared to allow for national differences in approaches to human 
dignity in Omega but did not display the same willingness with respect to industrial relations 
models in Viking and Laval. They venture that ‘these differences give the impression of the 
[CJEU] being more inclined to give preference to…fundamental rights which are based on 
moral and ethical considerations or on essential elements of the democratic system than to 
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such rights which are based on…economic considerations’.142 This claim is certainly 
supported by the Court’s reference to variation in moral and cultural views in Dynamic 
Medien.
143
 
 
These debates demonstrate that the mere existence of cases in which fundamental rights 
prevail over free movement is insufficient to support an assertion that the relationship 
between those two norms is entirely unproblematic. Indeed, this thesis does not concern itself 
with a quantitative assessment of the free movement/fundamental rights case-law. Even a 
finding that fundamental rights ‘triumph’144 over free movement in the majority of cases 
would not provide an adequately comprehensive picture of the significant qualitative impact 
that the Court’s approach might have on fundamental rights protection in those cases where 
free movement prevails. These consequences are explored, from practical, theoretical, and 
constitutional perspectives in section four. However, it will be emphasised in the next 
subsection that these issues broadly arise from the structure of the Court’s decision-making. 
In all of the Court’s case-law concerning interaction between free movement and fundamental 
rights discussed thus far, including those in which fundamental rights are favoured in the final 
analysis, the Court has processed disputes through a two-stage framework. At stage one, a 
restriction on free movement, by the exercise or protection of a fundamental right, is 
established. At stage two, the restrictive activity must ‘defend’ itself against this prima facie 
breach of Union law. The disparity in burdens of proof between these stages places the 
exercise or protection of fundamental rights at a distinct procedural disadvantage. While cases 
such as Schmidberger, Omega, and Dynamic Medien might demonstrate some flexibility in 
the Court’s application of this model, this is in spite of its requirements.145 These issues will 
be unpacked further throughout the thesis. The rest of this section is concerned with 
explaining the Court’s adjudicative methodology, providing an historical explanation for its 
use, and confirming the retention of a two-stage framework in the fundamental rights context.  
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3.2. Suffering from an historic hangover: retaining a pre-existing structural preference 
for free movement in interactions with fundamental rights 
 
3.2.1. The fundamental role of free movement in the creation of a common market 
 
In contrast with the Union’s incremental approach to fundamental rights protection, ever since 
its inception, the creation of the common market has been a central task of the EU. Indeed, it 
was the primary objective of the Union’s predecessor, the European Economic Community.146 
Further, the free movement of goods, services/establishment, workers, and capital across 
intra-EU borders is consistently recognised as critical to the functioning of a common market. 
Part Two of the Rome Treaty, entitled ‘Foundations of the Community’, was concerned, inter 
alia, with the elimination of obstacles to these four freedoms.
147
 Pursuant to Article 26 TFEU, 
‘the Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing and ensuring the functioning of 
the internal market…’. Article 34 TFEU imposes a prohibition on all quantitative restrictions 
on imports and measures having equivalent effect between Member States.
148
 Freedom of 
movement for workers ‘shall be secured’ within the Union by virtue of Article 45 TFEU, 
which requires the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers in 
relation to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. 
Restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State are prohibited by Article 49 TFEU, while Article 56 TFEU extends this 
to the cross-border provision of services. Article 63 forbids all restrictions on the free 
movement of capital, including between Member States and third countries.
149
 The Union also 
enjoys shared legislative competence in relation to the internal market.
150
  
 
At the judicial level, the CJEU explicitly recognised the fundamental role of free movement in 
the attainment of a common market in its early case-law. For example, in Sterling Drug, the 
Court referred to the free movement of goods as a ‘fundamental principle of the common 
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market’.151 This language is also present in the Court’s case-law on the other market 
freedoms.
152
 Reflecting the EEC’s primary purpose, the ‘fundamentality’ of free movement 
was soon generalised such that the free movement provisions were presented as ‘fundamental 
principles of the Community’.153 Given the Rome Treaty’s focus on economic integration, 
this generalisation within the language of the Court is unsurprising. It simply removes the 
‘middle man’. Free movement is essential to the achievement of a common market. This was 
the central aim of the EEC. Therefore, free movement was fundamental to the EEC as a 
whole.  
 
And yet, this generalisation of free movement from ‘fundamental principle of the common 
market’ to a ‘fundamental principle of the Treaty’ had the potential subtly to alter the 
perception of its role, transforming it into an independent ‘something’, fundamental in and of 
itself. In other words, this terminological change indirectly contributes to the 
reconceptualisation of free movement from a means to an end; to a separate objective. Against 
this backdrop, we begin to see free movement labelled a ‘fundamental freedom’.154 Within the 
confines of the EEC’s constitutional framework, with its focus on economic integration, this 
linguistic treatment conceptualises free movement as something akin to a fundamental right. 
This is especially true when we consider that the identification of the direct effect of the free 
movement provisions associated them with individual rights.
155
 Indeed, in ABDHU, the free 
movement of goods was placed on the same normative plain as fundamental rights.
156
 In 
Grogan, Advocate General Van Gerven went as far as to explicitly define the conflict 
between the freedom to provide services and the fundamental right to life as one between two 
fundamental rights.
157
 As chapter four will explore in more detail, later in the Union’s 
development, the utilisation by Union citizenship of free movement as the core right of the 
Union citizen, also resulted in the terminological presentation of free movement as a 
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fundamental right and to its conceptualisation as something more than a tool for the 
achievement of an internal market. 
 
The centrality of free movement to the EEC’s primary aims was not only reflected in the 
Court’s language but also in the structure of its decision-making. The two-stage approach it 
adopted to adjudicate clashes between free movement and competing public interests can be 
likened to that used by the ECtHR when determining conflicts between fundamental rights 
and public interests, further indicating the fundamentality of free movement within the EU 
legal order. The following subsection will examine this phenomenon in more detail and argue 
that the suitability of this model was contingent upon the limited goals of the EEC and the 
narrow scope of the free movement provisions, since free movement was unlikely to interact 
with fundamental rights in that context.          
 
 
3.2.2. The structural elevation of free movement to a fundamental right: introducing 
procedural bias through a two-stage model 
 
Where fundamental rights, under the ECHR, clash with public interests, the ECtHR case-law 
demonstrates that procedural priority is generally given to the former in accordance with the 
terms of the Convention right in question.
158
 Greer asserts that this prioritisation is an 
eventuality inherent in the structure of ECHR provisions themselves.
159
 For instance, Article 
10(1) ECHR bestows the fundamental right to freedom of expression while it is subsequent 
Article 10(2) that provides that public interests might limit this right. This textual architecture 
prescribes a two-stage approach,
160
 to determining whether a Convention right has been 
violated. It requires, first, the establishment of an interference with the relevant right; and 
asks, second, whether such interference is justified. The consideration of public interests as a 
‘defence’ against prima facie violations of the Convention affords evidential priority to the 
fundamental right. Thus, for a public interest interference with Article 10 to prevail it must 
overcome the justificatory hurdles imposed by Article 10(2). It must be ‘prescribed by law’, 
be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to pursue one of the public interests contained in that 
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provision,
161
 and must do so proportionately. Consequently, Greer concludes that 
‘[Convention] rights and public interests are not prima facie equal variables to be weighed in 
a balance. The scales are loaded, but not conclusively, in favour of rights’.162    
 
The CJEU utilises a similar procedural approach for clashes between the free movement 
provisions and public interests. The case-law contains numerous examples of that Court 
operating a two-stage breach/justification model, asking, first, whether there has been a 
restriction of the relevant free movement provision(s), and second, if this breach can be 
justified. For instance, in Commission v Italy,
163
 concerning an Italian rule which made 
advance payment of goods intended for import subject to the provision of a guarantee, the 
Court considered, first, whether the domestic measure restricted Article 34 TFEU on the free 
movement of goods. Once this was established, the Italian state was required to justify this by 
reference to the permissible derogations from that freedom contained in Article 36 TFEU.
164
  
 
The presentation of public interests as a ‘defence’ to initial breaches of free movement has 
practical consequences for their realisation. Public interests must clear significant justificatory 
hurdles in order to overcome their prima facie unlawful conduct. Thus, restrictions on free 
movement, caused by discriminatory activity, can only be justified where the measure is 
necessary to meet a real threat to the public good in question,
165
 where the discrimination in 
question is not arbitrary,
166
 where the measure is effective in meeting the aim pursued,
167
 and 
finally where the measure is suitable as the least restrictive option available.
168
 Moreover, as 
derogations from the ‘fundamental principle’ of freedom of movement, potential justifications 
must be interpreted ‘strictly’.169 The Gebhard case demonstrates the application of similar 
evidentiary obstacles to non-discriminatory restrictions on free movement. They must 
constitute an imperative requirement in the general interest; be suitable for attaining the 
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objective pursued; and not go beyond what was necessary to achieve it.
170
 These requirements 
are comparable to the hurdles, detailed above, faced by those wishing to justify an 
interference with a Convention right. Furthermore, it is inherent in the very wording of 
‘imperative’,171 ‘mandatory’172 ‘and ‘overriding’173 requirements that justifications must 
overcome any breach of free movement rather than be balanced against it, connoting a 
procedural disadvantage for public interests.  
 
In terms of burden of proof, it could be argued that since an initial restriction of free 
movement must always be established at stage one, before issues of justification even arise, 
the two-stage approach does not operate to favour free movement over public interests. 
However, as subsequent chapters will detail, there is a significant evidentiary gap between 
establishing a restriction and demonstrating that it is justified. As the discussion of Omega 
detailed, as ‘fundamental principles’ of the Union, the market freedoms must be interpreted 
broadly, derogations from them ‘strictly’.174 In practice, this introduces different standards of 
proof. For instance, trading rules ‘capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially’ intra-Union trade’175 can constitute a breach of the free movement of goods. By 
contrast, those wishing to establish a justification for such a restriction face the much more 
significant evidentiary hurdles outlined above.
176
  
 
In summary, the Court’s two-stage approach to conflict between free movement and public 
interests places the latter on the procedural back-foot. Greer’s claims about the ECtHR’s 
methodology are directly transferable into this new setting. Free movement and public interest 
are not equal variables. The scales are loaded in favour of free movement, although this will 
not always result in the ‘trumping’ of public interests by the free movement provisions.177 The 
similarity between the methodologies of the ECtHR and the CJEU suggest that, from a 
structural point of view, free movement is treated as the equivalent of a fundamental right, in 
the Union legal order. It is worthy of greater prioritisation than ‘mere’ public interests. As a 
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brief aside, this allows a definitional point to be made. The thesis will use the term ‘breach’ in 
the broad sense of covering restrictions on free movement established at stage one of the two-
stage process. Although wider than the common terminology of the Court – which generally 
uses the term ‘breach’ following its final assessment of both stages – our definitional 
approach emphasises that the structure of the Court’s adjudicative framework presents activity 
that restricts free movement as prima facie unlawful unless and until it can overcome the 
(generally) substantial hurdles associated with justification.      
 
However, within the confines of the original aims and scope of the EEC Treaty this is both 
understandable and (largely) unproblematic. As the Member States had come together with 
the primary objective of creating a common market, it is unsurprising that this goal would be 
prioritised within the EEC’s legal framework. Activity undermining the core aim of the EEC 
arguably should be presented as prima facie unlawful in such a context. For instance, the 
presumption, inherent to the two-stage approach, that protectionist Member State policy is 
‘manifestly wrongful’ facilitates the elimination of barriers to trade, a vital task of the EEC. 
Crucially, for our purposes, the use of protectionist policy, by a Member State, for 
fundamental rights reasons would be rare. Accordingly, it is unlikely that fundamental rights 
protection would be undermined by a two-stage model. One potential example is where 
collective action by trade unions, recognised as fundamental by Article 11 ECHR and Article 
28 CFR, is targeted at protecting national workers on the job market, as was the case with the 
British Jobs for British Workers campaign at the Lindsey Oil Refinery.
178
 However, in order 
for this fundamental right to trigger the market freedoms of service providers coming from 
other Member States, Article 56 TFEU would have to be directly effective against trade 
unions. The free movement provisions were not horizontally, or even vertically, directly 
effective immediately after the entry into force of the Rome Treaty. This shows the twin 
influences of the expansion in the material and personal scope of the free movement 
provisions, and the conferral of direct effect upon them, on their interaction with fundamental 
rights. Only after such constitutional developments does the CJEU’s two-stage approach 
becomes potentially problematic. Chapters two and three examine these evolutions in more 
detail.  
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First, however, it is necessary to demonstrate the retention of the two-stage model after free 
movement came into increased contact with fundamental rights and to consider, in the 
abstract, the potential consequences of this for fundamental rights protection. The following 
subsection will confirm this phenomenon and argue that this reduces fundamental rights, at 
this procedural level, to the equivalent of a public interest, in this context, introducing a 
presumption of illegality to the protection of fundamental rights. 
  
 
3.2.3. More fundamental than fundamental rights: the retention of a two-stage model for 
clashes between free movement and fundamental rights 
 
The descriptions of Schmidberger, Omega, Viking, Laval, and Dynamic Medien above, 
provide the necessary evidence that, despite the confines of the EEC’s original framework, 
free movement has evolved in a way that brings it into more frequent contact with 
fundamental rights.
179
 Here, we will reflect on how the Court structured its adjudication of 
tensions between these two norms. Perhaps because fundamental rights protection was not 
initially perceived as relevant to the EEC, the provisions permitting derogations from free 
movement contained no reference to fundamental rights. This remains the case today.
180
 This 
led to disagreement in the literature, following the nascent interactions between free 
movement and fundamental rights, about where fundamental rights feature in the adjudicative 
process. Brown and Perišin consider that they are a ‘floating’ justification that cannot be 
slotted into the existing derogating provisions. Brown nevertheless reflects that this new 
justificatory option is still subject to the same questions of proportionality.
181
 Barnard 
speculates that fundamental rights are a free-standing justification or a mandatory 
requirement, but one that has higher status than the others.
182
 Gonzales posits that 
fundamental rights, having primacy over Treaty freedoms, are neither mandatory 
requirements nor floating justifications.
183
 Spaventa argues fundamental rights have been 
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reduced to a public interest, which suggests they could be slotted into the public policy 
category.
184
  
 
It is submitted here that, through the retention of a two-stage approach, fundamental rights 
constitute either a ‘public policy’ exception or a ‘floating justification’. An examination of the 
case-law, detailed above, demonstrates the maintenance of that model where free movement 
conflicts with fundamental rights. As Brown highlights, although the Court identified a 
fundamental rights issue in Schmidberger, ‘it immediately swings back to classic 
Luxembourg-style jurisprudence: free movement is the guiding principle, but there may be 
exceptions to it – providing, of course, that the restrictions are proportionate and 
necessary’.185 Specifically, the Court concluded, first, that there had been a breach of free 
movement and only examined second whether this could be justified in the name of 
fundamental rights. Fundamental rights were defined as a ‘legitimate interest which, in 
principle, justifies a restriction…even [of] a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty 
[emphasis added]’.186 Despite the wide margin of appreciation the Member States enjoyed in 
this regard, the CJEU still proceeded to assess the proportionality of Austria’s fundamental 
rights protection against its effects on the free movement of goods. In Omega and Dynamic 
Medien, the Court also adopted this same two-stage approach, emphasising the need to 
consider whether Germany’s aims could be achieved by measures less restrictive of free 
movement. In Omega, this implicitly rejected the suggestion of the referring court that, as a 
fundamental right, human dignity would not be exposed to a proportionality assessment.
187
 
The ‘triumph’ of fundamental rights in those cases was the result of a ‘light-touch’ application 
of the proportionality principle; an examination that was still more rigorous than the Court’s 
cursory consideration of restrictions to free movement. Crucially, in Viking and Laval, the 
Court’s adoption of a two-stage methodology exposed the fundamental right to strike to 
extremely high justificatory hurdles. The exercise of that fundamental right could only be 
justified in practice, in Viking if jobs were ‘jeopardised or under serious threat’. Even then 
strike action was only warranted if measures less restrictive of free movement were 
unavailable. In Laval, the ceiling of protection offered by the PWD precluded altogether the 
                                                          
184
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use of the fundamental right to strike as a ‘defence’ against a prima facie breach of the free 
provision of services.  
 
This analysis cannot support Gonzales’ argument that fundamental rights enjoy primacy over 
the Treaty freedoms. Nor can Barnard’s claim, that fundamental rights are a free-standing 
justification of higher status than mandatory requirements, really be sustained. Fundamental 
rights are processed through exactly the same adjudicative mechanisms as other public 
interests. Accordingly, it is argued here that, in the context of their interactions with free 
movement, fundamental rights are treated either as ‘floating justifications’ exposed to the 
Court’s standard proportionality principle or as ‘public policies’ within the Treaty 
derogations. Free movement is, consequently, elevated beyond fundamental rights status 
and/or fundamental rights are relegated to ‘mere’ public interests by the structure of the 
Court’s decision-making.188 As the Court’s reasoning in Schmidberger demonstrates, this 
inverts the methodology of the ECtHR, requiring fundamental rights to defend themselves 
against breaches of free movement, and replacing the structural prioritisation of fundamental 
rights with a procedural preference for free movement.
189
     
 
In setting the parameters of the analysis, this section has acknowledged that there are both 
substantive and structural issues arising from the case-law on the interaction between free 
movement and fundamental rights. Indeed, a comparison of the outcomes of Schmidberger, 
Omega, and Dynamic Medien against the decisions in Viking and Laval might suggest that the 
Court alters its approach depending on the type of fundamental right involved. However, the 
section has also demonstrated the retention of a two-stage approach, originally used in the 
context of clashes between free movement and public interests, for addressing conflict 
between free movement and fundamental rights, regardless of the type of right involved. This 
treats free movement as more fundamental than fundamental rights, reducing the latter to the 
level of a public interest. This invites a more detailed consideration of the effects of free 
movement on fundamental rights protection. For instance, what are the consequences of 
structurally relegating fundamental rights to a ‘public interest’ in this context? It is to this 
issue that we now turn.     
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4. Exploring the consequences of an imbalanced adjudicative framework from 
practical, theoretical and constitutional perspectives 
 
This section will assess the effects of the two-stage breach/justification approach from 
practical, theoretical, and Union constitutional perspectives. It will examine, first, what 
potential fundamental rights outcomes the two-stage approach produces and acknowledge that 
the breach/justification framework can benefit fundamental rights outwith instances of clash. 
It will nevertheless outline arguments, developed in chapters two, three, and four that by 
assessing the proportionality of fundamental rights according to the restrictions they place on 
free movement, the two-stage model can result in a general lowering of fundamental rights 
standards. The section will ask, second, whether exposing fundamental rights to 
proportionality assessment is problematic from first principles. This also introduces questions 
of whether and why fundamental rights merit special protection as compared with ‘mere’ 
public interests. The section will draw on theoretical justifications for the generally superior 
hierarchical position of fundamental rights but will ultimately rely on the fact that the Union 
has chosen, through the agreement of its Member States, to offer distinct safeguards to 
fundamental rights. This invites, finally, a broader review of the suitability of the two-stage 
approach against the Union’s contemporary constitutional framework. The section will argue 
that the prioritisation of free movement over fundamental rights is outmoded when assessed 
against the Union’s explicit commitment to respecting fundamental rights, its new, broader, 
non-economic aims, and the way in which the Treaty envisages their realisation. In particular, 
the current adjudicative model does not leave the Member States with sufficient legal space to 
pursue the contemporary Union objectives with which the Treaty tasks them. 
  
 
4.1. What fundamental rights outcomes does a ‘priority to free movement’ approach 
produce? 
 
The general expansion of interactions between free movement and fundamental rights is not 
limited to instances of clash. In view of setting further the thesis’ boundaries, it is worth 
taking a moment to acknowledge, in practical terms, the different free movement/fundamental 
rights interfaces that have emerged. Although these all merit further examination, the 
subsection will also highlight the practical fundamental rights implications of the use of a 
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two-stage approach in instances of clash, that demonstrate why particular focus on this 
phenomenon is warranted here.  
 
In addition to the clashes between free movement and fundamental rights, visible in Viking, 
Laval, Schmidberger, Omega and Dynamic Medien, fundamental rights can act as facilitators 
of free movement within the two-stage model. A corollary of this development has been the 
facilitation of fundamental rights by free movement, since the former can now benefit, in 
certain situations, from the procedural priority that the two-stage approach offers to free 
movement. Finally, clashes between fundamental rights might arise as a result of the 
operation of the internal market, leading to simultaneous instances of clash and congruence 
between free movement and different Member States’ fundamental rights rules.  
 
The classic case demonstrating the ability of fundamental rights to facilitate free movement is 
ERT.
190
 Here, the Court held that Member States must adhere to EU fundamental rights 
standards when acting in the scope of EU law.
191
 Accordingly, in addition to the evidentiary 
hurdles imposed at the justification stage by the principle of proportionality, activity 
restricting free movement must respect fundamental rights before it can constitute a justified 
derogation. This increase in evidential burden facilitates free movement.
192
  
This development clearly also has the potential to benefit fundamental rights since it provides 
a new opportunity for external fundamental rights review of domestic measures. Moreover, in 
this context fundamental rights running congruent to free movement are able to share the 
procedural benefit of the two-stage approach. Domestic measures restrictive of fundamental 
rights face the evidentiary obstacles imposed as a result of the finding of a prima face breach 
of free movement. This potential was realised, most famously, in Carpenter.
193
 Mr. Carpenter 
ran a business in the UK that offered services to operators in other Member States. His third 
country national wife faced deportation. When the matter came before the Court of Justice, it 
held that:     
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It is clear that the separation of Mr. And Mrs. Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, 
to the conditions under which Mr. Carpenter exercises [the fundamental freedom to provide services]. That 
freedom could not be fully effective if Mr. Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in 
his country of origin to the entry and residence of his spouse.
194
  
 
Here, the fundamental right to family life under Article 8 ECHR not only ran congruent to 
Article 56 TFEU but was actually facilitated by it. At national level the normative clash in 
Carpenter was between the Carpenter family’s Article 8 ECHR rights and immigration policy 
as a public interest. By engaging EU law, the conflict becomes one between the fundamental 
right to family life and the free movement of services, on the one hand, and national 
immigration rules on the other. It is also worth noting here, though the point will be 
developed in chapters two and four, that the connection between the family issues involved in 
the case and Mr. Carpenter’s exercise of the freedom to provide services has been described 
as ‘ephemeral’.195  The Court merely declares that the separation of Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter 
would be ‘detrimental’ to his provision of services with no concrete explanation of the direct 
impact it would have.
196
 Nevertheless, the automatic use of the two-stage model when free 
movement is restricted in any way triggers the imposition of the proportionality test on 
conflicting measures. Not only has a fundamental right been restricted, but free movement has 
been breached. Thus, the scales are more heavily loaded in favour of fundamental rights than 
they might be outside of the EU framework.    
 
In this context, the two-stage approach might be viewed as unproblematic, since it works to 
the benefit of fundamental rights.
197
 Indeed, the broad definition of a breach of free 
movement, displayed in Carpenter, creates a portal through which individuals, dissatisfied 
with how fundamental rights issues have been adjudicated domestically, can access a 
potentially different result at EU-level. However, this raises the important question of whether 
restrictions on free movement, especially those of a tangential nature, are sufficient, on their 
own, to render the CJEU an appropriate locus for assessing complex and diverse policy 
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decisions made at Member State-level. This issue is unpacked in s.4.3 from the point of view 
of the division of competences between the Union and its Member States.
198
 Chapter two 
additionally highlights that such policy review, by the CJEU, can limit Member States’ 
abilities to design systems of social protection in instances of clash between free movement 
and fundamental rights. Here, the structural preference rests with free movement, working 
against fundamental rights. Indeed, the same imbalanced structural framework that benefits 
fundamental rights in Carpenter places them at a disadvantage in Viking and Laval.   
 
Our next free movement/fundamental rights interface, involves clashes between fundamental 
rights that are caused by the exercise of free movement. Familiapress provides a good 
example of this phenomenon.
199
 German publishers, wishing to sell magazines containing 
prize competitions in Austria, challenged a ban on such publications by that Member State as 
a breach of Article 34 TFEU on free movement of goods. The prohibition operated to protect 
the freedom of expression since smaller publishers could not offer such incentives to 
purchase, putting their continued existence at risk in a Member State that already suffered a 
lack of press diversity. The CJEU noted, however, that the Austrian measure also interfered 
with the freedom of expression of both the German publishers and their potential readership 
in Austria. This rights clash, between the German interpretation of the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression and that of Austria, only occurs because free movement allows for the 
flow of goods across their borders. In such a situation, the suitability of the CJEU as the site 
of adjudication is less open to challenge. As Nic Shuibhne argues, such a ‘rights review 
[arising from the operation of the internal market]…ultimately can only fall to the Court of 
Justice’.200 However, it remains arguable that the CJEU’s current two-stage approach 
challenges its capacity to address this new fundamental rights challenge. This model will 
automatically favour the protection of the fundamental right running congruent to free 
movement over Member State fundamental rights norms that clashes with it. On the one hand, 
Member States might have to accept alteration to their methods of fundamental rights 
protection in light of their commitment to the internal market. On the other, as chapter two 
discusses in more detail, the breadth of free movement subjects important areas of Member 
State law and policy, having only oblique and incidental impact on the internal market, to 
CJEU review. Moreover, situations idiosyncratic to the Member States, such as low press 
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diversity in Austria, might warrant specific methods of fundamental rights protection. 
Nevertheless, the Austrian rules are exposed to the evidentiary hurdles operating at the 
justification phase of the two-stage approach, not imposed on the German approach to 
freedom of expression, which runs congruent to free movement. This type of free 
movement/fundamental rights interface is relevant to this thesis. As Nic Shuibhne highlights, 
Omega can be re-categorised as a conflict, activated by the exercise of free movement, 
between the German understanding of the right to human dignity, which did not allow for 
‘playing at killing’ and the UK definition of that right, which did.201 Dynamic Medien, Viking 
and Laval can also be viewed in this way.  
 
The above discussion of the distinctive fundamental rights needs of Austria in Familiapress 
has already highlighted one component of our ‘impact trio’ i.e. the ways in which the two-
stage approach can threaten fundamental rights standards within the Member States. A full 
investigation of the practical fundamental rights consequences of the two-stage model is best 
conducted in chapters two, three, and four since they only arise as a result of the constitutional 
developments discussed in those chapters. In general, the CJEU only has occasion to review 
Member State fundamental rights rules, in this context, because of the expansion in the scope 
of the free movement provisions. However, a brief explanation of the other constituents of 
this ‘impact trio’ will be provided here as a point of reference.  
 
It will be recalled that as part of the proportionality test, which operates pursuant to the two-
stage model, fundamental rights must be protected in a way that is necessary for that goal. 
This is generally determined by reference to whether there are methods for attaining the 
relevant objective that are less restrictive of free movement.
202
 However, viewing necessity 
through a free movement lens does not always offer adequate legal space to consider the 
effectiveness of alternatives, particularly in light of the specific characteristics of a Member 
State. Familiapress gives us one example in this regard. Similarly, in the context of consumer 
protection, safeguarded by Article 38 CFR, the Court’s reliance on labelling as an alternative 
to Member State measures aimed at minimising consumer confusion arguably neglects to 
consider, in some cases, unique consumer needs arising from a Member State’s language or 
                                                          
201
 Ibid  
202
 Case C-36/02 Omega, para.36; Case C-368/95 Familiapress, n.19 
 49 
 
traditions.
203
 Second, an approach to necessity focused on what is least restrictive of free 
movement can underappreciate the inherently restrictive nature of some fundamental rights. 
Thus, commenting on Viking and Laval, Novitz remarks that ‘[i]t seems highly problematic 
that the legality of unions engaging in industrial action…depend[s] on whether…it would 
have been possible to achieve their objectives in a way which was, perhaps marginally, less 
restrictive of the free movement rights of, in many cases, the very enterprise with which they 
are in dispute’.204 Finally, where complex Member State programmes for the protection of 
fundamental social rights restrict free movement, alternative means of attaining such social 
goals might not be feasible in light of practical and budgetary concerns. For instance, in 
Watts,
205
 the Court held that recipients of medical services were entitled, pursuant to Article 
56 TFEU, to claim reimbursement from the UK’s National Health Service for treatment 
received in other Member States, in certain circumstances. Since the NHS is funded from 
general taxation, is free at the point of delivery, and had no method for such reimbursement, 
the ruling arguably posed a risk to the UK’s programme of protecting the fundamental right to 
health.
206
    
 
This subsection has outlined the different types of fundamental rights outcomes that are 
possible as a result of the use of the two-stage model. It has conceded that in cases of 
congruence between free movement and fundamental rights, the two-stage approach can 
actually operate to the benefit of fundamental rights but has argued that this is insufficient to 
neutralise the problems arising from the adoption of this imbalanced framework in instances 
of clash. Specifically, the focus of the proportionality test on whether fundamental rights can 
be protected in a way that is less restrictive of free movement reduces legal space for 
consideration of the idiosyncratic fundamental rights needs of the Member States, the 
peculiarities of certain types of fundamental rights, and the logistical and financial 
complexities involved in designing systems of social protection. Having delineated the key 
practical issues at stake, the discussion now turns to the theoretical justifications for affording 
special protection to fundamental rights.  
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4.2. Undermining the fundamentality of fundamental rights? Theoretical justifications 
for fundamental rights protection  
 
Commenting on the Court’s use of the two-stage approach in Schmidberger, Brown argues 
that, ‘[u]sing the language of prima facie breach…of economic rights suggests that, even if 
that restriction is ultimately justified, it remains something which is at its heart ‘wrong’ but 
tolerated. This sits rather uneasily with the State’s usually paramount constitutional obligation 
to protect human rights’.207 This implies that, regardless of the practical effects of the two-
stage model upon the protection of fundamental rights, this imbalanced framework might be 
problematic from first principles. The requirement that fundamental rights have to justify the 
restrictions they place on free movement at all could be said to call into question the very 
fundamentality of fundamental rights. However, fundamental rights, themselves, remain ‘an 
essentially contested concept’.208 This raises questions about whether fundamental rights are 
in fact worthy of special protection or their position at the apex of normative hierarchies. 
Since this issue has long been, and continues to be, the subject of intense and rigorous debate, 
it is beyond the scope of this work to conduct an in-depth investigation in this regard. 
Nonetheless, since the thesis rests upon the presumption that the subjugation of fundamental 
rights to the free movement provisions is problematic, it is necessary to provide a broad 
overview of theoretical justifications for fundamental rights protection. Ultimately, although 
acknowledging the strong body of literature that is deeply critical particularly of the universal 
nature of fundamental rights, the section will postulate that these criticisms do not diminish 
their utility. As social facts, rather than universal truths, fundamental rights can be used to 
shine a spotlight on the particular values of society. This can be especially important within a 
polity such as the EU, which, having been built on very focused, economic foundations, might 
be architecturally ill-equipped to appreciate the competing, but equally legitimate, interests 
operating within wider society. 
 
A long-established justification for the special protection of fundamental rights is that they 
have their foundations in a-political, a-historical ‘natural law’, and are applicable universally 
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to everyone by virtue of the uniqueness of being human.
209
 The history of this theoretical 
underpinning is traceable through ‘the ius naturalis of the Middle Ages…the ‘rights of man’ 
and ‘droits de l’homme’ of the English, American and French revolutions…up to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]…’.210 Thus, pursuant to Article 1, the 
UDHR declares that ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood’. This is frequently presented as a reaction to the atrocities of the Second World 
War and the ‘species-segmenting abuse of state power by the Nazi state’.211 Similarly, rights 
exist, therefore, as Dworkinian ‘trumps’ against government policies, particularly excessive or 
barbarous acts of the State.
212
 Gewirth, amongst others, also grounds justification for 
fundamental rights in the rational, moral needs of the universal human actor.
213
 This approach 
assumes that fundamental rights promote ‘normative agency’ by protecting the ‘goods’ of 
freedom and well-being. These are a necessary pre-condition to a person’s own goods or 
desired actions. However, she/he must equally accept that all other purposive agents also have 
rights to freedom and well-being. This creates, in the Hohfeldian sense, ‘claim-rights’ but also 
‘duties’. These ‘exist and are mandatory because they are logically necessary conditions of 
self-interested action’.214 In this way, fundamental rights provide a framework for our rational 
relationships with each other. Thus, the theoretical justification for criticising subjugation of 
fundamental rights to free movement provisions can lie in the fact that fundamental rights 
reflect needs central to our human dignity and exist to provide us with a core of essential 
safeguards in our interactions with the State and each other. They should not be denied by the 
operation of market freedoms since they are universal, absolute, and inviolable.  
 
Nevertheless, the notion that fundamental rights justification is grounded in their a-political, 
timeless, rational universality has been subjected to much criticism.
215
 First, the effectiveness 
of fundamental rights, in securing human dignity or protecting us from State power has been 
questioned. Douzinas asks, ‘[h]as the…ubiquity of rights ended domination and exploitation, 
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repression and violence… This is a comforting idea, daily denied in news bulletins’.216 
Indeed, Bentham argues that these experiences might provide a desire for rights but ‘hunger is 
not bread’. For him, focused positive law, targeted at particular ends would be more effective 
than vague declarations of fundamental rights based in natural law, which he famously 
declared ‘nonsense upon stilts’.217 
 
The claim that fundamental rights are a-political ‘trumps’ against States has been questioned 
by Koskenniemi, particularly in light of the restrictions that human rights instruments, such as 
the ECHR, tend to allow to be imposed upon their exercise. He argues that the identification, 
meaning, and applicability of rights are consequently dependent on contextual assessments 
and conflicting arguments about the political good. If decision-making procedures define 
rights, they cannot be controlled by them.
218
 Nevertheless, the use of ‘rights-language’ can 
also be criticised for petrifying political debate and thereby stagnating social development.
219
 
Similarly, it is argued that the focus of fundamental rights on individual freedoms reflects a 
Western hegemony centred on liberal democracy and capitalism.
220
 This leaves them open to 
the criticism that they operate to the benefit of the privileged, for instance property-owning 
individual, undermining their own claim of universal application.
221
 Douzinas posits that the 
argument that fundamental rights reflect the minimum claims and duties necessary, in our 
relationships with other rational actors, for the pursuit of freedom and well-being fails to 
appreciate that ‘the gravest deprivation and constraints of liberty’ are not caused by the 
actions of other individual actors but by ‘obscene inequalities created by…large-scale 
economic or social structures’.222 Linked to this, Grear argues that ‘the construct of the 
universal human being simply does not do justice to the full complexity, the sheer fleshy 
variability and multiple forms, colours, shapes, sex/genders of the embodied human 
personality in all its vulnerability’.223 This can result in exclusion of minority groups. 
Evidence of an ‘agenda-setting majority’ is found, for example, in the reference to 
‘brotherhood’, in Article 1 UDHR. If fundamental rights cannot be viewed as a-political then 
they can also be criticised for leaving political questions in the hands of unelected judges 
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rather than those of democratically-elected politicians. Speaking in the British context, Ewing 
has argued that codified rights would ‘empower judges to unsettle decisions made in the 
political arena by the people’s representatives and thereby frustrate the democratic 
process’.224 
 
However, as Gearty identifies, much of the ‘problem with human rights [lies in] the claims 
[they] make to universal absolutes’.225 He argues that fundamental rights can still be said to 
exist and to serve a useful societal purpose but as a set of social facts, rather than as a 
collection of revealed truths.
226
 He relies on the claims of Singh, who postulates that, [s]ince 
World War Two, the age-old problem of whether there are human rights and where they come 
from…has largely been avoided, if not resolved, by the social fact that the international 
community has come to accept a set of principles as being of global application’.227 As 
Hoffmann points out, once a fundamental right is enshrined in a domestic constitution or a 
State becomes party to an international human rights treaty, ‘the question of foundations 
becomes immaterial. All that counts from a legal perspective is whether a particular norm is 
(legally) valid and…whether it has been complied with…’228 
 
Nor does Gearty consider Bentham’s argument, that fundamental rights represent 
‘wants/desires’ rather than ‘lived realities’, to undermine their value. He views them ‘as a 
mission statement for humanity, not a legal charter guaranteeing an impossible Nirvana’.229 
Similarly, Günther postulates that fundamental rights provide us with a language for 
articulating a ‘rejection of a concrete historical experience of injustice and fear’.230 They 
allow us to assert, in our interactions with the State, each other, and ourselves, that we deserve 
the recognition and respect given to all.
231
 Gearty also welcomes the transparency with which 
most fundamental rights documents accept that their provisions can be restricted by political 
reality. Although this leaves political decision-making to judges, he speculates that, viewed as 
civil liberties, the fundamental rights to the freedoms of conscience, expression and 
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association, the fundamental right to freedom from torture and arbitrary imprisonment, and to 
vote, are part of the ‘essential fabric that goes into making our democratic tapestry’. They 
ensure the relevant organs of the State are truly and properly representative.
232
  
 
Moreover, Gearty’s acceptance that fundamental rights are not the a-historical, rational 
‘discoveries’ of the self-interested individual but can reflect a societal response to the ‘rapid 
progress of sentiments’,233 creates space for a broader, more inclusive approach to 
fundamental rights. He draws on the work of Sypnowich, who argues that ‘if human rights are 
shaped by social factors, there can be no ultimate, timeless “core” of negative human rights to 
which positive rights stand as dispensable extras’.234 Gearty then points to legislative 
intervention that could encapsulate this wider view of human dignity, such as the National 
Health Service Act 1946 and the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, in the UK context. 
He argues that, though ‘not presented in explicitly ‘human rights’ terms…it is nonetheless 
real for that’.235     
 
If this thesis rests on the presumption that the subjugation of fundamental rights to the free 
movement provisions is problematic, it relies on the above counter-arguments to established 
fundamental rights critiques to justify its supposition. Regardless of the theoretical debates as 
to the existence and foundations of fundamental rights, the Union’s commitment to respecting 
them exists as a social fact by virtue of Article 6 TEU, the Charter and the general principles. 
More broadly, this coheres with the utilisation of fundamental rights generally within the 
international community. Indeed, as a polity founded by Western liberal democracies in the 
post-Second World War era, one would expect to see the contemporary Union value 
fundamental rights highly, in a constitutional sense. Drawing on Hoffmann’s assertions, this 
‘suspends the essential contestability of human rights’ and introduces established questions of 
legal compliance.
236
 Therefore, the EU’s self-imposed fundamental rights obligations,237 
warrant, of themselves, an analysis of whether the Union is meeting its own pledges. The 
Union’s economic history also, arguably, necessitates the use of a fundamental rights ‘mission 
statement’ in the Gearty sense. Since, as this thesis will demonstrate, the EU’s economic 
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foundations structurally influence its approach to competing areas of law and policy, 
fundamental rights shine a crucial spotlight on competing but important societal goals.  
 
The structural prioritisation of free movement also shifts the perspective of arguments that 
fundamental rights protection is undemocratic. As chapter two will explore in more detail, the 
broad scope of the free movement provisions exposes a wide range of Member State law and 
policy to judicial scrutiny. This can include ‘basic’ fundamental rights contained in national 
constitutions, but also focused and detailed legislative programmes for fundamental rights 
protection. Both can reflect the choices of the population, implemented through their elected 
representatives. For instance, the fundamental right to human dignity, contained in German 
Basic Law, and the subject of a clash with the free provision of services in Omega, arguably 
reflects the fundamental rights priorities of the German nation. In Watts, the UK’s National 
Health Service, a legislative creation and frequently at the centre of political discussion, was 
potentially put at risk by the restrictions it imposed on the free provision of services. 
Interestingly, then, at the Union-level, fundamental rights might not (always) serve to remove 
political decision-making from elected representatives, but to remind the Union’s judicial 
branch of the democratic implications of their interpretations of EU primary law.  
 
The focus of this thesis, on testing compliance with the ‘social fact’ of the Union’s own 
commitment to fundamental rights, also provides it with a definitional framework. It will take 
a broad approach to fundamental rights grounded in the civil, political, economic and social 
rights contained in the Union’s own Charter and the general principles of Union law, 
influenced by the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and the international 
treaties to which they are signatories. This is also justified by the philosophical acceptance 
that, in light of the ubiquity of fundamental rights and ongoing debate in the field, the term 
‘fundamental right’ is ‘nearly criterionless’.238 They are ‘a dynamic and highly adaptive 
process’.239 Since the Union’s own Charter contains a collection of social rights, this permits 
the incorporation of programmatic rights into our definition of fundamental rights. This 
coheres with the increasing recognition of economic and social rights, traditionally viewed as 
aspirational, programmatic, and therefore not judicially cognisable, as of equal legal status to 
those of a civil and political nature. For instance, the provisions of the ECHR, focused on civil 
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and political rights, have been interpreted so as to include social rights
240
 while additional 
protocols have included, for instance, the right to education.
241
 We have also seen the 
emergence of third generation ‘solidarity’ fundamental rights such as rights to a healthy 
environment and consumer protection. These ‘new’ fundamental rights, especially those of 
the third generation, are not unanimously accepted. Some commentators argue that they dilute 
the fundamentality of fundamental rights.
242
 Crucially, however, for our purposes, the EU has 
been part of this eruption of fundamental rights. For instance, the Union’s own fundamental 
rights Charter makes reference to consumer and environmental protection.
243
 Indeed, the 
Charter’s status as a modern catalogue of fundamental rights, which has more contemporary 
relevance than the ECHR, and its ‘innovation’ in placing civil and political rights alongside 
economic and social rights, has been welcomed.
244
 Significantly, the Charter also presents (at 
least some of) the free movement provisions as fundamental rights. Chapter five will explore 
the significance of this in terms of how free movement is conceived and ultimately argue that 
free movement should be treated as equivalent to a fundamental right during the adjudication 
of conflicts between the market freedoms and (other) fundamental rights.  
 
As the thesis conducts a diagnostic analysis of the impact of the Union’s economic history on 
its contemporary ability to protect fundamental rights, it will, at times, retroactively apply a 
fundamental rights definition to ‘recent’ rights, previously operating as public interests. For 
instance, the Court has not adapted its adjudicative methodology in light of the Charter’s 
elevation of consumer protection to a fundamental right.
245
 This introduces the related 
question of how the thesis will approach the Charter’s ‘principles’. Although they feature in 
the Charter, they do not enjoy the same legal force as ‘rights’, only being judicially cognisable 
in the interpretation of legislative and executive acts of the Union institutions, and the 
Member States when implementing Union law.
246
 The Charter does not stipulate which of its 
provisions are ‘principles’ but they are thought to apply to its programmatic content such as 
the right to housing assistance
247
 or consumer protection.
248
 It is submitted that principles can, 
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in any case, be viewed as ‘fundamental rights’ in the framework of a thesis focused on 
instances of clash between free movement and fundamental rights. As an institution of the 
Union,
249
 and pursuant to Article 52(5) CFR, the Court should still take these rights into 
account in its interpretation of free movement. If the thesis seeks to examine the Union’s 
‘mission statement’ against its legal reality, then the Charter principles remain relevant. Since 
the focus is on the Union’s constitutional pledges, the thesis will generally also adopt the term 
‘fundamental rights’ as opposed to ‘human rights’ as this is the preferred terminology in the 
literature surrounding EU constitutional law. It is, however, accepted that some view 
‘fundamental rights’ as a broader term, incorporating a wider-range of constitutional law, than 
‘human rights’.250   
 
If the theoretical justification for fundamental rights protection lies in their existence as a 
social fact, then it is, additionally, vital to consider the impact of the two-stage model of free 
movement/fundamental rights adjudication from Union constitutional perspectives. The 
following subsection explores this issue. 
    
 
4.3. Union constitutional perspectives: is the two-stage model architecturally old-hat or 
in line with the contemporary constitutional framework? 
 
In assessing the constitutional ‘fit’ of the two-stage approach within the Union’s present-day 
framework, we will first accept that a two-stage approach could be viewed as a procedural 
eventuality inherent in the position of the free movement provisions within the Treaty. 
However, it will be argued that alternative Treaty interpretations, more in-keeping with the 
Union’s fundamental rights obligations, are available. Next, an examination of the 
contemporary constitutional framework in a substantive sense, with particular focus on the 
Union’s forthcoming accession to the ECHR, and the primary status of the Charter, will 
demonstrate that the two-stage model does not adequately meet the Union’s new goals and 
constitutional commitments.   
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4.3.1. Is the two-stage approach a procedural eventuality inherent to the free movement 
provisions? 
 
It might be argued that the breach/justification model is a procedural inevitability contained 
in, and required by, the Treaty itself. The free movement provisions lay down a set of 
normative rules. For instance, pursuant to Article 34 TFEU:  
 
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States.  
 
Article 36 TFEU, as a subsequent provision, arguably therefore exists as a defence to rules 
that breach this general prohibition. Further, Article 36 states that activity restricting the free 
movement of goods can be ‘justified’ if pursuing a goal included in that provision, suggesting 
that the burden of proof rests on the measure in breach. Indeed, Nic Suihbhne remarks that, 
since the Treaty expresses justifications as derogations from primary rights, standard 
interpretative canons require the free movement provisions to be interpreted widely and 
exceptions from them narrowly.
251
 She nevertheless accepts that its use is controversial in 
light of the encroachment of free movement into new areas of Member State law and 
policy:
252
    
 
‘There is a searing tension at the heart of how we conceptualise justification in free movement law…[it] has 
evolved overtime to become the prime space within which public interest arguments are aired…It is where we 
pitch the market ‘against’ other values…the language is about balancing and weighing, not derogating. We are 
trying…to make the justification framework operate for us in a way that its legal construction in the Treaty 
cannot achieve’.253  
 
However, whether the structure of the Treaty requires a two-stage approach is open to 
question, certainly in relation to fundamental rights protection. First, taking Article 36 TFEU 
as an example again, its opening sentence also states that, ‘[t]he provisions in Article 
34…shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports…justified [inter alia] on 
grounds of public morality, public policy, or public security…[emphasis added]’ This can be 
interpreted as meaning that rules cannot be prohibited by Articles 34/35 in the first place 
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where they pursue a justifiable aim. In other words, it is arguable that Articles 34 and 36 must 
be read alongside each other, as part of an overall assessment of what is and is not proscribed 
under EU law.  
 
Even if the positioning of Articles 34 and 36 implies some sort of structural subjugation of the 
latter to the former, Article 36 states only that national rules must not constitute arbitrary 
discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade. This does not dictate the use of a 
proportionality test that assesses the ‘necessity’ of a measure by reference to what is least 
restrictive of free movement. Moreover, as highlighted above, fundamental rights do not 
actually feature in any of the Treaty derogations from the free movement provisions. 
Accordingly, the breach/justification dynamic, arguably inherent in the relative positions of 
Articles 34 and 36, does not have to apply to clashes between free movement and 
fundamental rights. Instead, the need for fundamental rights protection can be drawn directly 
from the Union’s fundamental rights obligations imposed by Article 6 TEU. This removes 
fundamental rights considerations from the standard wide/narrow interpretative canons that 
Nic Shuibhne discusses.
254
    
 
Thus, the structure of the Treaty does not appear to necessitate a two-stage approach for 
adjudicating clashes between free movement and fundamental rights. Moreover, and 
significantly, the current adjudicative framework does not cohere with the present-day aims of 
the Union, which are much broader than the economically-focused goals of the EEC. 
 
 
4.3.2. The need to respect the contemporary constitutional framework and the division of 
labour in meeting Treaty goals 
 
This subsection will argue that the Court’s two-stage adjudicative model is ill-suited to the 
Union’s current substantive constitution. By charting the evolution of the Union’s goals 
beyond economic integration, it will postulate that the structural prioritisation of free 
movement is no longer an understandable mechanism by reference to the Union’s own 
constitutional confines. Further, since the Union tasks the Member States with achieving 
some of its more recent aims, this necessitates a model that leaves the Member States with 
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sufficient space to perform this function. Moving from the general to the specific, the 
subsection will posit that the two-stage approach is particularly outmoded in light of the 
Union’s future accession to the ECHR, since that framework cannot permit the structural 
subjugation of fundamental rights to the free movement provisions. The primary status of the 
Charter also realigns the core tasks of the Union, calling into question the contemporary 
suitability of a procedural preference for free movement. 
  
 
4.3.2.1. Charting the expansion of Union goals 
 
As section 3.2.1 outlined, although the drafters of the Rome Treaty were also ‘resolved to 
ensure the…social progression of their countries,’255 the core task of the EEC was economic 
integration through the creation of the common market.
256
 However, as Ludlow has pointed 
out, ‘the EU has since developed into a more explicitly comprehensive legal order’.257 This 
can be tracked through key amendments to the founding Treaties, though these changes, 
particularly in the social arena, were often precipitated by far-reaching and ambitious soft-law 
programmes, such as the Lisbon Agenda,
258
 which recognised the inextricable link between 
economic and social progression.
259
 Significantly, the Maastricht Treaty signalled a move 
towards political, as well as economic, integration. The European Economic Community 
became the European Community; the European Union was created, offering a legal 
framework for intergovernmental efforts in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
and Justice and Home Affairs; the concept of Union citizenship was formalised, attaching free 
movement rights to individuals’ status as Union citizens rather than just their roles as factors 
of production. The Amsterdam Treaty adopted a general provision prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, ethnic origin, religion, belief, age, or sexual orientation;
260
 and 
incorporated Maastricht’s Social Agreement into the Treaty proper, allowing the Union to 
take measures in areas such as the social protection of workers. The Lisbon Treaty developed 
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the aims of the EU further still. Indeed, Article 3 TEU, containing ‘quite a task list’261 for the 
contemporary Union, provides that the Union’s aims are, inter alia: to promote peace…and 
the well-being of its peoples; to offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice; to 
ensure the free movement of persons with appropriate measures in respect of external borders, 
asylum and immigration and combating crime; to establish an internal market; to work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth, price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at…social progress and a high level of 
protection of the environment and the promotion of scientific and technological advance; to 
combat social exclusion and discrimination; to promote social justice, and equality between 
men and women; to protect the rights of the child; and to establish monetary union. The 
Lisbon Treaty additionally merged the European Community and European Union into an 
overarching European Union, a move, arguably, towards greater supranationalism in 
traditionally intergovernmental areas.
262
 For instance, the Union’s power to act in the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice was strengthened significantly.
263
 Douglas-Scott notes that this 
expansion of EU goals requires the EU to confront issues with obvious relevance to 
fundamental rights, not relevant to the EEC, such as asylum and criminal matters.
264
   
 
On the specific issue of fundamental rights, as outlined in section 2.1, the Court accepted, in a 
series of cases, the existence of fundamental rights in the EU legal order by virtue of the 
general principles of Union law. At Maastricht, the Union pledged to respect fundamental 
rights
265
 while the Amsterdam Treaty later claimed that the Union is founded on respect for 
fundamental rights.
266
 It also introduced Article 7 TEU, allowing for the suspension of 
Member State voting rights in event of fundamental rights’ violations. Outside the framework 
of Treaty amendments, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was solemnly proclaimed by 
the EU institutions in 2000.
267
 The Lisbon Treaty introduced two highly significant changes to 
the Union’s fundamental rights framework. Pursuant to Article 6(2) TEU, it imposes a 
requirement that the EU accede to the ECHR, while Article 6(1) TEU accords primary legal 
status to the Charter. These drivers of adjudicative change, in terms of the interaction between 
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free movement and fundamental rights, are substantial and will consequently be discussed in 
the following subsections.  
 
First, however, it is important to note that the incremental expansion in EU objectives and 
competence has been matched by the progressive strengthening of Member State voice in the 
EU legal order.
268
 The introduction of the principle of subsidiarity at Masstricht is one 
example. Dougan finds it ‘unsurprising’ that this has continued with the Lisbon Treaty: ‘each 
step towards greater supranationalism is counterweighted by more effective checks and 
balances to protect Member State prerogatives and ensure the Union remains responsive to 
domestic concerns’.269 Indeed, in the fundamental rights context, there is arguably a ‘tension 
between the Charter’s objective of strengthening EU fundamental rights protection and its 
statement that it does not confer any new powers’ on the Union.270 Of particular interest, from 
a fundamental rights perspective, might be the strengthening, by Lisbon, of the Treaty’s 
national identity clause, contained in Article 4(2) TEU.
271
 Specifically, its reinforcement 
raises questions as to whether it might be used to underpin domestic fundamental rights 
provisions when they are pitted against the Treaty free movement provisions. To that end, 
Preshova argues that fundamental rights fall within the definition of national identity.
272
 
However, while the reference of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht to Article 4(2) TEU in 
its Lisbon decision,
273
 suggests that its concretisation post-Lisbon has added a ‘truly new 
flavour’274 to the Union’s legal obligations, the national constitutional courts have, in fact, 
‘left open the precise determination of the content of national or constitutional identity by 
using general and abstract formulations’.275 Indeed, ever since Solange II, national 
constitutional courts have consistently accepted equivalent, as opposed to identical, 
fundamental rights protection in relation to the conformity of EU rules with their own 
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constitutional requirements.
276
 This suggests that a strengthened Article 4(2) will do little 
more than provide a platform for renewed judicial posturing in respect of who has the final 
say on fundamental rights. Preshova is more optimistic arguing that the national identity 
clause could play a role in determining the degree of fundamental rights protection to be 
afforded at EU-level. Specifically, while in cases such as Omega, the Court processed 
fundamental rights questions through the justification stage of the two-stage model as a matter 
of EU law, Article 4(2) operates outside this framework and ‘crucially [and] clearly refers 
back to the Member States’.277 This might be particularly relevant to meeting fundamental 
rights needs that are peculiar to individual Member States. Nevertheless, he acknowledges 
that the Court’s most recent case-law does not provide much optimism in this respect.278 On 
the other hand, the Court’s recent decision to declare the Data Retention Directive279 invalid 
as a violation of Articles 7, 8, and 11 CFR might reveal the indirect influence of the national 
identity clause,
280
 since a number of national constitutional courts had already declared 
domestic implementing legislation to be unconstitutional.
281
 Thus, although it seems unlikely 
that Article 4(2) TEU requires the primacy of national constitutional provisions over EU law 
as a matter of principle, it does imply a contemporary need for greater balance where there is 
conflict between the fundamental principles of the EU legal order, such as free movement, 
and the constitutions of the Member States.  
 
As well as strengthening Member State voice in tandem with the expansion of its goals, the 
Treaty has also taken an imbalanced approach to the implementation of those objectives, 
dividing labour between the Union and the Member States. While in some fields - for 
instance, the customs union - the EU has exclusive competence to take action, in others - such 
as social, environmental, and consumer protection policies - it shares competence with the 
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Member States. In areas such as education and health, the EU may only support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States.
282
 The EU still has no general jurisdiction in the 
field of fundamental rights. Thus, in relation to some of the aims of the Union contained in 
Article 3 TEU, and many of the rights in the Charter, the EU relies on the Member States to 
meet its goals.
283
 Discussing social policy, Ludlow notes that activity ‘has been developed 
either at a European level or has been left deliberately in the hands of the member states as a 
counterweight to transnational economic integration’.284 For instance Article 28 CFR protects 
the right to strike. However, Article 153(5) TFEU explicitly excludes EU competence in this 
regard, while Article 153(1) explains that the Union will ‘support and complement’ the 
activities of the Member States in relation to, inter alia, the social protection of workers. 
Accordingly, though the Union has goals beyond the internal market, the Treaty presents the 
Member States as the principal agents of meeting some (though clearly not all) of them, 
accepting diversity in their execution. However, this requires that Member States be afforded 
sufficient legal space to pursue these endeavours when domestic measures clash with EU-
level rules, including primary free movement law. As Mason recognises, separating economic 
and social rights, as the Rome Treaty envisaged, is a ‘sheer conceptual impossibility’.285 Thus, 
an important challenge, identified by Nic Shuibhne, is ‘for the Court to achieve effective 
internal market regulation while still allowing for more localised regulatory diversity in 
keeping with the constitutional mandate of shared EU/Member State competence’.286 
 
Indeed, Piris argues that the asymmetry between the Union’s approach to social policy, which 
‘leaves almost complete freedom to the Member States’ and its implementation of free 
movement is what caused the large-scale reaction to Viking and Laval.
287
 In fact, in those 
cases the Court explicitly acknowledged that the EU had a social, as well as economic 
purpose, and the consequent need to balance the free movement provisions against social 
policy.
288
 Nevertheless, the Court processed this conflict of objectives through its existing 
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two-stage model, requiring social policy to justify itself against the pursuit of economic 
integration and rendering it procedurally disadvantaged. This results in clear disconnection, at 
the judicial-level, between the Treaty’s commitment to social progression under its social 
chapter and the deregulation of Member State social policy as a result of the pursuit of free 
movement. Moreover, as Maduro argues, ‘this has not been (at least totally) compensated by 
social policies arising at the level of the European Union’.289 This will evidently be 
particularly true in areas where the EU has limited or no legislative competence. Thus, as 
Maduro has noted:  
 
[W]hen market integration [challenges] the regulatory powers of the States, which are in many cases aimed at 
protecting…social rights, such as the right to education, health and social protection, fair working conditions, 
minimum income, and, in a broader sense, ‘other ‘social’ rights, such as consumer and environmental protection 
[it also undermines its own objectives since] many of these rights are recognised in the Treaties as goals of the 
European Union.
290
  
 
In other words, the Union is at something of a constitutional crossroads: it either needs to act 
to ensure that its social objectives are being met at the European-level, despite the 
deregulatory effects of free movement, or, at the very least, the Court needs to adapt its 
adjudicative methodology in a way that accepts the need for the Union to ‘back off’ and allow 
the Member States room to pursue legitimate aims outside of the shadow of a breach of free 
movement. Indeed Maduro called for a judicial approach to free movement that accepts, 
‘given the EU’s contemporary goals, [that] States should be left sufficient policy autonomy to 
ensure the continuation of welfare state traditions albeit under new economic constraints’.291  
 
More than a decade has passed since Maduro conducted this assessment of the balance 
between free movement and social rights in the EU. Nevertheless, as the above discussion 
demonstrated, the two-stage approach has been maintained for interactions between free 
movement and fundamental rights, even as the Union’s aims have further broadened, and its 
commitment to fundamental rights has become more entrenched. As a result, there remain 
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persistent calls in the literature for the adaptation of the Court’s adjudicative methodology.292 
Further, Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Santos Palhota, argued that the coming into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty meant that social policy derogations from the free movement provisions 
could no longer be interpreted narrowly.
293
  
  
These general expansions of the EU’s goals beyond economic integration, and the Union’s 
explicit commitment to respecting fundamental rights, pose a direct challenge to the 
constitutional ‘fit’ of the two-stage approach. The discussion now shifts to a more focused 
consideration of two key drivers of adjudicative change post-Lisbon, specifically the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR and the primary law status of the Charter.  
 
 
4.3.2.2.When systems collide: the impact of accession to the ECHR on the adjudicative 
preference for free movement 
 
The EU’s future accession to the ECHR, required by Article 6(2) TEU, is a potentially very 
significant driver of change in respect of the CJEU’s current two-stage model.294 This is 
because there is a clear ‘systems clash’ between the way in which the Strasbourg Court 
adjudicates conflict between fundamental rights and competing interests when compared with 
the Luxembourg Court’s model for resolving clashes between free movement and 
fundamental rights. Indeed, as Veldman remarks, ‘the methods applied by the ECtHR and the 
[CJEU] start out from opposite directions’. While the ECtHR adopts a two-stage approach, 
asking whether there has been an interference with fundamental rights, and then, whether it 
can be justified, taking a strict approach to potential derogations; the CJEU requires 
fundamental rights to defend themselves against prima facie breaches of free movement, also 
taking a restrictive approach to justifications.
295
 Arguably, then, when Union accession to the 
ECHR eventually occurs, it will necessitate a shift in the Court’s adjudicative processing of 
conflict between free movement and fundamental rights. Thus, Dorssemont speculates that 
accession ‘will force the European institutions to justify restrictions to citizens’ rights, instead 
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of forcing citizens to justify the exercise of their human rights’.296 Of course, this reflects a 
wider issue with the adjudicative architecture for addressing tensions between the market 
freedoms and fundamental rights, which remains problematic within the Union’s 
contemporary constitutional framework even in those cases where there is no breach of 
Convention minimum standards. Accordingly, the below consideration of the compatibility of 
the CJEU’s adjudicative approach with the requirements of the ECHR simply serves as one 
useful illustration of this broader concern.   
 
An area of particular interest within the literature has been the compatibility of the CJEU’s 
Laval quartet, concerning the rights to collective bargaining and collective action, with the 
recent case law of the ECtHR in this field. Accordingly, this offers a useful case-study to 
assess the CJEU’s current approach against the EU’s future constitutional obligations post-
accession. It will be argued that the decisions of the ECtHR in Demir and Enerji
297
 indicate 
that a modification to the CJEU’s adjudicative methodology would be advisable in order to 
avoid ‘a high noon conflict’ with the ECtHR,298 even in light of the ECtHR’s more cautious 
recent judgment in National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) v UK 
(hereinafter, RMT).
299
 
 
In Demir, a Turkish municipality had failed to meet some of the obligations arising out of a 
collective agreement it had made with a trade union, representing civil servants. Proceedings 
brought by the trade union before the Turkish courts failed on the basis that trade unions 
representing civil servants had no legal personality and no power to enter into collective 
agreements under Turkish law. This was challenged, before the ECtHR, as a violation of 
Article 11 ECHR, which provides individuals with the right to form and join trade unions for 
the protection of their own interests. The Strasbourg Court decided that denial of the trade 
union’s legal personality was a violation of Article 11. Crucially, in a departure from its 
previous case-law,
300
 the ECtHR also held that collective bargaining constituted an ‘essential 
element’ of that provision. Since Turkey had failed to demonstrate why its refusal to 
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recognise the collective agreement was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ its activity could 
not be justified. This outcome is significant for two reasons. First, the requirement that Turkey 
justify its conduct provides an example of the two-stage fundamental rights bias in the 
adjudicative approach of the ECtHR. Second, by holding that the right to collective 
bargaining constituted an essential element of Article 11, the Strasbourg Court raised the 
standard of fundamental rights protection required of the Contracting Parties by that 
provision.  
 
However, the question of whether the right to collective action was also an essential element 
of Article 11 was not addressed in Demir. The answer (appeared at least) to come with the 
Court’s subsequent decision in Enerji. Members of a trade union challenged, as a violation of 
Article 11 ECHR, sanctions imposed on them for participating in strike action, contrary to a 
ban imposed on public sector workers by the Turkish authorities. The Strasbourg Court 
highlighted that that Article requires Contracting Parties to permit trade unions to strive for 
the interests of their members. Strike action was ‘un aspect important’ of trade union activity 
in this regard. It noted also that the right to strike was recognised by the governing bodies of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as ‘le corollaire indissociable’ of the right of 
trade union freedom protected by ILO Convention No.87. The ECtHR concluded that there 
had been an interference with the rights enjoyed pursuant to Article 11.
301
 It then proceeded to 
its usual proportionality assessment. In light of the fact, inter alia, that the circular applied to 
all civil servants without distinction, the interference with Article 11 ECHR could not be 
justified.
302
  
 
Demir and Enerji elicited a considerable response from commentators in relation to their 
potential effects on Viking and Laval. Veldman argued that the ECtHR and the CJEU were 
‘likely to head for clash in respect of the fundamental right to strike once the EU accedes to 
the ECHR’,303 while Ludlow considered the cases ‘fundamentally irreconcilable’.304  The 
Strasbourg Court’s reliance on international labour law standards is of particular interest since 
the ILO’s Committee of Experts, in its 2010 report, explicitly stated that the approach of the 
CJEU in Viking and Laval was ‘likely to have a significant restrictive effect on the exercise of 
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the right to strike in a manner contrary to the [ILO] Convention’.305 Certainly, a legal order 
that respects the right to strike only where it is exercised in a way least restrictive of the 
fundamental economic freedoms of the employer is unlikely to conform with the status of the 
right to strike as an ‘essential element’ of Article 11 ECHR. As Ewing and Hendy point out, 
‘[i]t was not necessary…for the ECtHR to consider whether the other means by which the 
union might be heard on behalf of its members were sufficient: breach of the right to strike 
alone was a breach of Article 11(1)’.306   
 
However, writers also acknowledged, in the midst of their enthusiasm, that the ECtHR’s 
reference to the right to strike as ‘le corollaire indissociable’ of collective bargaining, in 
Enerji, related to discussion of the views of the governing bodies of the ILO. The ECtHR, 
when speaking for itself, ‘was slightly more timid in tone’307 referring to the right to strike as 
‘just’ an important measure to protect workers’ interests.308 Dorssemont went as far as to 
argue that since Demir and Enerji involved total bans on collective bargaining and action 
rather than conflicting rights and freedoms, they ‘do not provide sufficient guidance to predict 
anything whatsoever’.309 The recent case of RMT has, to some extent, confirmed these 
reflections. 
 
RMT was a trade union that argued, before the Strasbourg Court, that UK rules, prohibiting 
secondary strike action, were in violation of Article 11 ECHR. Having established that the 
ban was indeed an interference with the freedom of association, the ECtHR progressed to the 
standard questions asked at the justification stage. RMT argued that the prohibition could not 
be viewed as pursuing the ‘lawful aim’ of ‘protecting the rights and freedoms of others’ since 
the very purpose of strike action was to induce the employer to meet the demands of labour. 
Distinguishing its previous case of UNISON,
310
 in which the ECtHR had held that this could 
constitute a legitimate aim, that Court nevertheless, considered the UK measures to pursue a 
legitimate purpose, making no comment as to the future applicability of UNISON.
311
 RMT 
argued, in addition, that the UK government’s actions could not be viewed as necessary. 
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Relying on the Court’s use of the phrase ‘indispensable corollary’ in Enerji, RMT argued that 
the right to strike was an ‘essential element’ of Article 11. Thus, its restriction would impair 
‘the very essence’ of the freedom of association. The ECtHR disagreed, stating that it had 
only used that term when adverting to the position of the ILO supervisory bodies. Enerji was 
not authority for the privileged status of the right to strike but simply illustrated that strike 
action was clearly protected by Article 11(1) ECHR.
312
 The Strasbourg Court considered that 
RMT had been able to exercise two of the essential elements of Article 11: the right to seek to 
persuade the employer to hear it and the right to engage in collective bargaining.
313
 It also 
highlighted the need to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of individuals 
and the community as a whole. The margin of appreciation in Demir had been narrow because 
the dissolution of a trade union and non-recognition of a collective agreement went to the 
inner core of Article 11. However, this could not be read as ‘narrowing decisively and 
definitively the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation in relation to regulating, through 
normal democratic processes, the exercise of trade union freedom within the social and 
economic framework of the country concerned’.314 The democratic institutions of the 
Contracting Parties were generally better-placed than the international judge to decide which 
measures best suited the conditions in their country. Nevertheless, the Court did state that the 
removal of strike action altogether would ‘[strike] at the very substance of trade union 
freedom’.315   
 
In an Opinion that concurred with the substantive outcome of the case, Judge Wojtyczek 
made explicit reference to Viking and Laval. He noted, seemingly without concern, that ‘trade 
unions may be held liable for strikes which interfere with the fundamental freedoms protected 
by European law’. He also remarked that, while the ‘right to strike was protected under the 
Charter, that instrument did not entitle the European Union to prevent its Member States from 
imposing restrictions on the right to strike’.316  However, he made no causal link between this 
and the requirement that fundamental rights issue must fall within the scope of Union law, or 
the division of competences in relation to the right to strike contained in Article 153(5) TFEU.  
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Without doubt, RMT lessens the potential impact of Demir and Enerji on the treatment of the 
right to strike within the EU legal order. If the right to strike is not ‘le corollaire 
indissociable’ of a trade union’s Article 11 rights, then it is less clear that the requirement that 
trade unions pursue means less restrictive of free movement will violate that provision. Trade 
unions still have access to the ‘essential elements’ of Article 11: they remain generally able to 
enter into collective agreements; can seek to persuade employers to listen to them; and can 
strive to protect their members’ interests. Indeed, trade unions explicitly have the right to 
strike, pursuant to Article 28 CFR and acknowledged by the CJEU in Viking and Laval. The 
ECtHR’s acceptance that the right to strike has to be balanced against ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’ suggests that the Strasbourg Court would not find the application of some 
kind of proportionality test within the EU legal order problematic. More broadly, in relying on 
the judgments of the Luxembourg Court for his own conclusions, Judge Wojtyczek seemingly 
views the CJEU (for now, at least) as a parallel overseer of fundamental rights, as opposed to 
a regional polity that might itself fail to meet international standards. Finally, the deference of 
the ECtHR in RMT, to policy decisions reached by domestic authorities better-placed than the 
international judge to decide which conditions best suit its needs, suggests a potentially broad 
margin of appreciation for the CJEU on free movement issues post-accession. Currently, the 
ECtHR only faces the question of whether one Contracting Party’s law and policy meet the 
minimum standards required by the Convention. By contrast, as detailed in section 4.1, in 
cases like Familiapress, or even Viking and Laval, the CJEU has to reconcile competing 
Member State visions of fundamental rights protection, which clash as a direct result of free 
movement, and measure these also against the centrality of the internal market to the EU legal 
order. While certain substantive outcomes might be criticised, there is no questioning the 
CJEU’s extensive experience in this field, nor the inexperience of the ECtHR. Thus, post-
accession, the ECtHR might offer a broad margin of appreciation to the EU, and therefore the 
CJEU, in resolving conflict between free movement and fundamental rights. The CJEU is 
arguably better-placed to understand the complex social and economic needs arising out of the 
creation of an internal market.  
 
This introduces the related question of the ongoing application of the Bosphorus principle 
post-accession.
317
 It is arguably unlikely that even cases as controversial as Viking and Laval 
would be viewed as examples of ‘manifestly deficient’ fundamental rights protection on the 
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part of the EU. On the other hand, Craig has argued that ‘there is no rationale’ for the 
maintenance of the rule in Bosphorus after the EU formally accedes to the ECHR since it 
should be treated like any other signatory state.
318
 Moreover, in cases concerning competing 
Member State fundamental rights definitions, the ECtHR would not have to concern itself 
with which one the CJEU should have preferred, but rather with whether the substantive 
outcome of a given case meets minimum Convention standards. If it does not, then the EU 
should still be found to have violated the relevant ECHR provision. Further, the deference that 
the ECtHR shows the United Kingdom in RMT related, partly, to the fact that limitations 
placed on fundamental rights were the outcome of a democratic process. This has much less 
relevance in relation to those decisions of the CJEU that seem to favour free movement over 
the fundamental rights policies formulated by the democratic organs of the Member States.
319
  
 
Indeed, RMT might not limit the effects of Demir and Enerji as much as first appears. First, 
regardless of the status of the right to strike as an ‘essential element’ of Article 11 ECHR, it 
still falls within the protective scope of that provision. Interferences must therefore still 
overcome the justificatory hurdles imposed by Article 11(2). Accordingly, there remains a 
systems clash between the fundamental rights-bias of the ECtHR’s two-stage framework, and 
the preference for free movement inherent in the approach of the CJEU. More broadly, we 
have only examined Demir, Enerji, and RMT as a case-study of the current incompatibility 
between the ECtHR and CJEU adjudicative models. When set against all of the Convention 
rights, it is entirely possible that the pursuit of free movement might interfere with the 
‘essential elements’ of some of those provisions.320 In any case, issues of compliance with the 
ECHR are not the only problems arising from the current two-stage breach/justification 
framework of the CJEU. It will be recalled that future accession to the Convention is just one 
example of constitutional developments within the Union legal order that call into question 
the suitability of the CJEU’s adjudicative methodology.     
 
Returning to RMT, the ECtHR explicitly stated in that judgment that a total ban on the right to 
strike would ‘strike at the very substance of trade union freedom’. Arguably, the CJEU’s 
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interpretation of the Posted Workers’ Directive in Laval imposes a total ban on the right to 
strike in key areas of worker protection. Specifically, trade unions are precluded from taking 
collective action to strive for standards of worker protection higher than or beyond those 
referred to in the ‘core nucleus’ of Article 3(1)(a)-(g) PWD. As Veldman argues, 
‘[e]xaminations by the judiciary of a sufficient cause for the action prove…problematic 
because they could amount to unlawful interference with the right to collective action 
itself’.321 The BALPA saga also suggests that the uncertainty surrounding Viking and Laval 
has led to a de facto ban on strike action in some situations.
322
 British Airways (BA) sought 
an injunction against the strike action of the British Air Line Pilots’ Association (BALPA), 
concerning the setting-up of a subsidiary in another Member State, on the grounds that it 
would breach BA’s free movement rights, pursuant to Viking and Laval. Ewing and Hendy 
consider that the complexity of those cases and the associated costs of strike action will result 
in interim injunctions against strikes in most future cases.
323
 BALPA withdrew its application 
for a court declaration determining the ‘Viking question’ since this was likely to take many 
months, by which time the subsidiary would already be established. It could not risk strike 
action during this time because BA sought unlimited damages in that regard. Ewing and 
Hendy find it difficult to see how the constraints on the right to strike described above can be 
consistent with Article 11 ECHR. They argue also that the spectre of unlimited damages 
‘imperils the very existence of a trade union for taking what is no more than trade union 
action’.324 More generally, RMT does not diminish the status of the right to bargain 
collectively as an ‘essential element’ of trade union freedom. Accordingly, there is still a 
clash between Demir and the decisions of the CJEU in Rüffert and Commission v 
Luxembourg. It will be recalled that in those cases, collective agreements going beyond the 
core nucleus of the PWD, signed by public authorities, were rendered inapplicable as a result 
of the restrictions they placed on the free movement rights of service providers coming from 
other Member States.   
 
In light of this evidence of conflict between the methodologies of the ECtHR and CJEU, 
Ludlow has suggested that ‘…since head-on conflict and direct review of the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence by the ECtHR might be best avoided, accession to the ECHR might prompt the 
CJEU itself to make better use of the plentiful space that already exists within the EU law 
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framework for a more careful balancing of economic and social rights.’325 Nevertheless, there 
are some weaknesses in the ability of the ECHR to provide a suitable framework for 
addressing fundamental rights tensions arising within the Union legal order. Specifically, the 
ECHR generally only protects civil and political rights, with more programmatic economic 
and social rights located in protocols, protected through a generous interpretation of civil and 
political rights, or not included at all. Here, while accession to the ECHR might still push for 
general change in adjudicative methodology, it is unlikely to be of use to citizens in 
individual cases. Similarly, the ECHR will not act as a check on the CJEU where EU 
fundamental rights definitions comply with the Convention minimum but do not meet the 
idiosyncratic fundamental rights needs of the Member States. For instance, the Scandinavian 
social model relies on a strong right of collective action to regulate working life. In these 
instances, however, the EU Charter might plug the gap and act as a constitutional driver of 
adjudicative change: first, through the modernised catalogue of rights that it contains, and 
second, via its reinforced requirement that the Union draws on the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States. It is to the potential influence of the Charter that we now 
turn.  
 
 
4.3.2.3.The primary status of the EU Charter: requiring a new approach to conflict 
between free movement and fundamental rights? 
 
 
The primary law status enjoyed by the Charter post-Lisbon, pursuant to Article 6(1) TEU, 
calls for modification of the Court’s methodological approach to clashes between free 
movement and fundamental rights for a number of reasons. First, like the ECHR, the Charter 
contains an inherent fundamental rights-bias to which the Court’s current adjudicative 
breach/justification procedure is ill-suited. Second, while the Convention has always been a 
source of ‘particular inspiration’ for EU fundamental rights, Article 52(3) CFR expressly 
stipulates that Charter rights shall be given the same meaning as those in the Convention, 
where they correspond, except where the Charter offers more extensive protection. Third, the 
Charter indicates a fundamental shift in the central objectives of the Union, rendering an 
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adjudicative architecture that places other values and interests ‘after’ free movement 
inappropriate.  
 
Pursuant to Article 52(1) CFR restrictions on Charter rights must overcome well-known 
justificatory hurdles, such as proportionality and necessity. Thus, like the ECHR, the 
adjudicative structure for clashes between fundamental rights and other law and policy, under 
the Charter, is the inverse of that used by the CJEU when free movement clashes with 
fundamental rights. Indeed, within the case-law on the validity of EU legislative acts, the 
CJEU consistently works through a two-stage process that asks, first, whether the instrument 
breaches fundamental rights, and, second, whether it can be justified.
326
 Against this 
background, an adjudicative model which would require Charter rights to justify themselves 
against restriction on free movement, appears, prima facie, to be fundamentally incompatible 
with Article 52(1) CFR. 
 
However, in this respect, it is important to note that free movement also features in the 
Charter. Its preamble pledges to ‘ensure free movement of persons, services, goods and 
capital, and the freedom of establishment’. Article 45 CFR provides every citizen of the 
Union with ‘the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. 
Article 15 CFR stipulates that ‘every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek 
employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any 
Member State’. Thus, at least the free movement of citizens, workers, service providers, and 
the self-employed, potentially including larger businesses, enjoy free movement as a right 
under the Charter itself. Although it is less clear whether the Charter protects the free 
movement of goods and capital, some commentators have posited that the Charter covers all 
of the freedoms.
327
 Others have argued that capital and goods fall within the Charter 
provisions on the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property,
328
 or can be viewed 
as vital to the effective exercise of personal free movement rights by Union citizens.
329
 This 
suggests that the fundamental rights-bias inherent in Article 52(1) CFR cannot be applied to 
the free movement provisions since they, themselves, feature in the Charter.
330
 Nevertheless, 
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the Charter would seem, at least, to require an adjudicative model that would treat them 
equally.  
 
And yet, pursuant to Article 52(2) CFR, Charter rights ‘for which provision is made in the 
Treaties, shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those 
Treaties’. This has led Veldman to conclude that ‘it is doubtful that the Charter will shed any 
new light on the [Viking and Laval] matter’.331 In other words, Article 52(2) might suggest 
that the existing adjudicative model operating in relation to the free movement provisions is to 
be transported into the Charter framework. However, it is submitted that Article 52(2) can be 
read simply as emphasising the availability of the extensive, substantive potential 
justifications for restricting free movement that exist pursuant to Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1), and 
65(1) TFEU, and the mandatory requirements, although these do not explicitly feature in the 
Charter itself. Moreover, as section 4.3.1 demonstrated, the structure of the Treaty does not 
actually require a two-stage approach.  
 
Similarly, Article 28 CFR protects the right to collective bargaining and collective action ‘in 
accordance with Union law’. This arguably defines the right to strike by reference to the 
obligations arising under free movement, including the requirement in Viking and Laval, that 
trade unions organise collective action in a way that is least restrictive of free movement. This 
can be mitigated by the requirement, arising from Article 52(3) CFR, that, for instance, 
Article 28 CFR has to be given the same meaning as Article 11 ECHR, unless the Union 
offers more extensive protection. Consequently, although the right to collective bargaining 
must be defined ‘in accordance with Union law’, Union law itself must respect the right to 
collective bargaining as defined by the Convention. Further, while the ECtHR (currently) 
operates an ‘equivalence’ principle with respect to EU fundamental rights standards, pursuant 
to the Bosphorus ruling, the Charter would appear to oblige the CJEU to follow the clear case-
law of the ECtHR when defining relevant rights under the Charter.
332
 Given the probable 
clash between Demir and Enerji, and Viking and Laval, this should prompt the Luxembourg 
Court to reconsider its rulings.  
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Although the bestowal of primary law status on the Charter does not give the Union new 
powers to attain the rights therein,
333
 it encourages a shift in the core objectives of the EU. 
Accordingly, when the Union pursues policy within its competence, such as free movement, it 
must not value these over the fundamental rights that the Charter obliges it to respect. The 
significance of the Charter’s extension of fundamental rights protection beyond the ECHR to 
include economic and social rights and rights of the third generation, such as the need for a 
high level of environmental protection
334
 also strongly implies the need for the Member States 
to be given adequate legal space to perform their fundamental rights functions, where the 
Union lacks the relevant legislative competence.  These requirements call into question the 
suitability of an adjudicative framework that can only process such activity as a ‘defence’ 
against a prima facie wrongful breach of the free movement provisions. As Nic Shuibhne 
summarises, the binding status of the Charter ‘is a critical factor in the apparent conceptual 
shift towards greater legal recognition for values and interests traditionally positioned ‘after’ 
free movement objectives’.335  
 
This subsection has demonstrated that the CJEU’s current approach to resolving tensions 
between free movement and fundamental rights does not meet the contemporary needs of the 
Union constitution. Specifically, it has not adapted to the evolution of the Union from 
economic community, focused almost exclusively on the creation of a common market, to a 
political union with express responsibility for policy fields beyond economic integration. Nor 
has the CJEU’s adjudicative model adapted to the Treaty’s explicit commitment to respecting 
fundamental rights, introduced as far back as Maastricht, but concretised by Lisbon’s 
conferral of primary status on the Charter and its requirement that the EU accede to the 
ECHR. Moreover, in several areas, that cannot be cleanly delineated from free movement, 
thinking particularly of social policy, the Treaty has elected to respect the diversity of the 
Member States and make them agents in pursing the Union’s new objectives. This requires 
the Court to leave adequate judicial space for the Member States to perform this function, 
which the two-stage model does not achieve. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
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The Viking and Laval judgments sparked concern from an appreciable section of the academic 
commentary that the fundamental right to strike was subjugated to the freedoms of 
establishment and services respectively, in those cases. Writers have noted the potentially 
problematic use of a two-stage breach/justification methodology by the CJEU, whereby it 
establishes, at stage one, a prima facie breach of free movement.
336
 At stage two, the onus is 
on fundamental rights to justify this pre-determined wrongful conduct, by reference to 
questions of appropriateness and necessity under the principle of proportionality. This offers a 
procedural advantage to free movement over fundamental rights. However, the chapter 
emphasised that the two-stage approach has long been the standard methodology of the Court 
and had already been adopted for interactions between free movement and fundamental rights, 
prior to Viking and Laval. Accordingly, in setting the parameters of this thesis, the chapter 
highlighted the necessity of demonstrating how the two-stage framework came to be the 
Court’s dominant method of adjudication, why it is problematic in the context of interactions 
between free movement and fundamental rights, and how it can be overcome. In exploring 
overarching themes in this regard, the chapter argued that the two-stage model emerged from 
the historical centrality of free movement to achieving the core aim of the EEC, namely the 
creation of an internal market. In the context of clash between the Treaty’s market freedoms 
and protectionist Member State rules, a structural preference for free movement was a logical 
means of ensuring that it was able to tackle precisely the type of conduct that the Member 
States had agreed to eradicate when they formed the EEC. Crucially, contact between free 
movement and fundamental rights within this limited framework was unlikely. Indeed, the 
Rome Treaty made no provision for the protection of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the 
safeguarding of fundamental rights within the Union legal order has been more piecemeal, 
emerging out of the growing appreciation that the internal market could not operate in 
isolation from fundamental rights issues. Significantly, although the need to respect 
fundamental rights is now explicitly recognised by Union primary law, this historical 
asymmetry has resulted in fundamental rights law, policy, and activity being slotted into the 
pre-existing two-stage breach/justification model used to adjudicate clashes between free 
movement and competing public interests. In this context, free movement is procedurally 
presented as more fundamental than fundamental rights.  
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The chapter acknowledged that there is evidence in the case-law of fundamental rights 
prevailing over free movement, despite being processed through the two-stage framework. 
This has led some to question whether the Court distinguishes substantively between different 
types of fundamental rights, for instance on the basis of whether they are civil and political, or 
economic and social in nature.
337
 However, the existence of examples in which fundamental 
rights have overcome the structural bias inherent in the Court’s approach does not, of itself, 
demonstrate that the CJEU’s methodology is not problematic in cases where free movement 
prevails. In any case, where fundamental rights win out in the final analysis this is in spite of 
not because of the imbalanced adjudicative framework, which presents fundamental rights as 
‘derogations’ from free movement, to be interpreted ‘strictly’. This can undermine 
fundamental rights in a practical sense, since it underappreciates the peculiarities of certain 
Member States’ fundamental rights requirements, the inherently restrictive nature of some 
rights, or the practical considerations attached to protecting others. The chapter also 
demonstrated that presenting fundamental rights as derogations from free movement is 
problematic from theoretical perspective, particularly if fundamental rights are viewed as 
universal, a-political absolutes that should trump conflicting public interests. Even if we 
accept the legal reality that fundamental rights are frequently defined and/or restricted by their 
political environment, they exist as a social fact within the Union legal order. Accordingly, a 
procedural preference for free movement, over fundamental rights, is ill-suited to the EU’s 
contemporary constitutional framework, which not only claims to respect fundamental rights 
within its primary law, but also, post-Lisbon, confers primary law status upon the Charter and 
obliges the Union to accede to the ECHR. 
 
The finding that the two-stage approach does not meet the needs of the Union’s contemporary 
constitution provokes the pertinent questions of why it remains the Court’s predominant 
methodology and what alternative adjudicative approaches might better suit the EU’s present-
day constitutional requirements. In chapters two, three, and four, this thesis makes a 
significant contribution in this regard by conducting an essential diagnostic analysis of why 
the breach/justification framework has been retained for addressing conflict between free 
movement and fundamental rights by reference to the overlapping ‘constitutional trinity’ of 
developments, namely the expansion in the scope of free movement, the recognition of the 
direct effect of the market freedoms, and the introduction of Union citizenship. Chapter five 
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then tests the proposed alternative of balancing against practical and conceptual concerns, 
demonstrating how they can be overcome.   
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Chapter Two 
 
EXPANDING THE MATERIAL AND PERSONAL SCOPE OF THE FREE 
MOVEMENT PROVISIONS: EXPLORING THE IMPACT ON FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As chapter one underlined, the core aim of the EEC was economic integration between the 
Member States through the creation of a common market. In order to achieve this, the Rome 
Treaty recognised the need for, inter alia, the free movement of goods, workers, services, 
establishment and capital across intra-EU borders.
1
 The main tool for the achievement of a 
common market via these market freedoms was arguably the principle of non-discrimination. 
For instance, the protection of domestic commodities from foreign trade through, for example, 
the imposition of quotas on goods coming from another Member State or a refusal by Member 
State A to employ workers from Member State B would be the antithesis of a common market 
and was accordingly prohibited by Articles 30 and 48(2) EEC, respectively.
2
 The Treaty 
acknowledged that there would be some situations where discrimination between Member 
States might be necessary, not for reasons of protectionism but, for instance, to deal with 
issues of public health.  
 
However, in the following decades, the CJEU progressively extended the scope of the free 
movement provisions to acknowledge that the attainment of a common market can also be 
inhibited by law, policy, and activity that is not directly discriminatory in nature. Since the 
aim of the EEC was economic integration, this evolution within free movement was, 
arguably, an understandable one. Yet this gradual expansion of what constitutes a breach of 
free movement has direct consequences for the protection of fundamental rights. It is this 
phenomenon with which this chapter is concerned. As section two explores, the steady 
extension of the material scope of the free movement provisions, from questions of direct 
discrimination to a market access test, and the expansion of its personal scope has inevitably 
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caused the free movement provisions to interact with new areas of national law and policy. 
Frequently, these rules have only incidental or oblique (though sometimes, admittedly, 
significant) effects on the internal market, existing primarily to pursue other Member State 
objectives. Crucially, such Member State policy can represent attempts to protect fundamental 
rights. For example, in Dynamic Medien, the German rule requiring digital media to be 
assessed by a German classification body and its packaging to feature an age-label did not 
directly discriminate against foreign videos/DVDs but existed to protect the rights of the 
child.
3
 However, in section three, this chapter will posit that the historical focus on 
eliminating protectionist behaviour has supported the adoption and maintenance of the 
imbalanced two-stage breach/justification model, for the adjudication of clashes between free 
movement and conflicting activity, described in chapter one. It will be recalled that this offers 
a significant structural advantage to free movement. Critically, while this procedural 
prioritisation of free movement might be viewed as logical in the context of protectionist 
policy, which strikes at the heart of what the internal market is trying to achieve, the section 
will demonstrate that it is unsuitable for the new types of free movement dynamics that have 
emerged in light of its expansion, especially those concerning fundamental rights. In 
particular, the section will develop the argument, outlined in chapter one, that the focus, at the 
justification stage, on finding ways of protecting fundamental rights that are less restrictive of 
free movement, triggers a ‘trio of impact’, in relation to the protection of fundamental rights. 
Specifically, it reduces the legal space for considering the idiosyncratic rights needs of the 
Member States, caused, for instance, by the language spoken in a particular Member State, 
which might require a specific approach to consumer protection. It also limits appreciation of 
the inherently restrictive nature of certain rights, such as the fundamental right to strike, or the 
complexity of designing programmes for the protection of fundamental social rights. And yet, 
as the section will demonstrate, the expansion of the material and personal scope of free 
movement has also served to concretise the two-stage approach, simultaneously lowering the 
evidential burden at the breach phase and raising it at the justification stage.  
 
As a definitional point, it will be recalled from chapter one, that the thesis takes a broad 
approach to fundamental rights, incorporating rights of a civil, political, economic and social 
nature, but also including the third generation ‘solidarity rights’, such as the protection of 
health, the environment, and consumers. Accordingly, the term captures many of the well-
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established derogations from the free movement provisions contained in the Court’s 
mandatory requirements case-law. Although this terminological breadth might be contentious 
to some, this sites our study of fundamental rights usefully within a wider comment on the 
outer limits of the internal market. If, as chapter one argued, fundamental rights serve to shine 
a spotlight on the special commitments of a State/polity, then they highlight pertinent 
questions about when the Court should act and when it should hold back in the internal 
market context.      
 
 
2. Increasing the interaction between free movement and fundamental rights: a 
consequence of an expansion in the material and personal scope of the free 
movement provisions 
 
This section charts the expansion of the material and personal scope of the free movement 
provisions from a fundamental rights perspective. This thematic approach dictates that the 
discussion will be broadly but not wholly chronological. Specifically, it will demonstrate that 
the evolution of the tests for establishing a breach of free movement, from direct 
discrimination through to market access, and the broadening of key definitional terms within 
the free movement provisions, has increased the volume of interactions between free 
movement and fundamental rights. This sets the factual scene for section three to examine the 
influence of these historical definitional developments on the rights-restricting methodology 
for adjudicating new free movement/fundamental rights dynamics.   
 
  
2.1. From distinctly applicable measures to market access: the expanding material 
scope of the free movement provisions - a direct contributor to growing interactions 
between free movement and fundamental rights 
 
This subsection will focus on the direct contribution that the extension of the material scope 
of the free movement provisions has made to the frequency of their interactions with 
fundamental rights. In covering one of the most significant developments in Union 
constitutional law, the chapter will inevitably touch upon existing debates concerning the 
material expansion of free movement. For instance, there is a rich literature surrounding the 
question of whether dual regulatory burdens exist as a type of indirect discrimination, or form 
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a separate category beyond discrimination;
4
 whether a finding of a breach of free movement 
reveals protectionist intent or simply protectionist effects;
5
 and whether, within the free 
movement of goods, the market access test operates as the overarching, defining principle of 
that freedom,
6
 or merely a residual category of restriction.
7
 It is beyond the scope of this work 
to examine those issues in any detail, although they will be referred to where relevant to our 
specific examination of the interaction between free movement and fundamental rights. 
However, owing to the existence of these ongoing questions, it remains necessary to define, as 
far as is possible, key terms for the purposes of this chapter.   
 
The term ‘distinctly applicable’ will refer to measures that make an explicit distinction 
between the treatment of domestic factors of production and comparable foreign Member 
State commodities. In other words, here, we are concerned with law, policy and activity that 
directly discriminate between national and non-national Member State trade. ‘Indistinctly 
applicable measures’ concern rules that apply, on their face, equally to domestic and foreign 
trade but either discriminate in fact because their requirements are more easily met by home 
State workers/producers/companies/providers, or impose extra burdens on foreign Member 
State trade who have to meet these conditions in addition to obligations already imposed on 
them by their Member State of origin. This latter phenomenon is the so-called dual regulatory 
burden (DRB). ‘Market access’ relates to rules that apply equally to domestic and foreign 
commodities and do not indirectly distinguish between them in the ways described above. 
Nevertheless, their very existence is said to constitute a breach of free movement because it 
restricts access to a market place operating within the Union.  
 
        
2.1.1. A study of distinctly applicable measures in which interactions with fundamental 
rights are limited but possible   
 
As section one noted, the clearest obstacle to economic integration is the existence of 
protectionist Member State rules. Consequently, a central aim of the Rome Treaty was to 
eradicate rules that protect domestic factors of production from competition from outside, 
                                                          
4
 N. Bernard, ‘Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law’ (1996) 45(1) ICLQ.82; C. Hilson, 
‘Discrimination in Community Free Movement Law’, (1999) 24(5) ELRev 445 
5
 Ibid 
6
 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case 412/93 Leclerc-Siplec [1995] EU:C:1995:26, paras.38-45; S. Weatherill, ‘After 
Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification’, (1996) 33 CMLRev 885 
7
 J. Snell, ‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?’, (2010) 47 CMLRev 437 
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comparable, commodities. Such measures would be directly opposed to the common market 
ideal that the Member States agreed to work towards when the EEC was formed. 
Protectionism often manifests itself in distinctly applicable rules. For instance, a rule in 
Member State A that employers on its territory must give preference to its nationals when 
seeking labour, directly discriminates against workers coming from other Member States and 
would seem, prima facie, to reflect a protectionist agenda. Accordingly, references to 
discrimination feature or have featured in provisions covering all of the free movement 
provisions
8
 and the Court has consistently found directly discriminatory provisions to 
constitute restrictions on free movement.
9
  
 
The Treaty does recognise that even distinctly applicable Member State rules might, in some 
instances, exist to meet legitimate Member State endeavours not directly targeted at protecting 
domestic trade. Thus, for instance, Article 52(1) TFEU allows Member States to derogate 
from the freedom of establishment for reasons of public policy, public security or public 
health. Articles 36, 45(3), 62 and 65(1)(b) TFEU makes similar provision in relation to the 
free movement of goods and workers, the free provision of services, and the free movement of 
capital, respectively.
10
 Nevertheless, the Treaty obligation to dismantle barriers to intra-State 
movement arguably necessitates a reconsideration of how public policy objectives are to be 
achieved, where in the past they might have been pursued through directly discriminatory 
means. This has invited a strict approach to derogations from the Court. For instance, in 
Reyners, the CJEU held that a Belgian rule limiting the profession of avocat to Belgians was 
in breach of the freedom of establishment because it was possible to separate aspects of the 
                                                          
8
 Regarding Art.34 TFEU, this is arguably implicit in that provision’s focus on quantitative restrictions on 
imports. Moreover, Art.36 TFEU, imposes the condition that derogations from the free movement of goods do 
not constitute arbitrary discrimination. Arts.45, 49 and 56 TFEU, on workers, establishment, and services 
respectively all either prohibit discrimination or require equal treatment. Art.63 TFEU, concerning capital, 
states, more broadly, that ‘all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited’. However, Art.63(1)(b) makes a specific reference to 
discrimination at the justification stage. Moreover, original Art.67 EEC explicitly featured discrimination. Nic 
Shuibhne argues that, although they mention discrimination, none of the free movement provisions require it: 
The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law: Constitutional Responsibility and the Court of Justice, (OUP, 2013) 
190. Nevertheless, our focus is on the historical centrality of discrimination to defining a breach of the free 
movement provisions, from a fundamental rights perspective. Indeed, Nic Shuibhne notes that, while the Treaty 
only requires restrictions, ‘in reality…most of the national measures reviewed by the Court did 
involve…directly discriminatory measures’, 195     
9
 Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] EU:C:1974:68; see also Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] 
EU:C:1982:402; Case 44/72 Marsman v Rosskamp [1972] EU:C:1972:120; Case 15/69 Württembergische 
Milchverwertung Südmilch AG v Ugliola [1969] EU:C:1969:46 
10
 Although Art.36 contains a lengthier list of permissible derogations from goods and Art.65(1)(b) offers some 
justifications specific to capital movement. 
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role linked to the exercise of official authority, which might be limited to Belgian nationals, 
from the general tasks of an avocat.
11
   
 
The underlying objective of this approach is arguably to ensure that domestic pursuit of public 
policy goals is not arbitrarily discriminatory. Indeed, such an approach to policy objectives is 
not permitted under the Treaty provisions allowing derogations from free movement.
12
 
Nevertheless, assessment of the proportionality of national law and policy is broader in 
nature, focusing on whether endeavours can be achieved in a way less restrictive of free 
movement generally.
13
 Accordingly, this strict approach to derogations from free movement 
carried the latent risk that a restrictive approach to fundamental rights would also be adopted 
if these two norms should interact. However, as chapter one noted, there is no reference to 
fundamental rights in any of the derogating provisions. Since previous attempts at political 
unity foresaw the incorporation of the ECHR into their proposed legal frameworks, it is 
submitted here that the drafters of the Rome Treaty did not envisage the need for fundamental 
rights provision in a polity focused on economic integration.
14
 This might be particularly true 
in light of the fact that, at the time of the drafting of the Rome Treaty, fundamental rights 
protection in Western Europe centred on the civil and political rights contained in the ECHR. 
If the field of application of free movement were restricted to directly discriminatory conduct, 
it is difficult to conceive of the adoption of such measures, by Member States, primarily to 
protect fundamental rights. How would a French decision to distinguish, in its law, between 
domestic goods and those coming from another Member State better protect the fundamental 
right to a fair trial or the freedom of association of its citizens? Accordingly, the fact that the 
derogating provisions do not cater for fundamental rights initially appears unproblematic. 
Opportunity for interaction between free movement and fundamental rights seems limited. 
Indeed, consideration of the potentially problematic interaction between primary free 
movement law and (civil and political) fundamental rights is not really evident in the case-law 
before the scope of free movement expanded beyond direct discrimination, in cases such as 
Cinéthèque, Familiapress, and Schmidberger.
15
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 Case 2/74 Reyners; Case 44/72 Marsman; Case 15/69 Ugliola, n.9 
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 E.g. Art.36 TFEU 
13
 Case 104/75 De Peijper [1976] EU:C:1976:67; Case C-67/97 Bluhme [1998] EU:C:1998:584 
14
 See E. Furdson, ‘The European Defence Community: A History’, (Macmillan, 1980); J. Pinder, ‘The Building 
of European Union’, (OUP, 1998) 
15
 Joined Case 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque v Fédération nationale des cinémas français [1985] EU:C:1985:329; 
Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] EU:C:1997:325; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] EU:C:2003:333  
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Of course, a retrospective examination of the case-law does reveal some instances of clash 
between the prohibition of direct discrimination and fundamental rights. This is largely the 
result of an evolution within fundamental rights. At the national, regional, and international 
levels, second generation economic and social rights, as well as third generation solidarity 
rights are increasingly presented alongside civil and political rights. For instance, in relation 
to economic and social rights, Article 59 of the Polish Constitution
16
 and Article 28 CFR both 
recognise the right to collective bargaining and collective action. Regarding third generation 
rights, s.20 of the Finnish Constitution and Article 37 CFR both require a high level of 
environmental protection.
17
 Second and third generation rights are usually more programmatic 
in nature. When designing such programmes, the Member States might, in certain cases, find 
it necessary to adopt distinctly applicable measures. This can become problematic since 
directly discriminatory rules can only be justified by reference to the exhaustive lists 
contained in the Treaty’s derogating provisions. Consequently, we have seen the Court either 
perform legal gymnastics in order to allow a Member State to pursue a programmatic 
fundamental rights goal, or opt to prevent Member States from pursuing fundamental rights 
protection in a way that directly discriminates against foreign trade. 
 
Walloon Waste illustrates such legal acrobatics.
18
 For reasons of environmental protection, a 
Belgian regional decree prohibited the importation of waste into the area. This has been 
largely viewed as a directly discriminatory measure since by its nature it did not apply to 
locally produced waste. Although not explicitly presented as such in the decision itself, 
Walloon Waste accordingly represents a case of conflict between the free movement of goods 
and Wallonia’s programmatic protection of environmental rights.19 However, environmental 
protection does not feature in Article 36 TFEU. The CJEU sidestepped this issue by holding 
that the decree was not, in fact, discriminatory. Since waste was inherently damaging to the 
                                                          
16
 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2
 
April 1997 
17
 Constitution of Finland of 11 June 1999; pursuant to Art.52(5) CFR, the ‘right’ to a high level of 
environmental protection could constitute a mere ‘principle’. As ch.1 argued, this distinction is unimportant for 
our purposes. While individuals might not be able to invoke directly their ‘right to a good environment’ before 
the Court, the CJEU, as an institution of the Union should nevertheless be required to take environmental 
protection into account in its interpretations of free movement. Indeed, the Court did this in relation to the right 
to health in Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor [2012] EU:C:2012:526   
18
 Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] EU:C:1992:310 
19
 Art.37 CFR 
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environment and must, consequently be dealt with at source, waste coming from different 
regions could not be viewed as comparable.
20
  
 
Laval provides an example of the Court simply refusing to allow Member States to adopt 
directly discriminatory provisions to attain fundamental rights goals. It will be recalled that in 
that case a Swedish law permitted national trade unions to view service providers coming 
from other Member States, where they had signed collective agreements, as if they were not 
party to collective agreements at all. The Court held that this was an unjustified, directly 
discriminatory measure. Sweden had argued that the law existed to ensure that all employers 
active on its labour market pay wages and apply other terms and conditions of employment in 
line with those usual in Sweden. This can be viewed as a component of the fundamental rights 
of workers outlined in Articles 27-32 CFR, particularly Article 31 concerning fair and just 
working conditions. However, although the Court had recognised the right to strike as 
fundamental as well as the overriding public interest in worker protection, earlier in the same 
judgment, it simply stated that Sweden’s reasons did not fall within the categories of public 
policy, public security, or public health, contained in Article 52(1) TFEU and so could not be 
justified.
21
 
 
Thus, although interactions between free movement and fundamental rights were limited 
where the field of application of the former is restricted to directly discriminatory measures, 
some instances of clash are still apparent. Nevertheless, as subsequent subsections will 
demonstrate, the opportunity for conflict between free movement and fundamental rights has 
increased significantly in light of the expansion of the notion of a breach of free movement 
beyond distinctly applicable measures. Crucially, the early view of distinctly applicable 
measures as manifestations of protectionism, or at the very least potentially arbitrarily 
discriminatory means of pursuing public policy endeavours, encouraged the use of a two-
stage breach/justification model, whereby derogations from free movement are interpreted 
strictly. This becomes problematic where restrictions on free movement are caused by the 
protection or exercise of fundamental rights. This has become a much more substantial 
concern as the material scope of free movement has expanded. 
                                                          
20
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Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] EU:C:2000:585, paras.225-238; Opinion of AG 
Geelhoed, Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria [2005] EU:C:2005:459; for comment, see P. Oliver, S. 
Enchelmaier, ‘Free Movement of Goods: Recent Developments in the Case Law’, (2007) 44 CMLRev 649, 691 
21
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2.1.2. Indistinctly applicable measures as a restriction on the free movement provisions: 
increasing the chances of conflict with fundamental rights 
 
Although direct discrimination presents the most obvious obstacle to trade, the Court soon 
extended the material scope of the primary free movement provisions to cover other barriers 
to the formation of an internal market, namely indistinctly applicable measures.
22
 As the 
introduction outlined, there are two loose categories of indistinctly applicable measure, 
though certain national rules might legitimately fall into both.
23
 First, indistinctly applicable 
measures concern rules that appear on their face to apply equally to both domestic and non-
domestic Member State trade but are, in fact, more easily satisfied by the former. Thus, in 
Angonese, the Court noted that it was inherently easier for Italian nationals to meet a 
requirement, imposed by an Italian bank, that employees have certificates of bilingualism 
issued by the Italian region of Bolzano.
24
 Second, indistinctly applicable measures include 
dual regulatory burdens. The CJEU famously held in its seminal Cassis de Dijon judgment 
that the application, to French producers, of a German rule, requiring fruit liqueurs within its 
territory to have a minimum alcohol content of 25%, triggered Article 34 TFEU.
25
 Although 
the measure also applied to domestic producers, French products faced a dual regulatory 
burden since they had already also complied with the regulatory framework in the Member 
State of production.  
 
Indistinctly applicable measures, of both types, do not generally operate primarily to protect 
domestic trade. They exist in pursuit of other demands placed on the state. This creates new 
                                                          
22
 The Treaty drafters and the Union legislature had already recognised that measures not constituting direct 
discrimination could inhibit the internal market and had made provision accordingly via Article 114 TFEU and 
Commission Directive 70/50/EEC of 22 December 1969 on the abolition of measures which have an effect 
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23
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41 CMLRev 743 
24
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237/94 O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] EU:C:1996:206 
25
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services, Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] EU:C:1991:331.  DRBs are usually more relevant to goods 
and services since producers and service providers, still established in their Member State of origin, must meet 
regulatory requirements in that territory as well as in the receiving Member State, whereas workers and 
businesses seeking to establish themselves in a host Member State (generally) only face a single burden. 
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opportunities for free movement provisions to interact with fundamental rights. For instance, 
a Member State rule requiring that foreign Member State nationals, wishing to establish 
themselves as professionals on its territory, hold local qualifications or seek prior 
authorisation in relation to their foreign diplomas, would restrict Article 49 TFEU as an 
indirectly discriminatory measure.
26
 However, this might reflect a desire to protect consumers 
by ensuring that professionals hold qualifications that the State knows to be rigorous.
27
 Thus, 
we see a conflict between the more broadly defined free movement provisions and the right to 
consumer protection, now contained in Article 38 CFR.
28
 In relation to DRBs, in Cassis itself, 
the German government argued that its rules on the alcohol content of liqueur were essential 
inter alia for reasons of consumer protection.
29
  
 
Cassis also increased the likelihood that restrictions of the primary free movement provisions 
would be triggered by civil and political rights. Thus, in Familiapress, an Austrian ban on 
magazines containing prize draws constituted a prima facie breach of Article 34 TFEU since 
they imposed upon magazines coming from other Member States, product requirements in 
addition to those publishers already faced in their Member State of production. And yet, the 
purpose of the prohibition was to protect the freedom of expression by preventing small 
publishers from being driven from the market by larger undertakings who were financially 
able to offer such incentives.
30
 In Dynamic Medien, a rule that sought to protect the rights of 
the child
31
 by requiring digital media to be assessed and labelled for age-certification purposes 
by the relevant German authorities, constituted a dual regulatory burden since similar 
procedures had been conducted in the Member State of production.
32
 Although the focus here 
has been on goods, these effects are also viewable across the free movement provisions.
33
 
DRBs also activate clashes between different Member States’ definitions of fundamental 
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rights. It will be recalled from chapter one that Familiapress, for instance, can be viewed as a 
conflict between two Member State methods of protecting the fundamental right to freedom 
of expression. This is generated by the flow of goods between Member States and, in 
particular, the need to facilitate this movement by minimising regulatory duplication.
34
 
 
In the free movement of goods context, the Court recognised that, post-Cassis, individuals 
were increasingly using Article 34 TFEU not to eliminate the additional burdens they faced as 
foreign Member State traders, but instead to challenge regulation that restricted their activities 
in the host State in a more general sense. The classic example of this is the Sunday Trading 
case-law whereby non-national traders argued that host State rules precluding trading on 
Sundays imposed an obstacle to the intra-EU movement of goods.
35
 In Keck, the Court held 
that ‘the increasing tendency of traders to invoke [Article 34 TFEU] as a means of 
challenging any rules [that] limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not 
aimed at products from other Member States’ required it to reconsider its case-law.36 In doing 
so, the Court differentiated between product requirements – such as rules on designation, 
composition, form, size, weight, presentation, labelling, and packaging – and selling 
arrangements. While the former restricted Article 34 per se, the latter did not, provided that 
they affected in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and 
of those from other Member States.
37
  
 
For our purposes, it might appear that, since Keck limited the opportunity for free movement 
to encroach on Member State regulation, the potential for free movement to interact with 
fundamental rights would also be reduced. In fact, it is submitted that Keck did relatively little 
to decrease potential conflict between these norms.
38
 First, our discussion of cases such as 
Dynamic Medien has already demonstrated that while product requirements might constitute 
very real barriers to trade, they can also operate primarily to protect fundamental rights, rather 
than to undermine the internal market. Second, the Court’s approach to assessing whether 
                                                          
34
 See also Case C-36/02 Omega, ibid  
35
 Case 145/88 Torfaen BC v B&Q plc [1989] EU:C:1989:593 
36
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selling arrangements ‘affect in the same manner, in law and fact’ the marketing of domestic 
and foreign goods has, in fact, created new potential for interaction between free movement 
and fundamental rights.  
 
In LIBRO,
39
 an Austrian selling arrangement, which provided that importers and retailers of 
books could not fix prices below the recommended retail price (RRP) set in the Member State 
of publication, was found not to affect domestic and other European suppliers in the same 
way.
40
 Whereas Austrian publishers could set the RRP of books to suit the Austrian market, 
importers could not, since they were required to use an RRP set according to the conditions of 
a different market.
41
 The reason for the Austrian rule was grounded in a desire to ensure 
media diversity such that economically less attractive works could still be financed and 
smaller booksellers could offer a wider range of works. Thus, although not explicitly stated by 
the Austrian Government, the rules found to be imposing restrictions on the free movement of 
goods in LIBRO were rooted in protecting the fundamental right to freedom of expression. 
 
In addition, the Court has also frequently accepted arguments from importers/foreign traders 
that national rules on advertising affect them more than domestic producers. This has also 
created new interfaces between free movement and fundamental rights. For instance, in De 
Agostini,
42
 Sweden had banned, inter alia, television advertising directed at children under 12 
years of age. Although the rule applied to both domestic and foreign traders and did not 
impose additional requirements on products coming from other Member States, it was found 
to constitute a restriction on Article 34 TFEU since it had a greater impact on non-national 
producers. Specifically, television advertising might be the only effective method for non-
domestic traders to penetrate the Swedish market.
43
 This might well be true, especially where 
a trader wishes to use the same marketing methods across several Member States. However, 
crucially, the purpose of the Swedish measures was not to shield domestic production but to 
protect the consumer and, in particular, to safeguard the rights of the child.
44
 Thus, we see 
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examples of conflict between free movement and fundamental rights as the material scope of 
free movement has expanded to cover indistinctly applicable measures.
45
   
 
 
2.1.3. The impact of a market access test on the frequency of interactions with 
fundamental rights 
 
The requirements of the market access test are outlined comprehensively in the seminal 
Gebhard case, concerning the freedom of establishment.
46
 In that judgment the Court held 
that the Italian rule, whereby individuals wanting to use the professional title avvocato had to 
be registered to the local Bar, was a restriction of Article 49 TFEU, since it was ‘liable to 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty’.47 The rule applied to all individuals and compliance with it was not inherently easier 
for Italians. Moreover, since Mr. Gebhard was establishing himself in Italy, the measure was 
not a burden in addition to those imposed by his home State. Accordingly, Gebhard 
represents an expansion in the material scope of Article 49, creating a portal through which a 
wider range of Member State law and policy, beyond those imposing dual burdens, can be 
assessed at EU-level. Crucially, the Gebhard test now reflects the standard formula for 
defining a breach of the majority of the fundamental freedoms.
48
 Debate remains as to its 
application to the free movement of goods. While the Keck ruling, outlined above, might 
suggest that a single burden, market access test is not appropriate in that context, the judgment 
actually contained a reference to impediments to market access.
49
 Further, the Court has 
utilised the market access test in subsequent goods case-law on product-use. Thus, in 
Commission v Italy (trailers), prohibiting mopeds from towing trailers, even those designed 
for use with such vehicles, was declared a restriction on Article 34 TFEU.
50
 Although 
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importation of trailers was not precluded, the ban on their use would inevitably reduce 
consumer interest, thereby affecting ‘the access of that product to the market of that Member 
State’.51 This approach was echoed soon after in Mickelsson and Roos, concerning a 
prohibition on the use of personal watercraft outside designated waterways.
52
 These 
judgments have invited questions from commentators as to whether market access now 
provides the umbrella test in goods cases, or whether it operates as a mere residual category of 
restriction.
53
     
 
The incorporation of single burdens within the material scope of free movement creates new 
interfaces between free movement and national law and policy, which pursues diverse policy 
goals rather than protectionist agendas. This inevitably increases the potential for interaction 
between free movement and fundamental rights. The most infamous examples of this are, of 
course, the Viking and Laval judgments.
54
 A comprehensive outline of the facts of those 
seminal decisions was provided in chapter one and will not be repeated here. In short, Laval 
concerned strike action by a Swedish trade union to force a Latvian undertaking to grant its 
employees, whom it had posted to Sweden, the terms and conditions contained in a Swedish 
collective agreement. Previous cases concerning the posting of workers, while using the 
language of market access, had generally adopted a dual regulatory approach. Thus, in 
Arblade, a host State was not permitted to require foreign service providers to pay into its 
national bad-weather and loyalty stamp scheme for its employees where that undertaking 
already contributed to such a scheme in its Member State of origin.
55
 In Laval, the Court went 
further, holding that collective action relating to terms and conditions going above and 
beyond those referred to in Article 3(1)(a)-(g) PWD constituted a breach of the free provision 
of services ‘since it was liable to make it less attractive or more difficult for undertakings to 
provide construction services in Sweden’.56 The question of whether the fundamental social 
rights of workers were already protected in the undertaking’s home State was now less 
relevant at the justification stage since the focus was on the core nucleus of the PWD, rather 
than the existence of equivalent protection in the home State. Hence, the market access test 
makes a direct contribution to increased conflict between free movement and fundamental 
rights; in this case between the free provision of services and the fundamental right to strike, 
                                                          
51
 Para.56 
52
 Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Mickelsson and Roos [2009] EU:C:2009:336 
53
 Weatherill, n.6; Snell, n.7 
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recognised by Article 28 CFR.
57
 In fact, the Court went as far as to hint that the very threat of 
collective action might be enough to trigger Article 56 TFEU where ‘in order to ascertain 
minimum wage rates for posted workers, undertakings may be forced into negotiations of 
unspecified duration’.58  
 
In Viking, collective action, threatened by the Finnish Seamen’s Union to persuade the owners 
of a ship to continue to apply Finnish law and collective agreements to its workers should the 
ship be re-flagged to Estonia, constituted a prima facie breach of Article 49 TFEU. The result 
sought by the union would ‘make it less attractive or even pointless’ for Viking to exercise its 
freedom of establishment, since the purpose of the move was to sign Estonian collective 
agreements and thus lower costs.
59
 In addition, a circular, issued by the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, calling for affiliated unions to refuse to negotiate with 
Viking, pursuant to its ‘Flags of Convenience’ policy (FoC), was considered ‘liable to restrict’ 
the freedom of establishment. The FoC stipulated that ships should be flagged to their country 
of beneficial ownership and its purpose was to avoid precisely the situation in Viking, 
whereby employers are able to adopt lower terms and conditions of worker protection by 
establishing themselves, nominally, in another country. This is an example of a wider 
phenomenon whereby the freedom of establishment is utilised to avoid restrictive Member 
State regulation. For example, in Centros, a company was incorporated in the UK, since that 
Member State imposes no minimum share capital requirements in respect of limited liability 
companies, but intended to operate primarily through a branch in Denmark, which does 
impose such obligations.
60
 The refusal of the Danish authorities to register the branch, 
because it believed the company to be using its Article 49 rights to circumvent Danish rules, 
was held, by the CJEU, to be a breach of the freedom of establishment, since it restricted 
access to the Danish market.
61
  
 
Crucially, this creates the potential for Member State efforts to protect intrinsically weaker 
groups to constitute a breach of Article 49. For instance, the German rule of co-determination 
requires companies of a certain size, including those administered but not incorporated in 
Germany, to include worker representatives on their boards. As Johnston highlights, Centros 
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poses a danger to this model, since it allows companies to avoid this obligation, by 
establishing in a Member State where co-determination is not required, whilst still principally 
operating out of a branch in Germany.
62
 This would diminish standards of worker 
consultation, explicitly recognised as a fundamental right by Article 27 CFR, and, as Johnston 
argues, would ‘privilege return to super-mobile financial capital at the expense of far less 
mobile human capital’.63  
 
The potential for market access to provoke interactions between the free movement of capital 
and Member State efforts to protect fundamental rights can be viewed in the very case in 
which the test was introduced to that freedom, namely the Golden Shares judgment.
64
 
Following the privatisation of previously nationalised industries, ‘golden-shares’ deviated 
from the basic company law principle of ‘one share, one vote’, providing the State with 
control over certain decisions of the company, which was disproportionate to the size of its 
shareholding. The purpose of the ‘golden share’ is not to discriminate against foreign 
investors but to retain State input in undertakings, such as utility companies, that offer key 
public services,
65
 an endeavour recognised as fundamental by Article 36 CFR. Nevertheless, 
the Court has found that ‘golden shares’ constitute a restriction of Article 63(1) TFEU since 
they affect the position of other shareholders and are therefore liable to deter investors in 
other Member States from making investments, restricting access to the market.
66
  
 
Cutting across the expansion of the material scope of free movement, from distinctly 
applicable measures to rules restricting market access, is the finding that the Treaty not only 
imposes prima facie prohibitions on Member State activity that restricts free movement, but 
that it also requires Member States to take positive steps to protect the market freedoms. This 
definitional progression also leads to further instances of conflict between free movement and 
fundamental rights. 
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2.1.4. Introducing a positive obligation to protect free movement    
 
In Spanish Strawberries,
67
 the Court held that France was in breach of Article 34 TFEU, on 
the free movement of goods, due to the passivity of its authorities, in tackling the violent 
protests of French farmers against imported produce. Article 34 not only imposed a negative 
obligation that Member States abstain from activity that restricted the free movement of 
goods, it also applied where Member States failed to take positive steps to prevent 
obstructions to intra-State trade, emanating not from the State itself but from private 
individuals.
68
  
 
Although arguably an understandable outcome on the facts, since the case included violent 
and directly discriminatory attacks on goods in transit, Spanish Strawberries introduced a new 
potential avenue for clash between free movement and fundamental rights. First, the case 
itself can be viewed as such an occurrence, namely between the free movement of goods and 
the farmers’ freedom of association and freedom of expression. However, it is unlikely that 
criminal law precluding the acts that occurred in Spanish Strawberries – such as the 
destruction of stock and threats to shopkeepers - would be a violation of Articles 10 and 11 
ECHR. Both provisions may be restricted by laws necessary within a democratic society for 
the prevention of crime.
69
 
 
Second, the Court’s reasoning left open the possibility that the Member State would be 
required to take positive steps to prevent action by private individuals that restricted free 
movement even where it was not violent or directly discriminatory, and involved clear 
exercise of fundamental rights. This was confirmed in Schmidberger.
70
 It will be recalled 
from chapter one, that in that case the Court held that the decision of the Austrian authorities 
not to prevent a peaceful, environmental protest, which blocked a key transport hub between 
Member States for 30 hours, constituted a prima facie breach of Article 34. Confirming 
Spanish Strawberries, the Court declared that the Member States were required to take all 
necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that the free movement of goods was respected 
on their territories. In other words, a restriction on Article 34 was established because Austria 
had not taken positive steps to restrict the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and 
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association, protected by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, of the demonstrators. The CJEU 
acknowledged Austria’s Convention obligations, but utilised the availability of derogations 
from Articles 10 and 11 ECHR to stipulate that Member States that did not utilise those 
derogations, for the purposes of respecting the free movement of goods, would be in prima 
facie breach of Article 34 TFEU. Further, it inverted the structure of the Article 10(2) and 
11(2) derogations, exposing the protection of fundamental rights to a proportionality 
assessment in light of the restrictions they placed on free movement.
71
 
 
The reliance on Spanish Strawberries, in Schmidberger, seems to have masked an additional 
development: the progression towards a ‘restrictions’ based test. Unlike in Spanish 
Strawberries, the protest in Schmidberger was not directly discriminatory. It might be viewed 
as indirectly discriminatory: as a hub for intra-Union trade, the location of the protest could 
have impacted more heavily on foreign goods.
72
 However, the language of the Court centres 
on restrictions
73
 and therefore appears focused on the general reduction in the volume of intra-
Union trade. Thus, despite Keck, Schmidberger hints at the further use of a market access test, 
in relation to positive obligations, and accordingly demonstrates, in a number of ways, the 
increased volume of free movement/fundamental rights interactions that results from the 
evolving definition of a breach of free movement.      
 
In sum, the expansion in the material scope of the free movement provisions has made a 
significant and direct contribution to the frequency with which free movement confronts 
Member State attempts to protect fundamental rights. Although a number of cases 
demonstrate that even directly discriminatory measures can seek to protect fundamental 
rights, it is the evolution of the definition of a breach of free movement, from distinctly 
applicable measures through to market access, which has vastly increased interaction between 
free movement and fundamental rights. Similarly, the evolution of a breach of free movement 
to encompass an obligation on Member States to take positive steps to ensure free movement, 
in response to the actions of private individuals, has led to new conflicts with fundamental 
rights. Similarly, the broadening of the personal scope of free movement has also raised the 
frequency of clashes between free movement and fundamental rights.  
                                                          
71
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2.2. Watts a service? The increasingly broad personal scope of the free movement 
provisions as a direct contributor to a greater frequency of interactions between 
free movement and fundamental rights      
 
In order to trigger the free movement provisions, a litigant must fall within their personal 
scope. For instance, if an individual wishes to challenge Member State rules as a breach of 
Article 45 TFEU, on the free movement of workers, she/he must demonstrate that she/he is, in 
fact, a worker for the purposes of those provisions. Since the free movement provisions seek 
to facilitate the creation of an internal market by dismantling internal frontiers, applicants 
must generally also demonstrate a cross-border element to their case.
74
 The purpose of this 
subsection is to assess the effects of the Court’s generous approach to defining the personal 
scope of free movement on the extent of free movement’s interactions with fundamental 
rights. Although reference will be made to a range of freedoms, the freedom to provide 
services will serve as a case-study to argue that expansion within the personal scope of free 
movement has created new opportunities for conflict between free movement and 
fundamental rights. Not only does focus on Article 56 TFEU permit a detailed demonstration 
of the variety of ways the extension of the personal scope of free movement can trigger new 
conflicts with fundamental rights, it also avoids overlaps with related issues discussed 
elsewhere in the thesis. For example, the broadening of the personal scope of Article 45 on 
workers will be explored in the context of analysing the contribution Union citizenship makes 
to a procedural preference for free movement in chapter four. Similarly, the requirement, in 
Centros,
75
 that a Member State must recognise the legal status of companies established in 
other Member States that wish to set up branches on their territory even where those 
undertakings do not meet the host State’s incorporation rules was discussed, from a 
fundamental rights perspective, in s.2.1.3.
76
  The subsection will consider, first, the Court’s 
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broad and value-neutral approach to key definitional terms, which brings sensitive policy 
choices, aimed at fundamental rights protection, within the personal scope of Article 56 
TFEU. Next, the subsection will detail the Court’s ‘reading in’ of new beneficiaries of Article 
56 and the subsequent weakening of the cross-border requirement, which can also bring new 
fundamental rights issues to the fore.  
   
 
2.2.1. Protecting fundamental rights but breaching Article 56: the consequences of a 
broad, and neutral, approach to defining key terms 
 
The general definition of a service, for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU, is provided by 
Article 57 TFEU. That provision defines as a ‘service’ activity normally provided for 
remuneration temporarily in the host State…’ It will be argued here that the CJEU’s generous 
approach to the terms ‘service’, ‘remuneration’ and ‘temporarily’ can lead to conflict between 
Article 56 and fundamental rights.  
 
 
2.2.1.1.‘Services’: a ‘neutral’ term 
 
This subsection is concerned with the Court’s response to arguments that certain activities 
should fall outwith the concept of a service by their very nature, or because they represent 
legitimate Member State policy endeavours, not directly related to the internal market and 
falling outside the Union’s legislative competence. Crucially, these policy areas will, at times, 
incorporate fundamental rights. The subsection will demonstrate that the Court is generally 
dismissive of such arguments, opting to define ‘services’ neutrally.  
 
For instance, in Grogan, the Court found the provision of abortion to constitute a service for 
the purposes of Article 56 TFEU, notwithstanding that the Society for the Protection of the 
Unborn Child had argued that, as a ‘grossly immoral act’ abortion should not, by its very 
nature, be defined as such.
77
 Since abortion was a legal medical service in several Member 
States, the CJEU was not prepared to substitute the decisions of legislatures in those States 
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where the practice was legal with its own assessments.
78
 The Court had already held that 
medical activity, if remunerated, fell within the scope of Article 56.
79
 This approach is 
understandable in light of the passionate conflicting views surrounding abortion, not only 
across and within the Member States, but throughout the world. Nevertheless, the Court’s 
claimed neutrality in defining a ‘service’ in fact favours the viewpoint of the legislatures and 
service providers in Member States where abortion is legal.
80
 This brought the fundamental 
right to life, as defined by the Irish Constitution which includes the right to life of the unborn 
child, a step closer to a clash with the free provision of services.
81
  
 
Furthermore, the confirmation that remunerated medical services fall within the personal 
scope of Article 56 potentially exposes Member State programmes designed to ensure access 
to healthcare to review as potential breaches of the free provision of services. And yet, Article 
35 CFR explicitly states that ‘everyone has the right to benefit from medical treatment under 
conditions established by national laws and practices’.  To explore this issue in more detail, 
we need to consider the Court’s interpretation of the remuneration requirement.  
 
 
2.2.1.2.‘Remuneration’: a broad concept 
 
While a literal approach to ‘remuneration’ might suggest that a service is ‘remunerated’ where 
the service recipient pays the service provider, the Court has taken a much broader view of the 
term. Thus, the Court has held that remuneration does not have to come from the service 
recipient.
82
 In Deliège, amateur sportspeople fell within the personal scope of Article 56 due 
to the indirect remuneration triggered by their activities, including ticketing for venues, 
revenue for television broadcasters, and publicity for sponsors.
83
 These developments raised 
the question of whether services, remunerated, or even provided directly, by the State, such as 
education and healthcare, were included in the field of application of Article 56.  
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Although the Court has held that publicly-funded education does not constitute a service for 
the purposes of Article 56,
84
 as outlined above, medical treatment does fall within the 
personal scope of that provision.
85
 Crucially, in Watts, this had implications for a healthcare 
system funded from the public purse.
86
 The relevant authorities in the UK had refused to 
reimburse Mrs. Watts, for medical treatment she had paid for in France, on the basis that the 
UK’s National Health Service (NHS), as a free-at-the-point-of-delivery system funded from 
general taxation, had no mechanism for reimbursement. The CJEU held that since Mrs. Watts 
had remunerated a service provider for medical treatment received in another Member State, 
the issue fell within the scope of Article 56 TFEU, without it being necessary to determine 
whether healthcare provided by the NHS was a service for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU.
87
 
The decision in Watts potentially interferes with ‘the right to medical treatment in accordance 
with national laws and practices’, as recognised by Article 35 CFR, since the consequent 
requirement of a reimbursement mechanism will require changes to the structure, 
organisation, and budgetary planning of a healthcare system that, being free at the point of 
service, previously required no such mechanism.
88
 Reimbursement would have to be funded 
by diverting other resources.  
 
Ironically, however, implicit in this judgment is also the utilisation of a Member State’s 
responsibilities to provide access to healthcare for its citizens to create a relationship between 
Mrs. Watts and the NHS that would otherwise not exist. In the earlier case of Kohll, a health 
insurance provider had been required to reimburse Mr. Kohll for medical treatment that he 
had paid for in another Member State.
89
 Since insurers already provided reimbursement for 
treatment received in the home State, the decision required them to do little more than they 
were already doing. Thus, the outcome arguably rested not only on Mr. Kohll’s payment for 
services abroad but also on his service relationship with his insurer. Under the NHS system, 
there is no such relationship between an individual who seeks treatment elsewhere and a 
national healthcare provider. In Watts, the connection between the medical services that Mrs. 
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Watts paid for abroad and the NHS must therefore impliedly rest on the UK’s fundamental 
obligations to provide its citizens with access to healthcare. This conflicts with the UK’s 
choice to meet this obligation through a nationalised structure. Although public treatment is 
available to them, a proportion of people in the UK opt for private healthcare in that State 
outwith the NHS, for which no reimbursement is available. In seeking treatment from outside 
the NHS structure, Mrs. Watts is arguably comparable to these individuals. The Court, in 
Watts, effectively exploited the Member State’s fundamental rights duties in relation to the 
provision of healthcare to force it to reimburse Mrs. Watts for a service that she had chosen to 
pay for herself, and for which she would not be entitled to claim had she received similar 
private treatment in the UK. This might have been beneficial to Mrs. Watts, but, given the 
incongruence of reimbursement in a nationalised healthcare model, and its potential impact on 
planning and budgets, this arguably poses a threat to a system that seeks to ensure the 
fundamental right to healthcare for all. In short, those who are not financially or linguistically 
able to exploit their free movement rights to benefit from medical services abroad might 
suffer because those that can do.
90
 Accordingly, the Court’s broad approach to ‘remuneration’ 
has caused free movement to interact with complex areas of Member State law and policy that 
can be targeted at the protection of fundamental social rights, such as the programmatic 
provision of healthcare.
91
 
 
   
2.2.1.3.‘Temporariness’: a semi-permanent notion 
 
There are two developments in relation to the ‘temporariness’ requirement that have had an 
appreciable impact on the level of contact between free movement and fundamental rights. 
First, the term is applied generously to service providers who, in fact, maintain a long-term or 
repeated physical presence in a host State. Second, thanks to technology, providers can now 
offer services across borders on a permanent basis without ever having to establish themselves 
in a host State. Since Article 56 TFEU does not allow host Member States to impose as many 
of their regulations on service providers as would be the case in relation to workers and 
establishment, this limits Member State space for the implementation of policies related to 
fundamental rights protection. 
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Traditionally, if a person or undertaking maintained a permanent economic base, such as an 
office, in a host Member State, they would fall within the scope of Article 49 TFEU on 
freedom of establishment.
92
 Although arguably weakened by the introduction of a market 
access test,
93
 this freedom generally allows the host Member State to impose more of its rules 
on that individual/company since, being settled there, they are exposed to a single regulatory 
regime.  
 
However, in Gebhard, the Court held that a service did not necessarily cease to be temporary 
simply because a service provider might need to establish some kind of infrastructure, such as 
an office, in the host State.
94
 This is also relevant to construction companies, who will 
establish worksites in a host State, having been awarded a service contract there.
95
 As Laval 
demonstrates, host Member States, and the trade unions within them, are restricted in terms of 
the protection they can offer workers posted to their territory under service contracts. This is 
logical in the short-term since a change in the terms and conditions of employment for 
temporary work performed in another State potentially imposes a sizeable burden on 
employers. Arguably the quality of posted workers’ lives is unlikely to be significantly 
affected if they do not receive the same terms and conditions as comparable host State 
employees.
96
 However, the CJEU has declared that services, such as the construction of a 
large building, which might be provided over several years, can fall within the personal scope 
of Article 56.
97
 Posted workers operating under long-term or renewable service contracts are 
more comparable to workers moving across intra-State borders pursuant to Article 45 TFEU, 
since they are likely to encounter the (usually) higher costs of the host Member State and be 
away from their families over long periods. This creates an interface between the free 
provision of services and the fundamental social rights of workers and individuals’ 
fundamental right to family life.
98
 And yet, while individuals falling within the personal scope 
of Article 45 would enjoy the same terms, conditions and social advantages as national 
employees, and would be entitled to bring family members with them to the host State,
99
 this 
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is not the case for workers posted pursuant to Article 56. Moreover, given the likely high cost 
of living in the host State, and the inability, post-Laval, of host States or trade unions to 
impose ‘going rate’ as opposed to minimum rates of pay,100 posted workers’ ability to return 
home to maintain family relationships could be restricted.
101
  
 
The temporary nature of services has also been affected by certain technologies. Some 
services, by their nature, do not require a host State base. For instance, the permanent 
provision of televisual services in one Member State, by a broadcaster transmitting from, and 
established in, another Member State, has been held to fall within the scope of Article 56 
TFEU.
102
 This has allowed broadcasters to argue that attempts by Member States to impose 
rules upon them, which would ordinarily be enforced against stations established on their 
territory in order to protect the freedom of expression or the rights of the child, are restrictions 
on the free provision of services.
103
 Similarly, certain technological advancements have 
removed the need for undertakings to be established in host States. This has created the 
opportunity for undertakings to circumvent Member States rules targeted at protection of 
fundamental rights. In Gambelli,
104
 an Italian measure prohibited the taking or forwarding of 
bets, without a licence from the Italian authorities. Gambelli nevertheless used the internet to 
act as an intermediary between Italian gamblers and bookmakers legally registered in the UK. 
When faced with criminal proceedings, Gambelli successfully argued that the Italian rule 
restricted a service within the meaning of Article 56, though the CJEU accepted that the 
Italian rule existed for reasons of consumer protection.
105
    
 
Thus, the Court’s broad approach to key terms that define the personal scope of Article 56 
TFEU have significantly increased the volume of interactions between that freedom and 
fundamental rights. Similarly, the Court’s introduction of the ‘service recipient’, which allows 
Article 56 to be engaged where an individual travels to a service provider’s State of 
establishment, has also contributed to a rise in free movement/fundamental rights interfaces. 
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In several cases, it has also been unnecessary to identify particular service recipients residing 
in Member States other than the State of establishment of the service provider. This 
weakening of the cross-border requirement also widens the scope for conflict between free 
movement and fundamental rights. It is to these phenomena that we now turn.  
 
 
2.2.2. Introducing new beneficiaries and weakening the cross-border requirement: 
increasing opportunity for fundamental rights conflicts 
 
Although Article 56 only explicitly prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services, 
the Court held in Luisi and Carbone that recipients of services also fell within its scope.
106
 In 
Watts, this allowed an individual, who had travelled to another Member State to receive 
medical services, to argue that a refusal by her home State healthcare provider to reimburse 
her for this treatment, constituted a breach of Article 56 TFEU. As discussed above, this 
creates a new interface between free movement and Member State provision of the right to 
access to healthcare.  
 
The recognition of the service recipient also permits undertakings to challenge rules imposed 
in their Member State of establishment as restrictions on access to their services by recipients 
located in other Member States. Thus, in Gourmet,
107
 a Swedish ban on the advertising of 
alcohol was found to constitute a restriction on the right of Swedish press undertakings to 
offer their advertising services to product-sellers from other Member States. The purpose of 
the Swedish prohibition was to protect public health, which can be viewed as an essential 
component of the right to health, recognised by Article 35 CFR.
108
 In an example of 
congruence between free movement and fundamental rights, a service provider in 
Carpenter
109
 was able to challenge a UK immigration decision, with an impact on his 
fundamental right to family life, as a breach of Article 56 on the basis that he provided 
advertising space to recipients in other Member States. Moreover, that provision was 
triggered whether or not Carpenter had to go physically to another Member State to provide 
that service. It was unnecessary in both Gourmet and Carpenter actually to identify a 
particular service recipient. In fact, across all of the freedoms, it is not required that national 
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rules have an impact on cross-border trade on the facts, to bring a matter within the scope of 
EU law. It is sufficient that there is the possibility for those same rules to affect trade coming 
from other Member States. In Libert, this allowed Belgian property developers to challenge a 
Belgian rule, targeted at securing the fundamental right to access to housing, as a restriction of 
Article 63 TFEU.
110
  
 
As Spaventa points out, when discussing Gourmet, the combination of a market access test 
with a general relaxation of the cross-border requirement allows economic actors to challenge 
the very existence of market regulations on the domestic market.
111
 This greatly increases the 
potential for interaction between free movement and fundamental rights because, as she notes 
elsewhere, if free movement is triggered by rules that make activity less attractive to 
economic actors, ‘it becomes difficult to identify which, if any, national rules fall outside the 
scope of the Treaty and therefore need not be justified.’112 Speaking about market access 
generally, Advocate General Tizzano has expressed concern that, rather than forming a space 
in which operators can move freely, a test based on reduction in the economic attractiveness, 
would instead be used to create a ‘market without rules’.113 Since fundamental rights manifest 
as rules in domestic legal orders, this expansion applies equally to them.  
 
Section two demonstrated that the evolution of a breach of free movement, from distinctly 
applicable measures to rules restricting market access, and the requirement that Member 
States take positive steps to secure freedom of movement, has directly contributed to more 
frequent conflict between free movement and fundamental rights. The Court’s generous 
approach both to the interpretation of key definitional terms, relating to the personal scope of 
free movement, and to the cross-border requirement, have had similar effects. Placed in their 
internal market context, these developments are understandable, since they reflect the Court’s 
appreciation of the varied ways that economic integration can be impeded. However, the 
internal market logic behind these expansions does not alter the fact that they expose Member 
State fundamental rights choices to scrutiny as breaches of the free movement provisions. 
Unlike protectionist activity, such law and policy does not strike deliberately at the heart of 
common market ideals, having only oblique, though admittedly at times significant, effects on 
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economic integration. Accordingly, we might expect to see judicial approaches to these 
qualitatively different types of interference with free movement distinguished from 
adjudicative models employed when a restriction of free movement denoted protectionism. 
However, the analysis in the next section will reveal that, while the Court has taken 
substantive steps to recognise the changed landscape of conflicts between free movement and 
national law, the structure of judicial decision-making does not adequately reflect this shift.              
 
 
3. Increasing the free movement bias: the maintenance and reinforcement of a 
structural preference for free movement in spite of qualitatively different 
interactions  
 
This section will argue that the evolution in the scope of the free movement provisions, which 
has contributed to a surge in conflicts between free movement and fundamental rights, has 
ironically also crystallised the two-stage breach/justification model, which prioritises free 
movement over competing law and policy. Nonetheless, there are other contributors to this 
phenomenon and this section should be read with the understanding that much of the general 
analysis of the two-stage approach, discussed in detail for the first time here, applies equally 
to the other arms of our constitutional trinity, namely direct effect and citizenship, discussed 
in chapters three and four. Here, we acknowledge, first, that the CJEU has recognised the 
qualitative difference in the conflicts that can now take place between free movement and 
national law and policy in its substantive approach to justifications. However, there is an 
historical hangover, from the days when the adjudicative process was focused on tackling 
protectionism, in the language used in relation to justifications and in the structure of judicial 
decision-making, which nevertheless makes it more difficult for fundamental rights to prevail. 
 
Moreover, while the Court has maintained a strict approach to justifications, expansion in the 
material and personal scope of free movement has inevitably made it easier for a breach of 
EU law to be established. This results in a growing evidentiary gap between breach and 
justification. Specifically, the burden on those wishing to demonstrate a breach of Union law 
is generally decreasing. A very minimal impediment to free movement, with no empirically 
proven, or even actual, deterrent effects on the exercise of free movement will often establish 
prima facie wrongful conduct. Consequently, the permissibility of Member State pursuit, or 
individual exercise, of fundamental rights falls to be assessed entirely at the justification stage 
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where it is exposed to proportionality questions not imposed on free movement. In its final 
subsection, the section develops the critique, sown in chapter one, that assessing fundamental 
rights at the justification stage triggers an ‘impact trio’ of practical limitations on their 
realisation.      
  
 
3.1. Suffering from an historic hangover: the maintenance of a strict proportionality 
test for qualitatively different breaches of free movement  
 
As section 2.1.2 demonstrated, when the Court, in Cassis, brought dual regulatory burdens 
within the material scope of Article 34 TFEU, it created interactions between free movement 
and a diverse range of legitimate domestic policy goals, not targeted at undermining the 
internal market but capable of inhibiting its completion. For instance, each Member State had, 
independently, enacted rules to protect the position of consumers in light of their generally 
weaker position on the market place. These rules were not a deliberate attack on foreign 
goods. The disadvantage they created for importers lay in the fact that the Member State of 
production implemented this legitimate policy goal differently from the importing Member 
State. Although the Treaty drafters had envisaged, through the exhaustive lists contained in 
the derogating provisions,
114
  that, in some instances, restrictions on free movement might be 
the result of the pursuit of other valid goals, the introduction of DRBs caused free movement 
to interact with Member State endeavours, such as consumer protection, that did not feature in 
these lists. Consequently, in apparent acknowledgement of the qualitatively different nature of 
DRBs, the Court accepted that where measures were not distinctly applicable, Member States 
could justify restrictions on free movement by reference to the mandatory requirements facing 
a State, which included, but were not limited to: fiscal supervision, consumer protection, and 
the fairness of commercial transactions. Thus, the Court had catered, substantively, for the 
changed free movement/domestic restriction dynamic post-Cassis.  
 
However, in other ways Cassis maintained, and was inherently built upon, an intrinsic 
preference for free movement. First, the language surrounding the substantive expansion of 
potential justifications nevertheless connotes the procedural subjugation of national rules: 
they must be ‘mandatory’ or, in relation to the other freedoms, ‘imperative’ or ‘overriding’. 
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Further, the finding, in Cassis, that domestic rules must be necessary in order to achieve the 
relevant aim, introduces the same basic proportionality test for the justification of DRBs that 
is applied to protectionist or directly discriminatory policy, as part of a two-stage 
breach/justification assessment. This was confirmed across the four freedoms, and applied to 
rules restricting market access, in Gebhard.
115
 Here, the Court explicitly provided the 
applicable test in this context. Measures had to operate in a non-discriminatory manner; be 
suitable for attaining the objective pursued; and must not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve it.
116
 Yet, as we have seen, the expansion of the scope of the market freedoms creates 
more opportunity for conflict between them and fundamental rights. Accordingly, the 
retention of the two-stage model in this context exposes fundamental rights to further 
structural subjugation. Indeed, we see the Gebhard formula applied in, for example, all of the 
fundamental rights cases discussed in chapter one, namely, Familiapress,
117
 Omega,
118
 
Viking,
119
 Laval,
120
 Rüffert,
121
 Commission v Luxembourg
122
 and Dynamic Medien,
123
 all of 
which concern indistinctly applicable measures or rules restricting market access.
124
 The 
effects of this structural prioritisation of free movement will be explored in section 3.3. For 
now, we can already see that they are disadvantaged by their procedural presentation as prima 
facie unlawful and their consequent exposure to the standard proportionality questions of 
‘necessity’ and ‘suitability’, which is often assessed by reference to whether outcomes less 
restrictive of free movement are available.
125
 
 
Thus, despite a substantive recognition of the qualitatively different nature of the national 
rules with which free movement interacts in the post-Cassis era, there remains an historical 
hangover in terms of the procedure used for adjudicating conflict. The next subsection argues 
that, while a restrictive proportionality assessment has been retained for justifications post-
Cassis, the evolution of free movement beyond instances of discrimination has necessarily 
and simultaneously rendered it progressively easier to establish a breach of free movement. 
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This ever-widening evidentiary gap increases the structural bias in favour of free movement 
and against fundamental rights since applicants pursuing free movement have broad 
opportunities to establish a presumption of illegality in relation to the protection or exercise of 
fundamental rights by Member States or individuals. Certainly, there is no consideration, at 
the breach stage, of the impact of the pursuit of free movement on the exercise of fundamental 
rights. The weighing of these competing norms takes place at the justification stage where 
judicial focus is solely on assessing whether fundamental rights can overcome a prima facie 
unlawful breach of free movement. Thus, fundamental rights can be exposed to a restrictive 
proportionality assessment even against broadly-defined and minimal restrictions on free 
movement.    
 
    
3.2. The increased ‘breachability’ of the free movement provisions  
 
The evidentiary burden placed on applicants wishing to establish a breach of free movement 
is necessarily lowered when the concept of a breach is broadened. As we have seen, it will no 
longer be necessary for a foreign Member State trader to demonstrate that a receiving 
Member State is directly discriminating against her/him. In the wake of the market access test, 
she/he will not even have to display the differential impact of host State rules on her/him as 
compared with domestic traders. Thus, much of the second section of this chapter is equally 
relevant to the arguments in this subsection and those findings will not be repeated. Instead, 
we will focus, here, on the evidential requirements placed on applicants wishing to establish a 
breach of the free movement provisions. The subsection will argue that the existence of 
concrete barriers to free movement is largely irrelevant to the question of breach. Individuals 
are able to challenge Member State rules, including those that seek to protect fundamental 
rights, regardless of whether or not they have actually been deterred from crossing borders – 
arguably the whole purpose of free movement tools within a common market - and 
irrespective of whether their market position is affected by the existence of potential barriers 
to trade. Consequently, diverse areas of complex national law and policy can be scrutinised, 
and subsequently altered, where they do not impose the fewest restrictions possible on free 
movement, even where its exercise has been restricted to a very limited degree. 
 
The low evidential burden for establishing a breach of the free movement of goods originates 
in the Court’s definition of a ‘measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction on goods’, 
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which is prohibited by Article 34 TFEU. In its seminal Dassonville decision, the CJEU 
defined as an MEQR, ‘all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade…’126 Thus, 
the question of whether importation of goods was actually hindered was irrelevant as long as 
there was potential for impediment. Indeed, many cases involve applicants who are already 
operating in a host State, regardless of that State’s rules, though they might not always do so 
under their preferred market conditions. Thus, in Cowan,
127
 concerning services, the 
restriction of compensatory awards to victims of physical assault to those resident in France, 
constituted a breach of Article 56 TFEU. This decision appears fair; certainly Cowan himself 
might be discouraged from visiting France following his experiences there. But can it really 
be said that service recipients generally, or even Cowan specifically, would be deterred from 
seeking services in France on the sole basis that they would not be entitled to compensation 
should they be the victim of a violent crime? Nevertheless, the Court has maintained this 
approach such that non-discrimination is a stand-alone principle regardless of concrete 
deterrent effects.
128
  
 
Similarly, in Bickel,
129
 a German and an Austrian successfully challenged as a restriction of 
Article 56 TFEU an Italian rule, which provided that criminal proceedings in the bi-lingual 
German/Italian Bolzano region could be conducted in German but limited its application to 
residents of that region. As service recipients, both individuals fell within the personal scope 
of Article 56. Moreover, since Italian nationals were more likely to be resident in Bolzano 
than other German speakers, the rule was indirectly discriminatory and accordingly fell within 
the material scope of that provision. There was no assessment by the Court of whether the 
Italian measure actually deterred citizens from seeking services in Italy. Indeed, like in 
Cowan, it is arguably unlikely that German speakers would be discouraged from receiving 
services in Bolzano on the sole basis that, should they be arrested, they would face Court 
proceedings in Italian. At the justification stage, Italy had argued that it wished to recognise 
the ethnic and cultural identity of its German-speaking population by allowing them to speak 
German, wherever possible, in their interactions with the State. Accordingly, the measure can 
represent a manifestation of the fundamental rights of minority groups and respect for cultural 
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and linguistic diversity.
130
 Crucially, the Court did not assess the potential impact, or 
proportionality, of the pursuit of free movement on the protection of these fundamental rights 
as part of its breach analysis. At the justification stage, the Court simply acknowledged that 
the protection of minority groups was a legitimate aim, but then declared that there was 
nothing to suggest that this would be undermined if the rules were extended to cover German-
speaking nationals of other Member States.
131
 It was not until the Italian government 
expressly outlined the practical impact of the extension in the subsequent case of Rüffer that 
the Court considered, in more detail, whether the protection of minorities would be 
encumbered by the financial and organisational implications of an increase in German-
language trials.
132
 The CJEU maintained that the Italian rule could not be justified since the 
referring court had itself admitted that the extension of the measure to non-national German 
speakers would impose no new organisational burdens.
133
 In relation to additional costs, 
Member States could not rely on aims of a purely economic nature to justify restrictions on 
free movement.
134
   
 
It could, therefore, be argued that the Court’s approach in Bickel was not problematic from a 
fundamental rights perspective. And yet, it is intrinsically worrying that the low evidentiary 
burden at the breach stage contains no consideration of the potential impact, and 
proportionality, of a finding of a violation of free movement on a Member States’ ability to 
meet its fundamental rights obligations. The onus is, instead, on the Member State to highlight 
this at the justification stage where the focus is, nevertheless, on the proportionality of 
protecting fundamental rights in light of their restriction of free movement. Moreover, the 
Court’s rejection, in Rüffer, of additional costs as a justification since they were of a ‘purely 
economic nature’ underappreciates the budgetary considerations that are inherent in meeting 
the positive obligations of programmatic fundamental rights.
135
 Indeed, if protective schemes 
prove particularly costly, they might be abandoned altogether. This will be discussed in more 
detail, as a broader issue, in section 3.3.3.     
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The low evidentiary burden in Cowan and Bickel, containing no consideration of deterrent 
effects in real-terms, is arguably justifiable by reference to the fact that non-discrimination is 
a fundamental principle of the Union, especially in light of the introduction of Union 
citizenship.
136
 Nevertheless, ‘per se restrictions’ necessarily reduce the evidentiary burden for 
establishing obstacles to free movement and consequently expose a greater quantity of 
fundamental rights to challenge as restrictions of EU law. This can also be seen in relation to 
DRBs,
137
 where the CJEU adopts a per se approach with respect to product requirements i.e. 
rules concerning inter alia the designation, composition, size, weight and packaging of goods. 
Clearly, having to alter one’s product in order to enter another Member State’s market can 
have significant, restrictive effects on movement. However, the per se approach removes any 
requirement to examine the actual extent of limitations on free movement before a restriction 
is found. This is problematic in cases where DRBs reflect Member State efforts to protect 
fundamental rights because relevant domestic rules will be considered prima facie unlawful 
breaches of EU law, even where obstacles to free movement might be quite minimal. Since, 
by the justification stage, a restriction on free movement is already established, the emphasis 
turns to the proportionality of fundamental rights restrictions on free movement. No 
comparison is made between the size of the impediment placed on producers/importers, on 
the one hand, and the effect of allowing goods to enter the host State market unhindered on 
fundamental rights protection, on the other. The focus is on whether fundamental rights 
impose the fewest possible restrictions on free movement. As the following subsections will 
detail, this might require Member States to alter their methods of safeguarding fundamental 
rights protection, impacting on the effectiveness or level of protection. And yet, the obstacles 
to free movement, which trigger this change, only need be potential, indirect, or slight.   
 
Keck offered some opportunity for closing this evidentiary gap because, in the context of 
selling arrangements, it placed the burden of proof back on foreign traders to demonstrate that 
they were being treated differently in law or in fact from domestic producers. For instance, the 
Court stated in De Agostini, that, as a selling arrangement, a prohibition on television 
advertising did not breach Article 34 TFEU unless it was shown that the ban did not affect in 
the same manner, in fact and in law, the marketing of national products compared with those 
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coming from other Member States.
138
 This has led Barnard to argue that, in contrast with 
product requirements, there is a presumption in relation to selling arrangements that they do 
not hinder market access ‘and the trader will have to work very hard to rebut this 
presumption, possibly by introducing statistical or other evidence’.139  
 
However, De Agostini itself seems to undermine this conclusion. Although final application 
was left to the referring court, the CJEU appeared, in that case, to accept on face value that 
television advertising was the only way for De Agostini to penetrate the Swedish market.
140
 
This implies that De Agostini was at a disadvantage perhaps because domestic traders could 
penetrate the market in other ways, but no explicit assessment was made in this regard. While 
this was the responsibility of the national court, which could have conducted a rigorous 
analysis of De Agostini’s factual situation, the burden of proof to which Barnard refers, 
appears to have been discharged with relative ease. Moreover, in Gourmet, the CJEU 
conducted its own assessment.
141
 Examining the effects of another Swedish advertising ban, 
relating to alcohol, the Court declared that, since the consumption of alcohol is linked to local 
habits, it was not necessary to conduct a ‘precise analysis’ to conclude that a prohibition of 
alcohol advertising is liable to impede access to the market for imported goods more than 
domestic products, with which consumers are instantly more familiar.
142
 However, if the 
Court’s reasoning lies in consumer familiarity, surely the penetration of new products on to 
the market is similarly, or equally, difficult for both domestic and imported goods?
143
 Further, 
it will be recalled that this finding of a restriction in Gourmet exposed Member State rules 
that can be viewed as targeting the fundamental right to health, to a justification analysis, 
since they were a prima facie breach of EU law. This was also the case in De Agostini, which 
also concerned efforts to safeguard the rights of the child. Indeed, Wilsher has argued that a 
higher, more precise evidentiary burden should operate at the breach stage precisely because 
of free movement’s potential effects on other legitimate objectives:  
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[The Court] has found discrimination based on judicial hunches or intuitions rather than clear criteria and 
objective evidence about conditions of competition in the product markets… Only where a trader can 
demonstrate that a restriction is truly arbitrary should [Article 34 TFEU] bite. For many non-product rules this 
will rightly be difficult to do because such rules pursue broad policy goals that are largely non-justiciable.
144
 
 
The introduction of a market access test has removed the question of discrimination 
altogether, increasing the pertinence of Wilsher’s critique. Returning to Gourmet, this time in 
the context of services, the Court held that the Swedish ban constituted a restriction on Article 
56 TFEU, since foreign producers would not be able to use Swedish advertising service 
providers to market alcohol. This was established by reference to the ‘international nature’ of 
the advertising market,
145
 with no empirical examination of whether any foreign advertisers 
actually sought to advertise on the Swedish market. The fact that this presumption might 
prove true does not detract from the fact that empirical evidence is rarely needed to establish a 
breach of free movement. A similar approach can be seen in Libert.
146
 In that case, Flemish 
rules required, for certain target communes that there be a ‘sufficient connection’ between the 
area and proposed transferees before property could be conveyed. Likewise, property 
developers had to fulfil a ‘social obligation’ by making certain of their units available for 
social housing, or make payment in kind. Both measures were arguably targeted at providing 
accessing to housing, a fundamental right pursuant to Article 34 CFR. The ‘sufficient 
connection’ requirement was found to be in breach of, inter alia, Article 56 TFEU, since 
estate agents could not offer their services to ‘just any Union citizen’, and Article 63 TFEU 
because a prior authorisation assessment was a restriction on capital movements per se.
147
 The 
‘social obligation’ also constituted a restriction of capital since investors could ‘not freely use 
the land for the purposes for which they wished to acquire it’.148 Yet, there was no concrete 
assessment of whether estate agents’ business would really be affected by the ‘sufficient 
connection test’ or whether investors would genuinely be deterred by the rigmarole of a prior 
authorisation procedure.  For instance, how many target communes were there? What 
percentage of an estate agent’s annual business would be affected by the fact that they were 
restricted as to whom they could offer their services, and, in any case, only in relation to 
purchases and long-term rents, in particular communes? Although the Advocate General did 
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in fact acknowledge the pertinence of the number of target communes, this was only relevant 
at the justification stage, placing the evidential burden on the Member State.
149
 In any case, 
neither the Advocate General, nor the Court, actually took this into account as part of their 
justification analyses.
150
  
 
Of course, the Court has frequently made plain that it does not apply a de minimis threshold in 
its examination of whether there has been a breach of free movement.
151
  For the Court, 
evidence that potentially restrictive rules are not affecting foreign traders, who have no 
interest in the domestic market or who are not being deterred, only demonstrates the status 
quo and not the potential for further cross-border trade once a measure has been removed. 
Some commentators have argued convincingly against the introduction of quantitative 
empirical analysis for establishing a breach of free movement. For instance, Davies posits that 
free movement rights are often exercised by smaller actors
152
 who are not able to provide 
complex economic assessments.
153
 Nevertheless, as section 3.3 will demonstrate, the Court 
frequently imposes similar empirical obstacles at the justification stage, requiring Member 
States or private individuals to provide in-depth statistical data to support their fundamental 
rights justifications. Other writers have argued that a de minimis test does operate within free 
movement but is qualitative in nature. Specifically, Nic Shuibhne points to the Court’s focus 
on the absolute prohibition of use of motorcycle trailers in finding a restriction on market 
access in Commission v Italy,
154
 and the fact that use of personal watercraft was ‘very 
limited’155 in Mickelsson v Roos.156 Such thresholds can also be viewed in the free movement 
of persons case-law, where the Court has imposed a test of ‘serious inconvenience’.157 
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However, she notes also that the height of the qualitative threshold in the product-use cases is 
already lowering. Thus, in Bonnarde, the Court remarked that the requirement that motor 
vehicles have registration documents to qualify for ecological subsidies ‘may influence’ 
consumer behaviour and therefore restrict market access.
158
 Nic Shuibhne emphasises that this 
requirement would not ‘greatly restrict’ product use, as appeared to be the requirement in 
Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos.
159
 Crucially, for our purposes, the systematic 
application of the Gebhard formula to fundamental rights at the justification stage, and their 
subsequent exposure to strict proportionality assessment, is not matched by equivalent 
examination of free movement at the breach stage. This remains true even in the light of 
scattered examples in the case-law of a gradually lowering qualitative de minimis threshold 
for breach.       
 
This subsection has demonstrated the low evidential obstacles facing those wishing to 
establish a breach of free movement. As well as the broad approach to defining obstacles to 
free movement, the evidentiary burden imposed is generally shallow. Consequently, an 
increasing number of Member State measures, including those targeted at fundamental rights 
protection, are found to be prima facie unlawful restrictions of free movement, which must 
justify themselves according to the requirements of proportionality. It is to the practical 
consequences of this procedural eventuality that we now turn.   
 
 
3.3. The practical implications of these developments on the protection and pursuit of 
fundamental rights   
 
It might be argued that the evolutions that have taken place within free movement, discussed 
above, are not particularly problematic from a fundamental rights perspective. Yes, expansion 
in the material and personal scope of free movement has caused it to interact more frequently 
with fundamental rights. And yes, the Court has retained a two-stage approach to these 
conflicts that was historically used for tackling protectionism, leading to a broad and shallow 
burden of proof for establishing breach. But, the very existence of a justification stage 
precludes the conclusion that free movement will always ‘trump’ fundamental rights. Thus, 
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the exposure of more fundamental rights to interaction with free movement cannot necessarily 
be automatically viewed as problematic in terms of fundamental rights protection. Indeed, we 
saw, in chapter one, that there are several cases in which fundamental rights, processed 
through the two-stage approach, have prevailed over free movement.
160
  
 
However, this stance is contestable for a number of reasons. First, as chapter one 
demonstrated, an adjudicative framework that presents the protection or exercise of 
fundamental rights as prima facie wrongful conduct, which must be defended in light of the 
restrictions they place on free movement, undermines the very fundamentality of fundamental 
rights, from theoretical perspectives and is ill-suited to the Union’s contemporary 
constitutional commitment to respecting fundamental rights. Chapter one also outlined an 
‘impact trio’ of practical effects that the two-stage approach triggers in respect of Member 
State fundamental rights standards. Since review of domestic fundamental rights is 
increasingly possible as a result of the extension of the material and personal scope of the free 
movement provisions, and the Court’s choice to maintain the two-stage structure in this 
context, it is appropriate to develop this analysis further here.  
 
To lay the foundations for this analysis, the subsection will, however, first detail the often 
significant evidentiary hurdles that fundamental rights face as part of the two-stage process, in 
a practical sense. As derogations from ‘fundamental principles’ of the Union, justifications, 
including those relating to fundamental rights, must be interpreted strictly. We have already 
seen that the Gebhard formula imposes questions of ‘suitability’ and ‘necessity’ at the 
justifications stage. Here, we will examine what evidence the Court requires in this regard. It 
will be demonstrated that, in stark contrast to the general lack of de minimis at the breach 
stage, at the justification phase Member States/individuals are required to show that the 
protection of fundamental rights are under ‘serious threat’. Moreover, they are often required 
to provide detailed statistical data in this regard, which might, nevertheless, be rejected by the 
Court.  
 
 
3.3.1. Justifying fundamental rights protection: the requirement of a ‘serious threat’. 
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It is well-established in the case-law that, as derogations from a ‘fundamental principle’ of the 
Union, measures restricting free movement should be interpreted narrowly.
161
 A two-stage 
breach/justification framework, which establishes first a breach and then a justification, 
naturally lends itself to, and encourages, such an approach. As free movement has expanded 
to interact more frequently with fundamental rights, retaining the use of the two-stage model, 
this stance has been transferred into these new types of conflict. Thus, in Omega, the Court 
stated that public policy, which in this case concerned the safeguarding of human dignity, 
‘particularly as a justification for a derogation from the fundamental principle to provide 
services, must be interpreted strictly’.162 This accordingly imposes an evidential threshold not 
(usually) faced by free movement. For instance, in Omega itself, the Court declared that 
‘public policy may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society’.163 This phrase was repeated verbatim by the CJEU in 
Commission v Luxembourg, concerning worker protection.
164
 In fact, the Court referenced its 
case-law on public order legislation which it had held must be ‘so crucial for the protection of 
the political, social or economic order in the Member State concerned as to require 
compliance therewith by all persons present on the territory…’165 Similarly, in Viking, 
exercise of the fundamental right to strike with the aim of protecting workers was only 
permissible if jobs or conditions of employment were ‘jeopardised or under serious threat’.166  
 
Although the stringency of application with respect to these qualitative thresholds has been 
variable,
167
 the Court has repeatedly required Member States to provide extensive statistical 
data to support their claims that fundamental rights protection is under ‘serious threat’. Thus, 
in Commission v Luxembourg, the CJEU not only stated that the reasons invoked by Member 
States to justify derogations from free movement ‘must be accompanied by appropriate 
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evidence’.168 It also declared that ‘merely cit[ing] in a general manner’ the objective of 
worker protection, in this regard, was insufficient. Assertions will not satisfy the relevant 
standard of proof.
169
 In Commission v Austria, that Member State sought to derogate from the 
free movement provisions in order to prevent risk to the financial equilibrium of its education 
system. This represents a practical consideration for Member States when they design 
programmes for securing the fundamental right to education.
170
 Nevertheless, the Court 
emphasised that, in order to derogate from the fundamental principle of free movement of 
persons, Member States were required ‘to show in each individual case that their rules are 
necessary and proportionate…accompanied by…specific evidence substantiating its 
arguments’.171 Although Austria had maintained that the number of students registering for 
medical courses on its territory could be five times the number of available places, it had no 
figures in relation to other courses. Consequently, the Court held that Austria had failed to 
demonstrate that its education system was in jeopardy.
172
   
 
We saw, in section 3.2, that reasons of a ‘purely economic nature’ are not generally available 
as potential derogations from free movement, and the impact that this can have on 
fundamental rights. As Commission v Austria demonstrates, there is, in fact, an emerging 
case-law, in which the Court is willing to consider the risk posed to the financial balance of 
social security systems.
173
 This might seem encouraging from a fundamental rights 
perspective, but the evidentiary burden placed on Member States, in relation to what are 
essentially decisions of policy, arguably undermines this. As Nic Shuibhne and Maci argue, 
‘if a defendant State submits empirically-grounded arguments about why and how it chooses 
to allocate resources, on what basis should those decisions be assessed, let alone overturned, 
by any court – EU or national?’174 For instance, if a Member State wishes to justify its refusal 
to reimburse an individual for medical services received abroad because of the impact it will 
have on the operation of its health services overall, ‘how can States demonstrate – or more 
likely, project – to a sufficiently rigorous degree the knock-on, systemic effects’ in this 
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regard?
175
 In other fundamental rights areas, where furnishing statistical evidence might be 
easier, this will not necessarily lead to a Member State’s measure being justified in practice, 
in any case. Thus, in Petillant de Raisin, Germany tried to justify its restrictions on the use of 
champagne-style bottles for other drinks by presenting a survey in which 75% of participants, 
having been shown a photograph of such a bottle, believed that it contained champagne or 
sparkling wine. Even where this bottle featured a clear label, stating that it contained 
fermented fruit juice, 50% of people still though it was a picture of champagne. Nevertheless, 
the Court held that clear labelling would secure consumer protection and in a way less 
restrictive of free movement.
176
        
 
When the discussion in this subsection is contrasted with our assessment of the evidentiary 
hurdles imposed on those trying to establish a breach of free movement, we can see that, in 
evidential terms, the protection of fundamental rights is clearly disadvantaged by its 
examination at the justification phase of the two-stage approach. Next, we will consider what 
the consequences of this can be in practical terms, focusing first on the potential for 
underappreciation in relation to the idiosyncratic fundamental rights needs of the Member 
States.   
 
 
3.3.2. Lower levels of fundamental rights protection and a general under-appreciation of 
idiosyncratic Member State fundamental rights needs 
 
Aside from the high evidential thresholds discussed above, it could be argued that the 
obligation at the justification stage, that Member States demonstrate the ‘necessity’ of their 
fundamental rights measures, does not undermine their protection. Once a domestic provision 
achieves what is necessary to safeguard fundamental rights, it has, by definition, done enough. 
However, that argument is undermined when we consider that necessity is assessed through a 
free movement lens. The use of a model that asks whether there are measures ‘less restrictive 
of free movement’ available, to determine the necessity of national fundamental rights rules 
can, in fact, result in a lowering of Member State fundamental rights protection in real terms. 
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Moreover, fundamental rights needs that are peculiar to certain Member States can be 
overlooked by determining necessity by reference to free movement.  
 
This issue is exemplified in the case-law on vulnerable consumers. The Court has frequently 
held that consumers can be protected from potential confusion, when purchasing goods, by 
labelling that, for instance, indicates the content and composition of, or manufacturing 
methods used for, the given product.
177
 The Court’s stance is that the ‘reasonably 
circumspect’ consumer reads product labels. Since Member State measures for consumer 
protection have, for instance, included different compositional requirements,
178
 new product 
designations,
179
 or entirely altered packaging,
180
 labelling is clearly less restrictive of free 
movement. However, it is submitted that this does not automatically render Member State 
rules ‘unnecessary’, from a fundamental rights perspective. Specifically, this approach 
neglects to consider the realities of consumer behaviour or arguably legitimate Member State 
desire to protect vulnerable consumers. We have already seen that in the Pétillant de Raisin 
case, Germany presented evidence that at least 50% of consumers do not read labels. As von 
Heydebrand u.d. Lasa points out, ‘comparable to the small-print on a standard-form contract, 
the list of ingredients and other information on the label are in many instances plainly not 
read, even if the foodstuff is bought for the first time’.181 Accordingly, labelling may be a less 
restrictive, but not necessarily equally effective, form of consumer protection.  
 
In Mars, a German rule, which prevented packaging declaring that the consumer was getting 
‘10% free’ from being over 10% of the size of the chocolate bar, could not be justified by 
reference to consumer protection. For the Court, ‘reasonably circumspect consumers’ would 
not necessarily assume there was a link between the size of the publicity and the product 
enlargement.
182
 Thus, as Weatherill notes: 
 
The Court’s formulation admits by implication that it is concerned to improve the freedom of choice of a 
particular group of consumers, the “reasonably circumspect”, who have no need of…regulatory mollycoddling. 
                                                          
177
 Case 261/81 Rau [1982] EU:C:1982:382; Case C-179/85 Pétillant de Raisin, n.176 
178
 Case C-120/78 ‘Cassis de Dijon’, n.25 
179
 Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] EU:C:1987:126 
180
 Case 261/81 Rau, n.177  
181
 N.176, 402  
182
 Case C-470/93 Mars, n.29, para.24 
 124 
 
The ruling insists on the relaxation of the grip of national laws [regarding] a consumer more gullible than the 
European Court is prepared to acknowledge as deserving protection.
183
 
 
Moreover, even ‘reasonably circumspect’ consumers are unlikely to read labels on generic 
products about which, due to their generic quality, consumers have established expectations. 
Thus, in Canadane Cheese,
184
 Greece argued that the majority of consumers would assume 
that feta cheese was made in Greece, from goats’ or sheep’s milk, using the processes 
associated with feta. They would be unlikely to read a label that revealed it was actually made 
in Denmark, from cow’s milk, using processes that gave it a different flavour and texture. The 
Court held that, by their very nature, generic products, such as feta, could not have strict 
compositional rules. And yet, it was these very compositional requirements that made feta 
generic.   
 
The Clinique judgment also demonstrates that the Court’s global approach to the ‘reasonably 
circumspect’ consumer will often neglect to consider the inevitable idiosyncrasies that remain 
within a region that is still culturally and linguistically diverse.
185
 Germany banned the sale of 
beauty products under the brand name ‘Clinique’ due to its similarities with the German word 
‘Klinik’, meaning hospital, believing that some consumers would assume that the beauty 
products had medicinal qualities. The Advocate General was willing to accept that ‘there may 
be specific differences in linguistic, cultural and social conditions which have the result that 
something which does not mislead consumers in one country may do so in another’.186 
However, the Court held that the measure could not be justified since the name ‘Clinique’ was 
used in other countries where it apparently did not mislead consumers.
187
 This somewhat 
misses the linguistic point that is the very basis of the German rule. As Weatherill remarks, 
the Court’s reasoning ‘invites the retort that one [would not expect consumers in other 
Member States to be misled] if the issue is peculiar to the German language’. Consequently, 
Weatherill finds the decision unsatisfactory by virtue of its oversimplification, its neglect of 
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the question of consumer confusion and of the differences between consumers across 
Europe.
188
  
 
There is evidence of the Court’s lack of appreciation for Member State diversity beyond the 
case-law on vulnerable consumers. In Laval, collective action could not be used by Swedish 
trade unions to force Latvian service providers to negotiate over pay. The Court considered 
that there was a lack of sufficiently precise and accessible rules in Sweden in this regard. This 
rendered it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for service providers to determine 
their obligations on minimum pay.
189
 Absent from this reasoning is the fact that this lack of 
precision is borne from Sweden’s idiosyncratic approach to minimum pay, whereby there can 
be no set rules, since minimum pay is negotiated at the workplace on the basis of the skills, 
experience and qualifications of the individual worker. Moreover, determination of the level 
of pay remains within the legislative competence of the Member States.
190
 It might seem, 
then, that it would be advisable for the CJEU to leave the final application of Union law to the 
national courts. Domestic judges are likely to be more cognisant of the factual implications of 
less restrictive alternatives. However, since this often poses complex questions of policy, 
inextricably linked to political choice, this might also be an unsuitable or extremely difficult 
task for the national judge. For instance, in Familiapress, the CJEU left it to the national court 
to determine whether Austria’s ban on prize draws in magazines could be justified by the need 
to protect the fundamental right to freedom of expression, in light of particular issues relating 
to the market dominance of certain publications in that State. As Weatherill remarks, ‘one 
might forgive a national judge from looking aghast at the political judgments thrust upon him 
or her by the Court’ here.191 
 
Viewing the question of necessity through a free movement lens can also reduce the 
effectiveness of those fundamental rights that intrinsically rely on their ability to restrict the 
exercise of free movement by others. It is on this issue that our analysis is now focused. 
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3.3.3. The inevitable contradiction between a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test and the 
inherently restrictive nature of certain fundamental rights 
 
In its Albany judgment, concerning a conflict between EU competition law and a Dutch 
provision, which made affiliation to a designated sectoral pension fund compulsory, the Court 
held that ‘certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements’.192 The 
CJEU accepted that the social policy objectives of such agreements would be seriously 
undermined if social partners were subject to Article 101(1) TFEU, when seeking jointly to 
adopt measures to improve working conditions.
193
 This led the defendant trade union in 
Viking, to argue, by analogy, that exercise of the fundamental right to strike must fall outwith 
the scope of Article 49 TFEU, on the freedom of establishment, since it was, by nature, 
restrictive of that freedom. The CJEU rejected this argument, declaring that ‘it cannot be 
considered that it is inherent in the very exercise of trade union rights and the right to take 
collective action that those fundamental freedoms will be prejudiced to a certain degree’.194 
Davies has questioned this stance, remarking that ‘since collective action is intended to 
impose costs on employers and thus ‘render less attractive’ a particular course of action, it 
is…difficult to think of examples of meaningful collective action in a cross-border context 
that would not be caught by [Articles 49 and 56 TFEU].
195
 
 
This supports the assertion in section two that the expansion in the material scope directly 
contributes to further interaction between free movement and fundamental rights. For present 
purposes, it also calls into question the suitability of a proportionality test in the context of the 
fundamental right to strike, and particularly one that seeks alternative approaches to 
protection that are less restrictive of free movement. The Court in Viking stated that it was for 
the national court to determine whether the trade union ‘did not have other means at its 
disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment’.196 However, since the 
purpose of collective action is to allow employees, who are generally in the weaker social 
position, to impede the activities of the employer and therefore influence decision-making, 
this approach seems intrinsically contradictory. Thus, for Novitz:  
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‘[i]t seems highly problematic that the legality of unions engaging in industrial action…depend[s] on 
whether…it would have been possible to achieve their objectives in a way which was, perhaps marginally, less 
restrictive of the free movement rights of, in many cases, the very enterprise with which they are in dispute’.197 
  
Moreover, since the trade union in Viking was exercising its fundamental right to strike in 
order to persuade the employer not to exercise free movement rights, any collective action 
less restrictive of free movement would inevitably reduce the effectiveness of exercising that 
fundamental right. As Davies points out, there is a risk that this will not be recognised in the 
Court’s ‘least restrictive alternative’ approach. For instance:  
 
…while a leafleting campaign might be less restrictive of the employer’s free movement rights, it is not a 
genuine alternative and should not be treated as such by the courts. However, there is a real danger here that the 
courts will identify alternatives without considering their effectiveness in the bargaining process…this could 
prove highly restrictive of the right to strike.
198  
 
More broadly, many programmatic fundamental social rights will contain some kind of 
restriction on economic activity in a cross-border context. For instance, the application of host 
State rules in relation to minimum pay, holiday entitlement, rules on part-time and fixed work, 
and bad-weather or temporary lay-off rules, all place restrictions on the cross-border provision 
of services in the area of posting. While the Posted Workers’ Directive provides a minimum 
level of protection in this regard, we have seen from Laval, Rüffert, and Commission v 
Luxembourg, that its very existence is also viewed by the Court as a determinant of what is 
‘necessary’ for worker protection, generally precluding more protective measures.199    
 
 
3.3.4. The ‘least restrictive alternative’ approach: limiting capacity to consider the 
practicalities of fundamental rights protection.  
 
The definition of necessity, by reference to what is least restrictive of free movement can, at 
times, limit the legal space for much-needed consideration of the practicalities of designing 
and implementing programmes for the protection of fundamental social rights. The case of 
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Libert provides an example of this concern.
200
 It will be recalled that, in that case, a Flemish 
Decree required individuals to demonstrate a ‘sufficient connection’ to certain target 
communes before they could purchase property or rent it on a long-term basis. Flanders had 
argued that the purpose of this measure was to tackle gentrification, a process by which less 
affluent population groups are excluded from the property market due to the arrival of 
financially stronger individuals coming from elsewhere. Although not cited by the Flemish 
government or the CJEU, this is directly relevant to the fundamental right to access to 
housing, recognised by Article 34 CFR. However, the Court found the Decree to be an 
unsuitable means of protecting access to housing for low-income individuals, since the 
measure did not exclusively protect such categories of person; other groups were also able to 
satisfy this criterion. Yet, the Court’s use of an ‘exclusivity’ criterion in Libert to ascertain the 
proportionality of national measures neglects to consider the many competing policy demands 
that a policymaker faces when deciding on the feasibility of programmes of social protection. 
For instance, national measures might incidentally assist people to whom they are not directly 
targeted but this might nevertheless by the best approach when budgetary, administrative, and 
other logistical burdens are taken into account.  
 
Having found that the ‘sufficient connection’ test was an inappropriate means of protecting 
access to housing, the Court proceeded to assess its necessity via its usual question of whether 
alternatives, less restrictive of free movement, were available. It concluded that there were 
since, for example, subsidies specifically designed for less affluent people could meet 
Flanders’ purported objective.201 It is clear that subsidy provision would address well the 
programmatic aim of enabling access to housing and that such an approach would indeed be 
less restrictive of free movement. However, it is less clear whether this alternative is feasible 
in real terms. The positive obligations this would impose on Flanders, in the form of monetary 
assistance, are plainly qualitatively different from the negative implementation of this 
objective, through the ‘sufficient connection’ test. In short, the latter method is likely to cost 
less. Indeed, if Flanders cannot afford to offer such a subsidy, it might decide that, in light of 
its current violation of EU law, it has no option but to scrap attempts to tackle gentrification 
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altogether. Indeed, the European Parliament has explicitly recognised the impact of the 
current economic crisis on Member States’ abilities to provide such schemes.202   
 
Moreover, budgetary issues are broader than the question of whether the Member State will 
fund, for instance, a subsidy scheme for access to housing, since resources to fund such a 
programme will have to be diverted from elsewhere. This will potentially impact on other, 
previously unconnected, systems of social protection. We saw the risk of this, for instance, in 
the Watts case.
203
 The requirement that a nationalised health service offers a previously alien 
system of reimbursement for medical services obtained from other providers, inevitably 
necessitates the diversion of resources from elsewhere, not to mention that it imposes a new 
administrative burden.    
 
Indeed, we can ask if any court is the appropriate locus for such policy choices. As Nic 
Shuibhne and Maci have argued: 
 
Must States have their entire budgets scrutinised so that a court can establish that less restrictive measures for 
one policy area may be conceived but may nevertheless distort the balance of the social security system 
overall… Even if such a level of scrutiny were remotely feasible in practical terms, it is neither in the functions 
nor the capacity of courts to execute it…the Court of Justice has opened a precarious avenue of review in the 
suggestion that it, or any court, can work out the financial “balance” of an entire national budget by reflecting on 
whether one policy choice could have been implemented less restrictively.
204
 
 
The impact of the current approach to necessity on the Court’s capacity to contemplate the 
feasibility of its suggested alternatives can also be viewed outside programmatic systems of 
social protection. LIBRO, it will be recalled from section two, involved an Austrian ban on the 
sale of imported books below the recommended retail price in the country of origin. This was 
due to the need to maintain media diversity in a domestic market where the dominance of 
certain publications made the publishing of important but less economically attractive works 
difficult. For the Court, this goal could be met by the less restrictive means of permitting 
foreign publishers to set RRPs exclusively for the Austrian market, which would take into 
account the specificities of that market. However, the Court made no assessment of the 
likelihood of economic actors taking steps to limit their commercial success.    
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This subsection has provided evidence of the existence and effects of an increasing evidential 
gap between the first and second phases of the Court’s two-stage approach, even in the 
fundamental rights context. The broad definition of a breach of free movement is matched by 
a generally shallow evidential burden, making it increasingly possible for fundamental rights 
to constitute prima facie breaches of free movement. By contrast, Member States are often 
required to demonstrate the existence of a ‘serious threat’ to fundamental rights, evidenced 
through statistical evidence. Even then, the Court has been known to substitute Member State 
approaches for its own methods of safeguarding fundamental rights, which might, in fact, 
offer lower standards of protection. Further, the breach/justification dichotomy encourages an 
assessment of whether domestic fundamental rights standards are necessary by reference to 
whether there are alternatives available that are less restrictive of free movement. This can 
reduce the effectiveness of fundamental rights measures in real terms. This is visible, for 
instance, in the case-law in which focus on labelling as a less restrictive means of protecting 
consumers has neglected the needs of the ‘real’ as opposed to ‘reasonably circumspect’ 
consumer. Similarly, the focus on finding measures less restrictive of free movement can 
underestimate idiosyncratic fundamental rights needs, caused, for instance by the peculiarities 
of language. It can also lead to inevitable contradiction with rights, such as the fundamental 
right to strike, which are inherently restrictive of free movement when they are exercised in 
the cross-border context. Finally, Court-proposed ‘less restrictive alternatives’ do not always 
adequately consider the practicalities, whether logistical, financial or otherwise, of providing 
programmatic fundamental social rights or whether alternatives will be adopted by economic 
actors in practice.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the impact of the expansion in the material and personal scope of 
the free movement provisions on the protection of fundamental rights. It has demonstrated 
that the evolution of a breach of free movement, from distinctly applicable measures to a 
market access test and to positive free movement obligations, has resulted in a significant 
increase in the volume of interactions between free movement and fundamental rights. The 
widening of the personal scope of the free movement provisions has also made a direct 
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contribution to the classification of a larger quantity of fundamental rights endeavours as 
breaches of free movement.  
 
Given the fundamental role that free movement plays in the achievement of a common 
market, the central aim of the EEC Treaty, it is unsurprising that the Court opted for an 
approach, to adjudicating conflict between free movement and protectionist domestic policy, 
that prioritised the former over the latter. However, in light of the qualitatively different 
nature of indistinctly applicable measures, and rules restricting market access, we might have 
expected a change of methodology when free movement’s scope was broadened. In fact, 
although the Court has recognised this in a substantive sense, through the introduction of the 
mandatory requirements, no alteration has been made to the structure of the adjudicative 
framework. Non-discriminatory Member State rules, and individual activity, are subjected to 
the same strict proportionality test as is imposed on directly discriminatory measures. 
Moreover, while the procedural burden at the justification stage had been retained, the 
broadening of the notion of breach has necessarily expanded the evidentiary options at the 
breach stage, widening the evidentiary gap between breach and justification. Further, the 
Court asserts that a de minimis test does not operate at the breach stage, and certainly the 
proportionality of the free movement provisions in relation to its impact upon other areas of 
law and policy is not systematically assessed. By contrast, activity that is in breach of free 
movement must increasingly pass a ‘seriousness’ standard or be supported by statistical 
evidence. Even then, the Court will often substitute Member State methods of fundamental 
rights protection for its own. The focus on finding alternative means of safeguarding 
fundamental rights that are less restrictive of free movement has resulted in an ‘impact trio’ in 
this regard. Specifically, the alternatives proposed by the Court can fail to consider the 
specificities of individual Member States’ fundamental rights’ needs, the inherently restrictive 
nature of certain fundamental rights, and the practical considerations that are unavoidably at 
the heart of fundamental rights policy-making.  
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Chapter Three 
 
THE DIRECT EFFECT OF THE FREE MOVEMENT PROVISIONS: CEMENTING 
STRUCTURAL BIAS AND JEOPARDISING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS? 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter explores both the direct and indirect contributions that the identification of the 
direct effect of the free movement provisions has made to the structural prioritisation of free 
movement over fundamental rights. In section two, the chapter will argue, first, that in order 
to meet the Van Gend criteria for direct effect, it has been necessary to view the free 
movement provisions as ‘unconditional’ and ‘precise’. This reinforces and legitimises the use 
of a two-stage breach/justification model that prioritises free movement over conflicting 
activity. The presentation of the free movement provisions as unconditional, by its nature, 
invites the treatment of conflicting law, policy and activity as derogations from free 
movement, to be interpreted strictly. Similarly, if the free movement provisions are precise, 
the legal space for taking a more holistic approach to the definition of the market freedoms, at 
the breach stage, that would incorporate wider objectives, becomes limited. Since the direct 
effect of the free movement provisions allows individuals to invoke them directly before their 
national courts, the doctrine also introduces or strengthens the use of rights language in 
relation to free movement. This lends further support to an architectural preference for free 
movement, as it becomes something akin to a fundamental right.
1
  
 
Section three presents the principles of primacy and effective judicial protection as twin 
channels for realising the structural bias cemented by direct effect. Specifically, where 
individuals invoke directly effective free movement rights before the national courts, primacy 
requires those judicial bodies to set aside conflicting domestic measures. The need for 
effective judicial protection obliges national courts to do so immediately. Viewed in the 
wider, historical context of building an internal market, the introduction of direct effect, 
primacy and the principle of effective judicial protection makes logical and significant 
contributions to economic integration. Nevertheless, by solidifying, and providing outputs for, 
                                                          
1
 Ch.1, s.3.2.2 discusses the architectural preference for Convention rights over competing public interests 
within the structure of the ECHR.  
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a structural preference for free movement, these principles increased the latent risk that free 
movement would be prioritised over fundamental rights should these norms interact. As we 
saw in chapter two, free movement has, in fact, expanded in a way that brings it into more 
frequent contract with fundamental rights. In this way, these doctrines have indirectly 
intensified the subjugation of fundamental rights to the free movement provisions. This also 
illustrates that the constitutional developments discussed in each chapter cannot be viewed in 
isolation, or in a linear fashion, but must instead be seen as interconnected, interacting 
components in the historical and organic formation of architectural imbalance.  
 
Nevertheless, section four will argue that direct effect makes a distinct contribution to this 
phenomenon in two ways. First, the evolution of the doctrine from vertical to horizontal direct 
effect also increases the frequency of conflict between free movement and fundamental rights. 
Second, it additionally alters the nature of the interface, requiring private parties, in certain 
circumstances, to rely on justifications designed primarily for Member State actors, which can 
be ill-suited for claims based on the private exercise of fundamental rights.            
 
 
2. Recognising the direct effect of the free movement provisions: relaxing Van Gend, 
conferring rights, and exacerbating structural bias  
 
This section is concerned with the impact that the conferral of direct effect on the free 
movement provisions has had on the structural relationship between free movement and 
fundamental rights. It argues, first, that the interpretation of the free movement provisions as 
meeting the Van Gend criteria of ‘unconditionality’ and ‘precision’ reinforces an architectural 
framework that favours free movement over competing activity. It postulates, second, that 
since direct effect allows individuals to invoke the free movement provisions directly before 
the courts, it inevitably solidifies their rights status. This further legitimises an adjudicative 
model that is tilted towards free movement, when it conflicts with other law and policy.  
 
 
2.1. The free movement provisions as ‘unconditional’ and ‘precise’: the 
fundamental rights side-effects of loosening the Van Gend criteria 
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When the CJEU declared, in its seminal Van Gend judgment, that certain provisions of Union 
law had direct effect within domestic legal orders, thereby laying down rights that national 
courts must protect, it nevertheless attached conditions to this occurrence. Specifically, 
measures had to be clear and unconditional, imposing negative rather than positive 
obligations, and requiring no legislative intervention on the part of the States.
2
 These criteria, 
and the relative peculiarity of the relevant provision in the case itself in meeting them,
3
 meant 
that Van Gend did not cause quite the storm that we might expect with hindsight.
4
  
 
However, the requirements of ‘unconditionality’ and ‘precision’ have subsequently been quite 
broadly interpreted, allowing a greater range of Union law to enjoy direct effect. This includes 
the Treaty’s free movement provisions on goods, services/establishment, persons, and 
capital.
5
 This has certainly facilitated the market freedoms in their foundational task of 
creating an internal market as they can be directly enforced by national courts, while their 
presentation as unconditional and precise underscores their normative significance. 
Nonetheless, a side-effect of this historical development is the exacerbation of structural 
weakness in terms of fundamental rights protection. It is this phenomenon with which this 
subsection is concerned.
6
    
 
 
2.1.1.  The ‘unconditional’ criterion redefined   
 
In light of the fact that Articles 34, 45, 49, 56 and 63 TFEU, providing for the free movement 
of goods, workers, establishment, services, and capital respectively, are followed by 
                                                          
2
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] EU:C:1963:1, p.13 
3
 Now Art.30 TFEU 
4
 See B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in G. de Búrca, P. Craig (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law, (2
nd
 edition, OUP, 2011), 323, 329; D. Chalmers et al, European Union Law: Cases and 
Materials), (2
nd
 edition, Cambridge, 2010) 269   
5
 Case 13/68 Salgoil [1968] EU:C:1968:54 (goods); Case 41/74 van Duyn v Home Office [1974] EU:C:1974:133 
(workers); Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] EU:C:1974:68 (establishment); Case 48/75 Royer [1976] 
EU:C:1976:57 (workers, establishment, and services); Joined Case C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Sanz de 
Lera a.o. [1995] EU:C:1995:451 (capital).   
6
 Although related to state liability, and not direct effect, the Van Gend criterion that provisions of Union law 
impose ‘negative’ as opposed to ‘positive’ obligations has arguably been partially circumvented by the 
introduction of State liability for failure to implement Union law in Case C-6/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy 
[1991] EU:C:1991:428. In Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] EU:C:2003:333 this left a Member State open to 
an action for State liability for failing to take positive steps to secure the free movement of goods against 
restrictions imposed by the exercise of the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and association. 
However, this development relates more closely to the expansion in the scope of the free movement provisions 
which was already discussed in ch.2, s.2.1.4. 
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provisions permitting their limitation, they might have been interpreted as failing to meet the 
Van Gend requirement of ‘unconditionality’ for the identification of direct effect. For instance 
Article 52(1) TFEU, relating to establishment and services,
7
 stipulates that: 
 
The provisions of this Chapter…shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public 
security, or public health.  
 
Thus, the prohibition of obstacles to the freedoms of establishment and services could be 
viewed as conditional on there not being reasons of public policy, public security, or public 
health, requiring such restrictions. Similar arguments can be made in relation to Articles 34 
and 36, Articles 45 and 45(3); and Articles 63 and 65(1)(b) TFEU.  
 
And yet, each market freedom has been recognised as having some degree of direct effect.
8
 
Although this seemingly represents a relaxation of the Van Gend criteria, the free movement 
provisions have, nevertheless, been interpreted as far as possible in line with the 
‘unconditional’ requirement. In Salgoil, in which Article 34 TFEU was declared directly 
effective, the Court did not interpret Article 36 as imposing conditions on the operation of 
Article 34, but rather as dealing ‘with exceptional cases which are clearly defined and which 
do not lend themselves to wide interpretation [emphasis added].’9 Similarly, in Royer,10 the 
CJEU stated that Articles 45(3) and 52(1) were not to be viewed as a condition precedent to 
the free movement of workers, establishment or services, but as merely providing the 
possibility, in individual cases and where there is sufficient justification, of imposing 
restrictions upon those freedoms.
11
 As Craig remarks, in relation to Salgoil, the Court has 
made clear that it will read the free movement chapters as a whole, with the consequence that 
if the requisite conditions for direct effect are met by their main articles, this will not be 
lightly jeopardised by the existence of provisions such as Article 36. For Craig, the decision in 
Salgoil demonstrated: 
 
 …the determination of the [CJEU] that the peremptory force of direct effect was not to be weakened by 
enabling States to draw on Treaty articles which contained discretion to, for example, prohibit import of goods 
                                                          
7
 Application to services via Art.62 TFEU 
8
 N.5 
9
 Case 13/68 Salgoil, n.5, p.463 
10
 Case 48/75 Royer, n.5, para.29 
11
 For a similar approach to capital, see Case C-387/11 Commission v Belgium [2012] EU:C:2012:670, para.43  
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on grounds of public policy or public health… [These] would only be deemed to operate in carefully defined 
circumstances, the ambit of which would be controlled by [the Court] if and when necessary.
12
  
 
The interpretation of the free movement provisions as sufficiently unconditional to have direct 
effect is clearly an advantage from the perspective of economic integration. Not only is cross-
border movement facilitated by private enforcement in domestic courts, but the status of the 
free movement provisions as ‘unconditional’ introduces a presumption that they should be 
prioritised in any conflict with opposing law or policy. Thus, Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1) and 
65(1) are not conceptualised as limitations on, or conditions for, the exercise of free 
movement, but as ‘derogations’, operating in ‘exceptional circumstances’.13 These ‘do not 
lend themselves to wide interpretation’14 and will be defined by the Court. Crucially, this 
interpretation of the Treaty freedoms invites the use of an adjudicative model for addressing 
tensions between free movement and competing activity that structurally favours the former. 
Accordingly, the two-stage breach/justification model, which requires conflicting law and 
policy to justify itself against a prima facie unlawful restriction on free movement, is 
legitimised and reinforced by free movement’s direct effect. As part of this, a strict 
proportionality test, which assesses whether obstacles imposed on the market freedoms are 
suitable and necessary, by reference to what would be least restrictive of free movement, finds 
renewed support.       
 
However, both Salgoil and Royer preceded the Court’s decision in Cassis de Dijon.15 As 
chapter two demonstrated, this judgment brought the free movement provisions into contact 
with a wider range of legitimate societal aims with oblique, rather than direct, consequences 
for the operation of the internal market. Consequently, Cassis also introduced the non-
exhaustive mandatory requirements, which could be said to call into question the existence of 
restrictions on free movement as an ‘exceptional circumstance’. Critically, as chapter two 
demonstrated, free movement has, over time, come into increased contact with fundamental 
rights. Although accepted as permissible justifications for restrictions of free movement,
16
 
these do not feature in the derogating provisions. Thus, contrary to the Court’s reasoning in 
Salgoil, it seems that, for instance, Article 34 TFEU cannot necessarily be viewed as 
                                                          
12
 P. Craig, ‘Once Upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalisation of EEC Law’, (1992) 12(4) 
OJLS 453, 463 
13
 Case13/68, Salgoil, n.5 
14
 Ibid 
15
 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] EU:C:1979:42 
16
 Case 112/00 Schmidberger, n.6; Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] EU:C:2004:614 
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‘unconditional’ by virtue of the fact that derogations from them are ‘clearly defined’. Yet, as 
free movement has expanded into new areas of activity, we see a hangover of its presentation 
as ‘unconditional’ and of competing law and policy as ‘derogations’ to be ‘strictly defined’.17 
This includes the protection of fundamental rights, which are slotted into the justification 
stage of a two-stage model, legitimised by the notion of unconditionality that the conferral of 
direct effect creates.      
 
For instance, in Schmidberger, although the Court accepts the exercise of the fundamental 
rights to freedom of expression and association as permissible restrictions of the free 
movement of goods, the indirect influence of free movement’s historical presentation as 
‘unconditional’ is implicit in the CJEU’s declaration that: 
 
[T]he protection of [fundamental] rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the 
obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty [emphasis 
added]’.18 
 
Respect for fundamental rights is not viewed as a condition for the exercise of free movement. 
After all, Article 34 TFEU is unconditional. Instead, fundamental rights constitute a possible 
derogation from that provision, so long as they meet the requirements of proportionality.
19
 
The notion that as derogations from free movement, justifications ‘do not lend themselves to 
wide interpretation’ was explicitly transplanted into the fundamental rights context in Omega. 
Here, the Court, having decided that the fundamental right to human dignity fell within the 
public policy derogation, stated that: 
 
[T]he concept of ‘public policy’ in the Community context, particularly as justification for a derogation from the 
fundamental principle of the freedom to provide services, must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be 
determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the Community institutions.
20
 
 
This coheres with Craig’s interpretation of Salgoil that derogations operate in carefully 
defined circumstances, set by the Court itself.
21
 Although the CJEU elected to offer the 
                                                          
17
 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] EU:C:2010:806, para.86; Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain [2006] 
EU:C:2006:74, para.45 
18
 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, n.6, para.74 
19
 Para.78 and 82-94 
20
 Case C-36/02 Omega, n.16, para.30; see also Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] 
EU:C:2008:350, para.30 
21
 Craig, n.12 
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Member State a wide margin of discretion in Omega itself, the unconditionality of free 
movement supports the CJEU’s claim that this decision lies within its jurisdiction. More 
broadly, the presentation of fundamental rights as ‘justifications in principle’ for derogating 
from the ‘fundamental principle’ of free movement inherently supports the employment of a 
two-stage breach/justification methodology for adjudicating tensions between free movement 
and fundamental rights. Similarly, the application of a proportionality test, not faced by free 
movement, to the exercise of fundamental rights is intrinsic to their status as justifications ‘in 
principle’ that must nevertheless be interpreted ‘strictly’. This is reflected in the focus of the 
proportionality analysis on whether measures less restrictive of free movement are available. 
Chapter two demonstrated that the maintenance of the breach/justification framework in 
relation to non-discriminatory restrictions of free movement was encouraged by the Court’s 
language of ‘mandatory’ ‘overriding’ or ‘imperative’ requirements. The analysis now 
suggests that this language might, itself, reflect a historical hangover from the presentation of 
the free movement provisions as ‘unconditional’, to satisfy the Van Gend criteria, and the 
consequent need to interpret derogations strictly. Accordingly, this provides a richer, multi-
faceted explanation for the findings, in chapter two, that fundamental rights face significant 
justificatory hurdles not imposed on free movement.  
 
For instance, in Viking, exercise of the fundamental right to strike for the purposes of worker 
protection could only be justified if employees’ jobs were ‘jeopardised or under serious 
threat’.22 Even then, it was necessary to consider whether other means less restrictive of free 
movement were exhausted before strike action was initiated. In other words, a strict approach 
to justifying restrictions on free movement required the trade unions not only to pursue a 
tightly defined aim when exercising their right to strike, but also to justify the degree of action 
taken.
23
 In Laval and Rüffert, the core nucleus of the Posted Workers’ Directive,24 containing 
the terms and conditions that Member States (or trade unions via collective agreements) must 
impose on foreign undertakings posting workers to their territory, was found to impose a 
ceiling of worker protection rather than a floor.
25
 Thus, the core nucleus represented the 
extent to which industrial action, in situations of posting, would be ‘necessary’ for the 
protection of workers. Significantly, in the latter case, the Court explicitly stated that this 
                                                          
22
 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] EU:C:2007:772 para.81 
23
 See also Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] EU:C:2008:85, para.42; Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] 
EU:C:1997:325, para.19 
24
 Art.3(1)(a)-(g) Directive 96/71/EC  of the European Parliament and Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provisions of services (OJ 1997 L18/1) 
25
 Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] EU:C:2007:809; Case C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] EU:C:2008:189 
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interpretation was confirmed by the fact that the PWD sought to bring about the freedom to 
provide services as a ‘fundamental principle guaranteed by the Treaty’.26 In other words, the 
PWD is viewed as a facilitating instrument of, but also, simultaneously, a derogation from, 
the fundamental and unconditional status of Article 56. This necessitates a strict approach to 
its interpretation. Although the Court acknowledged, in Commission v Luxembourg, that 
Article 3(10) PWD allowed for additional terms and conditions to be applied for reasons of 
public policy, the CJEU reiterated that as a derogation from the fundamental principle of 
freedom to provide services, that provision must be interpreted ‘strictly’.27 It will be recalled, 
from chapter two, that Luxembourg was required to provide evidence of a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’.28          
 
This judicial control over, and scrutiny of, Member State derogations from free movement 
even in the fundamental rights situation of worker protection
29
 and the applicability of settled 
collective agreements,
30
 arguably has further foundations in the criteria for direct effect. In 
Van Duyn, although the CJEU accepted that Article 45(3) TFEU placed limitations on the free 
movement of workers, this did not preclude Article 45 TFEU from meeting the Van Gend 
criteria.
31
 Since those limitations were, themselves, ‘subject to judicial control’ Article 45 was 
capable of conferring rights upon individuals, which the national courts must protect.
32
 In this 
way, ‘judicial control’ is presented as a means of reducing the effect of potential derogations 
on the unconditionality of free movement. The courts are implicitly charged with constraining 
the operation of derogations against the prioritised market freedoms. Logical in the context of 
tackling potentially protectionist, directly discriminatory Member State law and policy, this 
approach nevertheless becomes potentially detrimental, when carried over into the 
adjudication of conflict between free movement and fundamental rights. It tacitly tasks courts 
with controlling or restricting fundamental rights that place limits on free movement. Indeed, 
Commission v Luxembourg arguably provides one example of the hangover of ‘judicial 
control’ in this context. More generally, this judicial control manifests in the subjection of 
fundamental rights protection to proportionality assessment at the justification phase of the 
                                                          
26
 Para.36 
27
 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg, n.20, para.50 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Art.31 CFR 
30
 Art.28 CFR 
31
 Case 41/74 van Duyn, n.5. See, in the context of capital, Case C-163/94 Sanz de Lera, n.5, para.43 
32
 Para.7 
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two-stage model. Thus, for instance, in the context of the fundamental right to health,
33
 we 
can see the legacy of ‘judicial control’ in the Court’s rigorous assessment, in Watts, of 
whether the operation of the UK’s National Health Service – which, as a nationalised system, 
did not have a reimbursement mechanism for medical treatment received abroad - imposed 
justifiable restrictions on Article 56 TFEU.
34
 Similarly, it is visible in the Court’s requirement 
in Commission v Austria, that that Member State provide statistical evidence of the effects of 
free movement on what can be viewed as Austria’s programmatic implementation of the 
fundamental right to education.
35
 More broadly, the Court’s decision to apply its usual one-
sided proportionality assessment in fundamental rights cases;
36
 to interpret fundamental rights 
strictly;
37
 to examine whether methods of protecting fundamental rights that are less 
restrictive of free movement are available;
38
 and, more recently, to assess whether 
fundamental rights policy exclusively protects targeted beneficiaries,
39
 can all be said to 
reflect an assumption of ‘judicial control’.         
 
 
2.1.2. The direct effect of programmatic provisions  
 
Direct effect was bestowed upon Article 30 TFEU in Van Gend inter alia because it required 
no further legislative intervention by the Member States. Article 52 EEC stipulated that 
‘…restrictions on the freedom of establishment…shall be abolished by progressive stages in 
the course of the transitional period [emphasis added]’. Article 59 EEC approached the free 
provision of services in a similar manner. Accordingly, it was argued in Reyners that Article 
49 TFEU did not enjoy direct effect because it was ‘...only the expression of a simple 
principle, the implementation of which is necessarily subject to a set of complementary 
provisions both Community and national, provided for by Articles 54 and 57 [EEC]’.40 The 
Court disagreed. It held that Article 49 imposed an obligation to achieve a precise result – the 
                                                          
33
 Art.35 CFR 
34
 Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] EU:C:2006:325, para.116: a requirement of prior authorisation must ‘be based on 
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 Case C-36/02 Omega, n.16; also Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien, n.23; Case C-368/95 Familiapress, n.23 
37
 Case C-36/02 Omega, n.16 
38
 Case C-438/05 Viking, n.22; Joined Cases C-197/11 and C-203/11 Libert [2013] EU:C:2013:288. For full 
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 Joined Cases C-197/11 and C-203/11 Libert, ibid, para.55 
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 Case 2/74 Reyners, n.5, para.5  
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freedom of establishment – which would be facilitated by, but was not dependent on, 
secondary Union legislation. After the transitional period, secondary legislation was 
superfluous since the freedom of establishment was sanctioned by the Treaty itself, with 
direct effect.
41
 In Royer, which also concerned the freedom of establishment, as well as the 
free movement of workers and services, the Court referred to secondary legislation as merely 
providing ‘closer articulation’ of the directly effective rights bestowed upon individuals by 
Articles 49, 45, and 56 TFEU.
42
  
 
Despite the Court’s assertion that comprehension of the content of the market freedoms is 
assisted by, but not reliant on, secondary legislation, it is clear that the ‘sufficiently precise’ 
criterion has been relaxed here.
43
 As Craig argues, Articles 49 and 56 seem to ‘contemplate 
expressly further action by the legislative organs of the [Union] and by the Member States in 
order to effectuate the social and economic aims of this part of the Treaty.’ The provisions 
acknowledge that ‘the very regime of freedom of establishment involves a complex array of 
legislative norms in order that these aims can be achieved.’44 When placed in its historical 
context, the Reyners judgment can, however, be understood as a response to a period of 
inertia from the Union’s political institutions in exercising their ‘decisional 
supranationalism’.45 The Member States had not agreed upon legislative programmes for 
achieving an internal market within the time set by the Treaty. Craig postulates that the direct 
effect status of Article 49 operated as a warning to the Member States that ‘normative 
supranationalism’,46 in the guise of direct effect, could act as a surrogate for the ordinary 
legislative process, in order to secure the internal market, should the States continue to be 
tardy to preserve their own interests.
47
   
 
Nevertheless, this historical explanation does not change the fact that the provisions on the 
freedoms of establishment and services, in particular, foresaw the creation of a legislative 
                                                          
41
 Paras.26 and 30. On goods see Case 13/68 Salgoil, n.5, p.460, discussing Art.31 EEC.   
42
 Case 48/75 Royer, n.5, para.23; see also Case 33/74 van Binsbergen [1974] EU:C:1974:131, para.26 
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 See also Craig, n.12, 464 
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 See J. Weiler, ‘The Dual Character of Supranationalism’, (1981) 1 YBEL 267, and ‘The Transformation of 
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46
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 N.12, 466-467; c.f. Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] EU:C:1999:439 in which the CJEU held that Article 7a 
EC could not be interpreted as requiring Member States to abolish passport checks at the border at the end of the 
transitional period since this required the harmonisation of laws governing external borders, including rules on 
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framework for managing the relationships between the important, and overlapping, areas of 
social and economic policy involved in securing these market freedoms. Accordingly, the 
direct effect status of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU changes the dynamic between the freedoms of 
establishment and services and other legitimate goals. Whereas the very definition of a breach 
of Articles 49 and 56 might originally have incorporated these other aims, ‘the Court, through 
direct effect…makes clear that the other provisions of the chapter [which acknowledged some 
of these other goals]
48
 are, in relative terms, of secondary importance’.49 This reinforces the 
structural favouring of free movement when it conflicts with other rules. Since the free 
movement provisions are precisely defined, competing law and policy cannot constitute 
definitional components of the market freedoms. Instead, they are examined as derogations 
and pushed to the justification phase of the two-stage process. As the free movement 
provisions are also ‘unconditional’, we have seen that these derogations must be strictly 
defined.   
 
The cases of Viking and Laval
50
 offer clear examples of the complex interactions between 
different areas of law and policy that are an inevitable consequence of achieving the freedoms 
of establishment and services. Significantly, they also illustrate the consequent impact on 
fundamental rights when these inevitable considerations are shunted to the justification stage 
by the presentation of the free movement provisions as ‘precise’. Thus, in Viking, the freedom 
of Viking Line to establish/register its ship in Estonia led to the question of whether it should 
be able to apply labour rules, arising from Estonian collective agreements, to a ship originally 
sailing under the Finnish flag. This has direct fundamental rights consequences due to the 
general lowering of worker terms and conditions that this would engender.
51
 Further, the 
presentation of proposed strike action to prevent the re-flagging, as a restriction of Article 49 
TFEU, also triggers the fundamental right to collective action, recognised by Article 28 CFR. 
Despite these questions, and the acknowledgement that regulation of the right to strike 
remained within the legislative competence of the Member States, the Court noted that 
freedom of establishment was one of the ‘fundamental principles’ of Union law that had been 
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 E.g. Art.54 EEC, which required the Member States to design a ‘general programme’ for the abolition of 
restrictions on establishment, and Art.57 EEC, which obliged the Member States to issue directives on mutual 
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 Craig, n.12, 467 
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 Case C-438/05 Viking, n.22; Case C-341/05 Laval, n.25 
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‘directly applicable since the end of the transitional period’.52 Since the aim of Article 49 
TFEU is clear: attaining freedom of establishment, it is irrelevant that the nuances of its 
achievement - such as how to match-up equivalent qualifications
53
 or cater for idiosyncrasies 
in healthcare models,
54
 or, in this case, address disparities in terms and conditions of 
employment - have not always been addressed. Accordingly, in Viking, a prima facie breach 
of Article 49 is instead established simply by reference to the fact the strike action, in order to 
secure the maintenance of Finnish employment conditions after re-flagging, would make 
exercise of the freedom of establishment less attractive to Viking Line. The ‘public interest’ in 
worker protection can only be considered as part of the trade unions’ defence in exercising 
their right to strike, as opposed to being incorporated into an holistic appraisal of the 
programmatic complexities of cross-border establishment.
55
 Consequently, despite the CJEU 
acknowledging that the Union has ‘not only an economic but also a social purpose’ against 
which the Treaty freedoms must be balanced,
56
 a true balancing of the competing goals does 
not occur. While exercise of the ‘precisely’ defined freedom of establishment must merely be 
rendered ‘less attractive’, the objective of worker protection must overcome the 
proportionality questions of ‘suitability’ and ‘necessity’, assessed by reference to whether 
there are means of protecting employees that are less restrictive of free movement’.57   
 
Similarly, in Laval, the CJEU explicitly accepted that the questions of labour law, which are 
triggered by the posting of workers from one Member State to another, had not been answered 
by harmonisation at EU-level. It stated that, ‘since the purpose of [the PWD] is not to 
harmonise systems for establishing the terms and conditions of employment in the Member 
States, the latter are free to choose a system at the national level, which is not expressly 
mentioned among those provided for in that directive’.58 However, critically, the Court added 
that this was ‘provided that it does not hinder the provision of services between the Member 
States’.59 Thus, the social objectives that inevitably interact with the cross-border provision of 
services did not form part of the definitional framework of Article 56 TFEU. Instead, they 
were to be considered as part of the justification for restrictions on the precise, but rather 
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simplified, goal of abolishing restrictions to intra-European service provision, which had 
allowed Article 56 to enjoy direct effect at the end of the transitional period.
60
 Consequently, 
despite the Court once again acknowledging the Union’s social, as well as economic, 
purpose,
61
 an obstacle to the free movement of services was found by reference to the fact that 
the imposition of terms and conditions of employment, going above and beyond the content of 
the PWD, made it ‘less attractive’ to provide services across EU borders. By contrast, the 
exercise of trade union collective action and the aim of worker protection were assessed in 
accordance with what was least restrictive of the precise goal of intra-EU service provision. 
The PWD was found generally to indicate the maximum level of worker protection necessary 
in this regard and therefore also to specify the extent to which collective action would be 
justified. On the issue of minimum pay, the CJEU held that the Swedish mechanism for 
determining minimum rates – which consisted of case-by-case negotiation at the worksite 
according to the qualifications and experience of the individual worker - was in breach of 
Article 56 TFEU because it formed ‘part of a national context characterised by a lack of 
provisions, of any kind, that are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do render it 
impossible or excessively difficult…for such an undertaking to determine the obligations with 
which it is required to comply…’.62 On the one hand, this is probably true and, therefore, 
Article 56 does reflect, to some extent, the precise goal of removing barriers to the free 
provision of services, while its direct effect contributes to tackling this obstacle. On the other 
hand, this simplified approach to defining the content of Article 56 deals only superficially 
with the question of pay, which is unavoidably triggered by the temporary posting of workers 
across borders. The Court’s reasoning does not make allowance for the lack of harmonisation 
in this area at Union-level or, indeed, for the fact that the Treaty leaves the issue of pay 
explicitly to the Member States.
63
 The Court’s focus is on the undermining of the Member 
State’s precise obligation not to restrict the freedom of services. A corresponding approach 
can be seen in the Rüffert and Commission v Luxembourg judgments, whereby national rules, 
determining minimum rates of pay according to local collective agreements and attaching a 
wage index to salaries respectively, were found to impose restrictions on Article 56 TFEU.
64
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Even if the Court were to take these issues into account in its characterisation of Article 56, 
the consequence of its recognition of the direct effect on the market freedoms is that the 
construction of that provision’s definitional framework is transferred from the legislature to 
the judiciary. The visual metaphor used by Craig in relation to Article 49 TFEU is equally 
applicable here:  
 
[I]magine that the totality of the relevant rules on freedom of establishment is represented by a chess board. 
Article [49], the core principle of the area, is the boundary of the board, while the particular squares thereof 
represent the detailed rules which should be enacted by the [political institutions]. [Where legislation is missing, 
the principle of direct effect means that] the ECJ will provide an answer…and will in that sense fill the 
appropriate square… It is, in reality, assuming a role which the Treaty primarily accords to other organs.65     
 
As well as reigniting the existing issue of the appropriateness of judicial law-making, direct 
effect consequently introduces practical questions about the Court’s ability to ‘fill in the 
blanks’ when its examination of fundamental rights is structurally shaped by the goal of free 
movement, and is channelled through a breach/justification framework. Thus in Libert, the 
Court presented subsidies for purchase as a more proportionate method of securing access to 
housing for low-income individuals/families on the basis that this was less restrictive of free 
movement than Member State rules requiring a ‘sufficient connection’ between a potential 
transferee and certain geographical areas.
66
 However, the feasibility of this alternative, 
devised by reference to the needs of abolishing restrictions to free movement, can be 
questioned. For instance, the European Parliament has subsequently remarked upon the 
decline in such subsidies for securing the fundamental right to housing
67
 as a result of the 
economic crisis.
68
 It is the direct effect of free movement that permits this Europeanisation 
through the judicial back-door of areas of fundamental social rights that the Treaty 
intentionally leaves to the Member States. Since the Van Gend requirement of precision has 
simplified free movement goals, social policy is reconceptualised as a breach of free 
movement and the Court suggests fundamentally different approaches, which might not be 
practicable on the ground. In other words, the presentation of, for instance, Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU, as precise by virtue of the goal of abolishing restrictions on establishment and 
services, presents these freedoms as areas of Union policy that are apparently discrete from 
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social concerns, when, in reality, they frequently, and unavoidably, overlap. Interestingly, this 
can be contrasted with the introduction of fundamental rights as a theme cutting across the 
economic, social and environmental impact assessments that form part of the formation of 
Union legislation. The purpose of an impact assessment, from a fundamental rights 
perspective, is ‘to provide the Commission, right from the start of the drafting process, with a 
complete picture of the various impacts which the process can have on individuals and groups 
whose rights may be involved, depending on the options envisaged’.69 The one-sided 
proportionality assessment of the impact of the exercise of fundamental rights on the market 
freedoms, at the justification phase of the Court’s two-stage methodology, does not 
incorporate such an approach within the judicial sphere.  
 
Where secondary Union legislation does exist to cater for some of the social and/or 
fundamental rights issues automatically triggered by cross-border movement, the direct effect 
of the Treaty provisions on free movement arguably reduces their potential in this regard. This 
is because secondary legislation can no longer be viewed as completing, or adding nuance to, 
programmatic free movement provisions. It must instead be interpreted according to the goals 
of precise and unconditional primary law. For instance, the Posted Workers’ Directive is 
concerned with coordinating the terms and conditions of employment in the context of the 
cross-border posting of workers.
70
 Accordingly, it could be viewed as an essential cog within 
the programme of the free provision of services itself. However, since Article 56 TFEU has 
already been found to have a specific meaning, in Laval the scope of the PWD was 
determined by reference to the precise obligation to abolish restrictions to the free provision 
of services. Consequently, as a concrete expression of the goals of Article 56, the PWD could 
provide a list of the terms and conditions host Member States are able to impose on service 
providers coming from other Member States, but this had to be viewed as a maximum, rather 
than minimum, level of protection. This clearly has the potential to lower standards regarding 
the fundamental social rights of workers. Further, it rendered trade unions, who had exercised 
their fundamental right to strike in order to secure terms and conditions for posted workers 
above and beyond those contained in the PWD, in breach of Union law.
71
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The above analysis has highlighted the indirect contributions to the structural prioritisation of 
free movement over fundamental rights that have been made by the interpretation of the free 
movement provisions as sufficiently ‘unconditional’ and ‘precise’ to enjoy direct effect. 
Specifically, the unconditional nature of the market freedoms presents Articles 36, 45(3), 
52(1) and 65(1) TFEU as ‘derogations from’ rather than ‘limitations on’ the free movement 
provisions, to be strictly defined. Moreover, the finding that the free movement provisions are 
unconditional, since their potential derogations are ‘subject to judicial control’, tasks the 
courts with taking a strict approach to interpreting opposing law and policy. These historical 
developments have been maintained in the case-law on fundamental rights, inherently inviting 
a breach/justification framework that treats fundamental rights as prima facie wrongful.  Since 
(for instance) Articles 49 and 56 TFEU are viewed as providing precise definitions of the 
freedoms of establishment and services, overlapping areas of law and policy, including 
fundamental rights issues such as worker protection and the right to strike, cannot be 
examined as part of a complex programme of forming an internal market and accordingly 
assessed alongside the abolition of restrictions to cross-border movement. Instead, competing 
goals must be examined as a derogation from the precisely defined objective of prohibiting 
obstacles to intra-EU movement. This inevitably reinforces, the two-stage breach/justification 
process that, when employed to address tensions between free movement and fundamental 
rights, structurally favours the former over the latter. In some cases, even where secondary 
legislation has been introduced to manage some of the social questions automatically 
triggered by cross-border service provision, the precise obligations that now arise from 
directly effective primary law inhibit the protective potential of secondary Union law, with 
repercussions for the exercise of fundamental rights. More broadly and beyond the scope of 
this work, this raises significant questions, regardless of the accepted existence of periods of 
political stagnation, about whether direct effect has alienated the legislature from the 
formation of the internal market and distorted the balance, originally envisaged within the 
Treaty, between competing but interlocking policy goals.    
 
The next subsection argues that direct effect has individualised and fundamentalised the 
market freedoms through its introduction or reinforcement of rights-language in relation to 
their exercise. The consequent fusion of free movement as a fundamental principle of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (OJ 2004 L158/77) was presented as a ‘specific 
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common market with its status as an individual right introduces fundamental rights 
connotations to cross-border movement. In this way, direct effect has indirectly strengthened 
a structural bias in favour of free movement. The subsection will posit, second, that by 
making individuals private enforcers of Union law, direct effect has altered the reach of the 
market freedoms. Specifically individuals are able to demonstrate new ways, by reference to 
their own experiences, in which activity, which might appear prima facie to be unrelated to 
the internal market, imposes obstacles to the exercise of free movement. Structural bias is also 
exacerbated since rights, which do not enjoy direct effect, cannot by enforced by individuals 
on an equal footing with free movement. Finally, the subsection will postulate that the 
conferral of direct effect contributes to the reconceptualisation of free movement from an 
instrument for completing the internal market to an independent goal in and of itself. At times, 
this can result in the prioritisation of free movement over other internal market considerations 
that might have complemented fundamental rights.        
 
 
2.2. The individualisation of free movement following the conferral of direct effect: 
the historically understandable yet potentially damaging language of the Court 
   
In its discussion of the doctrine of direct effect, the Court in Van Gend stated that, since the 
EU constitutes a new legal order comprising not only the Member States but also their 
nationals, Union law ‘not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to 
confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage [emphasis added]’.72 Thus, 
although it remains open to question whether direct effect confers rights status on provisions 
or if it is their rights status that triggers direct effect, Van Gend clearly associates directly 
effective provisions with the existence of individual rights.
73
 Accordingly, since, in the 
context of free movement, the relevant provisions have been found to encompass individual 
rights in the course of decisions granting them direct effect, the purpose of this section is not 
to enter into these debates.
74
 The focus is, instead, on the effects of the use of rights-language, 
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which the doctrine either introduces or reinforces to the exercise of free movement, on its 
relationship with fundamental rights.  
 
Analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Van Gend, quoted above, has led to the argument that the 
line between direct effect status and individual rights, in that case, was so blurred as to make 
the concepts ‘synonymous’.75 This connection is also evident in the Court’s reasoning when 
declaring the direct effect status of the market freedoms. While the Rome Treaty adopted 
rights-language in relation to the free movement of workers and establishment,
76
 it only 
granted a ‘freedom’ to provide services and created no ‘right’ to import or export goods, or 
effect capital transfers.
77
 However, when the Court confirmed, in Salgoil, that Article 31 
EEC,
78
 relating to the free movement of goods, was directly effective, it identified a clear link 
between this status and the existence of individual rights:   
 
The prohibition in Article 31 [EEC] of its very nature lends itself perfectly to producing direct effects... Thus 
Article 31 creates rights which national courts must protect [emphasis added].
79
 
 
These historically blurred lines between direct effect and the creation of individual rights are 
also particularly apparent in Royer, on the freedoms of workers, establishment, and services, 
in which the Court stated that the relevant Treaty provisions ‘have the effect of conferring 
rights directly on all persons [emphasis added]’ falling within their ambit.80 In Sanz de Lera, 
the CJEU used the phrase ‘conferring rights on individuals which they may rely on before the 
courts and which the national courts must uphold [emphasis added]’ to declare the free 
movement of capital directly effective.
81
 The inextricability of direct effect from rights, in this 
context, has led Eilmansberger to argue that it is direct effect that gives Articles 34 and 49 
TFEU the capacity to create individual rights.
82
 For our purposes, it is therefore clear that the 
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emergence of the doctrine has explicitly associated the market freedoms with the exercise of 
individual rights and, depending on the freedom in question, either introduced or reinforced 
rights-language in relation to them. 
 
Moreover, there is evidence of linguistic conflation of the market freedoms as individual 
rights with their status as ‘fundamental principles’ of Union law, arguably resulting in their 
implicit presentation as fundamental rights. For instance, in its Viking judgment, the Court 
uses the phrases ‘right to establishment’ and ‘fundamental freedom’ interchangeably, as part 
of its discussion of the directly effective nature of Article 49 TFEU.
83
 Similarly, the CJEU has 
combined these terms with the principle of primacy in order to justify the prioritisation of the 
free movement provisions:     
 
Articles 48-66 [EEC on persons, services and capital]…implement a fundamental principle of the Treaty, confer 
on persons whom they concern individual rights which the national courts must protect, and take precedence 
over any national rule which might conflict with them.
84
    
 
Placed in its historical context, this constitutional development is understandable. For 
instance, a fuller reading of Van Gend draws an explicit link between the EU’s economic 
goals and the rights of individuals:  
 
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market...implies that this Treaty is more than 
an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by 
the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples [emphasis added].
85
  
 
Certainly the association of free movement with individual, perhaps even fundamental, 
rights
86
 facilitates economic integration. While its rights-status makes free movement about 
more than the internal market, the market is, itself, enabled by the deeper entrenchment of the 
need to protect free movement from conflicting activity, through its attachment to the exercise 
of individual rights. This inherently welcomes the use of a two-stage breach/justification 
methodology for resolving conflict between free movement and competing policy, since that 
model structurally secures the prioritisation of the former over the latter.  
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Clearly, the recognition of the direct effect of the free movement provisions was not directly 
targeted at managing the relationship between the market freedoms and fundamental rights. 
Indeed, that status was conferred, in relation to the majority of the free movement 
provisions,
87
 at a time when their material scope was restricted to directly discriminatory 
policy and the opportunity for interaction with fundamental rights was limited. Nevertheless, 
by cementing an imbalanced adjudicative model, this linguistic approach makes indirect 
contributions to the maintenance of this framework when free movement began to interact 
with fundamental rights. In this context, free movement is, in fact, elevated beyond 
fundamental rights status since it is treated, procedurally, as more fundamental than 
fundamental rights, potentially weakening protection of the latter norms. We have already 
seen, in chapter two, that the expansion of the material and personal scope of the free 
movement provisions has brought them into more frequent contact with fundamental rights, 
and that the two-stage methodology has nevertheless been retained in this context. Section 
four of this chapter will detail the distinct contributions that the doctrine of direct effect has 
made to increased interactions.  
 
For now, however, the focus is on direct effect’s indirect exacerbation of two-stage bias via 
the rights-status of the market freedoms. Evidence of this can be found, for instance, in Laval, 
in which the Court stated that the exercise of fundamental rights ‘must be reconciled with the 
requirements relating to the rights protected under the Treaty and in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality [emphasis added]’, although the Treaty does not explicitly refer to 
Article 56 as a ‘right’.88 It should be acknowledged, here, that the conferral of direct effect 
denotes the existence of individual rights in relation to other provisions of Union law, 
unconnected or not directly related to free movement.
89
 However, it will be recalled that our 
analysis of the doctrine’s contributions to a structural preference for free movement over 
fundamental rights should be understood as one factor in a wider interconnected 
‘constitutional trinity’ of contributors to procedural imbalance.   
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Direct effect has made individuals private enforcers of the market freedoms. As Craig notes, 
this was a crucial step in the transformation of an economic Community into a “closer union 
among the peoples of Europe”.90 Nevertheless, this also creates new opportunities for 
interaction between free movement and competing law and policy. Specifically, the 
possibility for individuals to argue before the courts that their ability to move across borders 
has been restricted allows for the discovery or demonstration, through lived experiences, of 
the diverse activities that can present barriers to intra-EU movement. The significance of 
these restrictions is intensified by their impact on individual rights.  
 
Prima facie, this development appears to be only advantageous. Yet, the focus on the 
individual rights of free movers can arguably result in the over-prioritisation of free 
movement in relation to other legitimate aims, including fundamental rights. Thus, Reich 
argues that, as part of the neo-liberal recognition that market entry, guarantees for private 
property, and the exercise of professions all rely on individuals for their implementation, it 
was necessary to transform the economic freedoms into fundamental rights, through the 
concept of direct effect.
91
 On the one hand, it is clear that the Union has evolved steadily 
beyond an economic constitution, in which new provisions of primary law recognise the 
importance of, for instance, social, environmental, and consumer protection.
92
 However, ‘it is 
not yet clear how far [these] reciprocal rights are guaranteed to passive market citizens: that is 
to what extent free choice under the freedom to provide goods and services rules…exists as a 
right to safety corollary to the restrictions in Article 36 on free movement’.93 Indeed, tensions 
between free movement and these other objectives, some of which the Charter now presents 
as fundamental rights,
94
 continue to be processed through the two-stage model. Under this 
framework, opposing rights cannot be used as a sword but merely as a shield, by which, for 
instance, the Member States can defend their activity against the prima facie unlawfulness of 
imposing restrictions on free movement. Moreover, as the discussion of the fundamental 
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rights ‘impact trio’ in chapter two demonstrated, the one-sided proportionality test this 
triggers, and its focus on finding measures less restrictive of free movement, can result in a 
lowering of fundamental rights standards in real terms. For instance, labelling might be 
presented as an appropriate means of consumer protection where this might not fully address 
the presumptions made by consumers on the basis of language, or compositional norms.
95
 
 
Finally, by individualising free movement, through the introduction or reinforcement of 
rights-language, direct effect has contributed to the conversion of free movement, from a mere 
means for completing the internal market, to an end in and of itself. This metamorphosis into 
independent objective will generally facilitate the internal market since it strengthens the need 
for the prioritisation of free movement.
96
 Accordingly, free movement’s status as a separate 
goal also indirectly reinforces the two-stage adjudicative framework and therefore the 
favouring of free movement over fundamental rights. Further, in some instances, this 
reconceptualisation of free movement can, by contrast, actually undermine its original role as 
a facilitator of the internal market. Specifically, the status of free movement as an independent 
aim can result in its prioritisation over other tools for achieving economic integration. 
Crucially, these other instruments might, in certain circumstances, present the protection of 
fundamental rights as critical to economic integration as opposed to obstacles to its 
attainment.  
 
A clear example in this regard is the phenomenon of social dumping.
97
 Broadly speaking, the 
internal market is presented as achievable via the twin instruments of freedom of movement, 
through the prohibition of barriers to trade, and the elimination of distortions to competition. 
Originally viewed as generally operating in separate spheres, the former relating to public 
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activity, the latter to the actions of private individuals,
98
 the removal of barriers to trade and of 
distortions to competition can nevertheless be viewed as complementary. For instance, the 
preclusion of discriminatory laws in relation to imported goods addresses the competitive 
advantage otherwise enjoyed by domestic commodities.
99
 However, this is not the case in 
respect of social dumping. This is a process whereby, for instance, a service provider in a host 
State secures an advantage over domestic competitors by relying on its free movement rights 
to post workers employed in its own Member State, which has lower standards of 
employment. This has clear implications for fundamental rights in terms of worker 
protection.
100
 The issue of social dumping and its effects on competition were, in fact, 
recognised during the inception of the EEC,
101
 prompting the inclusion of Articles 119 and 
120 on equal pay for men and women and paid holiday schemes, respectively, in the Rome 
Treaty.
102
 As Barnard notes, these social provisions, which created obstacles to freedom of 
movement, nevertheless accordingly served an economic purpose.
103
 The Court recognised 
this in Defrenne: 
 
In the light of different stages of the development of social legislation in the various Member States, the aim of 
Article 119 [EEC] is to avoid a situation in which undertakings established in states which have actually 
implemented the principle of equal pay suffer from a competitive disadvantage in intra-Community competition 
as compared with undertakings established in States which have not…104 
 
Interestingly, in Defrenne, the CJEU also determined that this social provision enjoyed direct 
effect. Thus, recalling Reich’s concerns above, about the extent to which social rights can 
exist as reciprocal considerations in the exercise of free movement, Article 119 EEC/Article 
157 TFEU can operate more easily as a sword against some of the negative consequences of 
unrestricted free movement.  
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Against this background, we might expect to see the Court incorporate into its analysis the 
potential distortions of competition caused by the exercise of the freedoms of establishment 
and services in Viking and Laval, respectively, since the economic undertakings in those cases 
sought to take advantage of lower standards of worker protection in different Member States. 
This would, arguably have more readily presented worker protection and related collective 
action as forming part of economic integration, as opposed to conflicting with it. Instead, in 
Viking, the Court repeatedly referred to the freedom of establishment as a ‘fundamental 
freedom’ or ‘right protected under the Treaty’, linking this with its direct applicability in 
national legal orders, but making no explicit connection between this fundamental status and 
its role as a facilitator of economic integration.
105
 Accordingly, the collective action taken by 
the trade unions in that case was found to be a prima facie breach of EU law since it rendered 
the exercise of free movement rights less attractive.
106
 Worker protection was then assessed as 
a potentially permissible derogation from a fundamental freedom of the Treaty, rather than as 
forming part of a climate of fair competition.
107
 Thus, even when the Court acknowledged the 
social purpose of the Treaty, this was presented as something to be balanced against rather 
than contemplated as part of the Union’s economic goals.108 Finally, the CJEU emphasised 
that, as part of its proportionality assessment, it would be necessary for the national court to 
consider whether means less restrictive of free movement, as opposed to approaches more 
conducive to economic integration, were available to secure worker protection.
109
     
 
It will be recalled that the Laval case required, inter alia, examination of the applicability and 
operation of the Posted Workers’ Directive (PWD). Prior to the CJEU’s decision in Laval, 
this instrument was generally viewed as an anti social-dumping measure. For instance, while 
recognising the abolition of barriers to intra-EU service provision as a Union objective, the 
Directive’s preamble acknowledged that ‘the promotion of the transnational provisions of 
services requires a climate of fair competition, guaranteeing respect for the rights of 
workers’.110 Institutional discussions leading up to the adoption of the PWD also firmly 
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rooted it in tackling social dumping.
111
 Accordingly, Article 3(1)(a)-(g) PWD laid down a 
core nucleus of worker protection for which host Member States had to impose their rules on 
service providers posting workers into their territory. Moreover, Article 3(7) stipulated that 
Article 3(1) did not prevent the application of terms and conditions of employment that were 
more favourable to workers. Article 3(10) stated that the Directive did not preclude the 
application of measures not referred to Article 3(1)(a)-(g) for reasons of public policy.  
 
Nevertheless, in Laval, the Court interpreted the core nucleus of the PWD as ‘preventing a 
situation’ whereby undertakings established in other Member States would compete unfairly 
against companies in the host Member State, where the level of social protection is higher.
112
 
Accordingly, Article 3(7) PWD was interpreted as merely not precluding the implementation 
of more favourable worker conditions operating in the home Member State. And yet, the very 
fact that the content of the Swedish collective agreements, in Laval, went above and beyond 
Article 3(1)(a)-(g) suggests the domestic undertakings could face greater worker protection 
obligations than service providers coming from other Member States.
113
 In particular, the 
focus of the core nucleus on minimum pay prevents use of the PWD to impose national rules 
requiring service providers to comply with wage rates determined on a case-by-case basis, 
according to the skills of worker,
114
 or indexed to the cost of living.
115
 Currie points out that 
the Latvian workers in Laval earned around 40% less than their Swedish counterparts.
116
 She 
argues that the effect of the CJEU’s strict interpretation of the PWD in Laval, and also in 
Rüffert
117
 is to:  
 
…render it more difficult, in certain circumstances…for posted construction workers to even be guaranteed the 
relevant levels of pay as set out in host state collective agreements. As such, posted workers may find themselves 
                                                          
111
 E.g. the accompanying text to the initial legislative document COD/1991/0346, 28/06/1991, ‘Les entreprises 
non nationales seront ainsi mise à égalité avec les entreprises nationale’; EP Decision of the Committee 
Responsible, 2
nd
 reading, COD/1991/0346, 24/07/1996, ‘The aim is to eliminate unfair competition by ensuring 
that “posted” workers do not receive lower wages and are not subject to less favourable working conditions in 
the member state concerned’. 
112
 Case C-341/05 Laval, n.25, para.75 
113
 This is not the case where comparable protection is already secured in the Member State of origin - see Case 
C-369/96 Arblade [1999] EU:C:1999:575 – however, Laval seems to remove the need to investigate the 
existence of equivalent protection so long as the core nucleus of the PWD is observed, unless reasons of public 
policy can be established.  
114
 Para.70 
115
 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg, n.20 
116
 Currie, n.100, 398; see also Bengtsson, n.100 
117
 Case C-346/06 Rüffert, n.25 
 157 
 
entitled only to receive the general minimum wage… This potentially impacts considerably on the level of 
income available to…support their families in the home state’.118  
 
Thus, not only does the approach in Laval lead to a lowering in the host State standards 
concerning the fundamental right to worker protection,
119
 Currie also identifies consequent 
negative impacts on the fundamental right to family life of posted workers.
120
 Further, the 
fundamental rights of trade unions are diminished, either because strike action taken to 
enforce collective agreements will constitute an unjustified breach of free movement, as in 
Laval, or because terms of collective agreements will be found not to apply in relation to 
posted workers, as in Rüffert. Barnard has posited that labour lawyers were, however, 
mistaken to view the PWD as a worker protection measure, since it was firmly rooted in the 
Treaty’s chapter on services.121 And yet, if we view that chapter as fleshing out free 
movement’s role in economic integration, it is arguably necessary to interpret it in light of 
potential distortions to competition, which measures securing worker protection can be 
viewed as seeking to address. Nevertheless, in Laval, since competitive disparity is seemingly 
dealt with by the minimum standards of the PWD, worker protection and the fundamental 
right to collective action are determined to be disproportionate restrictions on the free 
provision of services, rather than as components of competitive equality. Indeed, in a separate 
part of the Laval judgment, concerning the Swedish Lex Britannia – which treated foreign 
service providers bound by collective agreements signed in other Member States as akin to 
national undertakings who had signed no agreement at all – the Court stated that the creation 
of a climate of fair competition could not constitute a justifiable restriction on Article 56 
TFEU since it did not feature in its accompanying Treaty derogation.
122
      
 
This subsection has postulated that by individualising the free movement provisions, and 
therefore introducing/reinforcing the use of rights-language in relation to them, the doctrine of 
direct effect has reinforced the Court’s two-stage breach/justification methodology and, 
therefore, indirectly contributed to the structural subjugation of fundamental rights to the free 
movement provisions. Direct effect has also made individuals private enforcers of the market 
freedoms. This inevitably leads to an increase in the volume of conflictual interactions 
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between free movement and other law and policy, including fundamental rights, as 
individuals confirm or demonstrate, through their lived experiences, the negative impact of 
diverse activity on their exercise of free movement. This can intensify structural bias since 
competing rights, such as consumer protection, which might be viewed as the static corollary 
of the exercise of free movement, do not always enjoy direct effect and cannot therefore be 
enforced on an equal footing with free movement. Finally, the individualisation of free 
movement has converted it from a tool for attaining economic integration to an independent 
goal in its own right. This not only deepens the perceived need for the prioritisation of free 
movement, thereby strengthening the two-stage model, it can also rank the pursuit of free 
movement over other tools of economic integration that would, in some instances, 
complement rather than conflict with the protection of fundamental rights.       
 
Yet, aside from indirectly reinforcing structural bias, the direct effect of the free movement 
provisions within domestic legal orders does not prescribe, on its own, the prioritisation of 
free movement by national courts. Where EU provisions form part of domestic law, by virtue 
of their direct effect, they enter an existing legal framework of myriad laws and regulations, 
structured through an internal hierarchy of norms. At the apex of such hierarchies is usually 
national constitutional law,
123
 often containing fundamental rights.
124
 Other domestic 
constitutional mechanisms stipulate that laws are impliedly repealed by more recent, 
conflicting law.
125
 In this context, the direct effect of the free movement provisions within 
national legal orders would not necessarily lead to their prevalence over competing norms, 
particularly those of a constitutional nature.
126
 However, this has been addressed, at EU-level, 
by the introduction of the doctrines of primacy and effective judicial protection, which, 
together, render national measures immediately inapplicable to the extent that they conflict 
with Union law. Since these principles apply to domestic rules of any nature, they provide 
outputs for direct effect’s contributions to a structural preference for free movement in 
conflicts with fundamental rights. Accordingly, the next section will assess primacy and 
effective judicial protection as aggravators of architectural imbalance.          
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3. The principles of primacy and effective judicial protection: providing outcomes for 
structural imbalance 
  
The principles of primacy and effective judicial protection, as significant constitutional 
doctrines within EU law, have warranted substantial academic discussion in their own 
right.
127
 The focus here, however, is on their capacity to aggravate direct effect’s 
reinforcement of a constitutional weighting towards free movement in instances of clash with 
fundamental rights. Accordingly, the discussion will limit itself, first, to discussing the 
concretisation of the two-stage model by the principle of primacy, which, by its nature, 
obliges a structural preference for free movement over competing law. The section will 
demonstrate, second, that even where domestic measures are permissible in principle, by 
virtue of their pursuit of an overriding interest accepted under Union law, they will not be 
justified in practice if they fail to meet the requirements of proportionality. Where this occurs, 
the combination of primacy and effective judicial protection requires the immediate 
disapplication of domestic law. This ‘all or nothing’ approach can result in a legal lacuna of 
fundamental rights protection in practice, even though the CJEU has accepted the need to 
protect them in principle. The section will assess, third, how, in some cases, the principle of 
effective judicial protection can lead national courts to allow actions for damages against 
private individuals who exercise their fundamental rights in breach of directly effective and 
prevailing free movement law, even where this would not be the case in the domestic legal 
framework. As with direct effect, the doctrines of primacy and effective judicial protection are 
of wider application than the free movement provisions. Accordingly, they should be viewed, 
here, as one of many factors in the multifaceted historical development of a free movement 
bias.  
 
The doctrine of primacy was established in the seminal Costa case, in which the Court stated 
that ‘the law stemming from the Treaty…could not, because of its special and original nature, 
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be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed [emphasis added]…’128 
Accordingly, in the context of our discussion, not only are the free movement provisions 
directly effective within the national legal orders, but they also have primacy over competing 
domestic norms.
129
 The Court’s reference to national law ‘however framed’ suggested that 
Union law had supremacy even over national constitutional law, including fundamental rights 
safeguards contained therein. This was confirmed in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft in 
which the CJEU declared that ‘the validity of a Community measure or its effects within a 
Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to…fundamental rights as 
formulated by the Constitution of that state…[emphasis added]’.130 
 
Prima facie, this appears to suggest that national rules, including fundamental rights 
measures, are not even capable, in cases of conflict, of derogating from directly effective EU 
law, such as the free movement provisions, since EU law is hierarchically superior. This 
would seem to necessitate not a breach/justification model but rather an even more heavily 
weighted one-stage approach that would set fundamental rights aside once a restriction on free 
movement is established. Alternatively, the Treaty itself contained derogating provisions, 
permitting restrictions on free movement as a matter of EU law.
131
 Further, in Internationale, 
itself, the CJEU introduced fundamental rights protection at EU-level in order to mitigate the 
effects of the primacy of Union law on domestic fundamental rights:  
 
[A]n examination should be made as to whether or not any analogous guarantee inherent in Community law has 
been disregarded. In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law 
protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community.
132
   
 
Thus, although the Treaty derogations from free movement do not include protection of 
fundamental rights, they have presented permissible restrictions on the market freedoms in 
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Schmidberger and subsequent cases.
133
 Since the development of primacy requires respect for 
fundamental rights as a matter of EU law, it could therefore be argued that primacy promotes 
equality between the free movement provisions and fundamental rights, rather than a 
structural preference for the former. However, it is submitted here that the historical 
development of fundamental rights protection, as a necessary response to the primacy of 
Union law, in fact, reinforces an adjudicative model that presents fundamental rights as 
derogations from free movement, to be interpreted strictly.  
 
First, according to Internationale, fundamental rights ‘must be ensured within the framework 
of the structure and objectives’ of the Union. This indirectly invites the slotting of tensions 
between EU law and fundamental rights into existing adjudicative frameworks, such as the 
two-stage model. The reference to the objectives of the Union also arguably sets the 
parameters of fundamental rights protection according to the economic endeavours of the 
Treaty. Since free movement seeks to facilitate the internal market, this also supports its 
structural prioritisation. Through repeated use, the entrenchment of such a model would 
continue to support a preference for the economic even after the Union’s aims diversified.134   
 
Second, although Internationale introduced fundamental rights to the Union legal order, these 
existed as general principles, and without the Union having competence in this field. 
Accordingly, fundamental rights are drawn from the domestic constitutional traditions as well 
as, later, the international agreements to which the Member States are signatories.
135
 
Similarly, although restrictions on free movements are permissible as a matter of Union law, 
via the Treaty’s derogating provisions or later the mandatory requirements, these frequently 
cover fields for which the Union has limited legislative competence.
136
 This creates something 
of an historical paradox within EU fundamental rights protection whereby fundamental rights 
are protected at EU-level but usually emanate from national restrictions on Union law. This is 
particularly visible in Omega in which the Court drew on the German recognition of the 
fundamental right to human dignity, which was also Germany’s justification for limiting the 
free provision of services, in order to recognise that right within the Union legal order.
137
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Accordingly, fundamental rights continue to be presented as national derogations from Union 
law, subject to judicial control at EU-level.
138
  
 
Consequently, although the existence of the Treaty derogations and the general principles
139
 
mitigate against a finding that all competing law is automatically overridden by the primacy 
of the free movement provisions, the continued presentation of fundamental rights as a 
national derogation from free movement tilts the doctrine towards free movement. Arguably, 
a principle that dictates that Union law must prevail over conflicting law concretely reinforces 
the notion that, if derogations from free movement are to be permitted at all, they must be 
interpreted strictly and only be justified where they impose the fewest restrictions on the 
market freedoms.
140
 This is also reflected in the language of the Court in Omega, Viking and 
Laval, in which it presents fundamental rights as a legitimate interest ‘even’ against the 
fundamental principle of free movement.
141
 This arguably works in tandem with the 
‘unconditionality’ of free movement as a result of its direct effect status. Although the Union 
still lacks legislative competence in the general field of fundamental rights, it remains to be 
seen how the primary legal status of the Charter will impact on this historically entrenched 
approach, since this provides a means by which fundamental rights can be drawn directly 
from an instrument of EU law. In the pre-Lisbon cases of Viking and Laval, the Court 
recognised the existence of the fundamental right to strike by virtue of Article 28 CFR. 
However, this did not alter the Court’s two-stage approach to the clash between this right and 
the freedoms of establishment and services respectively. Nevertheless, post-Lisbon, we see 
the Court drawing more frequently on the Charter in its fundamental rights assessments, 
especially outside primary law, demonstrating some potential in this regard.
142
    
 
As well as supporting the two-stage justification model, the doctrine of primacy, alongside the 
principle of effective judicial protection, places fundamental rights protection at further risk 
where fundamental rights measures, representing justifiable restrictions on free movement in 
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principle, have not been able to overcome the breach/justification framework in practice. This 
is because primacy requires national rules to be set aside as a result of the restrictions they 
place on free movement law, while the principle of effective judicial protection requires this 
to be done immediately.
143
 In other words, while the finding by the Court that the 
safeguarding of fundamental rights is justified in principle suggests a need for fundamental 
rights measures, there will be a legal vacuum in this regard until the relevant Member State 
adopts rules less restrictive of free movement. The combined force of direct effect, primacy 
and effective judicial protection in this respect is summarised by the Court in its Winner 
Wetten judgment: 
 
…in accordance with the principle of the precedence of Union law, provisions of the Treaty and directly 
applicable measures…have the effect, in their relations with the internal law of the Member States, merely by 
entering into force, of rendering automatically inapplicable any conflicting provisions of national law.
144
  
 
Thus, the finding in Rüffert,
145
 that a German law requiring local authorities to impose the 
minimum pay requirements contained in local collective agreements could not be justified by 
the goal of worker protection
146
 inter alia because it applied only to public contracts, 
provokes the requirement that national courts immediately disapply this law in relation to 
service providers posting workers from other Member States. Similarly in Laval, the finding 
that the Swedish approach to determining minimum pay was too imprecise to comply with 
Article 56 TFEU would seemingly suspend the application of basic wage mechanisms to 
posted workers until this matter had been resolved domestically. This also triggered the 
question of to what extent trade unions could exercise their fundamental right to strike in this 
regard.
147
 In short, this ‘all or nothing’ approach arguably does not leave the Member States 
with sufficient breathing space to safeguard fundamental rights while in the process of 
devising less restrictive fundamental rights approaches.     
 
However, the Court did open a door to the possibility of a temporary suspension of primacy in 
future cases in Winner Wetten itself.
148
 The case concerned a German law that made it a 
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criminal offence to operate public games of chance without the authorisation of a public 
authority. The Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen had authorised one company, Westdeutsche 
Lotteries, to offer such games. Consequently, Winner Wetten, a German undertaking that 
brokered bets for a company established in Malta, was prohibited from pursuing this activity. 
It subsequently argued that this was a breach of the freedom of services, pursuant to Article 
56 TFEU. The Bundesverfassungsgericht had already held, in a separate judgment, that a 
monopoly on betting infringed the fundamental right to pursue an occupation, protected by 
German Basic Law, since it did not ensure a reduction in gambling and addiction effectively. 
Accordingly, it had a disproportionate effect on fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the legislative restrictions on gambling could be 
maintained during a transitional period while the legislature addressed the issue at hand, so 
long as there was a minimum level of consistency between combatting gambling addiction 
and the effective existence of a monopoly. However, the national court in Winner Wetten 
accepted that the domestic measure was also a breach of Article 56 TFEU, which could not be 
justified in practice. Consequently, it referred to the CJEU the question of whether the 
legislation could nevertheless remain in place for a transitional period, during which the 
national legislature would devise alternative means of reducing gambling addiction. Referring 
to its case-law on invalidity actions against Union legislation, the Luxembourg Court held 
that: 
 
[T]he [temporary] maintenance of the effects of a Union measure…the purpose of which is to prevent a legal 
vacuum…may be justified where overriding considerations of legal certainty…are at stake.149   
 
Nonetheless, it proceeded to declare that, ‘even assuming’ that, by analogy, this allowed for 
the provisional suspension of the ousting effect of a directly applicable Union measure on 
national law, this would be determined solely by the Court of Justice. Moreover, the condition 
of overriding reasons of legal certainty had not been met in Winner Wetten itself, since the 
national courts had themselves admitted that the domestic measure was not capable of 
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meeting the objective of combatting gambling addiction in a consistent and systematic 
manner.
150
 
 
The Court’s use of the phrase ‘even assuming’ does not suggest much enthusiasm for the 
transfer of temporary suspensions of primacy into the adjudication of the relationship between 
free movement and conflicting national law. Indeed, subsequent cases citing Winner Wetten 
have focused on reinforcing the general rule, originating with Simmenthal,
151
 that the 
principle of effective judicial protection requires the immediate setting aside of opposing 
domestic measures.
152
 Nevertheless, the Court’s application of the requirements for 
suspension in Winner Wetten itself is a clear illustration of its introduction to the area. 
However, it remains uncertain how suspensions will operate. What seems clear is that 
domestic fundamental rights measures, found to be legitimate in principle but having failed to 
overcome the proportionality test at the justification stage, will face a second procedural 
disadvantage in the requirement that they demonstrate overriding reasons of legal certainty in 
order to trigger a transitional period. Moreover, this assessment is inextricably linked to the 
question of whether domestic measures could be justified at all during the prior 
breach/justification assessment, arguably reducing the possibility that a transitional period 
will be available in practice. For instance, in Winner Wetten, itself, the fact that the national 
rules did not reduce gambling addiction in a consistent and systematic manner would seem to 
be the reason that they did not constitute a justified restriction on free movement in the first 
place. Accordingly, asking the same question to assess the availability of a transitional period 
arguably sets the domestic measure up to fail. Similar conclusions could be drawn in relation 
to Rüffert. Since the German rule did not ensure the application of minimum wage rules 
contained in collective agreements in a consistent and systematic manner, as they applied only 
to public contracts, presumably this measure could not be maintained while Germany rectified 
this inconsistency. This introduces broader questions about how else the Court might 
determine the permissibility of transitional periods. For instance, would Swedish rules on 
determining minimum pay fail to qualify for temporary retention because they ‘lacked clarity 
and precision’ even though this was also why they failed to be justified in the first place in 
Laval? 
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Nevertheless, the possibility of temporarily suspending the principle of primacy in order to 
avoid legal lacunae is to be welcomed since it introduces a potential means of addressing the 
current ‘all or nothing’ approach of primacy and effective judicial protection, whereby 
fundamental rights are left unprotected when domestic measures for safeguarding them fail to 
meet the proportionality requirements of the two-stage model. Transitional periods are 
arguably also critical from a democratic perspective since they create legal space for political 
institutions to make choices about how to implement programmatic fundamental rights. 
Although this did not appear to be a relevant consideration for the CJEU, it was a significant 
factor in the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht provisionally to suspend the primacy 
of German Basic law over national legislation. As Beukers argues, if separation of the tasks of 
the judiciary and the legislature form a crucial part of the national identity of the Member 
States then the CJEU might be required to take this into account in its own criteria on 
transitional periods.
153
 This is particularly pertinent since the strengthening of the Treaty’s 
national identity clause, post-Lisbon.
154
         
 
The principle of effective judicial protection also requires that national courts adequately 
protect the free movement rights of individuals where they have been infringed. Initially, the 
CJEU had underlined that remedies for breaches of Union law were to be determined 
according to domestic rules. This was as long as these were proportionate, did not make the 
exercise of EU rights impossible or excessively difficult in practice, and were equivalent to 
the forms of action available in relation to violations of national law.
155
 Member States were 
not required to introduce remedies that would not be available under domestic rules.
156
 
However, the Court later added the requirement that national procedural rules secured the 
effective protection of the individual rights enjoyed pursuant to EU law, including those 
relating to free movement.
157
 This has required the introduction of remedies to secure the 
effective safeguarding of free movement rights that would not otherwise operate in the 
domestic legal order.
158
 This development potentially favours free movement over other types 
of rights that, not emanating from Union law, would not enjoy as extensive a range of judicial 
protection. As Advocate General Jacobs has acknowledged, in the context of competition law, 
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there exists a risk that greater protection will be afforded to Union rights that are not, by 
virtue of that status, inherently of greater importance than rights recognised by national 
law.
159
  
 
One means of securing effective judicial protection, that is particularly relevant to our 
discussion, is the requirement, in some circumstances, that national courts oblige private 
parties to pay damages where they have restricted the rights that other private parties enjoy 
under EU law. This can be the case even where a bar on damages would operate at the 
national level. Thus, in the competition law case of Courage v Crehan, Crehan, who had 
signed an anti-competitive agreement for the purchase of beer with Courage, brought a claim 
for damages against Courage, in light of this breach of Article 101 TFEU.
160
 Such an action 
was precluded under English law because it viewed Crehan, being a party to the agreement, as 
a cause rather than a victim of anti-competitive conduct. However, the CJEU held that since 
Article 101 TFEU had direct effect, it created rights for all individuals under EU law, which 
the national courts must safeguard. It reasoned that the full effectiveness of Article 101 would 
be at risk if it were not open to any individual, including parties to the anti-competitive 
contract, to claim damages.
161
 Accordingly, an absolute bar to Crehan’s claim was contrary to 
Union law.
162
 However, in laying down domestic procedural rules to protect the rights 
conferred by Article 101, national courts were able to take account, inter alia, of the fact that 
litigants should not benefit from their own unlawful conduct where they bear a significant 
responsibility for distortions to competition. This required consideration of whether the party 
claiming damages was in a ‘markedly weaker position than the other party, such as seriously 
to compromise or even eliminate his freedom to negotiate the terms of the contract’.163 
 
Since the majority of the free movement provisions now enjoy some form of horizontal direct 
effect,
164
 the option of suing private parties for breaches of EU law, introduces the possibility 
that actions for damages will be brought against private individuals who exercise fundamental 
rights in violation of free movement rules. Indeed, in his Opinion in Viking, Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro, having determined that Article 49 TFEU was directly effective against trade 
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unions exercising their fundamental right to strike, nevertheless stated, citing Courage, that 
‘should there be no remedy available, because domestic law does not provide a cause of 
action through which to challenge a breach of the right to freedom of movement, then, in 
accordance with the principle of effectiveness, the claim can be based directly on the free 
movement provision’.165  
 
The direct implications of this are visible in the BALPA saga, outlined in chapter one. It will 
be recalled that BALPA, a trade union representing airline pilots, had successfully balloted for 
strike action in relation to British Airlines’ (BA) plan to establish a subsidiary in another 
Member State. BA brought an action seeking an injunction against strike action, on the 
grounds that it would be a breach of its freedom of establishment, and seeking unlimited 
damages for any action taken. Faced with this prospect, BALPA withdrew from proceedings. 
Under English law, claims for damages against trade unions are generally viewed as 
‘proceedings in tort’. Subject to s.22 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992, available damages against trade unions in tort are capped. However, Apps has 
speculated that this provision might not apply in respect of ‘Viking actions’.166 A cap would 
inhibit the effectiveness of the judicial remedy as it would not fully compensate the employer 
for the considerable costs to business caused by industrial action. It might also fail the 
requirement of equivalent protection because uncapped damages may be claimed against 
other private parties and against Member States in comparable proceedings in tort. Ewing and 
Hendy consequently consider that the spectre of unlimited damages ‘imperils the very 
existence of a trade union for taking what is no more than trade union action’.167  
 
For Apps, the potential resultant chilling effect on the exercise of the fundamental right to 
strike is exacerbated by the lack of precision in relation to trade union liability for breaching 
free movement. She argues, amongst others,
168
 that the CJEU’s reliance on the case-law on 
emanations of the State
169
 to apply the free movement provisions directly to trade unions 
introduces the question of whether the availability of damages is assessed by reference to the 
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rules on State liability, under Francovich,
170
 or purely private liability under Courage. As a 
brief aside, although not strictly an example of direct effect, the possibility, post-Francovich, 
of bringing a claim for damages against the State for failing to implement Union law, made 
possible, in Schmidberger, an action for damages against Austria for its decision not to take 
positive steps to restrict the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and association.
171
  
 
The issue of how to assess whether trade unions will owe damages to economic actors for 
restricting their free movement rights is, in fact, significant. Actions for State liability require 
the demonstration, inter alia, of a ‘sufficiently serious’ breach of EU law,172 whereas Courage 
does not appear to impose such an obligation.
173
 As van Leeuwen remarks, ‘the result now 
appears to be that, in EU law, private liability damages are easier to establish than State 
liability’.174 However, Apps notes that the application of a ‘sufficiently serious’ criterion 
could act as an important safeguard. Specifically, she postulates that breaches of Articles 49 
and 56 TFEU by trade unions who have not been able to overcome the strict proportionality 
test laid out in Viking and Laval, should not be considered ‘sufficiently serious’ where they 
are the result of the exercise of fundamental rights.
175
 Conversely, Bernitz and Reich consider 
the ‘sufficiently serious’ requirement to be linked to the discretion frequently offered to 
Member States in their implementation of Union law. They consequently consider this 
criterion to be inapplicable to trade unions as private parties.
176
  
 
Bernitz and Reich also reviewed the subsequent assessment, by the Swedish Labour Court, of 
damages owed by the trade unions in Laval, following the finding that they had breached 
Article 56 TFEU. Although there was no direct precedent for the requirement that national 
courts impose damages on private parties who breach Article 56 rights, the national court 
found that this obligation existed, by analogy with Courage, but also Raccanelli, concerning 
the free movement of workers.
177
 Laval was awarded SEK 550 000 in exemplary damages 
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and the unions were additionally ordered to pay litigation costs of SEK 2 100 000, a total cost 
to the unions of around EUR 290 000. Although deploring the decision of the Swedish Labour 
Court not to refer the question of damages to the CJEU,
178
 Bernitz and Reich consider the 
national court’s reasoning to be justifiable by reference to the CJEU’s approach to 
compensation which, they argue ‘starts from the principle that EU law contains an “inherent” 
general rule on compensation for wrongs violating rights vested in individuals’ pursuant to the 
Francovich ruling.
179
 Although they accept that Francovich concerns State liability, they posit 
that direct effect, itself, requires the extension of this general rule to private parties since in 
Peter Paul, the CJEU stated that potential victims are entitled to compensation where the 
relevant EU law ‘confers rights upon the individual’.180 Accordingly, Bernitz and Reich 
postulate that this approach ‘is not limited to the State as a tortfeasor, but [extends] to every 
entity which is obliged by the direct effect of EU law [to respect free movement rights], 
including labour unions under Viking and Laval’.181 Thus, it is the combined forced of direct 
effect and effective judicial protection that permits damages claims against trade unions for 
the exercise of their fundamental rights.  
 
Nevertheless, Apps has argued that the UK cap on damages in relation to trade union liability 
could be justified by reference to inherent asymmetry in the collective bargaining relationship 
between worker and employer and the need of trade unions to protect the fundamental right to 
association of its members without the threat of unlimited damages.
182
 Even if the rules on 
private liability were to apply in relation to damages imposed on trade unions, such a cap 
might also be possible by virtue of inverting the CJEU’s reasoning in Courage that the 
availability of damages for a party to an anti-competitive agreement required consideration of 
whether that party occupied a ‘markedly weaker market position’. Indeed, the analysis of AG 
Poiares Maduro in his Opinion in Viking, hints at a prior endorsement of these arguments:  
 
The Court may apply different levels of scrutiny, depending on the source and seriousness of the impediment to 
the exercise of the right to freedom of movement, and on the force and validity of competing claims of private 
autonomy.
183
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Nonetheless, as Apps remarks, the very existence of trade union liability, coupled with the 
uncertainty, which has engendered the speculation above, as to how the extent of that liability 
will be determined, is likely to result in a chilling effect in relation to the exercise of the 
fundamental right to collective action by trade unions. She notes, in addition, that this is 
exacerbated by the fact that, if the conditions of private liability are applied, trade unions 
might face claims for damages not only from the market actor against whom they initiated 
strike action, but also any economic undertakings with whom that actor had dealings and who 
suffered the knock-on effects of such action.
184
 
 
This section has demonstrated the aggravation of direct effect’s contributions to a structural 
preference for free movement in its interactions with fundamental rights by the doctrines of 
primacy and effective judicial protection. Where directly effective free movement provisions 
enter the national legal order, the supremacy of Union law ensures that they prevail over 
opposing domestic rules, including those of a constitutional nature. This inherently invites the 
prioritisation of free movement over national fundamental rights. This has not been mitigated, 
but instead reinforced, by the incorporation of fundamental rights into the EU legal order 
since these are frequently drawn from national constitutional traditions and are still presented 
as derogations from Union law. The combination of the doctrine of primacy with the principle 
of effective judicial protection also results in an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the protection of 
fundamental rights. Specifically, though the need to safeguard fundamental rights might be 
accepted by the CJEU in principle, national implementing measures will, nevertheless, be 
disapplied immediately where they are not justified in practice. This results in a gap in legal 
protection while fundamental rights measures less restrictive of free movement are devised. 
Although the Luxembourg Court has opened the door to the possibility of temporarily 
suspending the application of primacy to deal with this issue, how such transitional periods 
will operate in practice is far from clear. Finally, the principle of effective judicial protection 
has created the possibility that private parties will face actions for damages where they 
exercise their fundamental rights in breach of the free movement provisions. There is already 
evidence that this is having a chilling effect on exercise of the fundamental right to strike for 
those who risk being exposed to damages actions, possibly without the protection of domestic 
caps. This lack of clarity in relation to damages actions against trade unions itself impacts on 
their ability confidently to exercise their fundamental rights.     
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Our discussion thus far has been focused on the indirect contributions direct effect has made 
to the development of a two-stage breach/justification framework as part of its broader 
historical evolution, as well as on the aggravation of these contributions by related doctrines. 
However, the next section is concerned with assessing the distinct impact of direct effect on 
the increased exposure of fundamental rights to a structural preference for free movement. 
Specifically, it will chart the growth in interactions between free movement and fundamental 
rights as a result of the expansion from vertical through to horizontal direct effect. The section 
will posit, second, that direct effect has also altered the nature of the interface, requiring 
private parties, at times, to rely on derogations for their restrictions on free movement that are 
primarily designed for Member State actors, leaving them ill-equipped for justificatory claims 
based on their private exercise of fundamental rights.  
 
 
4. The distinctive contribution of direct effect to architectural imbalance: the expansion 
of direct effect from State to the individual  
 
Much of the discussion above already demonstrates that the vertical direct effect of the free 
movement provisions, which furnishes individuals with the ability to argue that the actions of 
the State are in breach of their free movement rights, has created concrete opportunities for 
the free movement provisions to interact with fundamental rights. Omega, Rüffert and 
Commission v Luxembourg provide specific examples in this regard, although the intertwining 
contributions of the rest of our constitutional trinity should not be forgotten.
185
 Consequently, 
this section will focus on the effects of extending the direct effect of (some of) the free 
movement provisions beyond vertical direct effect on the level of interaction with 
fundamental rights. Specifically, it will argue that both the extension of vertical direct effect 
into horizontal disputes, and then the introduction of purely horizontal direct effect, has 
increased the frequency of contact between the market freedoms and fundamental rights.       
 
 
4.1. Vertical direct effect within a horizontal dispute   
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Vertical direct effect within horizontal disputes frequently concerns an action between two 
private parties in which private party ‘A’ contends that the conduct of private party ‘B’ is 
contrary to a national rule. Private party ‘B’ argues that it must be permitted to continue its 
activity since the domestic measure is itself in breach of free movement provisions, which are 
directly effective and prevailing within the national legal order.
186
 Accordingly, the issue is 
vertical to the extent that it is a Member State rules that is challenged. However, a decision in 
favour of free movement, and the resulting disapplication of national rules, would 
nevertheless impact on the outcome of the horizontal dispute, obliging private parties to act 
differently. This includes cases in which the domestic measure seeks to protect a nationally-
recognised fundamental right.  
 
For instance, in Familiapress,
187
 it was an Austrian newspaper that sought an order preventing 
a German publisher from selling, in Austria, its publications, which contained prize draws 
contrary to Austrian law. It will be recalled from previous chapters that this domestic measure 
sought to ensure a greater range of publications in Austria, and thus protect the fundamental 
right to freedom of expression. The German publishers argued that the Austrian rule could not 
be applied since it was contrary to the free movement of goods. Working through its standard 
two-stage approach, the CJEU agreed that the ban constituted a restriction of Article 34 TFEU 
and it consequently fell to the national court to determine whether this prima facie wrongful 
conduct could be justified.  
 
Similarly, in Dynamic Medien,
188
 a private company brought an action against its competitor 
for selling DVDs, imported from the UK, in contravention of a German law on the protection 
of young people. The competitor argued that the German measure was itself in breach of the 
free movement of goods and must be set aside. The CJEU again used the two-stage 
framework to adjudicate this conflict. Since this model is weighted towards free movement, 
the Court did not ask whether the competitor was acting in breach of the fundamental rights of 
the child, and whether this could be justified. The question, instead, was whether the German 
rule, as a restriction of Article 34 TFEU, was warranted.  
 
                                                          
186
 Case C-33/97 Colim NV v Bigg’s Continent [1999] EU:C:1999:274; Case 74/76 Iannelli v Meroni [1977] 
EU:C:1977:51; Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic v Eco Emballages [2002] EU:C:2002:343 
187
 Case C-368/95 Familiapress, n.23 
188
 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien, n.23 
 174 
 
Accordingly, in both Familiapress and Dynamic Medien we see the importation of a structural 
preference for free movement into new interactions between free movement and fundamental 
rights, caused by the expansion of vertical direct effect into horizontal disputes. These cases 
concern the use of free movement rules as a shield to prevent the application of a domestic 
fundamental rights measure in a dispute between private parties. This can also be termed 
triangular effect. A second type of triangular situation arises where there is a formally vertical 
dispute between an individual and a Member State but this, in reality, represents tensions 
between two private parties. In the context of directives, the Court has held that 'mere adverse 
repercussions on the rights of third parties…do not justify preventing an individual from 
relying on the provisions of a directive against the Member State…'189 This could have 
profound effects on fundamental rights protection. For instance, in a factually similar situation 
to Schmidberger, once the decision had been made to allow the demonstration to proceed, 
affected undertakings could challenge that decision as a breach of Article 34 TFEU prior to 
the protest, in order to prevent demonstrators from exercising their fundamental rights to 
freedom of expression and association that thereby restricts a transit route for economic 
undertakings.  
 
 
4.2. Purely horizontal situations   
 
As well as being used as a shield against the application of Member State fundamental rights 
rules, private parties may invoke some of the free movement provisions as a sword directly 
against the private exercise of fundamental rights. This is a direct result of their horizontal 
direct effect, allowing them to be utilised in actions against private parties.
190
  
 
The first steps in bestowing horizontal direct effect on certain of the free movement 
provisions can be observed in the “collective regulator” cases, in which the Court consistently 
stated that parties not established under public law, who regulate conduct within the market, 
are bound by free movement obligations. The Court’s reasoning in Walrave, in which a 
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cyclists’ union was subject to Articles 45 and 56 TFEU,191 arguably demonstrates that this is 
logical in light of the economic goals of the Union. It remarked that ‘the abolition of barriers 
of national origin could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal 
autonomy by associations…which do not come under public law’.192 Moreover, variations in 
Member State approaches for regulating work, some grounded in public law, others in private 
regulation, could result in inequality in the application of the relevant free movement rules.
193
  
 
Nevertheless, this very evolution makes a distinctive contribution to the further subjugation of 
fundamental rights to the free movement provisions by opening the door to further interaction 
between these norms, and extending the two-stage approach to actions taken by formally 
private institutions. While private actors, as collective regulators, might pursue activity 
largely similar to directly discriminatory domestic laws – such as an employment policy 
stipulating the recruitment of only national workers – the collective regulator case-law creates 
potential for the extension of the free movement provisions to private individuals acting in a 
purely private capacity. This could include the exercise of their fundamental rights. Indeed, in 
Bosman, the potentially limiting effects on private exercise of fundamental rights were 
explicitly cited as a reason not to apply Article 45 TFEU, on workers, to private parties.
194
 
However, while the CJEU acknowledged that free movement is more likely to interact with 
fundamental rights where it is directly effective horizontally, it determined, on the facts, that 
this would not be inappropriate in the given case, since the collective regulator’s rules were 
not necessary to enjoy the fundamental right to freedom of association.
195
 Within the factual 
confines of Bosman, where the fundamental rights issue was tangential, this approach seems 
reasonable. However, it becomes problematic if Bosman, and the collective regulator case-law 
more broadly, is used as general authority for the horizontal application of Article 45 to 
private actors, since this would inhibit future consideration, in different factual situations, of 
whether the horizontal application of free movement is inappropriate in light of the private 
exercise of fundamental rights. 
 
Nonetheless, Walrave and Bosman have been consistently cited as general authority for the 
application of free movement obligations to other private bodies, pursuing activities 
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unconnected to market regulation, and/or exercising their fundamental rights. Thus, in 
Angonese,
196
 the Court relied on those judgments to apply Article 45 TFEU to a private bank, 
which required employees to have a certificate of bilingualism obtained in the Italian region 
of Bolzano.
197
 The outcome of the case is understandable, on the one hand, since the rule, 
being indirectly discriminatory in nature, clearly imposed obstacles to the cross-border 
movement of workers. Yet, on the other, the judgment, nevertheless, represents a 
generalisation of the principle in Walrave. Indeed, it has been described, by Dashwood, as 
‘distinctly odd’ since the employer in Angonese could not be described as an association 
collectively regulating employment in the Italian banking sector.
198
 In fact, the bank, acting 
individually, simply sought a method of ensuring that its employees were proficient in both 
languages of the region. 
 
Similarly, and more significantly for our purposes, the Court, in its Viking and Laval 
decisions, cited Walrave and Bosman, amongst other collective regulator cases,
199
 as authority 
for the extension of the direct effect of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, respectively, to trade unions 
who had been exercising their fundamental right to strike.
200
 This is problematic for two 
interconnected reasons: 1) the Court’s focus on the capacity of trade unions to regulate the 
market
201
 fails explicitly to appreciate that trade unions use methods for rule formulation that 
utilise and impact on fundamental rights; 2) this authority ignores the separate representative 
task of trade unions, which was not the function of the other private regulatory organisations 
in the Walrave line of case-law.  
 
In Viking, the Court repeated its Walrave mantra that the abolition of obstacles to free 
movement would be compromised if barriers created by bodies not governed by public law 
were not eliminated.
202
 The Court noted that ‘in exercising their autonomous power...trade 
unions participate in the drawing up of agreements seeking to regulate paid work 
collectively’.203 In this passage, the Court seems to consider the ability to regulate collectively 
of key significance. However, both Viking and Laval distinguish themselves from Walrave et 
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al because, although trade unions participate in market regulation, this is by virtue of their 
representative function. As Davies notes, ‘professional bodies are given exclusive control 
over a particular area of economic activity, whereas unions are (in general) given the right to 
take collective action in support of their negotiating activities’.204 By shoe-horning trade 
unions into the existing Walrave framework, which concerns exclusive control of regulation, 
the involvement of fundamental rights in unions’ regulatory function as a result of the 
generally weaker economic position of workers, is somewhat underappreciated in the Court’s 
reasoning. Moreover, the fact that a trade union formulates rules through negotiation and, 
where necessary, by means of the exercise of the fundamental rights to strike, rather than 
through exclusive control, could significantly alter the meaning of questions such as ‘was the 
action taken by the party in breach proportionate?’.205  
 
As well as overlooking the methodology of unions’ regulatory function, the reliance on 
Walrave neglects the purely representative capacity of trade unions. The extension of 
horizontal effect to trade unions puts this role, and its related fundamental rights, at risk. As 
emphasised above, the Walrave case-law concerns collective regulators with exclusive control 
for laying down rules and imposing sanctions in relation to a regulatory field. Accordingly, it 
offers authority for the application of Articles 56 and 45 TFEU to bodies solely concerned 
with regulating an area of activity,
206
 and not with performing a representative function that is 
often linked to, but can be entirely separate from, their regulatory role. Consequently, the 
extension of horizontal direct effect to trade unions in Viking and Laval arguably 
underappreciates the crucial part played by trade unions in securing the fundamental right of 
workers to fair and just working conditions,
207
 to information and consultation in respect of 
the employer undertaking,
208
 broader rights to collective action,
209
 and protection in the event 
of unfair dismissal.
210
 Significantly, it also puts trade unions’ abilities to organise ‘political 
strikes’ at risk where this impedes cross-border activity. This is exacerbated by the 
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imbalanced nature of the breach/justification model since, as demonstrated by Viking, 
collective action in relation to cross-border outsourcing will only be justifiable where current 
jobs are ‘jeopardised or under serious threat’.211 As Weatherill remarks, this excludes the 
possibility of ‘more long-term strategic action by unions and even the ‘political strike’ in so 
far as it impedes cross-border movement. That constitutes a dramatic incursion into the 
permitted scope of collective labour rights’.212    
 
The Court did attempt to bolster its reasoning in Viking by stating that trade unions are not 
(only) subject to Article 49 TFEU as collective regulators but also simply because private 
parties are capable of restricting free movement. It used the cases of Schmidberger and 
Spanish Strawberries to illustrate this point.
213
 Accordingly, the notion that horizontal direct 
effect is restricted to bodies exercising a quasi-public or legislative function was rejected.
214
 
The Court’s reliance on Schmidberger and Spanish Strawberries is open to challenge. As 
Dashwood notes, ‘it is inaccurate to claim that those decisions “rely fundamentally on the 
reasoning that private parties can jeopardise the objectives of the provisions on freedom of 
movement”’.215 Rather, the actions of private parties merely form the factual background to 
the separate issue that public inaction can impede free movement.
216
 Yet, in Viking, we see 
this used to justify the extension of direct effect to those private parties who exercise 
fundamental rights. Indeed, in contrast to Bosman, in which the Court seemed to accept the 
argument, in principle, that the exercise of fundamental rights might prevent the direct 
application of free movement rules to private parties, in Viking, the very existence of 
restrictive effects on free movement by the exercise of fundamental rights is seemingly 
provided as a reason to apply Article 49 TFEU directly to private parties.  
 
Crucially, this alters the dynamic between free movement and fundamental rights in a number 
of ways. First, the frequency and types of interaction between these norms increase, 
introducing structural imbalance into a new free movement/fundamental right interface. 
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Specifically, in Schmidberger, actions were limited to claims against the inaction of the 
Member State, whereas in Viking and Laval, this was extended to the activities of private 
actors. The nature of the conflict is also altered since the question in Schmidberger was 
whether a public authority had appropriately managed the relationship between two rights-
holders: the logistics company wishing to exercise free movement rights, and the 
demonstrators exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of expression and association. 
By contrast, the extension of the applicability of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU directly to private 
actors, in Viking and Laval, leads to a qualitatively very different question: in exercising its 
own fundamental rights, has the private party ensured that its actions will not unduly restrict 
the free movement rights of others? This is not an obligation, placed on a public body, to 
weigh two competing interests, but a requirement that a private actor monitor her/his own 
exercise of fundamental rights to ensure that it does not interfere disproportionately with free 
movement. Further, since the two-stage breach/justification methodology is maintained in 
instances of horizontal direct effect, there is no obligation on the holders of free movement 
rights to consider the proportionality of free movement on the fundamental rights of the other 
private party.  
 
This approach is particularly unsuitable in Laval when we consider that, during collective 
action, social partners are effectively in opposition and that the whole point of strikes is to 
drive the employer to the point where they are willing to consider the trade union’s terms. 
Yet, as a result of the horizontal applicability of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, trade unions are 
required to take into consideration not only the interests of their members but also the 
interests of those they are acting against.
217
 More broadly, Spaventa speculates as to the 
impact of the Court’s reliance on Schmidberger and Spanish Strawberries on the fundamental 
rights of private parties having no regulatory role whatsoever. She asks if, for instance, a 
human rights group that organises a boycott against products coming from a Member State, 
which has attracted criticism for a political situation, is potentially liable for the restrictive 
effects of that boycott on Article 34 TFEU.
218
 Of course, there are situations in which a 
citizen will be expected to keep the exercise of her/his own fundamental rights in check. For 
instance, journalists are required to ensure that their exercise of the freedom of expression 
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does not unduly interfere with the right to privacy. However, since fundamental rights are not 
generally horizontally effective, this is achieved by reference to rules developed through an 
objective balancing of various public interests during the process of law-making, or via the 
measures of collective regulators. Thus, in Spanish Strawberries,
219
 the demonstrators could 
regulate their direct action by reference to the criminal law, which would prohibit violent 
conduct or the destruction of property, whilst the State was in breach of free movement law 
for failing to enforce it. By contrast, post-Laval, trade unions are expected to intuit, 
objectively, when their actions go too far, even when they are acting in compliance with 
domestic law.    
 
Second, the application of free movement to a private party in Viking and Laval, rather than 
the State as in Schmidberger, seemingly results in a more rigorous justification assessment by 
the Court. Specifically, the Court in both Viking and Laval examined the legitimacy of the aim 
behind the exercise of the fundamental right to strike, where it had held in Schmidberger that 
this was not relevant to the question of justification. This is seemingly a direct consequence of 
the application of the free movement provisions to a private party rather than the State. In 
Schmidberger, the Court focused purely on the question of whether the Member State had 
done enough to ensure that the freedom of goods was not unduly restricted by the exercise of 
fundamental rights, since the aim behind the protest related to the actions of the protestors 
themselves.
220
 By contrast, Advocate General Mengozzi, in his Opinion in Laval, explicitly 
distinguishes Schmidberger on the basis that ‘the aims pursued by the collective action taken 
by the defendant in the main proceedings are…decisive in the context of a dispute in which 
only private persons are parties’.221 This was echoed by the Court, which not only scrutinised 
the existence of the fundamental right to strike but also whether its exercise pursued a 
legitimate objective. As previously discussed, although worker protection was a legitimate 
aim in Viking and Laval, this approach might pose a threat to the political expression of trade 
unions. This risk is potentially increased by the Court’s combined use of 
Schmidberger/Spanish Strawberries with the Walrave case-law, since Walrave arguably side-
lines the purely representative function of trade unions and calls into question whether purely 
political activities will be legitimate where these impede free movement. The potential 
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liabilities arising from the British Jobs for British Workers strike action at the Lindsey Oil 
Refinery are pertinent here.
222
 In combination with the possibility of unlimited damages 
liability, the uncertainty around which objectives will legitimise collective action has the 
potential to discourage trade unions from exercising their representative function.
223
 This is 
simply not an issue in relation to Schmidberger actions against Member States, where aim is 
not relevant.  
 
Even the legitimacy of worker protection was limited, in Viking, to the safeguarding of jobs 
that were at ‘serious risk’.224 Accordingly, we see a distinctive architectural imbalance faced 
by private actors under the two-stage process, through the introduction of an additional 
evidentiary hurdle. The requirement that private parties demonstrate not only that they are 
exercising a fundamental right but also that the reasons behind it conform to an overriding 
reason of the public interest can be viewed as doubling the derogation requirement, since it is 
normally sufficient to provide one permissible justification, where here it is necessary to 
present two. Alternatively, existence of the exercise of the fundamental right to strike in 
Viking and Laval is effectively bypassed, with judicial focus centring on worker protection as 
a public interest.
225
 Moreover, even if objectives are found to be legitimate, the exercise of 
fundamental rights must still be appropriate and necessary in relation to that goal. Thus, in 
Viking, even where jobs were in jeopardy, trade unions had to exhaust collective measures 
that were less restrictive of free movement before taking strike action.
226
 In Laval, industrial 
action with the goal of worker protection could only be justified where it sought to apply the 
terms and conditions referred to in the core nucleus of the PWD.
227
 
 
Third, the reliance on Schmidberger to extend direct effect to private parties increases 
structural imbalance because the rationale for this expansion – that the exercise of 
fundamental rights is capable of restricting free movement – is also the very activity that 
private parties must rely on to justify their consequent breach of EU law. Yet, this reasoning 
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inherently perceives the exercise of fundamental rights as a wrongful act in need of control. 
Thus, in Viking and Laval, exercise of the fundamental right to strike was both the trade 
unions’ reason for restricting free movement and the rationale for applying Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU to private actors in the first place. Moreover, this reasoning creates the possibility that, 
for instance, in a future action factually similar to Schmidberger, Article 34 TFEU could be 
applied to the demonstrators themselves because their exercise of the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression can have a restrictive impact on the free movement of goods. Yet, this 
fundamental right would also be the justification for the protestors’ actions. This is markedly 
different from Schmidberger itself, in which the decision of a public body not to prevent a 
demonstration was in breach of free movement but its justification lay in the exercise of 
fundamental rights by private individuals. Accordingly, it was the process of this decision-
making that was subject to questions of proportionality, not the decision to exercise 
fundamental rights in and of itself.     
 
Fourth, the Treaty provisions are not necessarily designed with private parties in mind, putting 
them at a disadvantage when individuals come to rely on Treaty derogations to justify their 
breach of free movement. Thus, Dashwood argues that the a fortiori point that the free 
movement provisions should be afforded direct effect because private parties are able to 
present barriers to free movement is ‘unconvincing’.228 Specifically, he posits that while such 
an approach would be viable in relation to Treaty articles targeted at addressing mischief that 
can be both caused and cured entirely by private hands,
229
 this is not true for the market 
freedoms.
230
 For Dashwood, the free movement provisions are chiefly directed at ‘mischief’ 
created by a public power.
231
 Indeed, the horizontal direct effect of the relevant free 
movement provisions would appear to be the result of a purposive, rather than textual, 
interpretation of the Treaty. In Viking, the Court explicitly recognised that ‘certain provisions 
of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States’,232 but nevertheless extended the 
reach of Article 49 TFEU in light of the potential for private individual to restrict cross-border 
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establishment. Accordingly, Treaty derogations from free movement are also likely to be 
designed to cater for the legitimate needs of public bodies. This would automatically increase 
the structural disadvantage faced by private undertakings, already on the procedural back-
foot, when they seek to defend their prima facie wrongful breach of free movement rules at 
the justification phase of the two-stage framework. As De Witte asks, why should private 
undertakings be exposed to an obligation to respect free movement rights ‘when the legitimate 
reasons that can justify restrictions to trade…are entirely framed in terms of public interest 
and therefore leave private parties empty handed in trying to justify their behaviour’.233   
 
In short, in the admittedly limited instances of direct discrimination, a purely private party 
may find it difficult to justify that its actions were in the interests of public policy, public 
security or public health, as required, for instance, by Article 52(1) TFEU, which dictates the 
circumstances in which limitations on the freedoms of services and establishment might be 
permitted. This will be particularly relevant where private undertakings do not act as 
collective regulators – who in performing functions similar to those of the State might rely on 
justificatory options similar to those of public actors – but instead carry out important 
representative functions by means of exercising fundamental rights.  
 
Of course, many free movement cases concern non-discriminatory activity, for which 
justifications may be drawn from the mandatory requirements.
234
 Broader than the Treaty 
derogations, non-exhaustive and unwritten, these principles seem less open to criticism for 
being ill-suited for use by private parties. However, in some instances, the contributions that 
direct effect has made to a structural favouring of free movement can themselves restrict the 
utilisation of mandatory requirements by private actors. This is illustrated by examining the 
Court’s assessment of worker protection as a justification for the exercise of the right to strike 
in Laval.   
 
It will be recalled that, in Laval, the Court held that the trade unions’ strike action was not 
proportionate since those unions sought a level of protection going above and beyond the core 
nucleus of terms and conditions referred to in Article 3(1)(a)-(g) of the Posted Workers 
Directive. Significantly, although Article 3(10) PWD permitted the application of terms and 
conditions not referred to in Article 3(1)(a)-(g) for reasons of public policy, as a private actor, 
                                                          
233
 De Witte, n.4, 334 
234
 Case 120/78 ‘Cassis de Dijon’, n.16 
 184 
 
a trade union was not entitled to make decisions or impose restrictions in the public 
interest.
235
  
 
This reveals an inconsistent approach in the reasoning of the Court when viewed as a whole. 
The CJEU’s reliance on the collective regulator case-law to support the application of Article 
56 TFEU to trade unions must be rooted in the perception of trade unions as the equivalent of 
public actors when performing their regulatory function. This is emphasised by the Court’s 
statement, in Walrave, that ‘since…working conditions in the various Member States are 
governed sometimes by provisions laid down by law or regulation and sometimes by…acts 
adopted by private persons, to limit the prohibitions in question to acts of a public authority 
would risk creating inequality in application’.236 And yet, at the justification stage, a public 
policy derogation to extend the overriding requirement of worker protection, in the context of 
posting, may only be utilised by de jure public actors.
237
 Trade unions, now viewed as private 
actors, may not rely on public policy to defend their prima facie wrongful exercise of the 
fundamental right to strike. Since terms and conditions beyond the core nucleus may be 
applied for reasons of public policy in Member States that regulate labour through legislation, 
rather than social partners, this outcome could lead to the very inequality in application that 
Walrave claims to tackle.
238
 Accordingly, despite the Court’s statement in Bosman, that ‘there 
is nothing to preclude individuals from relying on justifications on grounds of public policy, 
public security, or public health’, these are, in certain situations, unavailable to private 
parties.
239
  
 
Consequently, the procedural disadvantage facing fundamental rights, when they are 
presented by the two-stage model as prima facie unlawful restrictions on free movement, can 
be even greater in instances of the exercise of fundamental rights by private individuals. 
Horizontal direct effect simultaneously makes it possible to bring actions against private 
parties for exercising their fundamental rights while restricting the opportunity to defend these 
rights. Admittedly, Laval, and the interpretation of the PWD, is a very particular example in 
this regard. Nevertheless, it introduces broader questions about who the Court will consider 
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capable of, for instance, implementing the mandatory requirements of environmental or 
consumer protection in future cases.      
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the doctrine of direct effect has made both indirect and 
distinctive contributions to the creation of an imbalanced architecture for the adjudication of 
conflicts between free movement and fundamental rights. It has posited that the influence of 
the Van Gend criteria during the process of conferring direct effect status on the free 
movement provisions has encouraged a perception of them as unconditional and precise. 
Consequently, Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1) and 65(1) are viewed as derogations from free 
movement rights to be interpreted restrictively, rather than as conditions for their exercise. 
This reinforced the need for a two-stage breach/justification process, which is problematic 
when free movement interacts with fundamental rights. The reading of the market freedoms 
as ‘precise’ limited the capacity of secondary legislation to incorporate fundamental rights 
considerations into the definition of originally programmatic free movement provisions, 
instead relegating them to the position of opposing derogations from precisely defined and 
unconditional economic freedoms. Direct effect has also strengthened the presentation of the 
market freedoms as individual rights. This has increased the frequency of interactions 
between free movement and fundamental rights as individuals have demonstrated new ways 
by which free movement can be restricted. It has also contributed to the conflation of free 
movement as an individual right with its role as a fundamental principle of the internal 
market, lending linguistic substance to the procedural prioritisation of free movement 
generally. By requiring the immediate setting aside of fundamental rights measures, which 
conflict with free movement, and by making it possible to bring damages actions against 
private parties for exercising their fundamental rights, the principles of primacy and effective 
judicial protection have aggravated the structural subjugation of fundamental rights to the free 
movement provisions. The extension of direct effect to new actors – i.e. from public to private 
– has increased the frequency of interactions between free movement and fundamental rights. 
Moreover, the nature of those conflicts has changed since private actors are obliged to provide 
a legitimate aim behind their exercise of a fundamental right and, at times, rely on 
justificatory options ill-suited to the private exercise of fundamental rights. In short, direct 
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effect has had a significant and multifaceted impact on the procedural prioritisation of free 
movement over fundamental rights.     
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Chapter Four* 
 
UNION CITIZENSHIP: FUNDAMENTALISING FREE MOVEMENT AND 
EXACERBATING STRUCTURAL IMBALANCE? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Article 20 TFEU bestows upon every person, holding the nationality of a Member State, 
citizenship of the Union. Pursuant to Article 21 TFEU, Union citizens enjoy rights including: 
freedom of movement and residence within the territory of the Union; the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in municipal and European parliamentary elections in the Member State 
of residence on the same basis as nationals; access to protection by the diplomatic and 
consular authorities of any Member State in a third country where the citizen’s Member State 
of nationality is not represented; and the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to 
the European Ombudsman, and to address Union institutions and advisory bodies in any of 
the Treaty languages and receive a reply in the same language. Putting aside the omission to 
include third country nationals within these provisions,
1
 Union citizenship would accordingly 
appear to be rights-enhancing. In particular, the availability of a right to intra-EU movement 
for all citizens, attached to their personal rather than economic status, has facilitated access to 
fundamental social rights by economically inactive Union citizens residing in host Member 
States.
2
 Nevertheless, borne from the existing concept of market citizenship, formal Union 
citizenship was introduced, at Maastricht, into a climate of scepticism.
3
 In particular, criticism 
has principally focused on the still pertinent question of whether Union citizenship goes far 
enough in recognising the fundamental rights of economically inactive individuals when it 
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still vests largely in movement,
4
 and when the right to move is still essentially subject to 
limitations and conditions associated with economic activity or economic self-sufficiency.
5
 
 
By contrast, but still focusing on its market origins, this chapter will argue that there is a 
paradox inherent in pursuing fundamental rights protection through the concept of EU 
citizenship. Specifically, the chapter will posit that, by adopting free movement as its core 
right and attaching it to the personal status of the individual citizen, Union citizenship has 
elevated free movement to a fundamental right. This lends legitimacy to, and emphasises the 
need for, an adjudicative framework, such as the two-stage breach/justification model, that 
favours free movement over conflicting law and policy. Within the confines of citizenship, 
where free movement generally runs congruent to fundamental rights this can be viewed as 
enhancing the fundamental rights of Union citizens, particularly in the field of fundamental 
social rights.
6
 However, a deeper analysis demonstrates that this enriched fundamental rights 
protection is only possible as a corollary of the structural boost that Union citizenship offers 
to free movement. Consequently, citizenship’s reinforcement of the two-stage approach 
contains the potential indirectly to subject fundamental rights to a strengthened free 
movement bias where the former clashes with the latter, placing fundamental rights at further 
structural disadvantage. Although this is more likely to occur in the domain of economic free 
movement, since Union citizenship was built upon the existing structures of the internal 
market any enhanced preference for free movement within Union citizenship is likely to 
cross-pollinate, via this shared architecture, into the economic sphere. Moreover, Union 
citizenship has, in any case, directly contributed to the increased frequency of interaction 
between the market freedoms and fundamental rights. Specifically, by attaching free 
movement to the rights of individual citizens, citizenship offers reasons to broaden the 
‘breachability’ of the free movement provisions. In some cases, this has resulted in the 
presentation of fundamental social rights as potential restrictions of EU law. Moreover, since 
breaches of free movement now also constitute interference with the rights of Union citizens, 
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Union citizenship encourages an increase in the evidentiary hurdles faced at the justification 
stage.    
 
The chapter unpacks this argument by first outlining, in section two, the market origins of 
Union citizenship. The section serves as an important reminder that formalised Union 
citizenship emerged from a market citizenship, which sought, principally, to recognise the 
human needs of the economic actor. As a result, a formal EU citizenship has adopted free 
movement as its core right and utilised the basic legal structures of the internal market to 
provide it. This historical backdrop is critical since it displays the enmeshed nature of 
citizenship and economic free movement and, therefore, the possibility for developments 
taking place within one to cross-pollinate into the other. 
 
Section three will highlight that, by attaching free movement to the personal status of Union 
citizens, EU citizenship has personalised and fundamentalised free movement, presenting it as 
a fundamental right. This supports the use of an adjudicative architecture weighted towards 
supporting free movement. Moreover, since free movement straddles both the personal and 
economic spheres, this fundamentalisation of free movement is likely to seep into the market 
freedoms. 
 
Section four analyses the potential consequences, from a fundamental rights perspective, of 
Union citizenship’s reinforcement of the two-stage breach/justification methodology. It 
postulates, first, that the fundamentalisation of free movement has altered its ‘breachability’ 
by domestic policy in the field of fundamental social rights. In particular, citizenship has 
created new situations in which complex programmes of social protection can be challenged 
as barriers to the exercise of free movement by individual Union citizens. The section argues, 
second, that by increasing the constitutional significance of a breach of free movement, Union 
citizenship has raised the evidential bar at the justification stage, arguably reducing further the 
opportunity for opposing fundamental rights to overcome the procedural disadvantage they 
face under the two-stage framework. Accordingly, the section considers Union citizenship as 
the third contributor within our constitutional trinity, alongside the constitutional 
developments discussed in chapters two and three, to the structural subjugation of 
fundamental rights to the market freedoms.     
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Having explained the capacity of Union citizenship to have limiting effects, in some 
instances, on Member States’ abilities to design workable systems for safeguarding 
fundamental social rights, section five re-frames the discussion in terms of the challenges 
currently facing Union citizenship. It advances that EU citizenship is at a cross-roads: it must 
either evolve so as to cater better, at the supranational level, for those fundamental rights that 
clash with free movement, or it must at least ensure that it does not operate to undermine 
fundamental rights protection offered at the domestic level. In this way, Union citizenship 
presents itself as a case-study for a wider constitutional issue remarked upon in chapter one. 
As a polity built on conferred powers, having diverse and, at times, conflicting contemporary 
objectives, with varying levels of legislative competence to achieve them, the Union must 
either offer supranational solutions to the negative aspects of deregulation caused by free 
movement, or the Court should adapt its adjudicative methodology to allow the Member 
States sufficient room to pursue legitimate aims outside of the shadow of a breach of free 
movement.
7
      
 
 
2. Union citizenship: borne from, and built upon, the internal market  
 
This section will demonstrate the historical and structural links between the internal market 
and Union citizenship and therefore the potential for seepage between the two. This is crucial 
to our understanding of how any fundamentalisation of free movement within citizenship 
might operate also to reinforce a structural advantage for economic free movement over 
fundamental rights. The section will first document the emergence of an incipient form of 
market citizenship as part of the judicial and legislative recognition that, in order to form an 
effective internal market, it would be necessary to meet the human needs of the economic 
actor, who might otherwise be disinclined to participate in free movement. The section will 
outline, second, that the result of this historical progression is that when Union citizenship 
was formalised in the Maastricht Treaty, the right to move and reside freely between the 
Member States was not only central to the rights associated with it but was also built upon 
existing internal market frameworks.    
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2.1. An incipient form of Union citizenship: recognising the human needs of the 
economic actor   
 
It will be recalled from chapter one that the creation of a European Economic Community 
followed unsuccessful attempts, focused on political and defensive union, to secure a more 
integrated Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War.
8
 This is reflected in the 
preamble to the Rome Treaty, which states that its signatories are ‘determined to lay the 
foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’. Nevertheless, the Rome 
Treaty clearly pursued integration via an economic framework. Accordingly, Article 2 EEC 
made explicit that the central task of the then-Community was the achievement of the 
common market. Although a social purpose was also visible in the Rome Treaty – for 
instance, its preamble speaks of the need to ensure social progress in the Member States – 
Article 2 EEC presents this as achievable through the medium of the common market. 
Moreover, as chapter three documented, the social provisions in the Rome Treaty, such as the 
principle of equal pay between men and women and the maintenance of paid holiday 
schemes, while serving important social functions, were principally inspired by the need to 
avoid distortions in competition.
9
 In short, the attainment of social goals was pursued by 
making provision for the needs of workers, enjoyed through their status as economic actors, 
and framed, initially at least, in terms of the negative impact, on economic integration, of 
ignoring the fact that workers are also human beings. Thus, regardless of whether the Rome 
Treaty can be said to have contained social as well as economic aims these would chiefly be 
shaped by, and built upon, the narrow economic foundations and legal structures of the 
internal market. 
 
For instance, several provisions of the Rome Treaty sought to improve the employment 
opportunities, working conditions, and standards of living of Union workers.
10
 Since free 
movement was the cornerstone of the common market, both the Union legislature and the 
judiciary endeavoured, almost from free movement’s inception, to ensure that certain human 
needs were met. For instance, Regulation 1612/68 (now repealed) – concerning the freedom 
of movement of workers within the then-Community – provided that Union workers ‘should 
                                                          
8
 In 1954, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence 
Community. See E. Furdson, ‘The European Defence Community: A History’, (Macmillan, 1980); J. Pinder, 
‘The Building of European Union’, (OUP, 1998) 
9
 Arts.119-120 EEC; ch.3, s.2.2. 
10
 See Part Three, Title III EEC, in particular Chapters 1 and 2, concerning social policy and the European social 
fund.  
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enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers’.11 The Court of Justice 
interpreted this provision widely, holding that it applied not only to social and tax advantages 
attached to worker status but also to benefits payable by virtue of residence on Member State 
territory.
12
 Regulation 1612/68, and later Directive 2004/38,
13
 also permitted Union workers 
to bring certain family members with them to the host State,
14
 and made provision for the 
children of Union workers to have access to State education.
15
 In relation to primary law, in 
O’Flynn, the Court recognised the family links that migrant workers generally maintain with 
their State of origin, finding UK rules restricting financial support for funerals to those taking 
place in the UK to be, therefore, in breach of Article 45 TFEU, on free movement of 
workers.
16
 Indeed, the Union judiciary has long acknowledged the general importance of 
treating the worker as a human being.
17
 
 
Nevertheless, although these legislative and judicial developments might well represent 
genuine attempts to secure important rights for workers – such as the fundamental right to 
family life or fundamental social rights – this could only be processed as a corollary of doing 
what ‘[s]eemed suitable to facilitate the mobility’ of Union workers,18 and was accordingly 
secured via the framework of economic integration. Clearly, the chance of a Union worker 
moving from one Member State to another, in order to work, would be significantly reduced if 
restricted access to social, tax, or pension benefits left her/him ‘worse off’ after exercising 
free movement rights; or if moving to another Member State created legal or practical 
obstacles to family life. Through addressing these practical issues, free movement could 
become a more effective mechanism for the internal market, and therefore, for economic 
integration.  
                                                          
11
 Arts.7(2) and 9, Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15
th
 October 1968 on Freedom of Movement of 
Workers within the Community (OJ 1968 L257/2) 
12
 Case 32/75 Cristini v SNCF [1975] EU:C:1975:120; Case 207/78 Ministère public v Even [1979] 
EU:C:1979:144  
13
 Directive 2004/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the rights of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (OJ 2004 L158/77) 
14
 Arts.10-12 Regulation 1612/68; Arts.6(2) and 7(2) Directive 2004/38 
15
 Art.12 Regulation 1612/68, which remained in place after the amendments introduced by Directive 2004/38. 
The substance of Art.12 of Regulation 1612/68 is maintained by Art.10 Regulation 492/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5
th
 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers (codification) (OJ 2011 
L141/1)  
16
 Case C-237/94 O’Flynn [1996] EU:C:1996:206, although this case post-dates the introduction of Union 
citizenship, it nevertheless provides a useful example of the Court’s understanding of the utility of recognising 
the human needs of workers for the facilitation of economic integration.  
17
 E.g. AG Trabucchi stated in Case 7/75 Mr and Mrs F v Belgian State [1975] EU:C:1975:75 that ‘the migrant 
worker is not to be regarded by Community law…as a mere source of labour but is viewed as a human being’, 
para.5 
18
 Case 207/78 Even, n.12, para.22 
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And yet, as early as 1961, the Commission recognised free movement as ‘le premier aspect 
d’une citoyenneté européenne’.19 The preamble to Regulation 1612/68 also viewed free 
movement as ‘a fundamental right of workers…and a means by which the worker is 
guaranteed the possibility of…promoting his social advancement’.20 Thus, free movement 
quickly emerged as more than just a tool for the creation of the internal market. It presented a 
means by which integration might be achieved beyond the economic; a route to an ‘ever-
closer union among [all] of the peoples of Europe’. Indeed, in Bettray, Advocate General 
Jacobs considered that the preamble to Regulation 1612/68 gave ‘precedence to the 
fundamental rights of workers over satisfying the requirements of the economies of the 
Member States’.21 Hence, the Court began to stretch the definitions of the ‘economic actor’ so 
as to provide free movement rights to those who were not net contributors to the host State. 
Those employed on part-time or fixed-term contracts, who relied on host State welfare 
provision to supplement their earnings, remained ‘workers’, consequently enjoying residence 
rights and social and tax advantages, as long as their work was ‘genuine and effective’.22 
Similarly, in a ‘daring [judicial] milestone’, the CJEU included service recipients within the 
freedom of services, though they were not covered by a strict and literal interpretation of 
Article 56 TFEU.
23
 This served ‘to expand the personal scope of the Treaty and make any 
direct economic link between the freedom exercised and the right(s) claimed less 
necessary’.24 Further, the Union legislature adopted secondary legislation that afforded free 
movement rights to economically inactive individuals, subject to certain conditions such as 
economic self-sufficiency and comprehensive sickness insurance.
25
 Thus, free movement 
                                                          
19
 European Commission, P.E. Deb, No.48, 135, 22
nd
 November 1961, cited by A. Evans, ‘European 
Citizenship’ (1982) 45 MLR 497, 499 
20
 N.11, Recital 3 
21
 Case 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1989] EU:C:1989:113, para.29 
22
 Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] EU:C:1982:105; Case 139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie [1986] EU:C:1986:223; Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] 
EU:C:1986:284; Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche v Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst [2003] 
EU:C:2003:600  
23
 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] EU:C:1984:35; Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] 
EU:C:1989:47. Since all of the constitutional developments discussed in this thesis overlap, the significance of 
the extension of the freedom of services to the service recipient was discussed in ch.2, s.2.2.2. as part of the 
analysis of the expansion in the personal scope of the free movement provisions.  
24
 N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Third Age of EU Citizenship’, in P. Sypris (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the 
EU Market, (CUP, 2012), 331, 335 
25
 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence (OJ 1990 L180/26) (economically 
self-sufficient citizens); Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees 
and self-employed persons who have ceased their economic activity (OJ 1990 L180/38) (retired persons); 
Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students (OJ 1993 L317/59). 
Although these very conditions led to these instruments frequently being collectively termed the ‘Playboy 
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began to ‘transcend the character of European integration as a purely economic project and to 
develop it in the direction of a political community’.26 
 
Consequently, the ‘incremental interpretative steps’, highlighted above, ‘became critical 
components in the legal construction of citizenship rights’.27 Free movement, and the existing 
market citizenship that these interpretative stepping stones had engendered, offered a means 
by which the EEC could evolve into a more political and social union without seeming to 
diverge as radically from its constitutional origins as might otherwise have been the case. It 
was therefore logical that, when Union citizenship was formalised in the Maastricht Treaty, a 
right to move freely between the Member States would be central to the rights associated with 
it, and that this right would be built on existing internal market frameworks. It is to these 
‘gifts’, which the internal market has been able to offer Union citizenship in the form of basic 
legal structures and historical legitimacy, to which we turn in the next section. This discussion 
will form critical background understanding for the later analysis of the transfer of the 
increased constitutional significance of free movement within Union citizenship into 
economic free movement, and the consequent exacerbation of structural bias within the two-
stage breach/justification model.   
 
However, it is worth pausing, first, to outline the potential contributions market citizenship 
was already making to architectural imbalance, and to increased interaction between free 
movement and fundamental rights, prior to the legal formalisation of citizenship at 
Maastricht. In particular, the gradual extension of social advantages to which Union workers 
were entitled, by its nature, created new interactions between free movement and programmes 
for securing fundamental social rights, implemented at domestic-level. Similarly, in O’Flynn, 
the need to recognise the family life of workers, in order to facilitate their free movement as 
economic actors, arguably forms part of the rationale for extending the definition of a breach 
of free movement from direct to indirect discrimination.
28
 Although that decision came after 
the introduction of Union citizenship to the Treaty, there is no mention of it in the judgment 
itself. The case accordingly remains useful in demonstrating the Court’s focus on creating an 
environment conducive to worker movement. Second, the legislative and judicial recognition 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Directives’: see e.g. K. Hailbronner, ‘Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits’ (2005) 42 CMLRev 
1245 
26
 F. Wollenschläger, ‘A New Fundamental Freedom Beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its 
Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration’, (2011) 17 ELJ 1, 14 
27
 N. Nic Shuibhne, n.24, footnote 15 
28
 Case C-237/94 O’Flynn, n.16, para.22 
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of free movement as being a ‘fundamental right’29 of the Union worker that deserved 
‘precedence over the economies of the Member States’,30 ‘loosened the nexus between free 
movement and market integration’.31 Free movement was presented as something more than a 
tool for economic integration. As a right of the individual worker, it also offered opportunity 
for her/his social advancement. This indirectly legitimises, and reinforces the need for, the 
structural prioritisation of free movement over conflicting law and policy, since the promotion 
of free movement runs congruent to these broader benefits. And yet, as section four will argue 
in more detail, such architectural reinforcement can prove problematic where fundamental 
rights are in conflict with free movement. Moreover, recalling the discussion in chapter two 
and the description of O’Flynn above, the expansion of the material scope of free movement 
beyond direct discrimination has itself provoked more instances of clash between free 
movement and fundamental rights.    
 
 
2.2. Free movement as the core right of the EU citizen: utilising the existing tools of the 
internal market to add value to a substantive Union citizenship 
 
The Maastricht Treaty formally employed free movement in an explicitly non-economic 
capacity. Placed in a new Part of the Treaty,
32
 free movement between Member States was to 
be available to individuals by virtue of their personal status as Union citizens.
33
 Although 
other rights were also attached to this status,
34
 the right to move and reside freely in the 
territory of the Member States has been described as the ‘principal right of Union citizens’.35 
Indeed, the vast majority of the Court’s citizenship case-law relates to the free movement 
rights of the Union citizen.
36
 This focus on a right providing for the geographical mobility of 
                                                          
29
 Recital 3, Regulation 1612/68 
30
 AG Jacobs, Case 344/87 Bettray, n.21 
31
 Wollenschläger, n.26, 11 
32
 Part Two of the TEC, ‘Citizenship of the Union’; now, Part Two of the TFEU, ‘Non-Discrimination and 
Citizenship of the Union’.  
33
 Arts.20(2)(a) and 21 TFEU 
34
 See s.1 
35
 AG Poiares Maduro, Case C-524/06 Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2008] EU:C:2008:194, para.19; 
AG Colomer, Joined Case C-11/06 Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln, and C-12/06 Bucher v Landrat des Kreises 
Düren [2007] EU:C:2007:174, para.67’; Everson, n.5, 73-74  
36
 N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 CMLRev 1597, 1612. She notes that 
the exceptions to this trend are Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] EU:C:2006:543 and Case C-
300/04  Eman and Sevinger v College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag [2006] EU:C:2006:545, 
both concerning voting rights. Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v ONEm [2011] EU:C:2011:124 suggested a new 
avenue of case-law grounded in the concept of the ‘genuine enjoyment of rights associated with Union 
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Union citizens, viewed against the historical constitutional development of the EU, is logical 
when one considers, as we did above, that ‘the codification of citizenship rights within the 
Treaty marked just one step in the functional lineage of constitutionally enhanced free 
movement rights’.37 A Union citizenship that focused on free movement, albeit extending it to 
a wider cohort, represented an incremental step in an existing, and largely accepted, 
framework. Moreover, the right to move and reside freely in all Member States brings 
appreciable added-value to a supranational citizenship. Free movement between different 
sovereign Member States allows EU citizenship to offer individuals something that national 
citizenship does not.
38
 
 
As a result of this historical evolution, free movement under citizenship was built upon the 
basic legal structures of economic free movement, resulting in permeable boundaries between 
a market-based freedom and a human-based right. For instance, as within the economic free 
movement provisions, the wholly internal rule is used within citizenship to define the scope of 
Union law. It has been argued that this rule is unnecessary in the context of Union citizenship, 
where the focus is on personal, rather than economic status, and where resort to the principle 
of equality would be more suitable.
39
 Nevertheless, using judicial reasoning established in the 
context of the economic free movement provisions, the CJEU has, for example, held that a 
Union citizen cannot access the generous family reunification rights that are available under 
Union law unless there is a cross-border element to her/his situation.
40
 This means that any 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
citizenship’ but subsequent case-law has linked this to the exercise of cross-border movement e.g. Case C-
434/09 McCarthy v SSHD [2011] EU:C:2011:277; Case C-40/11 Iida v Stadt Ulm [2013] EU:C:2012:691  
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 Nic Shuibhne, ibid, 1627 
38
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40
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fundamental rights benefit – for instance in relation to the fundamental right to family life or 
access to fundamental social rights – that Union citizenship is able to offer citizens is only as 
a corollary of its promotion of free movement. Moreover, the use of the wholly internal rule is 
evidence of the maintenance of historical links between the free movement operating under 
Union citizenship and the market freedoms.   
 
A further example of the borrowing of internal market structures by Union citizenship is 
visible in relation to permissible restrictions on free movement rights. Article 21 TFEU does 
not designate specific derogations from the right to free movement that it bestows upon Union 
citizens. Rather, it references ‘limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and 
secondary legislation’. Article 45(3) TFEU, relating to conditions placed upon the free 
movement of workers, and Article 52(1) TFEU, regarding limitations on the freedom to 
provide services/freedom of establishment, both permit restrictions for reasons of public 
policy, public security, or public health. Thus, in interpreting derogations from the free 
movement rights of Union citizens, detailed in secondary legislation implementing citizenship 
rights, the Court has drawn on its previous case-law relating to derogations from the free 
movement of workers and services.
41
 It has also structured them using the standard two-stage 
approach, requiring derogations from Article 21 TFEU to be interpreted ‘strictly’.42 Given the 
beginnings of Union citizenship, this borrowing makes sense. As Nic Shuibhne notes, it might 
have been legally cleaner to start from scratch and abandon the limitations prescribed by the 
(pre-Maastricht) residence directives, but it would have been ‘politically stupid’.43 Further, 
since it attaches to the individual status of the Union citizen, there would seem to be a greater 
need to interpret derogations from Article 21 TFEU restrictively. Nonetheless, for our 
purposes, this approach is significant since it maintains architectural connections between 
Union citizenship and economic free movement, creating routes by which developments 
within the former can cross-pollinate into the latter. Moreover, as will be discussed further 
later, citizenship’s focus on the individual could indirectly contribute to the imposition of a 
heavier evidentiary burden on fundamental rights where they clash with free movement.  
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 Case C-33/07 Ministerul Administraţiei şi Internelor - Direcţia Generală de Paşapoarte Bucureşti v Jipa 
[2008] EU:C:2008:396, para.23, citing Case 36/75 Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur  [1975] EU:C:1975:137; Case 
30/77 R v Bouchereau [1977] EU:C:1977:172; Case C-54/99 Église de scientologie [2000] EU:C:2000:124; and 
Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] EU:C:2004:614 
42
 Ibid 
43
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In truth, it is impossible to demarcate cleanly between the economic free movement 
provisions and the free movement that is specific to Union citizenship. Economic actors, such 
as workers or the self-employed, are also Union citizens. It is the same cross-border activity 
that triggers both their human-based rights as Union citizens, and their market-based freedoms 
as economic actors. Indeed, this straddling of the personal and the economic is recognised by 
Directive 2004/38. This instrument places the free movement rights of both economically 
active and economically inactive persons under the same legal framework, although the 
conditions for the exercise of those rights continue to differ according to whether an 
individual is economically active or inactive. Thus, blurred lines between Union citizenship 
and the market freedoms are unavoidable, and legislating for both under the same umbrella is 
arguably practical. Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that these shared legal structures 
create a clear portal by which changes occurring within citizenship can seep into the market 
freedoms.  
 
These links between Union citizenship and the internal market nevertheless raised questions, 
themselves, about the ability of Union citizenship to provide anything more for Union citizens 
than market citizenship already offered. This calls into question whether a formalised Union 
citizenship raised the constitutional significance of obstacles to free movement at all. 
Accordingly, the next section is concerned with demonstrating that, despite still being subject 
to cogent criticism that citizenship’s market origins inhibit its reach in relation to 
economically inactive Union citizens,
44
 Union citizenship has increased the normative force 
of free movement. This in turn has reinforced the structural prioritisation of free movement 
over competing activity.   
 
 
3. Legitimising a free movement bias? The personalisation and fundamentalisation 
of the economic free movement provisions as a result of Union citizenship   
 
In order to demonstrate the indirect contributions that the concept of Union citizenship has 
made to the two-stage breach/justification model, this section will first outline that, in order to 
create something meaningful for economically inactive Union citizens, it was necessary to 
                                                          
44
 N.4 and n.5. 
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forge a link between free movement and the personal, as opposed to economic, status of the 
EU citizen. This personalisation of free movement, alongside its presentation as a right of the 
Union citizen, has promoted it to the status of fundamental right, in the context of Union 
citizenship. Crucially, this qualitative change increases the perceived need for a procedural 
preference for free movement over competing norms and activity, legitimising the use of the 
free movement-enhancing two-stage model. The section will establish, second, that since the 
free movement rights of the Union citizen and the market freedoms operate under the same 
legal framework, and can be exercised simultaneously by, for instance, Union workers, this 
substantive modification is able to cross-pollinate into the economic context. Economic free 
movement becomes a moral good that must be assured if the fundamental rights of the 
economic actor are to be respected. This increases the perceived need for the general 
structural prioritisation of free movement over opposing rules. However, where the 
fundamental rights of individuals conflict with free movement, this same two-stage process 
works against those rights.   
 
 
3.1. The personalisation and fundamentalisation of free movement within Union 
citizenship  
 
Although concerns about the effectiveness of a formalised Union citizenship built on market 
foundations were pertinent, the introduction of a right to free movement for all Union citizens, 
by the Maastricht Treaty bestowed free movement, at the very least, with a new symbolic 
significance.
45
 Under what is now Part Two of the TFEU, free movement was sited within a 
list of the personal rights of the Union citizen, unrelated to their economic status. Thus, 
although still an essential cog in the internal market machine, the Member States had elevated 
free movement beyond its economic foundations. Free movement was no longer merely a 
means of attaining an internal market, but a right belonging to Union citizens; an end to be 
protected in and of itself. As Kostakopoulou has argued, the Maastricht Treaty, and the 
introduction of Union citizenship, tied the Union law rights of free movement and residence 
to the political status of the citizen. This, in turn, contributed to a transformation within free 
movement.
46
 From here on in, it would frequently be necessary to consider not only the 
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 Arts.20 and 21 TFEU 
46
 Kostakopoulou, n.3, 634 
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impact on the internal market of a breach of free movement, but also the potential 
infringement of key citizenship rights of the individuals concerned.      
 
This conceptual metamorphosis allowed the Court to readjust the components of free 
movement to cater better, at least to some extent, for the diversity of Union citizens. Not all 
Union citizens were economic actors, but by virtue of their Union citizenship, they all enjoyed 
a personal right to free movement. Thus, in Martinez Sala,
47
 the Court made clear that 
economic status was irrelevant to the availability, in principle, of free movement rights. Free 
movement was a personal right, inherent and central to an individual’s status as a Union 
citizen. Moreover, this created a portal to the principle of non-discrimination, pursuant to 
Article 18 TFEU, which meant, in turn, that Ms. Martinez Sala was able to access social 
welfare in her host State on the same basis as a national. Nevertheless, Article 21 TFEU 
permitted conditions to be placed on the exercise of free movement. For instance, 
economically inactive individuals could only reside in the host State, pursuant to that 
provision, if they were economically self-sufficient and therefore did not pose an 
unreasonable burden on that State.
48
 However, in Grzelczyk,
49
 the CJEU held that individuals 
could not be automatically expelled from a host State by virtue of their temporary reliance on 
host State social support.
50
 Union citizenship was ‘destined to be the fundamental status of the 
nationals of the Member States’51 and, having exercised their right to move, individuals 
should not be denied access to the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in relation to 
social welfare.
52
 Similarly, in Baumbast, the Court subjected the requirement, contained in 
Directive 2004/38, that economically inactive individuals and their family members have 
comprehensive medical insurance in the host State, to a strict proportionality assessment in 
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light of the impediment it placed on the exercise of free movement rights, a core right of 
Union citizens.
53
    
 
The notion that Union citizenship was destined to be the fundamental status of Union citizens, 
suggested that free movement was not only being personalised, but also fundamentalised, 
since free movement was the central right of the Union citizen. Indeed, in Huber, Advocate 
General Maduro explicitly stated that Union citizenship’s fundamental status was a ‘legal 
concept’ that went hand-in-hand with specific rights, ‘principal amongst these being the right 
to enter and live in another Member State’.54 This is supported by the statement in the 
preamble to Directive 2004/38 that EU citizenship is the ‘fundamental status of nationals of 
the Member States when they exercise their right of free movement and residence’.55 Indeed, 
both the Court and its Advocates General have explicitly referred to free movement as a 
fundamental right of the Union citizen. In Bidar, Advocate General Geelhoed stated that 
attempts to tackle benefit tourism should not ‘undermine the fundamental rights of EU 
citizens residing lawfully within [the host State] territory’.56 In Chen, the CJEU considered 
the UK requirement that a Union citizen should personally possess the sufficient resources 
necessary to avoid becoming an unreasonable burden on the host Member State to be a 
‘disproportionate interference with the fundamental right of freedom of movement upheld by 
[Article 21 TFEU].’57 This has led Elsmore and Starup to argue that a formalised Union 
citizenship pointed to ‘the emergence in law of a fundamental right, resulting from a genuine 
extension of Community jurisprudence to encompass the economically inactive person’s right 
to free movement [emphasis added]’.58   
 
The above discussion has demonstrated that Union citizenship has made some contributions 
to increasing the constitutional significance of a breach of free movement. By attaching free 
movement to the personal status of Union citizens, and treating it as a fundamental right, 
economically inactive Union citizens have been able to access fundamental social rights from 
which they would otherwise have been precluded within the host Member State. Accordingly, 
EU citizenship seems to have enhanced the protection of fundamental social rights within the 
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Union legal order. However, defining a Union citizen’s right to free movement as a 
fundamental right implicitly necessitates a stricter approach to those activities that limit its 
realisation. This naturally invites a two-stage breach/justification framework that affords 
procedural and evidential priority to free movement. It will be recalled from chapter one, for 
instance, that such an adjudicative methodology is utilised by the European Court of Human 
Rights for addressing tensions between Convention rights and public interests.
59
 Since Union 
citizenship uses the same basic legal structures as the market freedoms, any 
fundamentalisation of free movement within citizenship is likely also to fundamentalise the 
exercise of free movement by the economically active. In this context, the structural boost 
provided by Union citizenship might operate to the benefit of economically dominant social 
groups where their free movement rights clash with fundamental rights protected at national-
level. Indeed, O’Brien has remarked that the focus of Union citizenship on the individual right 
to free movement can, at times, ironically, ‘overlook the individual’ and the duties of society 
to protect the vulnerable.
60
 
 
To explore this further, the next subsection will analyse the transfer of free movement’s 
conceptual metamorphosis from Union citizenship into the internal market. This lays 
important groundwork for the discussion, in section four, of the potentially negative 
consequences, from a fundamental rights perspective, of the fundamentalisation of the market 
freedoms.   
 
 
3.2. Personalising the market freedoms: the transfer of the increased constitutional 
significance of a breach of free movement into the internal market 
 
The free movement that exists pursuant to Union citizenship and the Treaty’s market 
freedoms are clearly not mutually exclusive. First, in exercising their free movement rights as 
Union citizens, economically active individuals are plainly still playing their crucial part in 
the functioning of the internal market. There is a simultaneous triggering, by economic actors, 
of both economic and citizenship free movement by the same cross-border activity. As a 
result, in many cases, the CJEU is tasked with deciding whether both an individual’s right to 
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free movement as a Union citizen and her/his ability to move around  Europe as an economic 
actor have been restricted. Consequently, in these judgments, the Court has treated the general 
free movement right of Union citizens as a lex generalis of the economic free movement 
provisions.
61
 Additionally, the Court frequently uses the term ‘Treaty freedoms’ to group the 
economic free movement provisions and Article 21 TFEU.
62
 The treatment of, for instance, 
Article 45 TFEU, on workers, as a lex specialis of Article 21, alters the substance of Article 
45. It is no longer merely a mechanism to enable individuals to play their roles as factors of 
production. It also provides specific expression to the rights of Union citizens, who happen 
also to be workers, to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
63
 As 
Nic Shuibhne notes, both primary and secondary instruments of Union citizenship transform 
and unify, at least the personal free movement provisions, under the language of rights.
64
 
Within the case-law, Advocate General Maduro has explicitly argued for a reassessment of 
the constitutional significance of the economic free movement provisions in the light of Union 
citizenship: 
 
…it would be neither satisfactory nor true to the development of the case-law to reduce the freedom of 
movement to a mere standard of promotion between Member States… At present, the freedoms of movement 
must be understood to be one of the essential elements of the ‘fundamental status of the nationals of the Member 
States’.65  
 
Consequently, it is not just free movement under Union citizenship that has become a means 
in and of itself, but also economic free movement.
66
 As Kostakopoulou put it, ‘Union 
citizenship has transformed  ‘the presence in the territory of the host State of [Union] workers, 
work-seekers, establishers, [and] service providers…[from] a matter of state toleration…[to] 
an issue of exercising fundamental rights’.67 
 
                                                          
61
 Case C-155/09 Commission v Greece [2011] EU:C:2011:22, para.41; Case C-233/12 Gardella v INPS [2013] 
EU:C:2013:449, paras.38-41 
62
 Case C-589/10 Wencel v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych w Białymstoku [2013] EU:C:2013:303, para.69  
63
 See the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig and Landratsamt Calw 
[1993] EU:C:1992:504 
64
 Nic Shuibhne, n.43, 184-185 
65
 Joined Case C-158/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE and C-159/04 Carrefour Marinopoulos AE v Elliniko 
Dimosio and Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Ioanninon [2006] EU:C:2006:212, para.40  
66
 See also Wollenschläger, n.26, who points to the emergence of a new fundamental freedom beyond market 
integration as leading to a wider shift away from the economic paradigm of European integration towards the 
future significance of the fundamental freedoms as a distinct legal category, 2-3  
67
 Kostakopoulou, n.3, 634 
 204 
 
The new constitutional significance of the personal economic free movement provisions – i.e. 
those more closely related to the economic activity of individuals, such as workers or the self-
employed, than business undertakings – is reflected in the fact that, post-Maastricht, new 
areas of Member State law and policy have fallen within their scope. For instance, in 
Collins,
68
 the Court departed from its pre-citizenship decision in Lebon,
69
 and held that ‘in 
view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union, [it is] no longer possible to exclude 
from the scope of [Article 45(2) TFEU], concerning the equal treatment of workers, a 
financial benefit intended to facilitate access to employment…for work-seekers’.70 Similarly, 
in Bickel and Franz,
71
 the CJEU referred to the introduction of Union citizenship to 
strengthen its pre-Maastricht decision
72
 to include service recipients within the scope of 
Article 56 TFEU.
73
 It also reinforced the finding, in Bickel itself, that, in restricting the 
possibility of having one’s criminal trial proceed in German to residents of the Italian region 
of Bolzano, rather than extending this to German-speaking service recipients, Italy had 
breached Article 56 TFEU.
74
 Thus, the personalisation of free movement has seeped into the 
economic free movement provisions. Indeed, as Nic Shuibhne has pointed out, in cases such 
as Bickel, ‘there was an interchangeability at play with citizenship and traditional free 
movement rights often meaning (and conferring) the same thing’.75  
 
This is also arguably evident in cases such as Carpenter, in which the Court does not 
explicitly refer to Union citizenship, but where it is possible that its existence has impacted on 
perception of the free movement provisions.
76
 It will be recalled from chapter one that Mr. 
Carpenter ran a business offering advertising services, including to clients based in other 
Member States. His wife, Mrs. Carpenter, a third country national, faced deportation to the 
Philippines. Mr. Carpenter challenged his wife’s deportation order as a breach of Article 56 
TFEU. When the matter was referred to the CJEU, the Court held that the separation of the 
couple: 
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…would be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, the conditions under which Mr. Carpenter exercises 
[the freedom to provide services]. That freedom could not be fully effective if Mr. Carpenter were to be deterred 
from exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of origin to the entry and residence of his spouse.
77
  
 
However, beyond this general reference to the conditions under which Mr. Carpenter 
provided cross-border services, the CJEU conducted no detailed assessment of how or why 
Mrs. Carpenter’s deportation would present a particular barrier to Mr. Carpenter’s 
performance of this economic activity. The referring court had asked whether Mrs. Carpenter 
could be viewed as indirectly assisting Mr. Carpenter’s freedom to provide services by caring 
for his children from a previous marriage.
78
 However, the CJEU only referred to this role in 
its assessment of whether the Carpenters’ family life could be viewed as genuine.79 As a 
result, the link between the family separation and restrictions to the freedom of services is 
generally viewed as slight
80 
and it has been argued that, despite there being no explicit 
mention of Union citizenship in the case itself, Carpenter ‘is far closer to citizenship than to 
services’.81 It is submitted here that the underlying potential influence of citizenship on the 
outcome of a case, which the Court views exclusively from the perspective of services, is 
made possible by the blended history of Union citizenship and the internal market, their 
shared basic legal structures, and Mr. Carpenter’s simultaneous exercise of his rights as a 
Union citizen and as a provider of cross-border services. Indeed, as the economic free 
movement provisions so often also engage Union citizenship, vastly differing approaches to 
citizenship rights and the market freedoms will often be impractical. As a result, it is likely 
that any evolution affecting free movement within Union citizenship will also impact upon 
free movement under the internal market, even in cases where an express reference to Union 
citizenship is lacking.  
 
The increased ‘breachability’ of the economic free movement provisions in the line of post-
Maastricht case-law described above is the result of the personalisation and 
fundamentalisation of free movement taking place within Union citizenship. This, in itself, 
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legitimises the use of the two-stage breach/justification procedure for the adjudication of 
clashes between free movement and opposing law and policy. If, according to Union 
citizenship, free movement pursues a fundamental right of the Union citizen, then this 
logically calls for an adjudicative approach that requires conflicting activity to justify itself 
against this prima facie problematic conduct. The two-stage breach/justification model 
provides an effective structure to meet these needs. Union citizenship has also reinforced and 
even intensified the need to impose a strict proportionality assessment on law and policy, 
which restricts free movement, at the justification phase. Thus in Orfanopoulos, the Court 
explicitly stated that: 
 
…a particularly restrictive interpretation of the derogations from [the free movement of workers] is required by 
virtue of a person’s status as a citizen of the Union. As the Court has held, that status is destined to be the 
fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States [emphasis added].
82  
 
As section four discusses in more detail, the broadening of what constitutes a breach of the 
market freedoms, along with the requirement to take a ‘particularly restrictive’ approach to 
proportionality, in the light of Union citizenship, could present problems when free movement 
clashes with fundamental rights. However, it is necessary to consider, first, the extent to 
which citizenship has infused the market freedoms with a renewed constitutional significance. 
Specifically, commentators such as White have argued that there is a human/trade dichotomy 
operating within the market freedoms. He has posited that Union citizenship offers a 
constitutional right to move to people, including workers and, in some instances service 
providers, whereas ‘businesses enjoy a lesser Community right to move under the original 
economic free movement provisions’.83 In other words, Union citizenship’s capacity to 
strengthen an architectural preference for economic free movement might be limited to the 
personal economic free movement provisions, to the exclusion of goods and capital, but also, 
where relevant, service provision and establishment. It is submitted, here, that that is not the 
case.  
 
It is accepted that Union citizenship is likely to have a less direct impact on the non-personal 
free movement provisions. When goods are prevented from crossing an intra-EU border, their 
ability to perform their role as factors of production is clearly restricted. However, they are 
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not denied any free movement ‘rights’ attached to their ‘fundamental status’ as ‘Union 
goods’. This suggests that the non-personal freedoms have not been elevated to fundamental 
rights status. Indeed, a survey of the services and goods case-law, carried out by Oliver and 
Roth, found only one reference to fundamental rights terminology.
84
 Further, Currie points out 
that workers posted by service providers, who exercise their free movement rights via Article 
56 TFEU on services, do not enjoy the same rights as workers pursuing free movement under 
Article 45 TFEU on workers. Specifically, they do not enjoy rights under Directive 2004/38, 
such as the right to bring family members with them to the host State.
85
 In Laval, the Court 
focused on the inability of the undertaking, Laval, to provide its services in Sweden with no 
mention on the collateral impact this had on Laval’s workers to enjoy their own free 
movement rights.
86
   
 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the constitutional significance of the non-personal free 
movement provisions has been increased indirectly, in some cases, by focusing on the 
citizenship rights of the trader. Thus, in a number of cases, the Court has demonstrated a 
willingness to consider the person behind the freedom to provide services. This recognition 
began in the days of market citizenship with the introduction of the service recipient in Luisi 
and Carbone.
87
 However, we have seen that a formalised Union citizenship strengthened the 
position of the service recipient in Bickel.
88
 It also, arguably, allowed the Court to consider 
more closely the fundamental rights of the service provider in Carpenter.
89
 Moreover, in 
Laval, Advocate General Mengozzi did acknowledge that the restriction of Laval’s free 
movement of services indirectly caused the posted workers to lose their temporary 
employment in another Member State.
90
 In addition, the Union legislature has acknowledged 
that Union citizenship has rendered it necessary to review the legal framework concerning the 
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self-employed.
91
 More recently, in the context of goods, Tryfonidou has contended that ‘a 
meaningful notion of Union citizenship, which is the “fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States” [calls on] the Union to grant a number of minimum rights to all citizens, 
including the (economic) right to conduct a commercial activity…in an interstate context’.92 
Similarly, Horsley has recently argued that the free movement of capital is an essential 
facilitator of the free movement rights of ordinary Union citizens since ‘[c]apital movements 
also cover, inter alia, property purchases, mortgages, inheritances, and personal loans – 
routine economic transactions for millions of mobile Union citizens’.93 In Alfa Vita, which 
concerned the free movement of goods, Advocate General Maduro explicitly endorsed a 
general test of ‘discrimination against the exercise of free movement’ for triggering all of the 
market freedoms ‘in light of the requirements of a genuine Union citizenship’.94 For the 
Advocate General, the ‘fundamental freedoms must be understood to be one of the essential 
elements of the “fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”’.95 Such an approach 
would raise the substantive importance of all of the economic free movement provisions.  
 
However, in the final judgment, the CJEU did not adopt this stance, making no reference to 
Union citizenship.
96
 Certainly, others have argued against the need for the rules on free 
movement to converge in the light of Union citizenship. For example, Nic Shuibhne views 
Union citizenship as emphasising the person/trade dichotomy ‘all the more sharply’. She finds 
Tryfonidou’s argument, outlined above, that a meaningful citizenship requires a right to 
conduct cross-border commercial activity, to be problematic ‘when the consequence is a 
general “right to do business everywhere in the Union”, leading to the question of whether the  
Union seeks the general deregulation of the market’.97 However, it is submitted that this 
critique goes to the normative question of whether the non-personal market freedoms should 
be treated as a fundamental right. That issue is addressed in chapter five. Here, we are 
concerned with the narrower, factual question of whether Union citizenship is encouraging re-
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assessment of the constitutional significance of a breach of the non-economic free movement 
provisions. These very discussions demonstrate that it is.  
 
Moreover, the increasing convergence around the market freedoms generally, creates a means 
by which changes taking place within Union citizenship can influence the non-personal free 
movement provisions. Increasingly, the Court faces the question of whether a certain activity 
breaches a wide range of the free movement provisions. In dealing with this task, the Court 
often groups the free movement provisions together. This joint assessment of Article 21 and 
the economic freedoms can mean that the increased constitutional importance of free 
movement in the citizenship context can cross-pollinate into the Court’s analysis of the other 
free movement provisions.  
 
In the Libert case,
98
 the Court assessed whether Articles 21 (citizenship), 45 (workers), and 49 
TFEU (establishment) together precluded a Flemish rule, which made the transfer of 
immovable property in certain communes subject to the existence of a ‘sufficient connection’ 
between the prospective buyer/tenant and the geographical area concerned. In its analysis, the 
Court focused on the general right to movement of the Union citizen in order to establish a 
breach of all of these provisions.
99
 In its admittedly separate examination of whether Article 
56 TFEU (services) had been restricted, the Court nevertheless noted that ‘business activities’ 
and ‘undertakings’ would be unable to sell property to ‘just any Union citizen’.100 Similarly, 
the Court’s statement, that the Decree restricted the free movement of capital, because it was 
likely to discourage residents from one Member State from making investments in immovable 
property in another, acknowledges the Union citizen decision-maker who (usually) sits behind 
the economic actor. Moreover, having established a breach of Articles 21, 45, 49, 56, and 63, 
the Court assessed potential justifications for all of these restrictions at once. This meant that 
the Court did not differentiate between personal, fundamental free movement rights, which 
Orfanopoulos stipulated require a ‘particularly restrictive’ approach to derogations,101 and 
what White refers to as the ‘lesser Community rights’ of business undertakings. This allows 
the enhanced prioritisation of free movement under citizenship to be transferred into the 
economic free movement provisions. Moreover, as the Court is increasingly formulaic in its 
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application of the breach/justification procedure, it is possible to speculate that it will be 
unlikely that clear distinctions will be made in relation to precisely how much architectural 
priority should be afforded to free movement in a given situation, even in cases only 
involving economic free movement.  
 
In a different context, the ‘real link’ case-law provides an obvious example of the transfer of 
approaches specific to Union citizenship across the shared free movement architecture and 
into the internal market. Thus, in the cases of Geven and Hartmann,
102
 concerning frontier 
workers, the Court applied the ‘real link’ test, a concept used in Union citizenship to 
determine access to social benefits for economically inactive individuals. As a result, the 
workers in those cases were required to demonstrate that their work was substantial in order to 
prove a real link to the host State. This approach contradicted the well-established rule, 
applied in a wealth of Article 45 TFEU case-law, that workers are entitled to equal access to 
social welfare provided that their work is ‘genuine and effective’ and not ‘marginal and 
ancillary’.103 
 
Thus, to a greater or lesser extent, Union citizenship appears to have both legitimised and 
enhanced the structural prioritisation of free movement over conflicting activity. The dual 
status of certain individuals as both workers and Union citizens has resulted in Union 
citizenship making direct contributions to the increased constitutional significance of Article 
45 TFEU. At times, this has also been true for establishers and service providers. At other 
times, Union citizenship has made more indirect contributions to fundamentalising the 
provisions on services and establishment, as well as goods and capital, through its 
enhancement of a two-stage breach/justification procedure generally, since this is an 
adjudicative structure adopted in relation to all of the free movement provisions.  
 
As the next section explains, the status of free movement as a fundamental right can have 
potentially negative consequences for the protection of (other) fundamental rights when these 
clash with free movement. Union citizenship has, first, resulted in a greater level of 
interaction between the requirements of free movers and the, at times, conflicting duties of the 
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Member States to implement programmes for the protection of fundamental social rights. 
Moreover, the two-stage breach/justification process, bolstered by Union citizenship, dictates 
that these interactions are assessed through a free movement lens. In short, the constitutional 
entrenchment of the two-stage model elevates free movement beyond fundamental rights 
status, treating the former as more fundamental than the latter. The pursuit of free movement 
is procedurally favoured as Member States are obliged to defend their fundamental social 
rights models against a prima facie finding of wrongful restrictions of the market freedoms. 
 
 
4. Safeguarding fundamental rights only as a side-effect of boosting free movement: 
the potentially negative impact of Union citizenship where fundamental rights 
conflict with free movement  
 
Owing to its focus on free movement as the core right of the Union citizen, Union citizenship 
is only able to promote the fundamental social rights of Union citizens as a side-effect of 
promoting their exercise of free movement. This outcome would, nevertheless, seem mutually 
beneficial, for Union citizens, for the internal market, and for the broader integrative aims of a 
polity targeted towards an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe. However, a deeper 
analysis reveals that this is not always the case. While Union citizenship is able to protect, to 
some extent, the fundamental social rights of economically inactive free movers,
104
 the most 
vulnerable members of society might also be the least likely to exercise their free movement 
rights. Movement is not an ‘inevitable, neutral, or “natural” selective tool’.105 It requires an 
individual to have the financial means, (often) the linguistic ability, the general confidence, 
and the knowledge of one’s rights as a Union citizen, before she/he will move in practice.106 
The focus of Union citizenship on movement to activate rights under Union law currently 
precludes the use of Union citizenship to enhance the rights of non-movers. In this context, 
this task still largely falls to the Member States.
107
  
 
However, the focus of Union citizenship on movement has, in fact, posed a challenge to 
Member States’ abilities to perform this function. First, Union citizenship has resulted in 
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clashes between a broader range of domestic measures and the free movement provisions. 
This includes Member State efforts to implement fundamental social rights. By contrast, 
where the needs of individuals run congruent to free movement, Union citizenship has, in 
some instances, served to reduce the breachability of the free movement provisions, reversing 
established inclusive approaches. Second, the fundamentalisation of free movement by Union 
citizenship increases connotations of wrongful conduct in relation to breaches of free 
movement. Free movement is viewed as a moral ‘good’, necessarily implying that restrictions 
upon it are a ‘wrong’ to be avoided. This warrants special protection for free movement, 
exposing to strict proportionality assessment Member State efforts to offer programmes of 
social protection where they conflict with free movement. It will be recalled from chapter 
two, that the two-stage breach/justification approach does not impose any proportionality test 
on free movement and, therefore, generally precludes consideration, at the breach stage, of the 
potentially detrimental impact that free movement can have on domestic fundamental rights. 
Moreover, this method of examining proportionality requires the Member States to implement 
fundamental social rights in a way that imposes the fewest possible restrictions on free 
movement. While offering the best outcome for free movers, this might not be the paramount 
approach from a fundamental rights perspective, since it might lead to lower fundamental 
rights standards in practice. Nevertheless, free movement is seen as the most fundamental 
right and structurally favoured over opposing fundamental rights.    
 
 
4.1. The altered ‘breachability’ of free movement by the pursuit of fundamental social 
rights post-citizenship 
 
The increased breachability of free movement in light of Union citizenship can be seen in the 
cases of Martinez Sala, Grzelczyk, and Collins, outlined above.
108
 In those decisions, the 
preclusion of access, by economically inactive Union citizens, to social welfare – specifically 
access to a child-raising benefit, minimum subsistence, and job-seekers’ allowance, 
respectively - was held to be a prima facie breach of free movement rights. Within this 
framework, Union citizenship can be viewed as rights-enhancing, since it creates new 
situations through which fundamental social rights, running congruent to free movement, can 
be safeguarded. Not only are novel interfaces between free movement and fundamental rights 
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created, but the latter benefit from free movement’s structural prioritisation over the national 
rules that inhibit them. Access to social security is incorporated within the Union’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Article 34(2) CFR stipulates that ‘everyone residing and moving legally 
within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’. As the discussion in section 
three demonstrated, it is the concept of Union citizenship, combined with the right to non-
discrimination under Article 18 TFEU, that obliges Member States to ensure access to social 
security, on an equal basis with nationals, to legally resident economically inactive Union 
citizens.
109
 Similarly, in Bickel, a breach of Article 56 TFEU on services was more readily 
established in light of Union citizenship. Non-national service recipients in the Italian region 
of Bolzano were entitled to have their criminal trials heard in German, since this was 
available to residents of the region. Accordingly, Union citizenship bolstered the existence of 
a congruent relationship between free movement and the right to a fair trial, and the latter was 
enhanced by this dynamic since a trial is clearly fairer where it can take place in the 
defendant’s native language. In Carpenter, recognition of the family needs of a service 
provider triggered a prima facie breach of Article 56 TFEU, creating an interface between 
free movement and the fundamental right to family life.
110
 Thus, in these contexts, the 
increased breachability of the free movement provisions, and the consequent rise in the 
frequency of interactions between free movement and fundamental rights is beneficial to the 
latter. However, this is not as a result of their own fundamental rights status but a corollary of 
the architectural treatment of free movement as a fundamental right; a procedural advantage 
enhanced by Union citizenship’s fundamentalisation of free movement. 
  
Thus, the above analysis neglects to appreciate that, in some cases, this Union citizenship-
encouraged structural bias favours the free movement and social rights of a particular 
individual over Member State attempts to provide a programme by which social and 
economic rights are available to the general population. Specifically, the increased 
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breachability of the free movement provisions can result in the presentation of activity, which 
seeks to cater for fundamental rights, as prima facie wrongful behaviour where it clashes with 
free movement. For instance, in Watts,
111
 UK rules on the reimbursement of healthcare 
obtained in other Member States was held to interfere with Mrs. Watts’ rights, as a service 
recipient, to access medical services in another Member State. It was argued above that the 
concept of the service recipient has its origins in market citizenship and was later reinforced 
by a formalised Union citizenship.
112
 Although complementing Mrs Watts’ right to 
healthcare,
113
 this finding of a breach of free movement also brought it into conflict with the 
UK’s method of offering free, publicly-funded healthcare for its citizens, since a system of 
reimbursement is alien to a nationalised health service. Crucially, given the incongruence of 
reimbursement within such a structure, and its consequent potential impact on planning and 
budgets, the outcome of Watts arguably poses a threat to domestic systems that seek to ensure 
the fundamental right to healthcare for all. It was argued, for instance, in the discussion of 
Watts in chapter two, that those who are not financially or linguistically able to exploit their 
free movement rights to benefit from medical services abroad might suffer because those that 
can take advantage of this right do.
114
 The requirement that a nationalised health service offers 
a previously unnecessary system of reimbursement for health services obtained from other 
service providers, inevitably necessitates the diversion of resources from elsewhere, not to 
mention the introduction of a new administrative burden. And yet, by channelling 
proportionality questions towards what is least restrictive of free movement, the two-stage 
breach/justification model leaves little legal space for these considerations. 
 
Similarly, the citizenship-reinforced finding, in Bickel, that it was necessary to extend the 
possibility of having one’s criminal trial proceed in German to service recipients could be 
viewed as posing a risk to the protection of other fundamental rights. In fact, one of the 
reasons given by the Italian government, for restricting this option to residents of the Bolzano 
region was the protection of the fundamental rights of minority groups; specifically the 
maintenance of the ethno-cultural identity of Bolzano’s German-speaking minority.115 
                                                          
111
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Crucially, Union citizenship was only able to offer a boost to the fundamental rights of the 
service recipients and not those of the German-speaking minority in Bolzano, since Union 
citizenship can only support fundamental rights as a side-effect of reinforcing free movement. 
Thus, the fundamental rights conflict was processed through the standard two-stage 
breach/justification framework, which placed the fundamental rights of minorities at a 
disadvantage. Moreover, Union citizenship emphasised the manifest wrongfulness of Italy’s 
breach of EU law by highlighting the impact on the Union citizen’s right to free movement, 
widening this evidentiary gap. The Court held that Italy’s prima facie breach of free 
movement could not be justified because it did not appear that the extension of the right to 
have criminal proceedings in German to German-speakers coming from other Member States 
would undermine the aim of protecting minorities. While this may be true, it remains 
significant, more broadly, that there is limited space under the two-stage framework for the 
Court to assess the potential impact, or proportionality, of the pursuit of free movement on the 
protection of the rights of minorities. The Court simply stated that Mr. Bickel and Mr. Franz 
had argued ‘without contradiction’ that their trials could proceed in German ‘without 
additional complication or cost’.116 The evidential focus is on assessing whether Italy’s 
protection of minorities is proportionate in light of the restrictions it imposes on free 
movement.  
 
As the analysis of this case-law in chapter two pointed out, it was not until the Italian 
government expressly outlined the potentially negative effects of this extension in the 
subsequent case of Rüffer that the CJEU considered in more detail whether the protection of 
minorities would be hindered by the impact of a growth in German-language trials on 
organisation and time limits, and on costs.
117
 In that case the CJEU maintained that the Italian 
rule could not be justified because the referring court had already acknowledged that no new 
organisational burdens would be created by the extension of the Italian measure to non-
resident German-speakers. However, the Court also held, in relation to additional costs, that 
Member States could not rely on aims of a purely economic nature to justify restrictions on 
free movement.
118
 Chapter two argued that it remains an intrinsic concern that the low 
evidentiary burden at the breach stage contains no obligation to consider the impact of a 
finding of a violation of free movement on a Member State’s ability to meet its fundamental 
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rights obligations. Instead, the onus is on the Member State to highlight this at the 
justification stage where the focus is on the proportionality of fundamental rights measures in 
light of the restrictions they place on free movement. Moreover, the Court’s refusal, in Rüffer, 
to consider the additional costs created by expanding the beneficiaries of the Italian measure 
under-appreciates the budgetary considerations that are unavoidable when formulating 
programmes for the protection of fundamental social rights of a positive nature.      
 
Although necessary to show solidarity and concern for the welfare of each other’s nationals, 
cases such as Martinez Sala, Grzelczyk, and Collins also created new interfaces between the 
rights of the individual free mover concerned and Member State programmatic planning in 
relation to fundamental social rights. That is not to say that the substantive outcomes of those 
judgments were inappropriate. Clearly, citizenship is providing an important means by which 
individual EU citizens can confront discrimination and access fundamental social rights. 
Rather, the purpose of this analysis is simply to highlight that, in automatically favouring free 
movement, the procedure for reaching those decisions might leave insufficient room for the 
consideration of other public endeavours of fundamental importance. The Court sought to 
address this through the introduction of the ‘real link’ test, mentioned above. This requires 
economically inactive individuals to demonstrate, in order to access financial support, a ‘real 
link’ between themselves and the State from which they wish to receive financial support.119 
This test arguably seeks to balance the free movement rights of individuals against the 
practicalities of implementing programmes of social protection at domestic-level. While it can 
be argued that this limitation ‘makes sense in the economically inactive citizenship 
context’,120 it also served, in Geven and Hartmann to reduce the breachability of the economic 
free movement provisions, ‘reversing a more inclusive approach long established in the case-
law on the free movement of workers’.121  The Court has since addressed this issue in 
Commission v The Netherlands, by holding that genuine and effective work ‘in principle’ 
meets the requirements of the real link test, since migrant workers contribute to the financing 
of the social policies of the host State.
122
 However, the use of the phrase ‘in principle’ leaves 
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the door open for the real link test to restrict the fundamental social rights of Union workers in 
the future.
123
 
 
More recently, the breachability of the free movement provisions was also reduced as a result 
of Union citizenship to the potential detriment of the fundamental right to family life of the 
Union citizen in Iida.
124
 In this case, the usual cross-border test for bringing a matter within 
the scope of EU law was conflated with the more recent avenue for triggering Union law, 
introduced by the CJEU in its Ruiz Zambrano judgment. The ‘genuine enjoyment test’ brings 
national measures within the scope of Union law where they deprive Union citizens of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as Union 
citizens.
125
 The threshold for establishing that an individual’s circumstances involve a cross-
border situation is very low. Thus, it will be recalled from chapter two that it is not necessary 
for the relationship between the parties to a dispute to be cross-border, if the contested 
Member State rules would also restrict the intra-EU movement of economic actors coming 
from other Member States.
126
 Further, in Garcia Avello¸ a Member State rule could be 
assessed as a restriction of free movement by reference to the potential future movement of 
Union citizens.
127
 In Chen, an Irish national, who had been born in the UK and had never 
crossed an EU border, was able to establish a cross-border element to her case by reference to 
her Irish nationality.
128
 By contrast, increasingly, it appears that Union citizens must be 
absolutely deprived of the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of the rights associated with Union citizenship 
before EU law can be triggered through these means. For example, in both McCarthy and 
Dereci, the Court held that an individual would not be denied the genuine enjoyment of the 
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rights associated with Union citizenship unless she/he were forced to leave the Union 
territory.
129
 The conflation of the cross-border test with the genuine enjoyment test, in Iida, 
raised the threshold for triggering the cross-border test, leading the CJEU to hold that the free 
movement rights of a Union citizen had not been denied since she had already crossed an 
intra-EU frontier without impediment to movement. The Court refused to engage with the 
possibility that cross-border mobility might be inhibited in the future, despite the finding in 
Garcia Avello that potential future restrictions to free movement could trigger EU law. As a 
result of this higher threshold, the matter did not fall within the scope of Union law and 
Article 21 TFEU could not be utilised to safeguard the fundamental right to family life 
between a Union citizen child and her third country national father. Interestingly, this 
conflation between the cross-border requirement and the genuine enjoyment test seems to be 
the result of the Court’s finding in Iida that there is an ‘intrinsic connection’ between free 
movement and the genuine enjoyment of the rights enjoyed under citizenship.
130
 Thus, the 
maintenance of historical and architectural ties between citizenship and free movement and 
their effects are manifest in Iida.
131
  
 
Union citizenship has served both to increase and reduce the breachability of the free 
movement provisions. Where fundamental rights run congruent to free movement, ironically, 
Union citizenship has, at times, made it more difficult for individuals to establish a restriction 
on free movement rights. More commonly, however, in instances of clash between free 
movement and conflicting Member State fundamental rights measures, Union citizenship has 
increased the breachability of the free movement provisions. This has widened the evidentiary 
gap between establishing a breach of free movement and demonstrating justifications, under 
the two-stage model. This is further exacerbated by the fact the Union citizenship has also 
deepened the need for a strict proportionality test at the justification stage. It is to this issue 
that we now turn.      
 
 
4.2. Exacerbating the uphill struggle: reducing opportunity for justifying a breach of 
free movement 
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As section three outlined, Union citizenship appears to require the use of higher evidentiary 
hurdles at the justification stage, since activity in breach of the free movement provisions 
restricts the fundamental free movement rights of the Union citizen. Thus, as will be recalled, 
in Orfanopoulos, the Court stated that a ‘particularly restrictive’ interpretation of derogations 
from free movement was required by virtue of a person’s status as a Union citizen.  
 
The Libert case demonstrates the potential effects of a particularly restrictive approach to 
justifications on a Member State’s ability to safeguard fundamental social rights.132 It was 
outlined above that, a Flemish Decree, which required potential buyers/tenants of property to 
demonstrate a ‘sufficient connection’ to certain communes before they could buy property 
there, or rent it on a long-term lease, was found to be a restriction of Articles 21, 45, 49, 56, 
and 63 TFEU. It was argued earlier that the effects of the rule upon the Union citizen 
contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to this finding. Moreover, it was also posited that the 
Court’s grouping of all of these free movement provisions together at the justification stage 
could transfer the higher evidentiary hurdles operating within citizenship into the market 
freedoms. The Flemish Government contended that the ‘sufficient connection’ requirement 
was justified, inter alia, by the need to guarantee sufficient housing for low-income or 
otherwise disadvantaged members of the population. Accordingly, its justification lay in the 
fact that the measure sought to secure access to housing, a right recognised as fundamental by 
Article 34 CFR. The CJEU accepted that this was permissible in principle but, as required by 
the two-stage approach, proceeded to conduct a strict proportionality assessment to ascertain 
whether the measure was justifiable in practice by reference to whether there were alternatives 
available that would be less restrictive of free movement. In fact, the Court evaluated whether 
the actions of the Flemish Government were ‘necessary’ and ‘appropriate’ with even more 
rigour than usual. For instance, the Court noted that the conditions put in place by the Flemish 
Government for establishing a ‘sufficient connection’ to the relevant commune would not be 
exclusively met by the less affluent population. People other than those on a low-income could 
meet the criteria. Accordingly, the Flemish measure went beyond what was necessary to 
obtain the objective pursued. The Court proceeded to provide very prescriptive guidance on 
how Member States could protect disadvantaged families whilst still respecting free 
movement rights. It suggested that ‘[p]rovision could, for example, be made for subsidies for 
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purchase or other subsidy mechanisms specifically designed to assist less affluent 
persons…’.133 
 
This guidance is arguably questionable from a fundamental rights perspective. Specifically, as 
detailed in chapter two when discussing the trio of fundamental rights impact that the two-
stage approach creates, it does not consider the practical aspects, faced by a State when 
meeting its obligations to its citizens.
134
 For instance, the ‘sufficient connection’ test is 
negative in character and therefore likely to be low-cost. By contrast, the Court’s proposed 
alternative is more positive in nature. Since proportionality is viewed through a free 
movement lens, there is no consideration of whether the Flemish Government, with its finite 
resources, will be able to offer such a mechanism. It is sufficient that measures less restrictive 
of free movement exist in principle. There is no analysis of the possibility that, if the scheme 
is not workable from a financial or logistical point of view, protection for low-income 
families might be abandoned altogether. In other words, as has already been demonstrated in 
relation to Watts and Bickel, there is no examination, under the two-stage model, of whether 
free movement is being pursued in a way that is least restrictive of programmatic fundamental 
rights, which often encompass complex decisions of policy requiring considerations of 
practical effectiveness and financial and administrative cost. This is arguably exacerbated by 
the need for a ‘particularly restrictive’ approach to derogations following the formalisation of 
Union citizenship.  
 
Some might question whether the Court’s prescriptiveness in Libert was the result of the 
particular political and factual background to the case, and also query the negative effects of 
subsidy schemes on programmes of social protection in relatively wealthy regions such as 
Flanders. Indeed, Advocate General Mazák acknowledged the argument that the ‘sufficient 
connection’ test might exist not to secure access to housing but rather to preserve the Flemish 
nature of the population of the target communes.
135
 And yet, the Advocate General explicitly 
stated that such a reason could not constitute an overriding reason in the public interest, even 
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in principle.
136
 He then proceeded to assess whether the restrictions imposed by the Flemish 
Decree could be justified in light of the legitimate aim of ‘meeting the accommodation 
requirements of the less affluent endogenous population’.137 It was in this assessment that 
Advocate General Mazák provided the very prescriptive guidance on how Flanders might 
pursue this goal, later largely adopted by the Court. Moreover, while less prescriptive, and 
leaving the final application to the national court, the CJEU’s assessment of another provision 
of the same Flemish instrument, which required land developers to make a certain number of 
housing units available for social housing or make payment in kind, exposed that provision to 
the same proportionality hurdles. And yet, this ‘social obligation’ provides a relatively cheap 
way of adding to the local housing stock, and therefore of implementing the right to access to 
housing. Thus, the Libert case, like Bickel and Watts, is an example of a broader issue 
concerning whether the Court is a suitable locus for the complex decisions of policy that 
accompany the designing of programmes of social protection. This is especially true when the 
Court’s two-stage approach concentrates the analysis on what is least restrictive of free 
movement, with little legal space for considerations of the practicalities of policy design or 
the balancing of Member State budgets.   
 
As well as encouraging a more prescriptive approach in relation to whether measures are 
‘necessary’ to meet the fundamental rights goals of the Member States, it is submitted that 
Union citizenship has contributed to a stricter approach to proportionality in a more general 
sense. Following the Baumbast ruling,
138
 which exposed Member State decisions to deport 
individuals to a proportionality assessment even where those individuals did not meet the 
clear residence requirements laid down in (what is now) Directive 2004/38, Dougan 
postulated that this more stringent use of proportionality, inspired by Union citizenship, might 
be extended to cover other conditions attached to the exercise of economic activity.
139
 For 
instance, he argued that Member State implementation of Article 3(1)(c) of the Posted 
Workers’ Directive (PWD)140 might be exposed to questions of proportionality. This 
provision obliges Member States to apply domestic rules on minimum pay to non-national 
undertakings who, in exercising their freedom to provide services, have posted their own 
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employees to the host State. Dougan speculated as to whether, subsequent to the Baumbast 
ruling, a host Member State could nevertheless be found to be in breach of Article 56 TFEU 
on the freedom to provide services because, on occasion, requiring the payment of minimum 
wage to workers might be viewed as a disproportionate interference with that provision of 
primary law.
141
 This would clearly impact on the ability of both national and Union legislators 
to enact legislation that aims to mitigate the impact of free movement on other important 
endeavours, such as social equality and fundamental rights.  
 
These concerns were partially realised in Commission v Luxembourg.
142
 This case concerned 
a wage index that took the cost of living into account with regard to all wage categories. 
Although, the Commission and the Court both accepted that the indexing of minimum wage to 
the cost of living fell within Article 3(1)(c), the Commission challenged the fact that the 
indexation applied to all wage categories. Luxembourg argued that this also fell within Article 
3(1)(c). This argument was rejected by the Court. In light of the fact that rates of pay were 
adjusted due to the cost of living, however, the index could be viewed as imposing minimum 
amounts for differing roles in different geographical areas. Next, Luxembourg submitted that, 
because the purpose of the index was to ensure good labour relations and protect workers 
from the effects of inflation, it fell within Article 3(10) PWD. This provision allowed host 
States to impose terms and conditions of employment on employers, beyond those found 
within the Directive itself, for reasons of public policy. However, the Court read Article 3(10) 
as a derogation from the fundamental freedom to provide services and consequently required 
that it be interpreted strictly. Luxembourg’s wage index was found to constitute a breach of 
Article 56 TFEU, which could not be justified by reference to worker protection.
143
  
 
The situation in Commission v Luxembourg is not as clear-cut as the example provided by 
Dougan. Evidently, Article 3(10) is not a clearly worded provision of secondary legislation 
the application of which has, nevertheless, been subject to a strict proportionality assessment. 
Rather, it provides the Member States with the capacity to go above and beyond the clearer 
stipulations found within the PWD itself, where public policy requires it. However, Dougan’s 
speculation that the citizenship-based Baumbast ruling could have wider implications for the 
                                                          
141
 Prior to the coming into force of the PWD, the Court had already imposed a proportionality test in relation to 
minimum pay in Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni [2001] EU:C:2001:162 
142
 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] EU:C:2008:350 
143
 The disparity in the evidential burden faced at the breach and justification stages, in terms of the evidence 
that Luxembourg had to present to demonstrate that its measures tackled the effects of inflation upon the worker, 
are discussed in ch.2, s.3.3.1. 
 223 
 
economic free movement provisions has been realised to some extent. Recalling the 
discussion of this case in chapter three, prior to the cases of Laval,
144
 Rüffert
145
 and 
Commission v Luxembourg, the PWD was largely viewed as an anti-social dumping measure, 
targeted at preventing service providers from competing on cost in a host State by relying on 
the lower standards of social protection applicable within home State systems.
146
 The Court’s 
application of the principle of proportionality in Commission v Luxembourg is in direct 
contrast with this original purpose. The proportionality test focuses exclusively on the impact 
on free movement of national measures targeted at protecting workers. It does not consider 
the consequences for worker protection of the finding of a breach of free movement. Thus, the 
two-stage approach, boosted by Union citizenship, favours the free movement of the service 
provider over Member State efforts to secure the fundamental social rights of the worker.
147
    
 
The Rüffert decision offers another example in this regard.
148
 In that case, the PWD was also 
interpreted in a way that appears contradictory to its initial aims. Prior to Laval
149
 and Rüffert, 
Article 3(7) PWD, which stipulates that the core nucleus of terms and conditions featured in 
Article 3(1)(a)-(g) shall not prevent the application of terms of employment which are more 
favourable to workers, was thought to present the core nucleus as a ‘floor’ of protection for 
Member State workers.
150
 However, in Rüffert, a German law, obliging public authorities to 
require their private contractors to pay their workers the minimum wage laid down in local 
collective agreements (and therefore going beyond the mandatory minimum wage contained 
in law) was held to be a breach of Article 56 TFEU. Article 3(7) PWD was interpreted simply 
as permitting terms and conditions, coming from the service provider’s Member State of 
origin, which were more favourable to the worker, to continue to apply in the posting context.    
 
Thus, although Union citizenship can be seen as bringing a legitimate, material dimension to 
the interpretative process – through the recognition of the personal, fundamental status of the 
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Union citizen - that both widens the concept of breach and restricts the notion of justification, 
this is only beneficial to fundamental rights when they run congruent to free movement, for 
instance in cases like Carpenter. Union citizenship currently has little to offer those 
fundamental rights that conflict with free movement, since it can only assist citizens’ 
fundamental rights as a side-effect of its structural support for free movement. Indeed, as the 
above case-law demonstrates, citizenship’s entrenchment of the two-stage model, which often 
brings Union law into areas where the Union lacks legislative competence, can also 
undermine a Member State’s ability to protect fundamental social rights in instances of clash. 
Thus, Wollenschläger has remarked that, while the market freedoms had already curtailed the 
regulatory autonomy of the Member States, a general right to free movement ‘can only further 
boost such a dynamic’.151     
 
This introduces wider questions about the current challenges facing Union citizenship but also 
recalls broader issues, which run through this thesis as a whole, about how the competing 
objectives within the Treaty can be balanced against each other, especially when the Treaty 
foresees the pursuit of these goals at different levels, either the national or supranational. 
Where the Treaty leaves it to the Member States, for instance, to attain certain social aims, 
there needs to be sufficient legal space for the Member States to perform these functions 
domestically without this being challenged as a prima facie unlawful restriction of the free 
movement provisions. Accordingly, our final section re-frames the discussion and presents 
Union citizenship as a case-study offering an overview of these wider themes. This provides 
foundations for the analysis in chapter five of an alternative method of adjudication that, it 
will be argued, is better equipped to offer the legal room required to consider the Union’s 
diverse and conflicting goals. 
 
 
5. Moving beyond the legacy of market citizenship: ongoing challenges for Union 
citizenship 
 
The above sections have demonstrated the existence of a paradox within Union citizenship. 
Emerging from a market citizenship, a formalised Union citizenship has utilised the basic 
legal structures of the internal market and adopted, as the core right of the Union citizen, the 
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freedom to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States. By attaching free 
movement to the personal status of the Union citizen, Union citizenship has been able to 
secure access to fundamental social rights for a wider range of individuals. And yet, it is this 
very personalisation of free movement that has contributed to the elevation of free movement, 
also in the economic context, to a fundamental right, encouraging the structural prioritisation 
of free movement over (other) competing programmatic fundamental rights.  
 
However, this paradox is not unique to Union citizenship. In the wider context of citizenship, 
the term ‘citizen’ has historically served as a symbol of equality, casting off the inequalities of 
aristocratic titles and personal subservience. This notion of equality complemented liberal 
economics and capitalism. As Heater notes, ‘the free exercise of individual initiative is the 
very essence of capitalism… Initiative required the partitions between social class to be 
permeable. The concept of citizenship took this to the logical conclusion of equality of status. 
A citizen is a citizen is a citizen: no differentiation’.152 However, ‘lurking behind [this] is the 
counterbalancing economic inequality induced by unfettered capitalism’.153 In short, 
‘capitalism weakens [the] egalitarian political structure [upon which it is based] by giving 
primacy to economic relationships. New class divisions open up, separating the wealthy 
entrepreneurs from the general populace, a gulf condoned by the liberal virtue of individual 
enterprise’.154 For Marshall, the way to address this new inequality was to embrace the social 
elements of citizenship.
155
 According to him, citizenship required equal social worth, not 
merely equal natural rights.
156
 For instance, the provision of a welfare state ‘is necessary to 
raise the relatively poor to a condition in which they can enjoy the citizenly condition of full 
autonomy, freedom and participation’. Nevertheless, this, itself, results in paradox. Adding a 
social element to civic and political citizenship often necessitates the favouring of the 
community over certain freedoms of the individual. For instance, the funding, from taxation, 
of social housing and free education would impinge on an individual’s ability to reap fully the 
rewards of her/his individual initiative. Having previously complemented capitalism, the call, 
under citizenship, for a fuller equality challenges the development of a socially unequal 
capitalism. Macedo, however, has argued that this paradox can, in fact, be addressed through 
liberalism itself. While liberalism focuses on the freedom of the individual, this does not 
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equate to a ‘free-for-all’. It instead requires the moral qualities of ‘tolerance, self-criticism, 
moderation, and a reasonable degree of engagement in the activities of citizenship’.157 As 
Heater summarises: 
 
…the liberal citizen understands and accepts the plurality of society, a condition that demands toleration, lest 
society plunge into communal or civil discord… People as individuals or as groups are different, but they are all 
fellow citizens and should be respected as such.
158
  
 
This admittedly brief consideration of the wider citizenship discourse illustrates some of the 
challenges facing Union citizenship in its current stage of development as outlined in this 
chapter. Although Union citizenship has already achieved more, for a wider range of Union 
citizens, than its initial critics might have expected,
159
 it is only able to do this by 
strengthening the constitutional significance of free movement. Since free movement is not a 
‘neutral…selective tool’,160 there is the danger that, as with earlier forms of citizenship, 
primacy will be given to economic relationships over making programmatic provision for the 
fundamental social rights of wider societal groups. The breadth and strength of free 
movement, partly bolstered by Union citizenship, can reconceptualise domestic policies 
adopted with the aim of improving levels of social protection into an issue of a breach of free 
movement law. Moreover, as we reflected in chapter one, this might not reflect the Union’s 
own commitment to social advancement, or the clustering of Treaty social provisions around 
shared and complementary competence.
161
  
 
Thus, Union citizenship is at a cross-roads. The real challenge it faces is how best to reflect 
and cater for the (at times conflicting) fundamental rights needs of all Union citizens, 
including those who do not move. Indeed, if programmatic fundamental social rights 
increasingly trigger supranational concerns, then Union citizenship might require that they be 
taken seriously at Union-level. But, at the very least, Union citizenship should not be used as 
a tool by which market integration can diminish efforts to promote fundamental social rights, 
such as the right to health, education, fair working conditions, or broader solidarity rights, at 
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national-level. The question now, therefore, is where the line should be drawn. For instance, 
Union citizenship might seek to find a way to progress beyond its historical, market-focused 
beginnings and detach itself from free movement, so as to recognise better the diversity of 
Union citizens across Europe. A more social form of Union citizenship could be used to 
mainstream the variety of fundamental rights concerns into Union law and policy including 
into the definition of free movement. This might also, arguably, lead to a more efficient 
internal market. In the context of labour law, for instance, commentators have recognised the 
need for worker voice, through the fundamental rights of participation and representation, in 
order to increase efficiency and wealth maximisation: ‘such rights [also] enhance the concept 
of European citizenship by providing a new forum of decision-making which is normally 
ignored in the debates regarding the democratic deficit: the European common market’.162 
Alternatively, we might ask whether, for the time being at least, Union citizenship should 
develop, through its central tenet of equality, so as to ensure, as a minimum, that market 
integration is more respectful of Member State efforts to implement programmatic 
fundamental rights.  
 
The debates taking place within citizenship reflect the same dilemma occurring within the 
Union’s broader constitutional framework. As chapter one emphasised, although the Union is 
built on economic foundations, its contemporary goals are much broader.
163
 The European 
Economic Community has evolved into a European Union, signalling political as well as 
economic integration. The Treaties now cover broad policy fields from the internal market to 
common foreign and security policy;
164
 justice and home affairs, including asylum and 
immigration and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters;
165
 social policy;
166
 
education;
167
 and public health.
168
 The Treaties also make a specific commitment to the 
protection of fundamental rights and give primary law status to the Charter, which contains 
not only civil and political rights, but also economic, social, and solidarity rights.
169
 And yet, 
it will also be recalled from chapter one, that the Treaties divide labour, for pursuing these 
diverse areas of policy, between the Union and the Member States. Thus, in some fields, 
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where the Union only has shared or complementary competence, such as social, health or 
educational policy,
170
 the Member States can be viewed as the principal ‘agents’ for attaining 
contemporary Union goals.
171
 A two-stage approach, which pits free movement against 
domestic fundamental rights measures, presenting the latter as prima facie restrictions of EU 
law, accordingly does not always accurately encapsulate the contemporary constitutional 
framework.  
 
In this way, the same historical analysis of the concept of citizenship can be applied to the 
European Union as a whole. As Maduro has remarked: 
 
Promotion of economic integration through free trade is understood to increase efficiency and wealth 
maximisation. However, many fear that such gains may occur at the cost of weaker social groups or are not fairly 
distributed between all members of society. Underlying this discussion is the old conflict between efficiency and 
distributive justice or, in other words, between promoting competitiveness and wealth maximisation and securing 
a certain degree of social protection to all members of the community.
172
 
 
Since free movement has expanded to interact with a wide range of domestic policy, ‘the 
balance between economic freedom and social rights in the European Economic Constitution 
has largely been defined by the balance between market integration and national social 
rights’; between the acceptable degree of restriction on trade and the level of market 
regulation.
173
 However, since the Union is built on an economic constitution ‘the development 
of social rights appears to be a prisoner to the values of market integration and not the 
consequence of a political conception of the social and economic protection deserved by any 
European citizen’.174 Thus, even if normatively, free movement does not exist to challenge 
fundamental rights or social standards, it does expose national attempts to secure them to 
competition.
175
 Moreover, as we have seen, many areas of State regulation, aimed at 
protecting rights such as education, health, social protection, and fair and just working 
conditions, are recognised in the Treaties as goals of the Union
176
 but cluster around shared or 
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complementary competence. This has led Maduro to argue that ‘the relationship between the 
fundamental rights arising from the free movement rules and the classical economic and 
social fundamental rights has to be clarified’.177 On the one hand, this could provoke the 
argument that European social policy should be developed to reintroduce political control 
over the economic sphere at Union-level.
178
 However, if the Union cannot, due to 
constitutional or political limitations, act to secure the protection of fundamental social rights, 
then, at the very least, it needs to be able to ‘back off’ where appropriate, leaving Member 
States with sufficient legal space to enact and implement fundamental rights measures away 
from the shadow of a breach of free movement law. It is submitted here, that this is not 
possible when the Court of Justice adopts a two-stage approach to tensions between free 
movement and fundamental rights that procedurally presents the latter as prima facie 
wrongful under Union law, exposing fundamental rights to proportionality questions not faced 
by free movement. Accordingly, it will be the task of the next chapter to identify a new 
adjudicative approach to addressing tensions between free movement and fundamental rights, 
which better reflects the Union’s own contemporary constitutional framework and creates 
more legal room for fundamental rights considerations. 
    
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Union citizenship is borne from, and built upon, the internal market. It has adopted, as its core 
right, the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States. This has 
infused free movement, in both the personal and economic spheres, with a fundamental 
quality, since Union citizenship attaches to the personal status of the individual. This has 
legitimised the use of a structural bias that procedurally favours free movement over 
conflicting activity, treating the former as a fundamental right. Union citizenship has also 
brought the free movement provisions into more frequent contact with domestic fundamental 
rights norms. Where fundamental rights run congruent to free movement, this can enhance the 
fundamental rights of the Union citizen. However, where free movement clashes with 
fundamental rights, Union citizenship is not only unable to assist individuals, but, in fact, 
serves to undermine programmatic protection of fundamental rights at national-level, since its 
structural reinforcement remains attached to the exercise of free movement. This raises 
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fundamental questions about the contemporary challenges facing Union citizenship, reflecting 
dilemmas within the broader constitutional framework of the Union. Through its continuing 
attachment to movement, Union citizenship is not only limited in its ability to progress 
beyond market citizenship, but also in its capacity to cater fully for the diverse and conflicting 
fundamental rights issues taking place in free movement disputes. A pertinent task for Union 
citizenship, therefore, is to evolve in a way that allows the needs of non-movers to be taken 
more seriously at European-level, or, at the very least, to ensure that it does not operate to 
undermine any Member State attempts to deal with this concern. Consequently, although 
Union citizenship and the EU’s economic roots can be viewed as historical factors in the 
entrenchment of the structurally imbalanced two-stage approach, the evolution of EU 
citizenship, and the Union’s contemporary constitutional framework, can also be viewed as 
drivers of adjudicative change. This introduces the new question, addressed in the next 
chapter, of whether there is an alternative to the breach/justification framework that better 
accommodates the present-day objectives of the Union.   
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Chapter Five 
 
RESETTING THE SCALES: A NEW MODEL FOR ADJUDICATING 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FREE MOVEMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Previous chapters have demonstrated the existence of a two-stage breach/justification 
procedure for adjudicating tensions between free movement and fundamental rights that 
prioritises the former over the latter, treating free movement as more fundamental than 
fundamental rights. A trinity of constitutional developments, covering the expansion of a 
breach of free movement beyond instances of discrimination, the introduction of the doctrine 
of direct effect, and the development of Union citizenship, have simultaneously increased the 
volume of interactions between free movement and fundamental rights and reinforced this 
two-stage approach. However, it has also been established that the two-stage methodology 
does not adequately reflect the Union’s contemporary constitutional framework. Specifically, 
its presentation of fundamental rights as a prima facie wrong in need of justification does not 
encapsulate the Union’s own explicit commitment to respecting fundamental rights, most 
recently strengthened at Lisbon by the conferral of primary law status on the Charter and the 
introduction of a Treaty obligation to accede to the ECHR.  
 
The Union’s present-day aims are also broader than economic integration, although there is a 
lack of uniformity in the Union’s approach to its new goals. In several areas, that cannot be 
cleanly delineated from free movement, such as social policy, the Treaty opts to respect the 
diversity of the Member States and make them agents in the pursuit of these objectives as a 
result of the limits of the Union’s own legislative competence. And yet, the two-stage 
methodology still presents Member State policy, targeted at securing goals that the Union 
itself views as legitimate, as prima facie unlawful where they impose restrictions on free 
movement. This limits the legal space in which the Member States can safeguard fundamental 
rights since their permissibility is assessed by reference to whether there are means of 
protecting fundamental rights that are less restrictive of free movement. This can lead to a trio 
of negative impact in terms of fundamental rights protection. Specifically, previous chapters 
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have demonstrated that this one-sided proportionality assessment can under-appreciate the 
idiosyncratic fundamental rights needs of the still diverse Member States; neglect to consider 
the inherently restrictive effects of certain fundamental rights, such as the right to strike; or 
result in proposals for alternative means of fundamental rights protection that might not be 
feasible, for example from administrative or financial points of view.
1
    
 
The conclusion that the historically-entrenched breach/justification framework is ill-suited to 
the Union’s contemporary constitutional framework inevitably introduces the question of 
whether there exists an alternative adjudicative methodology that would better accommodate 
fundamental rights considerations, whilst still conforming to the Treaty’s constitutional 
requirements. This chapter will argue that the use of a rights-balancing model meets these 
conditions. Accordingly, section two will examine the increased use of rights-balancing, 
through the use of reciprocal proportionality assessments in the context of rights clashes 
occurring at the level of EU secondary law. Looking further afield, and in light of the 
requirement contained in the Lisbon Treaty that the EU accede to the ECHR, the section also 
surveys the utilisation of rights-balancing by the ECtHR to resolve tensions between 
conflicting Convention rights.   
 
Section three argues that a rights-balancing framework, focused on mutual impact assessment, 
should be adopted in the increasing instances of conflict between the free movement 
provisions and fundamental rights. Rather than viewing fundamental rights as prima facie 
wrongful breaches of free movement and consequently searching for outcomes that are least 
restrictive of the latter norms, a rights-balancing model treats free movement and fundamental 
rights as hierarchically equal. Although, for constitutional reasons, a balancing framework 
will still consist of two-stages, the potential for procedural disadvantage within such an 
approach will be neutralised by the use of a reciprocal proportionality assessment, triggered 
by the presence of fundamental rights concerns. This requires not only that the impact of 
fundamental rights on free movement is assessed, but also that the impact of free movement 
on fundamental rights is examined. The model then strives for an outcome that is least 
restrictive of both free movement and fundamental rights. Although this will, therefore, 
admittedly, still require alterations, at times, to domestic fundamental rights approaches, in 
light of the Member States’ commitment to European integration, such changes carry less risk 
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of a reduction in fundamental rights standards in real terms. In seeking compromise, measures 
that are less restrictive of free movement may be rejected for approaches that still achieve the 
core goals of free movement but are also respectful of fundamental rights and the 
complexities inherent in their protection. This will require the Court to take an holistic 
approach to the Treaty, respecting its contemporary aims, and the decisions of its drafters to 
leave the pursuit of certain goals to the Member States.  
 
Section four then acknowledges and addresses the conceptual challenge that arises from 
treating free movement, under a balancing model, as the same as, or at least equal to, 
fundamental rights. Drawing on the undeniable constitutional significance of free movement, 
not only to the internal market but to broader goals of the Union and the rights of the Union 
citizen, the section will argue that free movement should be recognised as a fundamental right 
within the EU legal order, or, at the very least, as a constitutional norm of equal rank to 
fundamental rights.  
 
 
2. Exploring balancing as an alternative approach to clashes between norms: 
lessons from the ECHR and EU secondary law  
 
The focus on the use of balancing by the ECtHR and by the CJEU in the context of rights 
clashes at the level of secondary law is pertinent because of the increased significance of both 
the ECHR and the Charter to the EU’s constitutional framework, post-Lisbon. Admittedly, the 
ECtHR and the CJEU have very different tasks. The former is focused on ascertaining 
whether Contracting Parties have met a minimum standard of protection in relation to the 
fundamental rights laid down in the Convention. This permits Contracting Parties the legal 
space for culturally or socially-influenced moral choices above this floor. Convention rights 
do not formally enjoy supremacy or direct effect within the national legal orders and the 
Strasbourg Court’s decisions are only binding between the parties to the dispute.2 The ECtHR 
does not claim that the creation of the ECHR entailed a transfer of the sovereign powers of the 
Contracting Parties.
3
 By contrast, the CJEU has famously held that the Union constitutes a 
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new legal order entailing some limitation on the sovereign rights on the Member States.
4
 The 
constitutional remit of the EU is also much broader than the Convention, covering varying 
policy fields.
5
 Provisions of EU law have primacy over national law and may be directly 
effective.
6
 Moreover, in order to secure the attainment of the internal market, Member State 
rules must comply with Union law even where they fall within areas of Member State 
legislative competence,
7
 and derogations from Union law cannot be determined unilaterally 
by the Member States.
8
 Accordingly, the Court has at times found that EU law imposes a 
ceiling on Member State policy choices.
9
 Nevertheless, as Gerards has argued, there are 
important and relevant similarities between the ECtHR and the EU Courts. She notes that in 
practice, the Convention increasingly forms part and parcel of the national legal order; that the 
impact of the ECtHR’s case-law reaches far beyond the case at hand; and that by imposing 
positive obligations on Contracting Parties, the ECtHR has influenced national law and policy 
with increasing directness.
10
 Further, since the Treaty obliges the Union formally to accede to 
the ECHR, it would seem appropriate, in order to minimise the chances of conflict between 
the pursuit of free movement and the Union’s future direct obligations under the Convention, 
for the Luxembourg Court to streamline its adjudicative models.
11
 Of course, that is not to say 
that the ECtHR’s judicial methodologies are without criticism. There is an extensive academic 
literature in this regard.
12
 Nevertheless, consideration of the processing of fundamental rights 
conflicts by the Strasbourg Court offers a useful counterpoint to the current methodology of 
the CJEU and allows us to explore those aspects of alternative models that might prove 
beneficial within the Union’s contemporary constitutional environment. Moreover, as will be 
explored in greater detail below, there is evidence of an emerging receptivity to balancing 
within the case-law of the CJEU and the Opinions of its Advocates General in the context of 
free movement/fundamental rights conflict.  
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2.1. Adjudicating conflict between fundamental rights through mutual impact 
assessment: the approach of the ECtHR 
 
At times the European Court of Human Rights has been tasked with addressing tensions 
between two competing fundamental rights. This occurs when a Contracting Party to the 
ECHR is accused of interfering with a Convention right and argues that its actions sought to 
safeguard a second fundamental right. In such situations, though the Strasbourg Court still 
processes the dispute through a two-stage interference/justification framework, the presence 
of a conflicting fundamental right triggers a new kind of proportionality test. The Strasbourg 
Court conducts a mutual impact assessment, in order to determine which fundamental right 
have been affected the most, and strives for balance in relation to the protection of competing 
rights. This new reciprocal proportionality test arguably neutralises the prima facie 
wrongfulness implicit in the finding of an interference with a Convention right since both 
fundamental rights face proportionality questions before the Court makes its final decision.  
 
In order to explain this process more clearly, we will examine two ECtHR cases concerning 
fundamental rights conflicts. The first, Kokkinakis, involves a conflict between the religious 
freedom of an individual citizen, protected by Article 9 ECHR, and the competing religious 
freedom of the general population of Greece. The second, Kutzner, sees Germany argue that 
its interference with the family life of a German couple is warranted by the need to protect the 
rights of the child.  
In Kokkinakis,
13
 Mr. Kokkanikis had called at the home of Mrs. Kyriakaki and, having gained 
entry, had talked about his beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. In relation to this, he was later 
found guilty of proselytism, which was prohibited by Article 13(2) of the Greek Constitution 
and defined in an implementing law as, inter alia, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on 
the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion with the aim of 
undermining those beliefs through moral or material support, fraud, or by taking advantage of 
her/his low intellect or naïvety. Mr. Kokkinakis brought an action before the ECtHR alleging, 
inter alia, that his Article 9 ECHR rights had been violated by Greek law. He argued that it 
was legally and logically difficult to draw a line between proselytism and the freedom to 
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change one’s beliefs and manifest one’s religion in the form of teaching. The Greek 
Government argued that the practice and expression of all religious beliefs was permitted in 
Greece but this was different from using deceitful and immoral means, such as exploiting 
destitution and low intellect, to secure conversion.  
In defining the scope of Article 9, the ECtHR outlined that religious freedom encompassed 
the right to manifest one’s religion, including, in principle, the right to try to convince others 
through teaching.
14
 However, it noted, in addition, that Article 9 also covered protection for 
the beliefs of others.
15
 Nevertheless, an interference with Mr. Kokkinakis’ freedom of religion 
was established automatically by virtue of his imprisonment. The ECtHR proceeded, 
therefore, almost immediately to the question of justification.
16
 Thus far, the Strasbourg 
Court’s adjudicative approach appears to favour Mr Kokkanikis’ religious freedom over the 
religious freedom of others. However, at the ‘necessity’ stage of the proportionality 
assessment, the ECtHR emphasised the need to weigh the requirements of the protection of 
the rights of others against the conduct of the applicant.
17
 In other words, rather than requiring 
the Greek rules to overcome the standard justificatory hurdles, usually applied to public 
interests, of the ‘strict’ interpretation of a pressing social need that was ‘compelling and 
convincing’, it was necessary to reconcile the right of religious individuals to bear witness 
and the need to protect the freedom of conscience of others, especially those in distress or 
need, from ‘improper pressure…violence or brainwashing’.18 The ECtHR concluded that the 
focus of the Greek law on improper proselytising adequately reconciled these competing 
needs. However, by simply repeating the wording of the Greek implementing law to find Mr. 
Kokkinakis liable, without conducting a thorough assessment on the facts, the domestic courts 
had not sufficiently demonstrated that his actions had been ‘improper’. Accordingly, the 
consequences for Mr. Kokkinakis’ religious freedom appeared to be greater than the impact of 
his activities on the Article 9 rights of others. He had been imprisoned, whereas there was no 
established interference with the religious freedoms of others at all. 
Although the presence of a competing Convention right triggers a different, reciprocal 
proportionality assessment at the justification stage, the dissenting opinions of Judges Foighel 
and Loizou suggest a concern, within the Strasbourg Court, regarding a residual inherent 
                                                          
14
 Para.31 
15
 Para.33 
16
 Para.36 
17
 Para.47 
18
 Para.48 
 237 
 
preference for the Article 9 rights of Mr. Kokkinakis as part of the two-stage model. Reaching 
a different outcome, due to their interpretation of the facts, Judges Foighel and Loizou stress 
that an interference with Article 9(1) ECHR should itself be defined by reference to the 
religious freedoms of others, as part of a simultaneous, one-stage assessment.  
Both approaches in Kokkanikis demonstrate an understanding, by the Strasbourg Court, that a 
proportionality assessment, which seeks to find an outcome that is least restrictive of the 
rights of the individual litigant, is ill-suited to a direct conflict between two Convention rights. 
Instead, it conducts a mutually reflexive consideration of the relative impacts of protecting 
conflicting Convention rights on each other. The Strasbourg Court then offers protection to 
the right that is restricted the most in the final analysis.  
 
In Kutzner,
19
 Mr. and Mrs. Kutzner, who had special educational needs, alleged, inter alia, 
that the withdrawal, by the German State, of their parental responsibility for their daughters, 
was a violation of their right to family life, pursuant to Article 8 ECHR. The Guardianship 
Court removed the children from the Kutzners’ care on the basis that the girls’ development 
was so delayed that foster care was the only solution, drawing on the report of an expert 
witness. Mr. and Mrs. Kutzner appealed and had, in the meantime, obtained a letter from their 
doctor stating that the girls should be returned and the evidence of an expert in psychology 
who agreed. Mrs. Kutzner also gained a certificate in child-minding. As part of the appeal, the 
Regional Court appointed a second expert witness who gave evidence that the applicants were 
incapable of meeting more than the girls’ basic needs and that knowledge and skills 
developed at school were likely to be stifled by the girls’ home life. Accordingly, the 
Regional Court, and subsequently the Court of Appeal and Bundesverfassungsgericht 
dismissed the Kutzners’ appeals. A subsequent expert report by a professor of educational 
science stated that the children would not be in danger if they lived with their parents and that 
Mr. and Mrs. Kutzner were emotionally and intellectually fit to raise their children. 
Educational support would largely compensate for any deficiencies.  
 
The Kutzners brought proceedings before the ECtHR for violation of Article 8 ECHR. Since 
the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constituted a ‘fundamental 
element of family life’, an interference with Article 8 was quickly established20 under the 
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interference/justification framework. However, the ECtHR then acknowledged the need to 
strike ‘a fair balance’ between the competing interests of the individual and the community as 
a whole.
21
 It accepted that the measures of the German authorities were intended to protect the 
‘rights and freedoms’ of the children.22 It noted that views on the appropriateness of public 
authority intervention in childcare varied from state to state, depending on, inter alia, state 
traditions on the role of the family and budgetary concerns. The ECtHR also acknowledged 
that national authorities have a better knowledge of all the persons concerned. Consequently, 
it was not the role of the Strasbourg Court to substitute itself for domestic authorities 
exercising responsibility over the care of children, but rather to review whether they were 
acting within their margin of appreciation. The breadth of that margin varied according to 
both the seriousness of the risk to child welfare and the objective of family reunification. 
Particularly strict scrutiny was required where the interference with family life is so severe as 
to limit even contact between parent and child. As part of its mutual assessment of necessity, 
the ECtHR stated that the fact that an environment more beneficial to a child’s upbringing 
existed was not enough to warrant the withdrawal of parental responsibility. However, it also 
did not consider the availability of measures less restrictive of family life to mean that 
removal of parental responsibility was unnecessary. Instead, it conducted an impact 
assessment of the potential impact on the children of family reunification, noting that the 
children had benefited from an early age from educational support and that the opinions of 
expert witness had conflicted. There had been no evidence of neglect or ill-treatment.
23
  
 
The ECtHR then proceeded to assess the impact of the removal on the Kutzners’ family life. It 
emphasised that measures less restrictive of their family life had not been sufficiently 
considered. It nevertheless reiterated the need for balance between serious, long-term 
interference with family life and the best interests of the child. The ECtHR noted that, in the 
present case, even visitation rights had been restricted and that this would likely have negative 
effects on the children. Having conducted this weighing of the relative impact of the 
protection of the right to family life and securing the rights of the child, the Strasbourg Court 
concluded that Germany had violated the Kutzners’ right to family life and that the actions of 
that State were not justified.
24
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By conducting a mutual impact assessment of the fundamental rights on each other, the 
ECtHR in Kutzner seeks to reconcile competing rights, as opposed to striving for a result that 
is the least restrictive of the right initially interfered with. As part of this assessment, the 
Strasbourg Court accepts that the international judge is not best-placed to make decisions of 
policy, that are derived from social and cultural traditions of family life and from the 
pragmatics of designing systems of social protection, nor to make decisions of fact when 
domestic authorities have a superior knowledge of the circumstances surrounding removal. In 
requiring the Contracting Party to act, nevertheless, within its margin of appreciation, the 
ECtHR lays down guidelines on how this is defined. It emphasises that the more serious the 
interference with the right to family life, for instance through the withdrawal even of 
visitation rights, the narrower the Contracting Party’s margin of appreciation, while still 
mindful of the need to consider the seriousness of risk to the child.  
 
It is submitted that the complexity of contemporary interactions between free movement and 
fundamental rights, the primary law status of both free movement and fundamental rights, the 
lack of uniformity in the Union’s competence to achieve its goals, and the CJEU’s role as a 
constitutional court, rather than one of fact, demands a similar approach from the 
Luxembourg Court for its adjudication of clashes between free movement and fundamental 
rights. Crucially, the ECtHR’s balancing model is able to accommodate the variety of (often 
opposing) rights issues and policy considerations in a way that, as our discussion of the 
‘impact trio’ in chapter two demonstrated, the CJEU’s current one-sided approach to 
proportionality cannot. These arguments and the practicalities of implementing such an 
approach are discussed further in section three.  
 
 
2.2. ‘Striking a fair balance’: the adjudication of rights clashes in the context of 
secondary legislation 
 
The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty has seen a genuine engagement, on the part of the 
CJEU, with the rights contained in the Charter, in its review of secondary Union legislation. 
Specifically, for our purposes, where secondary legislation, pursuing a particular purpose 
linked to fundamental rights, has been challenged as invalid due to its undermining of another 
fundamental right, the Court has acknowledged the equal worth of these competing norms, 
regardless of the aims of the secondary legislation itself. In order to determine which should 
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prevail, the Luxembourg Court has sought to find a fair balance between them, conducting an 
analysis of their respective impacts on each other.  
 
For instance, in Deutsches Weintor,
25
 Deutsches Weintor sought a declaration that it was 
permitted to use the phrase ‘easily digestible’ on the labels of one of its wines, despite the 
objections of the German authorities that this was a prohibited ‘health claim’, pursuant to 
Article 4(3) Regulation 1924/2006,
26
 which precluded such statements on the labelling of 
alcoholic beverages. The German Federal Administrative Court made a reference to the CJEU 
concerning, inter alia, the compatibility of the prohibition on health claims in respect of wine 
with the fundamental rights to choose an occupation and to conduct a business, protected by 
the Charter. This was because producers were prevented from stating that their wine was 
‘easily digestible’ even when, due to low acidity, this claim was correct.  
 
Acknowledging the primary status of the Charter, the CJEU accepted that Article 15 CFR 
protected the freedom to choose an occupation, while Article 16 CFR guaranteed the freedom 
to conduct a business.
27
 However, it noted too, that under Article 35 CFR, the Union was also 
obliged to ensure a high level of human health protection in its policies. Accordingly, it was 
necessary to assess Article 4(3) of the Regulation in relation to both Articles 15 and 16 CFR 
on the one hand, and Article 35 CFR on the other. The Court stated that it must conduct its 
assessment ‘in accordance with the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of 
those various fundamental rights protected by the Union legal order, and strike a fair balance 
between them [emphasis added]’.28 Thus, the Court conducted, first, an assessment of the 
impact of allowing the contested phrase on wine bottles. It noted that there were risks of 
addiction, abuse, and serious disease connected to the consumption of alcohol, warranting its 
strict regulation and that public health concerns arising from alcoholic abuse had led to 
justifiable restrictions on the free movement of goods. Consumers had to be able to regulate 
their consumption and protect their health effectively by being in the position to consider the 
inherent dangers of alcohol consumption. Although substantively correct, the claim that 
Deutsches Weintor’s wine was ‘easily digestible’ was silent as to the fact that, regardless of 
sound digestion, the inherent dangers connected to alcohol consumption had not been 
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removed or even limited in that particular wine. By highlighting its ‘easy digestibility’, the 
label might encourage immoderate consumption, increasing the risk to health. Consequently, 
the total prohibition, without exception, of ‘health claims’ regarding alcoholic beverages 
could be viewed as necessary.
29
  
 
However, crucially, this was insufficient to conclude that the measure was justified. It was 
also necessary to consider the impact of the prohibition on Articles 15 and 16 CFR. The Court 
noted that, although those rights were not absolute, restrictions upon them must correspond to 
objectives of general interest pursued by the Union, and not constitute, in any case, a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of those rights.
30
 
For the Court the restriction placed on the right to choose an occupation and the freedom to 
conduct a business was justified, in principle, by the objective of protecting health, recognised 
by Article 35 CFR. Moreover, the essential aspects of Articles 15 and 16 had been respected. 
Far from prohibiting the production and marketing of alcohol, the Regulation merely 
controlled, in a very clearly defined area, the labelling and advertising of such products. The 
substance of the rights contained in Articles 15 and 16 was unaffected. Consequently, the 
prohibition was justified in practice and the Regulation valid.
31
 Thus, in Deutsches Weintor, 
the Court conducted a reciprocal proportionality test, assessing the mutual impact of 
fundamental rights on each other. The aim of the secondary legislation, which was to protect 
human health, was irrelevant.
32
 By contrast, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, once 
a breach of primary free movement law is established, it is exclusively the fundamental right 
that must demonstrate its proportionality, in view of its impact on free movement. There is 
limited procedural space for the consideration of the fundamental rights consequences of the 
pursuit of free movement.  
 
Similarly, in Sky Österreich,
33
 Sky contested the requirement in Article 15 of the Audio-visual 
Directive
34
 that it allow other broadcasters to choose short excerpts of broadcasts, for which 
Sky had exclusive broadcasting rights, for the purposes of short news programmes. Thus, the 
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Court was tasked with reconciling a clash between Article 16 CFR (the right to conduct a 
business) on the one hand, and the right to receive information and promote the pluralism of 
the media, protected by Article 11(1) and 11(2) CFR, on the other.  Again, the Court 
conducted a reciprocal proportionality test, assessing the impact of Article 15 on Sky’s 
freedom to conduct a business, but also the effects of Sky’s pursuit of this freedom on the 
plurality of the media and the rights of others to receive information. It noted that the core of 
Article 16 CFR remained because the Directive did not prevent business activity ‘as such’. It 
also did not prevent the holder of exclusive broadcasting rights from using them to broadcast 
events for consideration or from granting new rights to others for consideration.
35
 Further, the 
marketing on an exclusive basis, of events of high public interest was increasing and liable to 
restrict considerably the access of the general public to information regarding them.  
 
The Court, nevertheless, exposed Article 15 of the Directive to questions of appropriateness 
and necessity. Since the provision put any broadcaster, irrespective of commercial and 
financial capacity, in a position to broadcast short news reports on matters of high public 
interest, it was found to be appropriate to the aim pursued. Crucially, on the question of 
necessity, while the Court accepted that there were less restrictive measures available, such as 
allowing holders of exclusive broadcasters access to compensation relating to the cost of 
securing exclusive broadcasting rights in the first place, it noted that this would not achieve 
the objective of freedom of information as effectively as Article 15. The proposed alternative 
could deter or prevent certain broadcasters, due to their limited financial capacity, from 
requesting access to broadcasts of high public interest and thus considerably restrict the 
freedom of information. Article 15 was therefore viewed as necessary for meeting the goal 
pursued.
36
 These considerations of the effectiveness of fundamental rights protection are in 
stark contrast to the necessity test operating in relation to clashes between free movement and 
fundamental rights, which, as will be recalled from all previous chapters, generally focuses on 
finding restrictions less restrictive of free movement, which can reduce the legal space for 
considering the issue of effectiveness.
37
  
 
In relation to residual proportionality, the CJEU held that it was ‘necessary to strike a balance 
between the freedom to conduct a business, on the one hand, and the fundamental freedom of 
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citizens…to receive information, and the freedom and pluralism of the media on the other’. 
Where two Charter rights clash, there is a need to seek reconciliation and a fair balance 
between them.
38
 To determine whether a fair balance had been struck, the Court conducted a 
mutual impact assessment of the effects of the fundamental rights on each other. It noted, 
first, that interference with Article 16 CFR, by the need to protect the freedom of information, 
had been ‘confined within precise limits’. By contrast, the increasing use of exclusive 
broadcasting contracts, for events of high public interest, was likely to ‘significantly restrict’ 
access to information about them by the general public. Consequently, the Union legislature 
had been entitled to prioritise the freedom of information in its Audio-visual Directive.
39
 In 
other words, since the impact on freedom of information was significant, and the effect on the 
freedom to conduct a business minimal, the former should prevail.   
 
The above case-law suggests that the primary status of the Charter has had an appreciable 
effect on the Court’s cognisance of the need to ‘strike a balance’ between competing, but 
normatively equal, Union goals. The CJEU’s adjudicative approach consists of a genuine 
attempt to reconcile conflicting fundamental rights through mutual impact assessments, which 
seek to find an outcome that protects the essence of both fundamental rights. However, the 
value of these cases could be questioned since the outcomes of both favour those fundamental 
rights corresponding to the aims of Union legislation. Particularly following the Tobacco 
Advertising II judgment,
40
 the Court could be accused of being more lenient in its judicial 
review of the actions of the Union legislature compared with its approach to reviewing 
national legislation. However, there is evidence in the case-law that the Court is able to take 
fundamental rights seriously, even where their protection restricts the achievement of the core 
aims of EU secondary legislation.  
 
For instance, the preamble to Directive 98/44/EC makes clear that its central purpose is to 
acknowledge the high-risk investment involved in genetic research and the consequent need 
for legal protection.
41
 Noting, the significant progress in the treatment of disease by medical 
products derived from elements isolated from the human body, the preamble emphasises that 
technical processes in relation to these developments could not be excluded from 
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patentability.
42
 Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 6(2)(c) Directive 98/44/EC, the use of human 
embryos for industrial and commercial purposes was unpatentable. In Brüstle,
43
 a patent, held 
by Mr. Brüstle, had been found to be invalid since it covered human embryonic stem cells and 
the processes for their production. In short, although the patent involved a ‘technical process’, 
this required the prior destruction of human embryos. While the Directive allowed for the 
patenting of technical processes derived from elements of the human body, Article 6(2)(c) 
clearly stated that it was not possible to patent the use of human embryos for commercial and 
industrial purposes. A reference was made to the CJEU, asking, inter alia, for clarification of 
the term ‘human embryo’ and whether a technical process, which did not, itself, involve 
embryo destruction, but required this as a precondition for its operation, could be patented.    
 
The CJEU considered that, although the Directive aimed to promote investment in 
biotechnology, it was also clear from its preamble that the use of biotechnological material 
from humans must be consistent with fundamental rights, in particular, human dignity. 
Consequently, the term ‘human embryo’ had to be interpreted widely. The Court held that the 
legislature clearly intended to exclude from patentability anything that could affect human 
dignity. Thus, an invention had to be regarded as unpatentable where it required the 
destruction of human embryos for its implementation.
44
 In other words, the central aim of the 
Directive, the promotion of investment in biotechnology, had to be reconciled with competing 
objectives, such as respect for fundamental rights, even where this restricted biotechnological 
investment. This contrasts sharply with the CJEU’s approach in Laval,45 in which the 
statement within the recital to the Posted Workers’ Directive, that it is without prejudice to the 
law of the Member States concerning collective action,
46
 was largely neglected. Decided prior 
to Lisbon, and in the context of a clash at the level of EU primary law, the fundamental right 
to collective action was interpreted exclusively by reference to the primary objective of the 
PWD, namely the free provision of services, and what would be least restrictive of that 
freedom. 
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Accordingly, in cases like Brüstle,
47
 the CJEU has shown a clear ability to recognise that the 
maximum pursuit of the objectives of secondary legislation is not always possible in light of 
the need to respect fundamental rights. Indeed, where Union legislation represents a ‘mere’ 
public interest, the Court operates a fundamental rights bias whereby the Union instrument 
has to justify itself against an established interference with a Charter right.
48
 Thus, it appears 
that it is the Court’s adjudicative approach to clashes between primary free movement law 
and fundamental rights, which channels the dispute towards considerations of what is least 
restrictive of free movement, that is the core contributor to the potential undermining of 
fundamental rights by the CJEU.  
 
Consequently, it would seem desirable to transfer the mutual impact assessment, used by the 
CJEU in the context of secondary legislation, into its adjudication of clashes between free 
movement and fundamental rights. Such an approach would be conducive to the Union’s need 
to reconcile, as best it can, its often competing commitments to the internal market and to 
protecting fundamental rights. The next section will consider how the use of balancing, 
through mutual impact assessment, would operate in the context of primary free movement 
law.  
 
 
3. Introducing balancing to EU primary law: overcoming practical concerns 
 
Certain practical questions arise in relation to the adoption of a balancing model for 
addressing tensions between primary free movement law and fundamental rights. These 
primarily concern whether balancing can actually offer concrete outcomes rather than just an 
inherent normative statement that fundamental rights should be treated as equal to, rather than 
hierarchically lower than, free movement. In other words, what tools does balancing actually 
equip the Court with to resolve conflict between free movement and fundamental rights in 
practice? The second half of this section argues that through the process of reciprocal 
proportionality assessments, focused on mutual impact, balancing does offer a workable 
methodology for these conflicts. First, the section will re-emphasise the key arguments that 
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support the transfer of a balancing model into clashes between fundamental rights and the 
primary free movement provisions. 
 
 
3.1. Balancing as a better ‘fit’ for the Union’s contemporary constitutional framework 
 
It is argued here that the use of a balancing model, for clashes between free movement and 
fundamental rights, would seem a better ‘fit’ for the Union’s contemporary constitutional 
framework. By allowing room for the examination of the effects of fundamental rights on free 
movement and the reciprocal consideration of the impact of free movement on fundamental 
rights, it leaves sufficient space for the recognition of competing Union aims. By not seeking 
an outcome that simply has the least restrictive effects on free movement, there is adequate 
scope for the Court to consider the actual effectiveness of alternative means of fundamental 
rights protection. Specifically, it can consider the idiosyncratic fundamental rights needs of 
the Member States, the peculiarities of certain fundamental rights, and the practicalities of 
designing programmes of fundamental social rights protection, given, not only the budgetary 
and administrative constraints facing Member States, but also the division of labour between 
the Union and the Member States in fields such as social policy.   
 
In fact, the Court has, itself, made reference to the need to ‘strike a balance’ between 
competing Union objectives. In Schmidberger, the Court, having recognised the existence of a 
clash between free movement and fundamental rights, explicitly emphasised that ‘the interests 
involved must be weighed having regard to all of the circumstances of the case in order to 
determine whether a fair balance has been struck between those interests’.49 Even in the 
Viking and Laval cases, the Court stated that the fundamental freedoms ‘must be balanced 
against the objectives pursued by social policy’.50 However, by retaining the 
breach/justification approach, and imposing the standard proportionality questions on the 
protection of fundamental rights at the justification stage, a genuine balancing was not 
effected. Rather, fundamental rights remained procedurally disadvantaged.  
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However, post-Lisbon, there has been an emerging acceptance of the need to alter the 
adjudicative framework in recognition of new constitutional dynamics. In Santos Palhota,
51
 
which also concerned the posting of workers, Advocate General Cruz Villalón argued that the 
changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, specifically Article 9 TEU, Article 3(3) TEU 
and the primary status of the Charter, required a different approach to restrictions placed on 
free movement as a result of social policy. Since worker protection is warranted under the 
Treaty itself, it could no longer be viewed as a ‘simple derogation from a freedom, still less an 
unwritten exception inferred from case-law’.52 Insofar as the Treaty provides for a high level 
of social protection, it ‘authorises the Member States’, for the purpose of safeguarding social 
protection, to restrict fundamental freedoms and to do so without Union law regarding this as 
something ‘exceptional’, requiring ‘strict’ interpretation.53 The Advocate General’s 
subsequent exposure to the proportionality test of only the social endeavours involved in the 
case somewhat undermines this important recognition of the Union’s constitutional evolution. 
However, significantly, the Advocate General emphasised that the proportionality test must be 
conducted in an individualised manner, which, in accordance with the Treaty had to be 
particularly sensitive to the social protection of workers.
54
 This meant that when the Advocate 
General came to review the necessity of the relevant Member State measures, he was able to 
consider whether measures less restrictive of free movement would also be as effective in 
achieving the goal of social protection, concluding in that case that they would be.
55
  
 
A sharper focus on balancing was, however, apparent in the Opinion of Advocate General 
Trstenjak in Commission v Germany.
56
 Local authorities in Germany had awarded service 
contracts, in respect of salary conversion schemes for old-age pensions, to service providers 
referred to in a collective agreement, without first making a call for tenders. Consequently, the 
Commission brought an action, arguing that Germany had not met its obligations under the 
Public Procurement Directives.
57
 Since these instruments were concerned with the 
implementation of the freedoms of establishment and services, the Advocate General elevated 
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the conflict to the level of primary law.
58
 Accordingly, the case involved a clash between free 
movement and the right to bargain collectively, contained in Article 28 CFR. In addressing 
the conflict, Advocate General Trstenjak conducted a review of the recent case law, 
specifically Viking and Laval. She noted that, despite acknowledging the Union’s social 
objectives, the Court had subsumed fundamental social rights within the existing scheme of 
analysis relating to ‘overriding reasons of the public interest’, making them answerable to the 
standard justificatory hurdles of legitimacy of aim, appropriateness, and necessity.
59
 The 
Advocate General argued that this approach sat ‘uncomfortably alongside the principle of 
equal ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms [and]…suggests the existence 
of a hierarchical relationship between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights in which 
fundamental rights are subordinated to fundamental freedoms…’60 For her, ‘no such 
hierarchical relationship’ exists.61  
 
As a result, Advocate General Trstenjak emphasised the need for ‘a fair balance’ between free 
movement and fundamental rights in instances of conflict. This would only be ensured when: 
 
‘…the restriction by a fundamental right on a fundamental freedom is not permitted to go beyond what is 
appropriate, necessary and reasonable to realise that fundamental right. Conversely, however, nor may the 
restriction on a fundamental right by a fundamental freedom go beyond what is appropriate, necessary and 
reasonable to realise the fundamental freedom…this analysis based on the principle of proportionality is capable 
of producing an outcome which ensures the optimum effectiveness of fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms’62 
Thus, it is necessary to consider the impacts of free movement and fundamental rights on 
each other and seek an outcome that is least restrictive of both norms. While it might be 
possible to protect a fundamental right in a way less restrictive of free movement, this 
alternative has, itself, to be tested against the obligation that free movement imposes as few 
restrictions as possible on fundamental rights. This might mean that higher limitations can 
legitimately be placed on free movement than would be the case under the one-sided 
proportionality assessment that the Court currently operates. Accordingly, the Opinion of 
Advocate General Trstenjak signifies the emergence of a balancing model in the context of 
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conflict between free movement and fundamental rights and is important in proposing a ‘more 
symmetrical approach which acknowledges the economic freedoms must sometimes give way 
to fundamental rights’.63  
However, this development is partially limited by the Advocate General’s reliance on the 
Schmidberger case to support her argument, and her concrete application of balancing.
64
 
Specifically, having noted that evidence provided by the German government concentrated on 
whether its protection of fundamental rights was appropriate and necessary, Advocate General 
Trstenjak’s implementation of proportionality still focused on these questions, imposing a 
heavier evidential burden upon fundamental rights than on free movement and remaining 
structurally one-sided.
65
 The Advocate General still emphasised that a measure is ‘necessary’ 
if it is the ‘least onerous’ way of pursuing the right at issue.66 Nevertheless, her earlier 
discussion of the need for ‘fair balance’ does encourage a stronger consideration of the 
effectiveness of alternatives. In other words, whether alternatives less onerous to the pursuit of 
free movement would impose too great a restriction, in turn, on collective bargaining:  
…[o]nly if the social partners could have achieved an alternative consensus, conforming more closely to 
Community law, could the preliminary selection at issue in favour of certain pension scheme providers be 
rejected as unnecessary. 
 
In answering [that] question…the Court must proceed with caution [and] respect as far as possible the social 
partners’ scope for assessment and action.67 
 
Thus, the concept of balancing has already created more legal space for the appreciation of 
the division of labour – in terms of policy-formation – within the Union. Nonetheless, the 
Advocate General concluded that it was possible to envisage the creation of a conversion of 
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earnings scheme, as required by the collective agreement, but implemented by means of a call 
for tenders, as necessitated by the public procurement directives. In sum, the Advocate 
General considered the impact on free movement to be greater than that on fundamental 
rights:  
 
‘The requirements [regarding the list of approved service providers] must be regarded as technical 
implementation provisions hardly touching on terms and conditions of employment whilst at the same time their 
effect is to exclude in their entirety the requirements arising from the principles of freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services [emphasis added]’.68   
 
Thus, by comparing the relative impact of free movement and fundamental rights on each 
other, Advocate General Trstenjak in Commission v Germany sought an outcome that 
reconciled the competing needs of free movement and fundamental rights, rather than simply 
asking what would be least restrictive of free movement.  
 
Although the Court, in this case, was not as explicit as its Advocate General, there is evidence 
of the CJEU’s cognisance of the need to take a more holistic approach to the Treaty.69 
Crucially, the Court did not conduct a two-stage breach/justification analysis. Indeed, as 
Barnard and Deakin remark, rather than attempting to establish a breach of free movement, 
via its usual Säger market access approach, the Court instead cites Schmidberger as authority 
for the need to reconcile competing interests.
70
 Instead of exposing the protection of 
fundamental rights to the question of whether it is pursued in a way that is least restrictive of 
free movement, the issue was whether, ‘a fair balance was struck in the account taken of the 
respective interests involved’.71 It concluded that it was not as the effect of the collective 
agreement was ‘to disapply the public procurement rules completely’.72 By contrast, 
compliance with public procurement rules could still respect the right to collective bargaining 
because their application did not ‘preclude the call for tenders imposing on interested 
tenderers conditions reflecting the interests of the workers concerned’.73 Thus, the Court 
tested the necessity of the collective agreement in relation to restrictions it placed on free 
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movement, but also the impact that protecting collective agreements in a way less restrictive 
of free movement would have on the effectiveness of those agreements.  
 
Accordingly, a balancing model, through mutual impact assessments, leaves greater legal 
space for the complexity of defining fundamental rights. Recalling the ‘impact trio’ triggered 
by the breach/justification framework, under a balancing approach, the necessity of a 
fundamental rights standard, in relation to consumer protection,
74
 might be determined by 
reference to whether measures less restrictive of free movement would be as effective in light 
of the language spoken in a Member State.
75
 Similarly, balancing has the capacity to 
appreciate that the fundamental right to access to housing or healthcare
76
 forms part of a 
larger budgetary plan, which limits public authorities’ abilities always to choose the option 
least restrictive of free movement. We have already seen, throughout this thesis, that the two-
stage model limits the appreciation of these factors.
77
 Thus, the case suggests an emerging 
doctrinal adjustment regarding the interaction between free movement and fundamental rights 
in the post-Lisbon era.   
 
Nonetheless, it remains necessary to consider what a clearer commitment to balancing would 
look like. Crucially, a firmer departure from the breach/justification model is needed to ensure 
a fully reciprocal assessment of impact.  
 
 
3.2. Operating a balancing model in the context of primary free movement law 
 
It will be recalled from chapter one that the Treaty does not inherently require the treatment 
of fundamental rights as a derogation from free movement.
78
 As the rest of the thesis has 
demonstrated, the structural position of fundamental rights has rather evolved organically out 
of the Union’s historically economic focus and key constitutional developments. For instance, 
the statement in Article 36 TFEU that ‘Articles 34 and 35 TFEU shall not preclude measures 
justified by’ the reasons contained therein arguably suggests that competing norms should be 
considered alongside each other as part of an overall assessment. Moreover, since 
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fundamental rights do not feature in the Treaty’s derogating provisions, a clash between, say, 
the free movement of goods and fundamental rights can be formulated as a conflict between 
Article 34 TFEU and Article 6 TEU. Accordingly, the balancing of these competing values 
would be more constitutionally appropriate than the establishment of a prima facie breach, 
followed by a one-sided justification assessment.  
 
Nevertheless, any balancing model introduced into EU primary law will have to retain the 
formal shape of a two-stage process in light of the fact that, pursuant to the principle of 
conferral,
79
 the Court requires a hook to EU law in order to have jurisdiction over 
fundamental rights concerns.
80
 Indeed, the principle of conferral might be viewed as an 
additional cause of adjudicative imbalance, beyond the constitutional trinity discussed in 
chapters two, three and four since, as Weiler and Lockhart remark:  
 
Formalistically, the Court has no option but to decide first whether the national measure…constitutes a prima 
facie prohibited restriction and only in the second place whether it can be justified… Only if the first question is 
answered in the affirmative…could the human rights dilemma become an issue.81 
 
However, although the principle of conferral might have been a key player in provoking a 
two-stage structure, it has not led to an increase in the volume of interactions between free 
movement and fundamental rights. Nor does it require or extend the evidentiary gap between 
establishing a breach of free movement and proving a justification. Indeed, conferral can be 
satisfied without recourse to a proportionality test that reviews Member State rules 
exclusively from the perspective of what is least restrictive of free movement. Crucially, then, 
a two-stage balancing approach, similar to the adjudicative methodology employed by the 
ECtHR, will respect the principle of conferral. It will be recalled, from section two, that the 
Strasbourg Court first establishes that there has been an interference with the Convention 
right, which the applicant argues has been violated. However, this does not establish a prima 
facie violation of that right. Instead, the presence of a second competing fundamental right 
triggers a different reciprocal proportionality assessment. A violation is not established until 
this balancing is complete. This approach neutralises the manifest wrongfulness that might 
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otherwise accompany an initial finding of breach. In Deutsches Weintor, the CJEU adopted a 
similar system with regard to secondary legislation.
82
 
 
Similarly, the Luxembourg Court could employ an approach whereby it seeks first to establish 
an initial obstacle to free movement but the use of a fundamental right to explain it would 
automatically trigger the use of a new proportionality assessment. ‘Obstacle’ would no longer 
be synonymous with prima facie breach as is currently the case. Critically, rather than being 
viewed as a justification for a breach of free movement, requiring a proportionality test that 
seeks to find an outcome least restrictive of free movement, fundamental rights would be 
presented as an explanation for initial obstacles to free movement. This would trigger a 
mutual proportionality assessment that seeks compromise between these competing 
objectives, counteracting the imbalance of a two-stage approach. Initial steps towards such an 
approach are visible in the reasoning of the Advocate General in Santos Palhota.
83
 As Nic 
Shuibhne notes: 
 
The Advocate General’s interpretation of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty retains the formal shape of the Court’s 
[two-stage] method in free movement case law; but it changes profoundly the emphasis that should be attached 
to public interest arguments in the second…stage when the relevant objectives are themselves recognised by the 
Treaties.
84     
 
Thus, while, for instance, Article 34 TFEU might remain the initial ‘hook’ to EU law, the 
existence of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 TEU, as well as the Charter, would channel a free 
movement/fundamental rights conflict away from the standard adjudicative model, which 
structurally favours free movement, towards a balancing framework. In this way, the need for 
the scope of EU law to be triggered would not be problematic but free movement would also 
no longer be treated as ‘too’ fundamental.  
 
A further question that arises from the proposal of a balancing model is the relative weight to 
be afforded to the competing values of the Union. Nic Shuibhne argues that the objectives 
shaping the EU internal market are ‘profoundly imprecise’85 and that ‘…different parts of the 
Treaty do not include appropriate guidance about [their] relative internal or systemic 
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weight.’86 Acknowledging the ongoing prioritisation of free movement at the justification 
phase of the two-stage approach, Nic Shuibhne recognises that ‘a more nuanced approach 
would posit the different values and objectives expressed in Article 3(3) [TEU] as at least 
equal to free movement rights’,87 especially where the conflicting value concerns a 
fundamental right. But, she argues, ‘‘equal’ legal status does not signal an obvious way 
forward when values collide’.88 
 
This does not mean that the relative weight of free movement can continue to be determined 
according to an outdated economic framework devised when many of the aims contained in 
the contemporary Treaty were not a Union (or rather an EEC) concern. As Mason recognises, 
‘the compromise sought at the Treaty of Rome, whereby greater economic integration and 
wealth was promised in exchange for a separate Ordungpolitik outside of the Member States’ 
competence, while Member States remained in charge of ‘social’ policy broke down several 
decades ago’.89 Any adjudicative model should, at the very least, consider the impact of free 
movement on new aims. The capacity for the Court to do this, under an imbalanced 
adjudicative structure that channels proportionality assessments towards the question of what 
is least restrictive of free movement, is low. Thus, until the Treaty provides further guidance, 
the Court must exercise its ‘immense institutional power’90 responsibly to develop an 
adjudicative model more suited to the Union’s contemporary constitution.    
 
It is submitted that a model that starts by treating free movement and fundamental rights as 
equal, and then seeks to reconcile the two by striving for an outcome that is least restrictive of 
both norms is a workable approach. This can be compared to Alexy’s definition of balancing 
as ‘the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater 
must be the importance of satisfying the other’.91 Alexy’s theory does not focus on the 
intrinsic value of a norm; indeed he argues that this ‘can never be determined independently 
or absolutely’.92 Instead, the analysis centres on ‘the extent to which one principle is infringed 
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for the benefit or satisfaction of another’.93 In the Union context, values might also be 
grouped together when assessing impact. For instance, where the free provision of services 
clashes with the right to strike, the Court might consider, when examining the effects of free 
movement on collective action: the primary status of the Charter, which recognises the 
fundamental right to strike; the Union’s commitment to proper social protection, taking into 
account diverse national practices;
94
 its task of ensuring a highly competitive social market 
economy;
95
 its recognition of the role of social partners;
96
 and the Union’s explicit lack of 
legislative competence in relation to the right to strike.
97
    
 
Nevertheless, there remain further practical hurdles facing the operation of mutual impact 
assessments. The first relates to the Court’s consistent assertion that no de minimis test 
operates in relation to free movement since a balancing model requires consideration of the 
concrete impact of competing fundamental rights on free movement.
98
 Advocate General 
Jacob’s famous call for a ‘substantial impact on market access’ test for establishing a breach 
of free movement, though welcomed by a sizeable section of the literature,
99
 has never been 
explicitly approved by the Court.
100
 However, for two reasons, it is time that the CJEU 
accepted some kind of de minimis assessment in this regard. First, the growing gap, outlined 
in chapter two, in the evidentiary burden placed on free movement, on the one hand, and 
fundamental rights, on the other, cannot be justified in a Union committed to respecting 
fundamental rights. Second, despite a generally consistent refusal to apply a de minimis 
threshold in the context of free movement, Nic Shuibhne has produced evidence of an 
‘obliquely operative’ de minimis test in several free movement cases.101 Consider, for 
instance, Garcia Avello, which required ‘serious inconvenience’ to the exercise of free 
movement;
102
 or the total or near total prohibition on product use in Mickelsson and Roos and 
Italian Trailers.
103
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One reason for rejecting a de minimis standard in the context of free movement has been its 
traditional association with quantitative assessments within competition law. Oliver has 
argued that introducing quantitative economic assessments into free movement would be a 
‘disaster’ for legal certainty.104 Davies has additionally stressed that free movement law 
differs from competition as it often involves smaller actors who are unable to provide 
complex economic assessments.
105
 However, the de minimis test emerging in Nic Shuibhne’s 
case-law analysis is qualitative in nature. She argues for the introduction of an ‘appreciability’ 
test that would require some sort of qualitative impact on free movement before a breach is 
established. She nevertheless accepts such a model would present some challenges.
106
 How to 
define, for instance, a ‘serious’ or ‘considerable’ restriction on free movement? Nic Shuibhne 
acknowledges Weatherill’s remarks that while these thresholds appear ‘crucial’ they are 
alarmingly elusive and seem inevitably to point to a messy case-by-case application.
107
 
Responding to these issues, she argues that qualitative methods are still a constituent of 
science and emphasises that it is the responsibility of the Court to define qualitative terms in a 
systematically coherent way.
108
 Although Nic Shuibhne’s discussion centred on the issue of 
breach, her arguments are equally relevant to a balancing model.  
 
While concepts such as ‘serious’ are hard to define, mutual impact assessment would at least 
require the Court to articulate and then consider explicitly the level of interference imposed 
by free movement on fundamental rights and vice versa. In order to avoid the ‘messy case-by-
case analysis’ that troubles Weatherill, the CJEU could lay down general guidelines relating 
to when restrictions on free movement are considered particularly serious. For instance, we 
might see a presumption of serious impact in cases of direct discrimination. Likewise, a high 
level of interference with fundamental rights might be presumed, where limitations are placed 
on political speech. Other restrictions on free movement might also be found to be ‘high’, on 
the facts, but without enjoying such presumptions. For example, in a case similar to Italian 
Mopeds, where there is no direct or indirect discrimination or DRB, applicants would have to 
demonstrate the impact of receiving State rules on, what Nic Shuibhne defines as, their 
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‘access to free movement rights’.109 This might be demonstrated by the existence of a total 
ban on product use, but this would still have to be balanced against the (possibly) high level 
of interference with fundamental rights that might arise from product entry onto the market of 
the receiving States.  
 
This approach would be in stark contrast to the outcome of cases such as Gourmet under the 
existing breach/justification model.
110
 As chapter two explained, in that case, the ban on 
certain types of advertising of alcohol in Sweden was found to be a breach of the free 
movement of services due to the ‘international nature of advertising’. There was no need to 
identify actual clients coming from other Member States who wished to use Swedish 
advertising space to sell alcoholic beverages. Nor was there any obligation on the Court to 
consider whether those wishing to sell advertising space were materially affected by the ban 
when they could sell advertising to other clients. As Spaventa has argued, Gourmet seemed to 
be about challenging the very existence of regulation, rather than about the limitation of free 
movement rights.
111
 In such situations, the impact on access to free movement rights should 
be viewed as low. Crucially, as well as placing no real evidentiary burden at the breach stage, 
there was also no analysis of the impact of free movement on Swedish attempts to protect the 
right to health. Given the potentially low impact on access to free movement rights by the 
Swedish rules in Gourmet, it seems that a mutual impact assessment would have led to a 
different result.
112
  
 
One of the dangers linked to defining a breach through an analysis of norms’ relative impact 
on each other, as Nic Shuibhne has recognised, in a different context, is that, ‘prejudging what 
may or may not have any real impact on the decision to go to another Member State 
is…dangerously subjective ground’.113 As she accepts, this is inherent in qualitative 
appreciability thresholds. This criticism can be levelled at balancing itself, which incorporates 
considerable judicial discretion.
114
 However, this discretion is no greater than that operating 
under the current two-stage approach. Moreover, as de Vries points out, it is ‘often 
unavoidable in solving conflicts between fundamental rights’, which are hardly ever absolute 
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in character.
115
 Nevertheless, this problem can be mitigated, although not completely 
overcome, in two ways. First, indicators of impact on both free movement and fundamental 
rights can be presented to the CJEU as part of the national court’s preliminary reference, and 
during written and oral submissions.
116
 This can be seen as a reproduction, within the 
logistical confines of judicial proceedings, of the already accepted need, at Union legislative-
level, to conduct fundamental rights impact assessments ‘to provide the Commission, right 
from the start…with a complete picture of the various impacts…on individuals and groups 
whose rights may be involved, depending on the options envisaged’.117 Pre-legislative impact 
assessments might also prove useful in the judicial balancing of free movement against 
fundamental rights where the matter involves secondary legislation implementing free 
movement and elevated to a primary law dispute.  
 
Second, while the CJEU should act as a forum for the articulation of genuine supranational 
concerns, final decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the site of the dispute, 
namely at the level of the national courts. Thus, having considered the various submissions, 
the CJEU is well-placed to highlight to national courts the impact of domestic rules on EU 
objectives. It can remind the Member States of their commitment to the European project, and 
their Treaty obligations. It can highlight the legitimate need, in some cases, for Member States 
to alter their fundamental rights approaches, where equivalent fundamental rights standards 
can provide sufficient protection with fewer negative consequences for free movement. In 
short, it can require some give and take from the Member States. Thus, the Court’s statement 
in Beer Purity, that consumers’ conceptions vary from State to State but will also evolve over 
time as part of the establishment of the Common Market, and that ‘…the legislation of a 
Member State must not be allowed to crystallise given consumer habits so as to consolidate an 
advantage acquired by national industries’ is a legitimate one.118 The ability of the CJEU to 
act as a forum for comparing and contrasting different fundamental rights methodologies will 
be particularly important, in cases like Omega and Grogan,
119
 where a free 
movement/fundamental rights dispute also represents conflict between two different Member 
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States’ fundamental rights definitions. Here, fundamental rights conflict arises because of 
participation in the internal market. Accordingly, the CJEU is not only legitimately involved 
in fundamental rights issues but the only institution capable of airing competing claims.       
 
On the other hand, mutual impact assessments will also require the Court to have genuine 
regard for our identified trio of impact, which free movement can impose upon fundamental 
rights. As outlined above, the Court should also be cognisant of the potential effects of the 
pursuit of free movement on other Treaty aims. In other words, an holistic approach to the 
Treaty is needed. When deciding whether Member State methods for pursuing certain 
legitimate aims impose too great a restriction on free movement, the Court should take 
particular care in considering what competence the Union has to meet these goals 
supranationally. The Court should always examine whether the Union is able to act in place of 
individual Member States and, if it cannot, whether the Court should leave more room to the 
Member States to perform this function. This is especially the case when domestic measures 
are only tangentially related to free movement or where the Treaty has explicit objectives in 
this field but largely leaves their implementation to the Member States. In such situations, as 
De Búrca points out, ‘a thorough enquiry into what alternative means the state might have 
chosen to pursue its aims [would lead to the CJEU] effectively assuming…a legislative role 
[raising] concerns about legitimacy’.120  
 
Nevertheless, where judicial action is necessary, questions of the impact of free movement on 
fundamental rights must be taken, as frequently as possible, by the national courts. Having 
both the guidance of the CJEU – on the supranational effects of the normative interaction – 
and the factual background to the case, the national courts ‘enjoy the best knowledge of the 
facts, and can assess the impact of different interpretations to the case at hand’.121 Torres 
Perez argues that interpretative decisions on fundamental rights are ‘better taken at a level 
closer to the citizen’,122 while Nic Shuibhne highlights the national courts’ ability to ‘tighten 
the connection between the decision-maker and the policy-maker, as well as to the parties 
actually affected by the outcome’.123   
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Moreover, national courts can and should be trusted with this responsibility. First, they act as 
agents of both the European and national legal orders. Facing upwards, to the supranational 
level, Article 267 TFEU, as interpreted by the CJEU in Opinion 1/09,
124
 involves domestic 
courts in the ‘correct application and uniform interpretation of European Union law’. Indeed, 
although not consistently adhered to by the CJEU, ‘under the proper division of functions 
between the Court of Justice and national courts, it is precisely the responsibility of the Court 
of Justice to provide and reinforce a coherent guiding structure for the application of 
proportionality in cases with an EU dimension, [while] the application of that structure to 
concrete fact-sets should be…the task of the referring court’.125 The judicial diplomacy in the 
Solange line of case-law demonstrates awareness amongst national courts that the consistent 
rejection of CJEU rulings might ‘undermine the efficacy of EU law and impair the integration 
project’.126 Facing downwards, to the national level, domestic courts are also in a better 
position than the CJEU to understand legitimate idiosyncratic needs within the Member States 
and to have access to facts relevant to the practical decisions of policy-makers. It is this dual 
role, of EU and national court, that allows domestic courts to come closer to effecting genuine 
balance between conflicting interests. One potential issue is in cases such as Omega,
127
 
involving also a clash between two Member State definitions of a fundamental right. Leaving 
concrete application to the national court brings the final decision closer only to one of those 
Member States. Nevertheless, the preliminary reference procedure allows the CJEU to 
provide any necessary guidance in this regard and to highlight the supranational obligations 
of, for instance, the receiving State.
128
  
 
This section has addressed the practical questions arising from the introduction of a balancing 
model into the adjudication of clashes between the primary free movement provisions and 
fundamental rights. Under a process of mutual impact assessment, when these conflicts occur 
they cannot be overcome simply by the existence of alternatives less restrictive of free 
movement, since these must also be effective means of securing fundamental rights. This 
creates greater legal space for analysis of the idiosyncratic fundamental rights needs of the 
Member States, the peculiarities of particular fundamental rights, such as the right to strike, or 
the pragmatic concerns attached to devising programmes for the protection of fundamental 
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social rights. This framework of reciprocity requires the acceptance of a qualitative de 
minimis framework in relation to a breach of free movement. Since balancing involves 
relative assessments, for reasons of legal certainty, the Court should lay down general 
guidance in relation to what will constitute high impacts on free movement and fundamental 
rights. In all cases, any amount of interference would, nevertheless, have to be weighed 
against its relative impact on fundamental rights. The final analysis, in this regard, should be 
left to the domestic courts. Through access to the general guidance of the CJEU, they are 
suitably cognisant of Member States’ supranational obligations. However, they are also aware 
of particular domestic constitutional needs and their proximity to the factual environment of 
the case mitigates against the subjectivity of qualitative assessment.  
 
   
4. Does mutual impact assessment undermine the fundamentality of fundamental 
rights? Treating free movement as a fundamental right 
 
It will be recalled from chapter one,
129
 that fundamental rights are an ‘essentially contested 
concept’.130 Their existence, normative position, scope and content are the subject of such 
intense and rigorous debate that, in truth, the term ‘human right’ can be viewed as ‘nearly 
criterionless’.131 Accordingly, defining what is, and what is not, a fundamental right is not a 
question that is easily answered, while any efforts will always invite subsequent debate. In 
light of this, chapter one recognised that any real attempt to answer this question was beyond 
the scope of this work. Consequently, that chapter, instead, outlined the well-known claim 
that fundamental rights are universal, a-political, timeless and absolute norms. It then 
acknowledged and provided an overview of the vast literature that strongly contests those 
assertions, and which argues that fundamental rights are, in fact, shaped by politics, ideology, 
culture, and history. Chapter one, nevertheless, posited that, regardless of these criticisms, 
fundamental rights remained useful as social facts, as opposed to universal truths, which can 
shine a spotlight on the particular values of society. 
 
Often recalling but also re-framing that discussion, this subsection will test the free movement 
provisions against the definition of fundamental rights as universal absolutes. It will accept 
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that this terminological framework presents some appreciable challenges to defining free 
movement as a fundamental right. However, since many largely accepted fundamental rights 
also fail to meet the conditions imposed by universalism, these hurdles arguably reflect a 
weakness within that definitional model, rather than a problem per se with free movement. In 
light of this, the subsection will favour an approach grounded in legal positivism. It will argue 
that the explicit constitutional significance of free movement within the EU’s legal order 
renders it a fundamental right, as a social fact, within that framework. This is especially true 
following the introduction of Union citizenship and the primary status of the Charter.   
 
Before embarking on this analysis, however, it is worth noting that an adjudicative model that 
treats free movement as equal to fundamental rights is automatically more respectful of the 
latter norms than the Court’s current breach/justification methodology, since the latter 
framework treats free movement as more fundamental than fundamental rights. Thus, the 
presentation of free movement as (equal to) a fundamental right, unusually, reduces its 
normative force. Similarly, the proposed balancing model is likely to be more readily 
compliant with the EU’s forthcoming obligations under the ECHR, reducing the potential for 
the systems collision detailed in chapter one.
132
 Although an adjudicative structure that 
prioritises fundamental rights over free movement would reduce the risk of systems clash 
even further, a balancing model reflects the different goals of the Union whilst still leaving 
sufficient space for the EU’s Convention obligations. Significantly, the Convention only 
provides a floor of protection. Consequently, the treatment of free movement as a 
fundamental right within the Union legal order will only be problematic where (other) 
fundamental rights are denied this minimum by the treatment of free movement as 
fundamental. However, these questions can be incorporated into the mutual impact 
assessment as part of a balancing model in order to prevent this eventuality. The Strasbourg 
Court is unlikely to be concerned with the adjudicative methodology of the Luxembourg 
Court if substantive outcomes meet Convention standards. Sabel and Gerstenberg argue that 
this can be understood in the Rawlsian sense of overlapping consensus. This states that ‘there 
is agreement on fundamental commitments of principle – those essentials which each order 
requires the others to respect as the conditions of its own deference to their decisions[. I]t does 
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not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of 
human dignity, individuality or the like’.133  
 
This is linked to the very different tasks of the ECtHR and the CJEU. As has been 
acknowledged, the Luxembourg Court frequently faces fundamental rights questions arising 
as a direct result of freedom of movement. This is reflected in Omega where a conflict 
between UK and German approaches to human dignity was triggered by a UK company’s 
cross-border provision of games simulating killing into Germany. The ‘priority to 
fundamental rights’ approach of the ECtHR is ill-suited to the ‘dense quadrilateral 
connection’134 of Member State A’s fundamental right vs Member State B’s fundamental 
right vs free movement vs EU fundamental right that operates in this new supranational 
context. Accordingly, the ECtHR might be amenable to an EU adjudicative model, such as 
balancing, that simply leaves enough space for all these competing interests to have a voice.            
 
Nevertheless, the fact that a balancing model would be less problematic than the CJEU’s 
current framework is not sufficient to defend the treatment of free movement as a 
fundamental right. O’Brien labels equal ranking ‘the best approach on offer’ but contends that 
the use of fundamental rights language to refer to the market freedoms is potently problematic 
since it ‘demotes the importance of the person in herself [and]…treat[s] the market as 
morality’.135 However, her argument centres on the ongoing link between economic activity 
and the activation of personhood at Union-level. As chapter four recognised, Union 
citizenship is at a crossroads whereby it must find a way to progress beyond its historical, 
market-focused beginnings and detach itself from free movement. Through its central tenet of 
equality, an updated Union citizenship, separate from the market, should require, at the very 
least, that where the Union cannot act, the Member States are given sufficient legal room to 
pursue fundamental rights goals for Union citizens, including those unable to trigger cross-
border free movement rights.  
 
It is submitted that balancing permits this breathing space and it is this issue on which we are 
currently focused. Although admittedly contentious, the proposed model acknowledges that 
                                                          
133
 C. Sabel, O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a 
Coordinate Constitutional Order’, (2010) 16(5) ELJ 511, 513 
134
 Nic Shuibhne, n.128, 246 
135
 C. O’Brien, ‘I Trade, Therefore I Am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’ (2013) 50 CMLRev 1643, 
1678 
 264 
 
free movement has itself become about more than the market. For instance, where it runs 
congruent to fundamental rights, free movement can push beyond the objective of economic 
integration, providing new fundamental rights choices to individuals, offering an external 
check on Member State fundamental rights standards, and encouraging tolerance towards the 
Other.
136
 Nevertheless, through reciprocal proportionality, balancing is also able to 
accommodate Member State activities that place an at times necessary brake on the excesses 
of free movement; that endeavour to provide protection for Union citizens who are unable to 
move and whose rights clash with free movement; and that recognise the often intrinsically 
stronger economic or societal position of free movers, thinking for instance of Viking. On the 
question of the relevance of free movement beyond the market, de Búrca argues, that the 
conclusions of the Advocate General in Grogan, that Irish restrictions on women’s right to 
travel or their freedom from unsolicited physical examinations would be disproportionate,
137
 
‘can be seen as reflecting the view that such measures would unacceptably undermine values 
and freedoms which have an independent moral content in [Union] law’.138 She posits that the 
question was not simply about restriction of trade, ‘since individual freedom of movement has 
more than a commercial value’139 and that the Opinion suggested that, within EU law, 
physical integrity, the moral autonomy, and freedom to travel of pregnant women was to be 
ranked at the same normative level as the protection of unborn life.  
 
Nonetheless, we have also seen, over the course of previous chapters, that free movement is 
still a central tool of the internal market and is frequently prioritised over the fundamental 
rights goals of the Member States, or even the exercise of fundamental rights by individuals. 
It can be harnessed to strengthen the rights of actors who already enjoy a favourable position 
in society against those we might expect fundamental rights to protect. Yet, it is also utilised 
by economically inactive and/or disadvantaged individuals to access social support.
140
 
Balancing, through mutual impact assessment, embraces and makes room for these opposing 
roles of free movement. It recognises the part free movement can play in challenging Member 
State moral codes and tackling conceptions of the Other. Conversely, by requiring the courts 
to consider the impact of free movement on fundamental rights, it appreciates free 
movement’s potential to undermine fundamental rights developed as a result of genuine 
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idiosyncratic or practical need. Balancing creates a useful system of reciprocal checks and 
balances between the supranational and national levels in recognition of the fact that neither 
the Union nor the Member States can be viewed as exclusive champions of fundamental 
rights. Having demonstrated that balancing deals well with the simultaneous status of free 
movement as more than the market, and yet still connected to the market, we will proceed to 
test free movement against broad theoretical frameworks. 
 
It will be recalled from chapter one that the justification for the special protection of 
fundamental rights is frequently grounded in their universal nature. Thus, as Callewaert has 
argued, the question ‘what makes fundamental rights fundamental’ might broadly be 
answered by reference to the basic needs and dignity of the human being. Accordingly, 
fundamental rights should be enjoyed in the same way by the largest possible number of 
people and their fundamental nature is, thus, related to their universality.
141
 The presentation 
of fundamental rights as reflecting universal basic human need, invites the accompanying 
claims that they are a-political, timeless absolutes, arising from natural law, by virtue of the 
uniqueness of being human.
142
   
 
Free movement seems incapable of meeting these criteria. First, as a construct of the single 
market, free movement cannot be described as ‘a-political’, ‘timeless’, or ‘natural’. Indeed, 
Spaventa has argued that ‘the Treaty rights are instrumental to the achievement of a political 
project…Those rights would not, and do not, exist outside the Treaty providing for them’ and 
are, consequently, different from fundamental rights.
143
 Second, applying (generally) only to 
Union citizens, free movement rights are not of ‘universal’ application. I do not have the right 
to work in France by virtue of being human but rather because I am a UK national and, 
therefore, a Union citizen who enjoys movement rights pursuant to Articles 21 and 45 TFEU. 
My American friend cannot commence a job in France, relying on free movement rights, 
since they are (generally) unavailable to her. This hurdle is raised by the fact that conditions 
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are attached to the enjoyment of free movement, in the form of economic activity or self-
sufficiency requirements.
144
   
 
However, it will also be recalled from chapter one that universalism as a conceptual and 
definitional framework for fundamental rights is itself open to challenge. Crucially, it was 
argued that, in truth, even largely accepted fundamental rights can be viewed as the product of 
Western political philosophies.
145
 Moreover, Koskenniemi has posited that the ongoing 
identification, meaning and applicability of rights are dependent on ongoing contextual 
assessments of the political good. This is particularly the case since fundamental rights are 
not, in reality, absolute because human rights instruments explicitly allow for derogations in 
the public interest, a necessarily political assessment.
146
 Finally, the universal application of 
fundamental rights to all individuals is challenged by their focus on the freedoms of the 
property-owning individual to the exclusion of economically or socially disadvantaged 
groups.
147
 Thus much of the criticism levelled at free movement is equally applicable to 
fundamental rights.     
 
On the issue of universality of application, consider the right to vote, which features in 
numerous fundamental rights instruments.
148
 Yet, this is not a fundamental right to which 
everyone has access at all times no matter in which country they find themselves. French 
citizens, for instance, cannot vote in elections to the UK parliament where their citizenship 
status does not allow it. Their right to vote in municipal and EU elections arises as a result of 
their EU citizenship.
149
 The right to vote, therefore, is arguably linked to citizenship, rather 
than a right that one enjoys simply by virtue of being human. Nationality and age 
requirements also impose conditions upon the exercise of this right. This is also the case with 
a number of second generation, but nevertheless established, fundamental rights. The right to 
work, for instance, is enshrined in Article 15 CFR and Article 23.1 UN Declaration on Human 
Rights. However, in reality, the exercise of this right is again usually accompanied by various 
residence conditions and sometimes necessarily by age restrictions. The imposition of 
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geographical and other limitations on fundamental rights weakens the argument that free 
movement cannot be treated as a fundamental right because it lacks universality. Moreover, in 
any case, in Baumbast, the CJEU has restricted limitations on free movement as a result of 
their centrality to Union citizenship.
150
 
 
Alternatively, universal application can be reconfigured. Thus, it might be met where a right 
is available to all human beings but its exercise is restricted to a certain geopolitical area. 
Hence, all human beings enjoy a right to vote. French citizens may vote in France. The fact 
that they are not able to vote in the UK’s national parliamentary elections does not change the 
fact that they have a right to vote somewhere and thus does not undermine the universality of 
that fundamental right. By contrast, it might be argued that since freedom of movement is a 
construct of the EU legal order and is (generally) only available to Union citizens, that it is 
not universal. Yet, Article 2, Protocol 4 ECHR provides that ‘everyone lawfully within the 
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his residence. Everyone shall be free to leave a country, including his 
own’. However, since it is restricted by state borders, this right can only be interpreted as a 
right to move somewhere as opposed to everywhere. My Texan friend, as a US citizen, has the 
right to move anywhere within the United States and the right to exit the US. But she does not 
have the automatic right to move to and reside in France, simply by virtue of being human.
151
  
 
It is argued here that the EU has created a new geopolitical area in which Union citizens’ right 
to move somewhere is extended beyond Member State borders to the entire EU region. My 
French friend is free, in principle, to move around the Union in the same way as my Texan 
friend can move freely within the US. A third country national may not have the free 
movement rights of a Union citizen, but neither does a Union citizen (usually) have the 
automatic right to enter the US. Freedom of movement in this sense should not be 
downgraded from rights status in the EU context simply because EU law has blurred the 
boundaries of the nation state or because the Union, as a geopolitical area, is younger than 
regions such as the US or, for instance, the UK. Indeed, the Court of Justice, in Rutili, 
presented free movement rights as a ‘special manifestation of the more general principle, 
enshrined in [inter alia] Article 2, Protocol 4’.152 
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More recently, the CJEU asserted in Ruiz Zambrano that Union citizens cannot be deprived of 
the genuine enjoyment of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as Union citizens.
153
 
The Court has stated that this has an ‘intrinsic connection’ to free movement.154 The clearest 
example of these rights to date is the right not to be forced from Union territory.
155
 Thus, Ruiz 
Zambrano suggests the creation of a new geopolitical space that Union citizens have a right to 
be on and move around within. Within the commentary, Lemmens has remarked that 
‘[i]nsofar as [Article 45 CFR] applies to freedom of movement and of residence within the 
territory of a given State, it has to be read in the light of Article 2 Protocol 4 [ECHR]’.156 This 
approach can be seen as conforming to Griffin’s theoretical model of different levels of 
abstraction with fundamental rights. For instance, the freedom of the press might not be 
considered a universal right, since it is irrelevant in societies where the press simply does not 
exist, but it can be viewed as an abstraction of the freedom of expression, which is universal. 
Thus, lower levels of abstraction are more culturally specific, relating to specific social and 
temporal circumstances.
157
 Accordingly, EU movement rights can be seen as best reflecting 
the present concerns of the Union at the necessary level of abstraction.     
 
We can also test free movement against the notion of fundamental rights as a-political and a-
historical reflections of the minimal tools that rational actors need to co-exist and exercise 
their normative agency.
158
 Nino has described human rights as referring to: 
 
(i) The opportunity for the holder of the right to perform or not perform a certain 
action; 
(ii) The exclusion of actions of third parties which involve some harm to the holder of 
the right, or the requirement placed on third parties that they do something that 
involves a benefit for the rights holder; 
(iii) The enjoyment of some good or the avoidance of some evil.159 
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Arguably, the free movement provisions conform to (i) since they enable rights-holders to 
move freely within the Union, to provide services, to establish businesses, to sell goods and to 
transfer capital around Europe. Moreover, regarding (ii), Member States are precluded from 
depriving rights-holder of this opportunity by imposing discriminatory rules and in many 
cases, by restricting market access. Post-Spanish Strawberries/Schmidberger, there is even a 
positive obligation on the Member States to ensure the free movement rights of Union 
citizens/traders.
160
 Whether the exercise of free movement represents a ‘good’ or avoids an 
‘evil’ is more debatable since the content of those terms are themselves continually open to 
interpretation. Günther argues that they require the existence of ‘negative experiences’ that 
are overcome by the recognition of human rights.
161
 
 
Specifically, it will be recalled from chapter one that Günther describes human rights as ‘the 
rejection of a concrete historical experience of injustice and fear, caused by actions of the 
State’. This itself poses a challenge to claims that fundamental rights are a-historical since, if 
they represent the recognition of the articulation of suffering, they ‘can never be  completely 
and comprehensively declared…’162 On the one hand, this weakens the argument that free 
movement cannot enjoy fundamental rights status because it is not a-historical. However, 
since the focus of Günther’s discussion of ‘injustice and fear’ is on the events of the Second 
World War and on colonisation, it seems inappropriate to term the inconvenience of 
restrictions on free movement within such a category.  
 
Nevertheless, Günther later broadens his characterisation of injustice, noting that, ‘[i]t at least 
makes sense to claim that negative discrimination and social exclusion by reason of gender, 
race, religion or other human properties are not a misfortune and not the victim’s own fault, 
but injustice… It is part of European history that some people began at some time not to take 
social exclusion by reason of birth as given by the nature of God but demanded that any such 
exclusion be justified’.163 Arguably, personal free movement rights, especially those arising 
from a combined reading of Articles 18 and 21 TFEU on non-discrimination and the right to 
freedom of movement of Union citizens, fall within this category. They highlight the injustice 
faced by Union citizens, living in host States, where they do not have access, for instance, to 
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social security, state education, healthcare, on the same basis as host State nationals, purely by 
reason of nationality.
164
  
 
Chapter one also challenged the conceptual underpinning of fundamental rights as the a-
historical rational ‘discoveries’ of the self-interested individual, arguing that their existence 
and justification could lie in their ability to reflect a societal response to the ‘rapid progress of 
sentiments’.165 Thus, the gradual expansion in fundamental rights, to reflect changing social 
attitudes with regard to, for instance, the marriage rights of transsexuals and homosexuals, 
female physical autonomy in relation to abortion, and the growing importance of 
environmental and consumer protection, demonstrates that ‘there can be no “timeless” core’ 
of fundamental rights.
166
 This further weakens the use of universalism to challenge free 
movement’s potential fundamental rights status. 
 
Finally, in relation to the a-political requirement, the operation of doctrines such as the 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation allows the scope of fundamental rights to be defined by 
political context. Thus, the idea of fundamental rights as a-political is something of a fallacy. 
Weiler and Lockhart have underlined that fundamental rights are rarely absolute.
167
 Like the 
free movement provisions, they are usually accompanied by derogating provisions. Thus, 
‘their very definition almost invariably involves a balance between competing interests…’168 
Further, States often place dissimilar emphases on different rights according to their 
historical, social, and cultural backgrounds. For instance, states might draw differing balances 
between the competing rights of Article 8 and 10 ECHR, concerning the rights to privacy and 
expression respectively. Likewise, Germany, and now the EU, respects the right to human 
dignity as a separate fundamental right,
169
 while elsewhere it is generally presented as an 
overarching justification for other fundamental rights.   
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This is directly translatable to the free movement provisions, which whilst clearly formed as 
part of a political project, have increased but also broadened in constitutional significance 
over time. The Preamble to Regulation 1612/68 concerned with ‘the freedom of movement 
for workers within the Community’ described free movement as ‘a fundamental right of 
workers and their families’. The Maastricht Treaty introduced freedom of movement as the 
central right of the Union citizen, via Article 21 TFEU. The Court has described the Union 
citizen’s right to move as ‘fundamental’.170 It also frequently refers to the free movement 
provisions as ‘fundamental freedoms’, a term it uses also in relation to fundamental rights 
such as the freedom of expression.
171
 Most recently, the Charter mentions all four of the 
Treaty freedoms in its Preamble. Further, pursuant to Article 15 CFR, ‘every citizen has the 
freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment, and to provide 
services in any Member State’. Under Article 45 CFR, ‘every citizen has the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. If individual Member States - 
such as Germany with its independent protection of human dignity or Ireland which includes 
the unborn child in the fundamental right to life - are permitted independently to isolate 
societal values as fundamental rights, why should this not be the case within the Union legal 
order?  
 
Clearly, though, the German right to human dignity is more closely grounded in Günther’s 
concept of ‘injustice and fear’ than is the realisation of a political project through free 
movement. And yet, as noted above, many established civil and political rights reflect 
political ideals. For instance, the right to property complements capitalism, betraying a 
hegemonic approach to what constitutes a fundamental right. The ongoing differentiation 
between the normative force of civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic and 
social rights, on the other is also testimony to this.
172
  
 
Accordingly, as chapter one noted, Koskenniemi has argued that ‘rights are constantly 
examined, limited and criticised from the perspective of alternative notions of the good. This 
is evident particularly [in]…the relationship between rights and exceptions to them and the 
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indeterminacy of rights’.173 Within the context of the Union, where free movement acts as an 
essential tool for the achievement of an internal market and as an individual right of the Union 
citizen, it represents a ‘good’ to be promoted within that legal order. Indeed, Koskenniemi 
welcomes the honesty of the CJEU in Hauer for explicitly stating that fundamental rights face 
restrictions corresponding to the objectives of the Union.
174
 For him, fundamental rights are 
themselves defined by their political contexts. He argues that ‘policies are needed to give 
meaning [and] applicability…to rights’ and that ‘what is recognised as a fundamental right 
always reflects a political preference’. Given the constitutional significance of free movement 
within the Union’s legal order, then, equal ranking between free movement and (other) 
fundamental rights, might be inevitable. Accordingly, the usefulness of balancing lies in its 
representation of the political reality of supranational dynamics and its creation of a forum for 
differing notions of the political good. This is especially significant where free movement 
causes tension between different Member States’ competing visions of the ‘good’, thinking of 
cases such as Omega, and Grogan.
175
 
 
Given the broadening purpose of free movement within the Union, and the explicit reference 
to it as a fundamental right by both the Court and within EU primary law, by virtue of the 
Charter, the use of equal ranking between free movement and fundamental rights might best 
reflect the former’s constitutional significance within the Union legal order. It might also 
represent better the political and legal matrices faced by the CJEU and the domestic courts, 
attempting to grapple with, and to reconcile, competing visions of the political good. This also 
conforms to the definitional approach taken to fundamental rights in the thesis generally. In 
chapter one, discussion of the justification for the special protection of fundamental rights 
concluded that this was warranted simply by virtue of their existence as a social fact. By 
means of positive legal instruments, States have committed themselves to respecting 
stipulated fundamental rights, regardless of theoretical debates as to whether or how they 
exist. Indeed, as chapter one noted, Hoffmann has remarked that ‘once a fundamental right is 
enshrined in a domestic constitution…the question of foundations becomes immaterial’.176 As 
a result of its constitutional significance, and the language used by the Court and in the 
Charter, free movement as a fundamental right exists as a social fact within the EU legal 
order.  
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However, the extent to which all of the free movement provisions enjoy this enhanced 
constitutional significance is contestable. Certainly, the Court has expressly stated that the 
free movement of Union workers
177
 and citizens
178
 is a fundamental right. The Charter also 
unambiguously includes the free movement rights of individuals, in their capacity as citizens, 
workers, work-seekers, service providers, and establishers.
179
 However, as Nic Shuibhne 
notes ‘things are more controversial when the discussion turns to the more general 
(fundamental) right to trade, as expressed through the free movement of goods…’.180 If one is 
to root free movement in the legal reality of its constitutional position, then it should be noted 
that a case-law review was unable to locate more than one instance in which the non-personal 
free movement provisions were referred to as ‘fundamental rights’.181 
 
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, it is argued that even the non-personal free movement 
provisions deserve recognition as a ‘fundamental something’ warranting equal status to 
fundamental rights. First, the non-personal free movement provisions can represent new levels 
of abstractions for (generally) accepted fundamental rights. Trstenjek and Beysen are 
particularly strong proponents of this argument. They posit that: 
 
‘Since the free movement of goods applies in essence to goods that are owned by a natural or legal person, the 
EU fundamental right to property can be assessed as part of the foundation on which the free movement of goods 
is based. As far as the substantive guarantees inherent in certain fundamental rights coincide with the substantive 
guarantees of the fundamental freedoms, those fundamental rights can also be relied upon to bolster the effective 
enforcement and implementation of the fundamental freedoms in the Member States.’182 
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They argue, similarly, that Articles 15 and 16 CFR, concerning, respectively, the fundamental 
rights to choose an occupation and to conduct a business, support the implementation of the 
freedoms of establishment and services.
183
  
 
Second, the non-personal free movement rules can be viewed as key tools for facilitating the 
general right to move of EU citizens. Thus, Tryfonidou has argued, in the context of goods, 
that ‘a fully-fledged citizenship appears to be requiring the Union to grant a number of 
minimum rights to all its citizens, including the (economic) right to freely conduct a 
commercial activity – to trade – in an inter-state context’.184 Similarly, Horsley has recently 
remarked that the free movement of capital: 
 
‘[does] not simply ensure, for the benefit of corporate investors…that financial resources are free to be directed 
towards the most favourable investment environment within the internal market. ‘Capital movements’ also 
cover, inter alia, property purchases, mortgages, inheritances, and personal loans – routine economic 
transactions for millions of mobile Union citizens’.185  
 
Thus, although still subject to much doubt,
186
 even the free movement of capital can be 
viewed as facilitating the free movement rights of Union citizens. Arguably, then, the non-
personal free movement provisions should also be treated as equal to fundamental rights.  
 
Nevertheless, a sizeable section of the literature argues that we should distinguish between 
personal and non-personal freedoms. Weiler has suggested that ‘perhaps a distinction could, 
and should, be drawn especially in relation to fundamental human rights, between provisions 
dealing with the situation of real human beings and that dealing with goods’.187 Further, as 
noted in chapter four, Nic Shuibhne views Union citizenship as emphasising the person/trade 
dichotomy ‘all the more sharply’. She finds Tryfonidou’s reasoning problematic ‘when the 
consequence is a general ‘right to do business everywhere in the Union’ leading to related 
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questions about whether the Union seeks the general deregulation of the market.
188
 It is 
submitted that this problem is intrinsic to free movement’s Janus-like nature. In the same 
instance, free movement represents a genuine resource to individuals but also plays its part in 
favouring the pursuit of commerce over other legitimate endeavours. A balancing model, 
which allows different supranational and domestic aims to be tested against each other, 
creates a forum where this can be recognised.  
 
Finally, as discussed above, the exercise of both personal and non-personal free movement 
rights can lead to conflict between competing concepts of fundamental rights beyond the right 
to move. Thus, for instance, Grogan can be interpreted as representing two Member States’ 
competing views on the right to life; Familiapress on the right to freedom of expression;
189
 
and Omega on human dignity. This conflict arises as a result of free movement. Since it is 
also free movement that gives the CJEU jurisdiction to assess a fundamental rights issue, 
bestowing normative equality on free movement creates a balanced legal space within which 
these competing fundamental rights standards can be tested.
190
 
 
Although this work has been focused on the potential danger posed by free movement to the 
protection of fundamental rights, usually at the national-level, it is overly simplistic to present 
the Member States as an overarching ‘good’ for fundamental rights, and free movement as 
some kind of constant, malevolent threat. As demonstrated above, free movement can also 
provide a means for Union citizens to challenge the fundamental rights standards of their 
Member State and/or utilise the right to move to access the preferred fundamental rights 
‘packages’ of other Member States.191 A balancing model, which uses mutual impact 
assessment to execute reciprocal checks and balances on both EU and competing Member 
State fundamental rights standards embraces this complexity. Member States, having 
willingly signed up to the EU, must offer some give and take in their fundamental rights 
definitions as part of that commitment. For instance, where Member States have different 
fundamental rights methods that ultimately reach the same goal, they must become flexible in 
their fundamental rights approaches. As de Witte points out, ‘By choosing a ‘maximum 
standard’ of protection, the Court of Justice would in fact be privileging [say] the German 
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over the Swedish approach, and there is no obvious reason why this should be so’.192 Within 
the context of a common market, it is also never clear which fundamental rights option is the 
‘most’ protective.193 Assessing the impact of fundamental rights on free movement (and 
congruent fundamental rights) allows for this. Conversely, where the particular scope of a 
fundamental right within a Member State meets an idiosyncratic need within that Member 
State, or reflects a complex, programmatic system of fundamental social rights protection, for 
which that Member State has competence, the assessment of the impact of free movement on 
fundamental rights will account for this.  
 
For those who find it intuitively difficult to connect economic freedom to trade with human 
rights, it is worth noting that fundamental rights are traditionally broader than human rights. 
De Witte has noted that the latter term is a ‘potentially broader notion…embracing those 
rights recognised in the constitutional law of the Member States of the EU’.194 This is 
comparable to the difference between Menschenrechte and Grundrechte in German law. In 
short, the diverse and complex constitutional significance of all of the free movement 
provisions warrants their treatment as (or equivalent to) fundamental rights. Where non-
personal free movement rights represent the needs of economic integration more than the 
requirements of the Union citizen, the impact of the pursuit of conflicting fundamental rights 
on their realisation should be viewed as lower.  
 
This section has argued that the justification for treating free movement as a fundamental 
right largely lies in its constitutional significance within the EU legal order, since fundamental 
rights are always defined by their political, social, cultural, historical, and economic context. 
Their purpose is to shine a spotlight on those goals that are important to a particular society. 
Since the Union is made up of 28 different societies, all with differing ideas about the political 
‘good’, while also developing its own notions in that regard, this fundamental rights spotlight 
shines on a number of competing goals. A judicial architecture, which recognises the inherent 
but also changeable worth of all of these aims within the individual Member States and the 
Union, is needed to address this complex dynamic. It is argued here that a balancing model 
provides an appropriate forum for this to occur.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Tasked with offering an alternative to the constitutionally outdated breach/justification 
adjudicative methodology, this chapter has forwarded balancing as a model more suited to the 
contemporary constitutional framework. It focused, first, on the emerging use of balancing by 
the CJEU, in the context of secondary legislation, and by the ECtHR when two fundamental 
rights clash against each other. It was argued that a starting point, in which competing norms 
are of equal rank, invites courts to ask new proportionality questions. In particular, courts 
seek to reconcile and find compromise between conflicting rules, attempting to find an 
outcome that is least restrictive of both norms. Crucially, the adoption of such an approach in 
primary free movement law would create sufficient legal space for consideration of the 
Union’s fundamental rights commitments as well as to lessen the trio of negative fundamental 
rights impact highlighted throughout this thesis. It was advanced that, through overarching 
guidelines, the CJEU could play a critical role in explaining the impact that Member State 
activity can have on the internal market and in reminding the Member States of their 
obligations under the Treaties. National courts, as agents of the EU judicial system and 
forming part of the national judiciary, are, nevertheless, best placed to conduct the final 
analysis. Relying on legal positivism and the existence of fundamental rights as ‘social facts’ 
rather than universal truths, it was argued that the treatment of free movement as a 
fundamental right should not be viewed as conceptually problematic but rather representative 
of the political and legal reality of the Union legal order.   
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Chapter Six 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Ever since the CJEU was explicitly confronted with reconciling conflicts between the Treaty 
free movement provisions and fundamental rights in Schmidberger it has faced persistent 
criticism that its adjudicative approach procedurally subjugates the latter to the former.
1
 
Specifically, criticism is levelled at the Court’s use of a two-stage breach/justification 
methodology, which requires fundamental rights measures to justify themselves against prima 
facie breaches of EU law. This inherently associates the protection of fundamental rights with 
wrongful conduct. Treating fundamental rights as derogations from free movement, it also 
exposes them to a proportionality test that requires them to be interpreted strictly; their 
suitability and necessity being assessed by reference to whether there are means of protecting 
them that are less restrictive of free movement.
2
 However, these criticisms have not been 
accompanied by a large-scale assessment of exactly why this framework is problematic in 
broader constitutional terms beyond the assumption that subjugating fundamental rights is 
inherently inappropriate.
3
 Nor have the origins of this procedural bias been fully explored. 
And yet, not only are these diagnostic questions significant in and of themselves, they are also 
crucial precursors to identifying the need for, and the suitability of, alternative models of 
adjudication.     
 
This thesis has plugged this gap in the literature. It has demonstrated that the two-stage model 
is the product of the Union’s economic roots. Since the central purpose of the Rome Treaty 
was economic integration through the creation of the common market, and a key tool in the 
achievement of this was the free movement of goods, workers, services/establishment, and 
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capital between the Member States, it was logical to prioritise free movement over conflicting 
law and policy. Crucially, since the market freedoms were not initially directly effective and 
could only be triggered by protectionist and/or directly discriminatory Member State conduct, 
they were generally unlikely to interact with fundamental rights. Indeed, the Rome Treaty 
made no provision for the protection of fundamental rights within free movement’s 
derogating articles or the wider Treaty text. Rather the free movement provisions were most 
likely to interact with precisely the type of domestic activity that the Member States agreed to 
eradicate when they created the EEC. The structural presentation of such conduct as prima 
facie wrongful under Union law, and the procedural requirement that it defend itself by 
reference not only to the legitimacy of its endeavours, but also the proportionality of its 
implementation, was therefore understandable.   
 
And yet, free movement has expanded so as to come into more frequent contact with 
fundamental rights. Moreover, the Court has retained the two-stage model to address these 
types of interaction. This introduces a number of questions: do fundamental rights prevail 
under this framework; is that enough; if not, why is this model problematic from practical, 
theoretical and Union constitutional perspectives; what has caused the rise in the volume of 
interactions between free movement and fundamental rights and why has the 
breach/justification model nevertheless been retained; finally, what alternatives are there to 
this adjudicative approach and are they a better fit for the Union’s contemporary 
constitutional framework?  
 
Chapter one argued that, although there are examples in the case-law in which, in terms of 
final outcome, fundamental rights have triumphed over the free movement provisions,
4
 this 
was not enough to negate the need for investigation into the process of decision-making or its 
effects. Crucially, a quantitative analysis of the case-law would fail to provide an adequately 
comprehensive picture of the qualitative impact of a structural preference for free movement 
in those cases where free movement prevails. Moreover, while fundamental rights constituted 
justified restrictions of free movement in Schmidberger, Omega and Dynamic Medien,
5
 this 
was in spite of rather than because of the Court’s two-stage assessment. 
 
                                                          
4
 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] EU:C:2003:333; Case C-36/02 Omega; Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien, 
n.2 
5
 Ibid 
 280 
 
Accordingly, a significant contribution of the thesis was to explore some of the practical 
consequences of the breach/justification model for the protection of fundamental rights. It 
underlined that in interactions between free movement and fundamental rights, only the latter 
faces questions of proportionality. This is assessed by reference to the ‘suitability’ and 
‘necessity’ of the fundamental rights measures, which in turn is generally judged according to 
whether there are means less restrictive of free movement available to secure that goal. Since 
a breach of free movement has already been established, generally through low evidentiary 
burdens such as whether free movement is liable to be less attractive as a result of the 
opposing measure, there is limited room in the proportionality assessment for consideration of 
the effects of free movement on fundamental rights. Thus, the analysis identified a trio of 
fundamental rights consequences flowing from assessing the proportionality of free 
movement through this free movement lens. First, a specific approach to fundamental rights 
might be needed within a particular Member State that faces idiosyncratic fundamental rights 
issues. As one example, a certain approach to protecting the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression might be required in a Member State that suffers from an unusual paucity of press 
diversity.
6
 Second, the structural prioritisation of free movement also limits capacity for 
consideration of the fact that some rights, such as the fundamental right to strike, are, in 
certain situations, inherently limiting of free movement such that measures less restrictive of 
free movement will automatically reduce the effectiveness of exercising the fundamental right 
concerned.
7
 Third, means less restrictive of free movement that appear suitable in principle 
might not be feasible in practice when logistical, financial, administrative, or other 
considerations are taken into account. Critically, the free movement focus of the 
proportionality test isolates the issue from the complex legal environments in which many 
programmatic fundamental rights are situated.  
 
Chapter one acknowledged that the existence, scope, content and normative positioning of 
fundamental rights is the subject of intense debate at the theoretical level. This raises the 
question of whether the structural prioritisation of free movement over fundamental rights is 
actually problematic, especially from the perspective of legal positivism, since the internal 
market is clearly a core objective within the written text of the Treaty. The chapter posited 
that the theoretical justification for viewing the procedural preference for free movement as 
inappropriate lies in the social fact of the Union’s explicit commitment to fundamental rights 
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pursuant to Article 6 TEU, the Charter, and the general principles. As Hoffmann has 
remarked, this ‘suspends the essential contestability of human rights’ and instead introduces 
questions of legal compliance.
8
 Consequently, the fundamental rights obligations that the 
Union imposed upon itself, through the agreement of its Member States, provided a 
theoretical justification for testing whether the Union had succeeded in meeting its own 
pledges.  
 
This theoretical justification necessarily led to the need to interrogate the constitutional 
implications of the procedural preference for free movement in the contemporary context. 
Thus, having charted the evolution of the Union’s aims beyond economic integration, the 
chapter demonstrated that the Court’s current adjudicative framework is ill-suited to the 
present-day constitutional needs of the Union. In particular, the conferral of only shared or 
complementary competence on the Union in relation to some of its new goals, such as social 
policy, public health, or education, which overlap with fundamental rights concerns, 
necessitates a model that permits the Member States sufficient space to pursue these 
objectives, away from the shadow of a potential breach of free movement. The structural 
subjugation of fundamental rights is also particularly unsuitable in the post-Lisbon era in 
which the Union is obliged formally to accede to the ECHR and in which primary law status 
is conferred on the Charter. The cases of Viking and Laval were contrasted against the ECtHR 
cases of Demir and Enerji to demonstrate the existence of a systems clash between the 
adjudicative approach of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts.
9
 Indeed, commentators 
have argued that the CJEU’s current adjudicative framework is ‘fundamentally irreconcilable’ 
with the approach of the ECtHR.
10
           
 
Since the theoretical justification for the importance of fundamental rights was grounded in 
their existence as a social fact in the Union legal order, and in their ability to shine an 
important spotlight on the legitimate (often Union-endorsed) demands placed on Member 
States beyond economic integration, a conscious choice was made to define fundamental 
rights broadly within the thesis. This allowed the thesis to test the Union’s ability to meet its 
own commitment to the broad range of fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, which 
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incorporates fundamental rights of a civil and political nature, but also economic and social 
rights, as well as third generation solidarity rights. What emerged from this approach was that 
analysis of the subjugation of fundamental rights to the free movement provisions in fact 
serves as a useful case-study for broader, but equally important, questions relating to the 
relationship between Union and domestic law and to how provisions of Union primary law 
interact with each other.  
 
Chapters two, three, and four explained why the free movement provisions interact more 
frequently with fundamental rights than was seemingly first anticipated and why, 
nevertheless, a two-stage approach has been retained to address these types of conflict. All 
three chapters demonstrate an irony inherent within a trinity of key constitutional evolutions 
that have increased the likelihood of conflict between free movement and fundamental rights, 
and yet also entrenched or even exacerbated a structural preference for free movement. Thus, 
chapter two mapped the evolution of the material and personal scope of free movement. It 
demonstrated that as the notion of a breach of free movement has evolved so as to incorporate 
indistinctly applicable measures or rules restricting market access, free movement has 
inevitably begun to clash more frequently with domestic fundamental rights measures. The 
extension of the personal scope of the free movement provisions has had similar 
consequences. Although the Court recognised, in a substantive sense, through the mandatory 
requirements, that this expansion of free movement brought it into contact with Member State 
policy only tangentially related to the internal market, no adjustment was made to the 
structure of the Court’s adjudicative methodology. Crucially, this meant that the interactions 
between free movement and fundamental rights, which were triggered by free movement’s 
wider scope, were still processed through the two-stage model, whereby fundamental rights 
are interpreted strictly, according to questions of suitability and necessity. Importantly, 
chapter two emphasised the widening disparity in evidential burden between establishing a 
prima facie breach of free movement and demonstrating that it is justified. While no de 
minimis standard generally operates in relation to a breach of free movement, fundamental 
rights must frequently overcome a ‘seriousness’ threshold with Member States often being 
required to provide statistical evidence of substantial interference.      
 
Chapter three highlighted both the indirect and direct contributions that the doctrine of direct 
effect has made to the reinforcement of the structurally imbalanced breach/justification 
methodology. Specifically, it argued that the Van Gend criteria for the conferral of direct 
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effect presents the free movement provisions as ‘unconditional’ and ‘precise’. Accordingly, 
the Treaty provisions permitting limitations on the exercise of free movement and the 
mandatory requirements must be viewed as derogations from the free movement provisions 
rather than conditions for their exercise. Moreover, the capacity of secondary Union 
legislation to incorporate fundamental rights considerations into the definition of free 
movement becomes limited by the presentation of primary free movement provisions, which 
might originally have been viewed as programmatic in nature, as precise. Fundamental rights 
are therefore positioned in opposition to precisely defined and unconditional Union law. The 
indirect contributions that direct effect has made to structural imbalance have been given teeth 
by the accompanying doctrines of primacy and effective judicial protection, which require the 
immediate setting aside of conflicting domestic fundamental rights measures. This creates the 
risk of a legal lacuna in fundamental rights provision. The availability of damages for 
violations of free movement can also have a chilling effect on the exercise of those 
fundamental rights that pose potential obstacles to free movement, as evidenced in the 
BALPA saga. Finally, direct effect has also made a distinct contribution to tensions in the free 
movement/fundamental rights dynamic. The extension of the free movement provisions from 
vertical to horizontal direct effect has created new opportunity for interaction between free 
movement and fundamental rights that would otherwise not arise, as famously demonstrated 
by the Viking and Laval cases. Crucially, private parties appear to have to go further to defend 
their exercise of fundamental rights than do public actors. Thus, in Schmidberger, Member 
State protection of the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and association were 
sufficient on its own to justify, in principle, the restriction of the free movement of goods. By 
contrast, in Viking and Laval, the fundamental right to strike had to be accompanied by a 
legitimate aim, namely worker protection, before it could even be justified in principle. 
Moreover, since the focus of the derogating provisions is on the activity of public bodies, they 
are at times ill-adapted to the justificatory needs of private actors. This can even be relevant to 
mandatory requirements since the Court, in Laval, limited the capacity of private actors to 
pursue worker protection in the public interest.      
 
The final arm of our constitutional trinity was Union citizenship. Departing from the 
extensive literature that argues that Union citizenship does not go far enough in safeguarding 
the fundamental rights of Union citizens, chapter four highlighted a potential danger in trying 
to secure fundamental rights protection through the medium of EU citizenship. Specifically, it 
demonstrated that, since it is borne from, and built upon, the internal market, adopting free 
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movement as the core right of the EU citizen, Union citizenship has infused free movement 
with a fundamental rights quality in both the personal and economic spheres. This inevitably 
welcomes the structural prioritisation of free movement. Union citizenship has also caused 
more instances of both congruence and clash between free movement and fundamental rights. 
While clearly rights-enhancing in the context of congruence, since Union citizenship is only 
able to support fundamental rights as a corollary of the structural boost it offers free 
movement, in instances of clash it is not only unable to assist individuals but actually operates 
to undermine domestic programmatic protection of fundamental rights.  
 
Chapter four argued that this phenomenon leaves Union citizenship at a cross-roads. Either it 
must evolve so as to allow the fundamental rights issues created by market deregulation to be 
addressed at EU-level, or, at the very least, it should develop, through its central tenet of 
equality, to ensure that it does not diminish Member State efforts to protect fundamental 
rights. In this sense, Union citizenship is a microcosm of a broader constitutional challenge 
facing the wider Union legal order. How should the present-day Union, which claims to 
respect fundamental rights and which has broad objectives, ranging from the internal market 
to social policy, from education to judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, manage 
the relationships between those sometimes conflicting aims? Further, since the Treaties do not 
pursue these goals in a uniform manner but instead divide labour between the supranational 
and domestic levels, how should clashes between Union and domestic law be presented? 
Specifically, can tensions between free movement and domestic law always be viewed as 
conflictual if national measures also fulfil Union objectives featured in a different part of the 
Treaty? If the conclusion is that they remain opposed to one another, then the Union’s 
legislative bodies must act to ensure that legitimate concerns, which can no longer be 
addressed at domestic-level, are met by supranational action. And yet, the capacity of the 
Union legislature to act might itself be limited by its legislative competence and/or the 
political will of the Member States to concede that an issue should be supranationally 
managed.
11
 The alternative is for the Court to alter its adjudicative methodology so as to allow 
the Union to ‘back off’ in certain situations where the Member States pursue goals 
domestically, which the Treaties consider legitimate, but which inevitably restrict free 
movement.  
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The thesis postulated, in its final chapter, that it is possible to offer greater legal space to the 
Member States when free movement conflicts with fundamental rights, in order better to 
reflect the Union’s contemporary goals whilst still conforming to its ongoing constitutional 
requirements. It argued for the introduction of a balancing model, which recognises the equal 
status of conflicting norms and accordingly triggers the introduction of different 
proportionality questions. Specifically, rather than focusing on whether fundamental rights 
measures are proportionate in light of the restrictions they place on free movement, balancing 
seeks to reconcile and find compromise between conflicting rules and to locate an outcome 
that is least restrictive of both norms. Crucially, through the process of reciprocal 
proportionality assessment, which creates the legal space for examination of the impact of 
free movement on fundamental rights, balancing is able to accommodate the Union’s 
commitment to fundamental rights and to minimise the trio of negative fundamental rights 
impacts, outlined above, that currently arises under the breach/justification methodology.  
 
Chapter five recognised that there were practical and conceptual obstacles to the introduction 
of a balancing model but argued that these could be overcome. It was accepted that equal 
legal status does not itself provide a means of resolving tensions between free movement and 
fundamental rights. However, relying on Alexy’s approach to the law of balancing, the 
chapter postulated that the focus should be on the relative effects of free movement and 
fundamental rights on each other through a process of mutual impact assessment.
12
 The final 
outcome should seek, where possible, to impose the fewest possible restrictions on both free 
movement and fundamental rights and to ensure their effectiveness in real terms. It was 
argued that the CJEU should provide overarching guidelines on the impact of Member State 
activity on the internal market. For instance, direct discrimination might be presumed to have 
a serious impact on free movement, whereas the level of interference would have to be 
demonstrated in relation to restrictions to market access. Regardless, in all cases this would 
still have to be weighed against the effect of free movement on fundamental rights. Although 
this necessarily requires subjective assessments, this can be mitigated by the preliminary 
reference procedure, and oral and written submissions to the CJEU. Crucially, final decisions 
must be left to domestic courts that, being closer to the facts of the case and to the social and 
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cultural environment of the particular Member State, are better placed to conduct the final 
analysis.  
 
It is accepted that balancing will not be viewed by all as a solution to the structural 
subjugation of fundamental rights to the free movement provisions. For many, free 
movement, as an ongoing tool for economic integration, does not qualify for fundamental 
rights status. From this viewpoint, balancing still gets the emphasis wrong. However, since 
the theoretical justification for the protection of fundamental rights, within this thesis, rested 
on their existence as a social fact, it was crucial to recognise the constitutional significance of 
free movement within the Union legal order, not just to economic integration but to the Union 
citizen. Accordingly, the chapter argued that free movement should be considered as (equal 
to) a fundamental right for several reasons. First, the free movement provisions can be seen as 
embodying the fundamental right to move, recognised by Article 2, Protocol 4 ECHR, within 
the geopolitical space created by the Union. Similarly, it represents a new level of abstraction 
for the fundamental rights to property, to conduct a business and to pursue an occupation. The 
personal free movement provisions feature in the Union’s Charter while even the non-
personal free movement provisions facilitate the exercise, by Union citizens, of their 
individual fundamental right to move. Finally, all of the free movement provisions trigger 
conflict between different Member State definitions of accepted fundamental rights. Hence, 
while the treatment of the free movement provisions as fundamental rights will be 
problematic for some, its attractiveness nevertheless lies in its ability to offer practical 
solutions to ensuring the effective protection of fundamental rights within the reality of the 
internal market.     
 
Thus, the thesis has demonstrated not only that the two-stage breach/justification model is ill-
equipped to cater for the contemporary constitutional framework but also that there exists a 
potential alternative that would still comply with the Union’s ongoing constitutional 
requirements. Indeed, over the course of writing this thesis, there has been a growing support 
for balancing within the commentary.
13
 However, writers, including myself, have perhaps 
been overly encouraged by post-Lisbon nods to balancing in the primary law context. 
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Although Advocate General Trstenjak explicitly called for reciprocal proportionality 
assessment in Commission v Germany,
14
 the Court, while adopting a similar approach, did not 
explicitly endorse her methodology. Crucially, within the post-Lisbon case-law, it is still the 
two-stage framework that dominates.
15
 Thus, while other Advocates General, such as 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón, have also seemingly recognised the need for a 
reconfiguration of the relationship between free movement and opposing law and policy since 
the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
16
 this is yet to be reflected in the more sluggish 
response of the Court itself. Interestingly, this can be contrasted with the Court’s speedier 
reaction to the post-Lisbon environment in the field of secondary law where balancing by 
reference to the Charter has become commonplace.
17
 The Court’s apparent reluctance to 
update its adjudicative methodology might lie, therefore, in the historical entrenchment of the 
two-stage model by the constitutional trinity discussed in chapters two, three, and four. And 
yet, the same constitutional drivers of change, for instance, the broader aims of the 
contemporary Treaty, the eventual formal accession of the Union to the ECHR, the primary 
law status of the Charter and an evolved, more inclusive approach to Union citizenship can all 
also be viewed as vehicles for adjudicative change. Since they all call for a more holistic 
approach to the Treaty, they can be seen as means of overcoming the historical and out-dated 
entrenchment of a structural preference for free movement. 
 
However, during the final edits of this thesis, the Court also handed down Opinion 2/13 
concerning the draft agreement on EU accession to the ECHR. In that Opinion, the Court 
reiterated that fundamental rights ‘must be ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the EU’. It stated that the pursuit of those objectives is entrusted to a series of 
fundamental provisions, inter alia, the free movement provisions ‘which are part of a 
framework of a system that is specific to the EU [and] are structured in such a way as to 
contribute – each within its specific field and with its own particular characteristics – to the 
implementation of the process of integration that is the raison d’être of the EU itself’.18 On 
the one hand, as has been suggested by O’Neill, the Opinion ‘appears to be more about the 
                                                          
14
 Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] EU:C:2010:183 (Opinion), EU:C:2008:492 (judgment)  
15
 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund [2014] EU:C:2014:2235; Case C-197/11 Libert 
[2013] EU:C:2013:288; Joined Cases C-344/13 and C-367/13 Blanco [2014] EU:C:2014:2311 
16
 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota [2010] EU:C:2010:245 
17
 Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor [2010] EU:C:2012:526; Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich, [2013] 
EU:C:2013:28; Case C-70/10 Scarlett [2011] EU:C:2011:771; Case C-12/11 McDonagh [2013] EU:C:2013:43 
18
 Opinion 2/13 [2014] EU:C:2014:2454, para.172 
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Court of Justice’s fears about its constitutional position’.19 On the other, it might also suggest 
something of an historical hangover, from the days when the internal market was the sole goal 
of the EEC and free movement its essential tool, in the Court’s perception of the 
contemporary constitutional framework. Thus, while the Court has often been at the forefront 
of pushing the boundaries of EU law and broadening the Union’s constitutional remit, 
strangely, as yet, this has not been accompanied by the simultaneous adaptation of its own 
conceptual architecture.   
 
                                                          
19
 A. O’Neill, EUtopia Law, http://eutopialaw.com/2014/12/18/opinion-213-on-eu-accession-to-the-echr-the-
cjeu-as-humpty-dumpty/, last accessed 16/01/15 
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